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Abstract 
Increasingly, governments communicate strategically with the public for political 
advantage, seeking as Christopher Hood describes it to “avoid blame” and “claim credit” 
for the actions and decisions of governance. In particular, Strategic Political 
Communication (SPC) is becoming the dominant form of political communication between 
Canada’s executive branch of government and the public, both during elections and as 
part of a “permanent campaign” to gain and maintain public support as means to political 
power. This dissertation argues that SPC techniques interfere with the public’s ability to 
know how they are governed, and therefore undermines the central right of citizens in a 
democracy to legitimate elected representation by scrutinizing government and holding it 
to account. Realization of that right depends on an authentic political communication 
process that provides citizens with an understanding of government. By seeking to hide 
or downplay blameworthy actions, SPC undermines the legitimation role public discourse 
plays in a democracy. The central questions that shaped this dissertation are first, why 
citizens in a democracy have a right to understand government and second, what role 
does communication play in realizing that right? The arguments rely on national and 
international rights jurisprudence; communication rights theory, in particular concerning 
communicative action (Habermas); authentic deliberation (Dryzek); arguments for and 
against critical citizenship (Tully, Norris and Schumpeter); and political studies, including 
deliberative democracy and legitimization of government (Dewey). Methodologies include 
multi-disciplinary literature reviews; primary records obtained through the Access to 
Information Act (ATIA); media monitoring; database analysis and process tracking through 
elite interviews with scholars, government actors and political journalists. Chapter two 
considers rights history, philosophy, and jurisprudence in arguing that access to authentic 
information is both a right and is essential to the informed, reasonable public deliberations 
(Young) central to democratic legitimation (Dunn). Chapter three considers SPC, including 
the positivity bias of partisan SPC actors, and the countering “negativity bias” (Hood) of 
political journalists. Chapters four and five examine SPC practices of politically-appointed 
partisan staff in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) of Stephen Harper. Chapter six 
concerns secrecy, and resistance to Canada’s ATIA. The conclusion makes 
recommendations for greater transparency and accountability. 
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Authentic Communication and Democracy 
1.1. Introduction 
Anyone who has spent years working on a PhD dissertation will have been asked 
hundreds of times, with varying degrees of interest, what it is about? You quickly realize 
that what most people are seeking is the short answer. So you learn to boil it down. The 
short answer, and the thesis of this dissertation is: In a democracy people have the right 
to know how they are governed in order to manage and control those who represent them, 
and to thereby influence the decisions their representatives make in government. The 
publics’ right to know in a democracy is an established argument that has been made by 
both political and communication scholars. This dissertation argues further that in order to 
know, the public must have access to meaningful information about the governing 
process, including the decision-making process. This is described as authentic 
communication, which is derived from Jürgen Habermas’ “communicative action” for the 
purpose of “reaching understanding” (1984: p. 285-286). It is also derived from John 
Dryzek’s definition of “authentic deliberation” as the “the essence of democratic 
legitimacy,” which depends on “the ability of all individuals subject to a collective decision 
to engage in authentic deliberation about that decision. These individuals should accept 
the decision only if it could be justified to them in convincing terms” (2000: p. v). Authentic 
communication stands in contrast to what Habermas describes as “strategic actions” or 
communications intended to advantage the messenger or “agent” (p. 286), such as the 
governing party, through the use of persuasive tactics that may even distort understanding 
of the actions and decisions of government. Simply put, I am arguing that access to 
authentic communication that allows understanding of the actions and decisions of 
government is a right because it is essential to facilitate the public deliberations about 
governance required to legitimate and control government. Strategic political 
communication (SPC), which here denotes a range of communication techniques intended 
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to promote and protect political advantage, most often for partisan gains, is increasingly 
the norm in developed democracies such as Canada’s federal government. Where SPC 
seeks partisan political advantage over promoting public understanding of governance, it 
undermines public legitimation processes and thereby undermines democracy itself. This 
dissertation has been inspired, in part, by James Tully’s call for public philosophy as “a 
critical activity” undertaken to improve understanding of contemporary political issues for 
both scholars and citizens, as a means to “clarify and transform the normal understanding 
of them so as to open up the field of possible ways of thinking and acting freely in 
response” (Tully 2008: p. 37). My thesis argues that because the public has a right to know 
how it is governed in a democracy, it has a right to authentic political communication that 
allows understanding of governance and elected representation. That is the short answer. 
The longer version unfolds over the next several hundred pages. 
It is important to note that this thesis is focused on issues of transparency, 
accountability and access to authentic information as a matter of routine government 
communication practices. It therefore is not concerned with non-routine means of 
obtaining government information such as leaks and whistleblowing, which are beyond 
the scope of this dissertation. That said, this in no way is meant to dismiss the importance 
and courage of public servants who have put their own careers and even freedom at risk 
by providing the public with secret information that they believed the public had a right to 
know. This dissertation makes an argument for the release of government information 
when it is in the publics’ interest to do so. Public interest is admittedly a broad term which 
may apply to large or small communities of individuals who are subject to governance. It 
therefore applies to a pluralistic community of individuals whose lives – interests – are 
affected by government actions, decisions and legislations. Determining whether or not 
something is in the public interest takes into consideration what Aristotle first described 
politically as governance that considers the “common good.” By that Aristotle did not mean 
the interests that people happen to share, but that which is “good for their community” 
(Cunningham: p. 7).1 It is the principle of the common good, which is most often described 
in modern terminology as “the public interest,”   
It is an argument for the expansion of legal access rights through greater and 
routine transparency. This is not an argument for total or random transparency. Rather, it 
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envisions a systematic and routine political communication that determines whether 
information is held in secret or made transparent by the same criteria: Does it serve the 
publics’ interest? There will always be a limited number of cases where secrecy better 
serves the publics’ interest than transparency. However, as Chapter 6 demonstrates, 
secrecy is currently the default mode of the government in Canada. I am arguing that 
secrecy, like transparency, needs to be qualified as serving the publics’ interest. As is 
further discussed, secrecy by this measure would also require a significant measure of 
transparency in terms of justifying secrecy policy as it applies to specific government 
actions and decisions (Thompson, 1999). This would obviously include informing the 
public about the existence of programs of mass surveillance, and also require that 
government justify such activities on the basis of whether or not it served the publics’ 
interest, and how. Secrecy, in that sense, would become transparent. However, that is 
currently not the case. It is therefore important to acknowledge the debt of gratitude 
democratic societies owe to the courage and integrity of whistleblowers such as Edward 
Snowden who set aside his own freedom and security in order to alert the citizens around 
the world to government infringements on their privacy rights through the application of 
massive government and private surveillance capabilities. Whistleblowing is made 
necessary when, and because, transparency and information- access processes have 
failed to serve the publics’ interest and instead impede the publics’ right to understand 
how government operates on its behalf. My argument is for the establishment of 
comprehensive and systematic government transparency and information-access 
practices that would require governments to notify citizens of the scope and types of 
surveillance it pursues, while at the same protecting information when it is clearly in the 
publics’ interest to keep it secret. A transparent and authentic communication regime 
would ideally limit, if not eliminate, the need for whistleblowing and leaking of government 
records on behalf of the publics’ interests. It is my sincere hope that governments’ 
acceptance and facilitation of greater government transparency and public access to 
authentic information will reduce the need for private individuals to jeopardize their own 
rights and freedoms, in order to protect the rights and freedoms of others. 
The argument begins in Chapter 2 by first establishing why the public has a right 
to know how it is governed in a democracy, by defining what is meant by authentic political 
communication and by an examination of the role communication plays in the democratic 
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process. Influential in this argument is John Dewey’s The Public and Its Problems, written 
in 1927 and appended in 1946 in the aftermath of the Second World War. Dewey is 
important for a number of reasons, first of all because he firmly situates the public at the 
centre of the democratic process, and also because he recognizes the need for 
communication “tools” that allow the public to serve that mandate. “That government exists 
to serve its community, and that this purpose cannot be achieved unless the community 
itself shares in selecting its governors and determining their policies are a deposit of fact” 
(p. 146). Dewey is also important, although not alone, in recognizing that democracies 
everywhere have largely failed to respect the central premise that authority in a democracy 
lies with the public, by providing the public with the information necessary to knowingly 
select representatives, or determine policies. Dewey was hopeful that this might change:  
We have every reason to think that whatever changes may 
take place in existing democratic machinery, they will be of 
a sort to make the interest of the public a more supreme 
guide and criterion of governmental activity, and to enable 
the public to form and manifest its purposes still more 
authoritatively. In this sense the cure for the ailments of 
democracy is more democracy (Dewey, 1991/1946: p. 146). 
However, as this thesis argues, developed democracies in countries like Canada still have 
a long way to go towards achieving this end.  
Chapters 3 through 6 are an examination of the ways in which the publics’ 
understandings of governance are undermined through the employment of sophisticated 
strategic political communication tactics which distort rather than explain governance 
realities for the benefit of the governing party. Chapter 3 is an examination of SPC theory, 
from political marketing to propaganda. Chapters 4 and 5 are a combined case study of 
selective SPC tactics employed by the Conservative government of Stephen Harper. The 
examination is selective because the uses of SPC are so vast and so ingrained in the 
processes of governance at every level, that it is simply impossible to document in detail 
in this or any other thesis or study. The dissertation therefore concerns selected SPC 
tactics exercised under the control and command of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), 
and focuses on major campaigns to illustrate the systematic nature of SPC tactics as the 
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primary means of communication with the Canadian public. The case study spans almost 
a decade from the election of Conservative minority governments on January 23, 2006 
and October 14, 2008; and through its election as a majority government on May 2, 2011 
until its defeat on October 19, 2015. The new Liberal government of Justin Trudeau was 
elected, in part, on a promise of greater openness and transparency of government. 
Whether or not that plays out as promised is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Chapter 
6 is an examination of existing public access to information in Canada under the 1983 
Access to Information Act (ATIA). The federal disclosure law allows citizens to request 
government records that would otherwise remain secret, but which are qualified to be 
made public under ATIA. It is important to note, as this chapter makes clear, that many of 
the records held by the government are not qualified for release, which in some cases 
serves the public interest, and in other cases, as successive Information commissioners 
and disclosure scholars have argued, is cause for re-examination and reform of 
exemptions and exclusions contained in the Act.  
Chapter 7 considers what many may see as a downside of transparency which is 
that when it results in the discovery of wrongdoing or abuses of power, it serves to 
undermine public trust. However, the argument here is that trust, in particular blind trust, 
is not the gold standard for democracy, and while a degree of trust is essential for 
government and society to function, mistrust is also a legitimate outcome of scrutiny of 
government. In fact, mistrust which is the result of active citizenship may signal and secure 
a healthy democratic process in which government is rightfully held to account for its 
actions and decisions.  
The concluding Chapter 8 turns to practical considerations with regard to 
strengthening the publics’ ability to understand how it is governed, by strengthening 
mechanisms of government that instrumentalize public information access rights. This is 
by no means exhaustive or complete as that will, hopefully, be the work of public 
deliberation, task forces, government committees and policy decisions for decades to 
come, if not forever. Democracy is after all a work in progress. Rather, I have presented 
some possible entry points for discussion which have already been tabled by various 
experts and special interests, including several Information commissioners and other 
scholars. My project has been to help turn up the volume on that conversation. It is a 
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conversation that matters because if democracy means anything, it is that we, the public, 
have a right to know how we are governed, and to exercise that right we must also have 
a right to information that allows us to understand how that process is unfolding.  
1.2. Literature Review 
As with any project that unfolds over a period of years, there are too many 
influences and sources to list. However, some sources are more influential than others 
and are deserving of recognition outside of the direct citations contained in the work. I 
therefore wish to acknowledge some of the key influences on this work. Already cited is 
John Dewey, whom I see as a turning point in democratic and political communication 
theories because he turns the focus onto the need to inform ordinary people – the public. 
His influence resonates throughout the entire dissertation, but is acknowledged directly 
here and in Chapter 2 which considers the publics’ right to know, and the information 
required to implement that right. Chapter 2 argues that access to authentic political 
communication is a right in a democracy. This argument includes a review of literature in 
the areas of political science, communication and public administration theories and 
approaches as they relate to the role and right of citizens as a check and balance on the 
powers delegated to their elected representatives in a democracy. The starting point is an 
argument that communication rights are human rights, and that communication rights are 
necessary to protect and promote all other basic human rights, from the right to the 
essentials to sustain and protect human life, to political, legal and constitutional rights. 
Here I rely on human rights scholar and former Liberal Party leader Michael Ignatieff, 
whom I interviewed in addition to citing his works.  
Chapter 2 also relies on political science canon concerning the role of deliberation 
in a democratic state, again as a means to check and balance the disproportionate powers 
afforded elected representatives over the larger public. John Dunn’s 2005 work 
Democracy: A History concerning legitimation rights of citizens was important to this 
perspective. In terms of defining information as authentic or strategic, Jürgen Habermas’ 
plays a central role with his theory of communicative action (1979:p.22 and 1984:p.2863), 
versus “strategic” or “instrumental” communication (1984:p.285). John Dryzek’s (2000) 
arguments for information that allows “authentic deliberation” among citizens is also at 
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play in the definitions adopted here. Deliberative and discursive democracy scholars, 
including Dryzek, David Marquand (2004), and James Tully (2008), among others, were 
important influences in the development of this communication rights thesis. My interest 
in their works is largely focused on their interpretations and arguments for the right of 
citizens to be part of the democratic process, including the freedom and ability to 
communicate with one another openly and with purpose. Other key scholars include: Jean 
Jacques Rousseau (1968/1762), Harold Laski (1938), Amy Gutmann and Dennis 
Thompson (1996, 2004). Critics are also important to any area of research, and most 
notable among those who argue against the publics’ right to know is Joseph Schumpeter 
(2008/1950), who sees no ongoing role for the public beyond voting.  
Chapter 3 focuses on strategic political communication (SPC) which is intended to 
advantage the messenger over the receiver in terms of understanding. Of key importance 
to an examination of the purposes and goals of SPC is Christopher Hood’s The Blame 
Game: Spin, Bureaucracy and Self-Preservation in Government (2011), which considers 
SPC, or government “spin”, as he describes it as focused on avoiding blame and seeking 
credit for political gain. The chapter also relies on literature from the emerging field of 
political marketing, including Margaret Scammell (1999 and 2003)4; Jonathan Rose 
(2000)5; Stuart Ewen (1996)6; Phillippe Maarek (2011)7; Nicholas O’Shaughnessy (2002)8; 
and Bruce Newman (1999); Gary Rawnsley (2005), and Bob Franklin (1994). I have also 
cited literature from the established field of propaganda and persuasion studies by 
scholars such as Murray Edelman (1988)9, Jacques Ellul (1973)10, and Theodore Adorno 
(2004)11, and by public relations founder and practitioner Edward Bernays (1947)12. 
Bernays in particular was a proponent of “manufacturing consent” by the public. 
Chapters 4 and 5 are case studies of communication practices in the PMO and it 
is in these chapters where most of the interviews I conducted are found. Some 
interviewees have been quoted at some length and others less so, however, all have been 
influential in my understanding of how communication practices of government operate at 
the level of the Executive Branch in Canada. The interviews I conducted included a former 
Clerk of the Privy Council who worked with three prime ministers; several former PMO 
communications staff; former Stephen Harper campaign manager and mentor Tom 
Flanagan; then-Parliamentary Budgets Officer Kevin Page and several veteran reporters 
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who work on Parliament Hill. The 15 individuals interviewed for this thesis in May and early 
June 2011, and in August 2014 are listed in the Sources Index. The contributions and 
further details of those who were interviewed is explained in more depth below.  
Chapter 4 relies both on journalism accounts and on political studies scholars, 
many of whom recognize the increasingly central role played by SPC tactics in 
governance. Building on Donald Savoie’s thesis on the centralization of government 
powers in the hands of the prime minister in Canada, Paul Thomas (2011) points to the 
centralization and centrality of communication in the Prime Minister’s Office as a key 
mechanism of political power. He points to new realities of the “permanent campaign” as 
shaping the processes of governance, including policy decisions. “A communications 
perspective needs to become a central component for the scholarly analysis of the 
governing process,” writes Thomas (p. 2). In order to understand and interpret 
governance, especially concerning the executive branch in Canada, and in similar 
Westminster model governments such as Britain, it is essential for communication 
scholars to become familiar with the political studies perspectives of senior and seminal 
Canadian scholars including Peter Russell (2009) whom I also interviewed in 2011. Other 
Canadian political studies scholars who have played important roles in the development 
of this dissertation include  Ignatieff’s scholarly works on human rights (2000 and 2001), 
Herman Bakvis (2001), Peter Aucoin (2012), Nicholas d’Ombrain (2004, 2009), all of 
whom are experts in the structures and hierarchies of government institutions, the laws 
and traditions which guide those institutions, and the roles, responsibilities, rights and 
privileges of political and non-political actors in government. Chapter 5 considers the 
PMO’s political staff and their increasing role within government, and on their relationship 
with news media who remain the primary target of their SPC tactics. Lianne Benoit’s 
(2006) study of ministerial staff, was particularly helpful concerning exempt staff. Perhaps 
most important for Chapters 4 and 5 is the extensive work on Canadian governance by 
former bureaucrat and public administration scholar Donald Savoie (1999, 2004, 2008 and 
2010), whose work offers key insight into the inner power structures of the federal 
government, and in particular of the executive branch.  
Chapter 6 is an examination of the Canadian government’s attempts to evade 
public scrutiny and legitimation of representation through the use of excessive secrecy, 
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and through political interference in the processes of transparency, with a focus on the 
introduction, implementation and ongoing government resistance to the 1983 Access to 
Information Act (ATIA). It contains two key interviews conducted with the current 
Information Commissioner, Suzanne Legault, and former Information Commissioner John 
Reid. Their recommendations for reform of the Act are also included in the conclusion in 
Chapter 8. The chapter also relies on an emerging body of literature on secrecy, 
transparency, disclosure laws and access rights that includes a number of articles and a 
2006 book on international disclosure law by Alasdair Roberts who is the leading scholar 
in disclosure law. Other key scholars include David Heald (2006), Christopher Hood 
(2010), Donald Rowat [as cited by Roberts], K.G. Robertson (1982 and 1999) and Ann 
Rogers (1997). 
Chapter 7 also challenges the trust paradigm as an indicator of the health or lack 
of health of a democratic state (Nye, Neustadt, and Zelikow). In fact, active and critical 
citizenship (Tully, Norris) implies a degree of public distrust in representation which 
necessitates active public scrutiny and deliberation about government, as opposed to the 
passive trust between elections proposed by political scholars such as Schumpeter. A 
recognition that representation poses risks to the publics’ interests requires the active 
public oversight of that risk to manage and mitigate any harms which might result. Passive 
trust not only fails to address that need, it fails to protect the public interest in managing 
representative risks. Mistrust is one end of the sliding trust scale, rather than a failure to 
meet the standard trust measurement. There can be no fixed trust standard to serve as a 
measure of the health of democracy. As further discussed in  
Chapter 7, we invest considerable trust in the institutions of government which is 
demonstrated by sending our children to public schools, driving on public roads and 
respecting the rule of law. That is why and how society functions. However, trust is not a 
contract and the terms of trust are always subject to renegotiation. Mistrust is also part of 
that renegotiation. A government which decides to discriminate against a particular religion 
and rules that its practitioners are not entitled to equality of rights as a result would 
justifiably earn public distrust. Trust or distrust are by this measure the earned outcomes 
of scrutiny and accountability by active citizens who have assessed the risks posed by 
such representation. Chapter 7 considers how transparency may undermine public trust 
when abuses of power and wrongdoing on the part of government is revealed as a result. 
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It also argues that while a level of trust is essential for the functioning of government and 
society in general, mistrust is also a legitimate outcome when it is the result of active 
citizens seeking to scrutinize government and hold it to account. This chapter relies on an 
existing body of literature which moves the role of citizens beyond trust towards greater 
participation and engagement in the democratic processes of legitimation. Therefore, 
many of the references already cited in other chapters, including Roberts and Thomas, 
play important roles in making this argument. In addition, the chapter relies on key works 
by Ben Worthy (2010)13; Gary Orren (1997)14; Joseph Nye (1997) and Philip Zelikow 
(1997); Richard Neustadt (1997); and Dennis Rousseau, Sim Sitkin, Ronald Burt and Colin 
Camerer (1998).   
1.3. Non-Academic Sources 
Journalists have played a significant role in the development of this thesis. For one 
thing, access to authentic information is central and essential to the practice of good 
journalism, which means to practise journalism in the public interest rather than in the 
service of personal or other special interests. The Canadian Association of Journalists 
Ethical Guidelines states: 
We serve democracy and the public interest by reporting the 
truth. This sometimes conflicts with various public and 
private interests, including those of sources, governments, 
advertisers and, on occasion, with our duty and obligation to 
an employer (2011). 15 
The Ottawa press gallery has unquestionably suffered a significant loss of access to 
government sources and authentic government information under the tight management 
of Stephen Harper’s communication controls. I am grateful to Canadian Press reporter 
Jennifer Ditchburn for the insight her 2014 Master of Journalism thesis for the Carleton 
University School of Journalism and Communication provides concerning the reality on 
the ground of working in this environment. Government restrictions on information have 
met with resistance from reporters, as shown by her as yet unpublished thesis titled 
Journalistic Pathfinding: How the Parliamentary Press Gallery Adapted to News 
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Management under the Conservative Government of Stephen Harper. I refer to her work 
in more detail in Chapter 5. In fact, a great deal of agency has been demonstrated by a 
number of reporters in dealing with well-documented PMO attempts to control news media 
and its access to authentic information. I have therefore conducted several interviews with 
national political reporters and columnists who work in Ottawa and deal with government 
political communications actors and practices on a daily basis. They provide a journalism 
insiders’ perspective on dealing with government political communication practices in 
Ottawa. In addition to insights provided to me through these interviews, I am also grateful 
for the work of the many journalists who cover Parliament and on a daily basis strive 
against great, and stacked odds to bring a measure of transparency to governments 
which, were it not for the working media, would be much more effective in spinning political 
communication to their own advantage. It is through their work that I have been able to 
track political practices and events of relevance to my research on political communication 
in the federal government. Since the devil is in the details, I am deeply indebted to the 
work of journalists who cover federal politics on a daily basis, and in particular to journalist 
Lawrence Martin (2011); and to scholar-turned-partisan-player Tom Flanagan (2009), both 
of whom have produced books that provide invaluable insider insight on the Harper PMO.  
1.4. Methodology 
This study relies on a variety of methods and interdisciplinary approaches to 
consider the role and impact of strategic political communication (SPC). It includes two 
chapters which constitute a case study of political communication practices in the office of 
Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper. Since the PMO is outside of the Access to 
Information Act, and operates behind a veil of secrecy, I have had to rely on a variety of 
external sources for insight, including requesting records from the Privy Council Office 
(PCO) which is covered by the ATIA, and also other government databases such as the 
Government Electronic Directory Service (GEDS). 
1.4.1. Primary Records 
Research methods include the collection of primary federal government 
documents through targeted Access to Information (ATI) requests to the Privy Council 
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Office (PCO) and the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS). The purpose of these requests is 
to obtain primary records that provide insight into internal and specific government 
communication practices, hierarchies and actors. Records obtained under ATI form the 
basis of several case studies of internal political communication practices and policies that 
are directed and approved by the executive branch, including the Prime Minister’s Office 
(PMO) and the President’s Office (PO) at TBS, which oversees the operation and 
administration of Canada’s Access to Information Act (ATIA). In several cases I followed 
up on ATI requests by requesting records indicating who had handled the requests and in 
what capacities. I have also subscribed to the PMO website and collected all PMO 
communications sent to subscribers over the past 12 months.  
1.4.2. Media monitoring 
News media reports of government political communications and public access to 
information issues were closely-monitored from the election of the Conservative Party in 
January, 2006 to the time of writing. Hundreds of related articles, including news stories 
and opinion pieces, were collected from mainstream newspapers and broadcasters, and 
from non-partisan political publications such as iPolitics.ca and The Hill Times newspaper. 
I have cited journalistic news reports and opinions where relevant, including as they relate 
to the case studies examined in this thesis.   
1.4.3. Quantification data 
It is extremely difficult to quantify staffing in the PMO as staff is politically-appointed 
and accountable only to the executive branch. Unlike bureaucrats whose salary rates are 
reported, along with the number of civil servants employed in a department, the salaries 
and even the number of political staff hired are not reported by government. Neither are 
there resumes available for political staff from government sources. Therefore, a variety 
of non-traditional methods were applied to help quantify the number of politically-
appointed “exempt staff” – non-bureaucrats – employed by the PMO. I first attempted to 
obtain the names and positions of PMO political staff by filing an ATI request for their 
resumes through the Privy Council Office (PCO) which serves as the administrative arm 
of the PMO. But no CVs or any other officially-sanctioned information was provided. While 
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the PCO publishes an organizational flow chart that includes the names of senior 
bureaucratic staff, the PMO does not. The names of current exempt staff and their job 
titles were therefore obtained by downloading the data from the Government Electronic 
Directory (GED), which lists names, positions, organizations and contact information for 
all government employees and elected members. However, the GED does not specify 
whether the employee is a public servant, nor who is a member of the “exempt” political 
staff. Therefore, where possible, the “exempt” status of PMO employees was verified by 
matching the names obtained from the GED database with the exempt staff named on the 
PCO’s proactive disclosure website titled: Travel and Hospitality Expenses Reports, 
Ministers and Exempt Staff, Office of the Prime Minister (2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012).  
The limitation of this database is that a staff member must file an expense claim in 
order to appear. While it would appear that most exempt staff did file expense claims, not 
all did so and the database is therefore incomplete in terms of registering all exempt staff. 
At least one key staff member, former Chief of Staff William Stairs, is missing from the list 
of PMO staff making claims since January, 2006 when the Conservative Party was 
elected. It seems that it is also unusual for PMO summer interns, listed in the GED as 
“student,” to file for expenses. However, further investigations show that students are 
exempt staff and therefore could be counted. The quantification of PMO staff using these 
methods of data collection was repeated on four occasions: the first on January 1, 2009; 
the second on September 2, 2010 and the third on June 14, 2011, and fourth on July 6, 
2012. The results were combined on Excel worksheets in order to sort the data and 
eliminate duplication of names. Further verification of employee status was attempted by 
searching for the named individuals on Google to find references in various credible media 
sources, such as CBC.ca, the Globe and Mail newspaper and the Hill Times newspaper. 
In addition, in lieu of official resumes for the staff listed in the PMO in 2012, I have searched 
online databases such as Google, LinkedIn, Twitter and Facebook to build profiles of the 
majority of the staff. While these are not official biographies, in combination they paint a 
picture of the type of qualifications required for an appointment to the PMO. One key and 
clear common characteristic is that most, if not all, of the staff have prior political affiliations 
with the Conservative Party.  
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1.4.4. Process tracking and data collection through elite interviews 
Given the confidential mandate and nature of the PMO, its staff and staffing levels, 
it was not possible to rely solely on traditional methods of data collection and process 
tracking. Further, requests for interviews with the prime minister and with selected exempt 
staff (key positions such as chief of staff, head of issues management, the head of 
communications) currently employed by the PMO were refused. Therefore, it was 
necessary to rely on interviews with willing actors who were no longer employed by the 
PMO, but who had previously played key roles in the Harper administration, or as political 
staff for a previous prime minister.  
The selection of interviewees relied on what Oisin Tansey (2007: pg. 770)16 
describes as “positional” and “reputational” criterion: “the extent to which they are deemed 
influential in a particular political arena by their own peers,” and in this case also the 
reputations ascribed to them by informed political media. Selection therefore relied on both 
an understanding of elite positions within the executive branch and PMO – for example 
the central communications role of the Clerk of the Privy Council as the liaison between 
the public service (PCO), and elected officials and political actors in the PMO, and in 
cabinet. By contrast, the relative importance and powers of exempt staff is most likely to 
emerge from a careful reading of informed political media who often track and report on 
the power relationships and roles of exempt political staff, particularly in the PMO. The 
purpose of conducting research prior to selecting a subject is therefore aimed at targeting 
the most informed and useful actors, and therefore is the reverse of random sampling, as 
Tansey points out.  
When researchers use process tracing, the key issue to 
consider when drawing the sample are to ensure that the 
most important and influential actors are included, and that 
testimony concerning the key process is collected from the 
central players involved. In such circumstances, random 
sampling would be a hindrance rather than a help, as the 
most important actors of interest may be excluded by 
chance. Instead, the principal goal is to reduce randomness 
as much as possible, which in turn request that researchers 
 15 
establish the identities of the most important actors and 
approach them directly for interviews (p.769).  
Therefore, while I have attempted to conduct interviews with a range of elite 
political and communication actors, it was never my intention, nor was it within the realm 
of possibilities to canvas all, or even a representative sample of actors from which to 
generalize or predict future political communication outcomes. Rather, it was my intention 
to examine the Conservative Party PMO of Stephen Harper as a case study which 
demonstrates the consequences of the current lack of transparency and accountability 
guidelines as detrimental to the public right to know the business of government. The case 
study shows how the lack of clear accountability requirements by the executive branch 
can, and in this case does, result in information manipulation, control and censorship for 
partisan purposes.  
The nature and culture of this secret government office, in which all currently 
employed actors are sworn to confidentiality (see Chapter 5), also eliminated any 
possibility of random sampling for predictive generalizations. Instead, I am relying on 
interviews with informed, elite and inside actors who understand and can therefore 
illuminate and explain otherwise hidden communications hierarchies, organizations, 
mechanism, values, goals and beliefs in the PMO and executive branch. Tansey argues 
that elite interviews are “highly relevant for process tracing approaches to case study 
research. Particularly in political science, process tracing frequently involved the analysis 
of political developments at the highest level of government, and elite actors will often be 
critical sources of information about the political processes of interest” (p. 766). The goal 
of process tracking elite interviews is therefore not, as Tansey points out, to obtain a 
“representative sample in order to use interviews to make generalizations.” Rather, the 
purpose of elite interviews is to gain insight into “processes of interest [involving] very 
specific episodes of decision-making at the elite level, where a limited set of actors are 
involved in deliberations, decision, and actions regarding a particular political outcome” 
(p.769).   
Finally, as Tansey also points out, one advantage of interviews, as opposed to 
sampling surveys, is that they allow for open-ended questions and answers, and for follow-
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up questions from the interviewer. In order to further facilitate a free flow of questions and 
answers, all interviews were taped, and were to be used on the agreement that they would 
be on the record, provided that the intended portion of the interview to be used in the 
thesis was submitted for approval. The interviews were therefore transcribed exactly from 
the taped version, and the exact quotes that I wished to cite were later emailed to the 
interviewee for attribution approval, which without exception was granted. No substantial 
changes were requested or made as a result. Not all of the information provided in the 
course of these interviews was cited in direct quotes. But whether cited directly or not, the 
background information provided was useful in providing context and insight, and 
inevitably served to inform this work.  
1.5. Ethics Approval: 
This project was ruled exempt from ethics approvals by Dr. Hal Weinberg, Director 
of Research Ethics. In a letter dated February 25, 2009 he wrote:  
This is to confirm waiving of the ethics approval for 
Application #39639. Dr. Catherine Murray confirms that the 
policy falls under Policy R20.01, Section 1.7 and therefore 
is not required to undergo ethics review. (Weinberg 2009) 
In an email sent January 31, 2008, Dr. Weinberg stated that this thesis was exempt 
for interviews that fit the criterion outlined in the following sections of the policy Ethics 
Review of Research concerning Human Subjects: 
1.  ‘Public Policy’ is defined as follows: Research protocols 
that require contact with human participants in the study, 
whose regular occupational duties involve communicating 
with the public on behalf of their organizations (such as 
public relations officers, official spokespeople, diplomatic 
officials, freedom of information officers, archivists, etc. or 
the Chief Executive of an organization), do not require ethics 
review, to the degree that answering questions posed by the 
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public are within the ordinary occupational duties of the 
subject.  
2.  Researchers whose inquiries are referred to other 
members of an organization by a public relations officer, 
official spokesperson, etc. for the organization are not 
required to submit their projects for ethics review, to the 
degree that their inquiries are in keeping with the initial 
protocol and the substance of the interviews are attributable. 
As per the P.R.E. (Panel on Research Ethics) 
recommendation, interviews with elected officials are 
exempt from ethics review to the degree that such 
interviews are part of their ordinary obligations to 
communicate with the public. The same exemptions apply 
to declared candidates for public office. 
The interpretation of ‘public domain’ includes all information 
that is subject to FOI (Freedom of Information) provincial, 
federal and SFU policy, whether or not the information has 
been exposed to the public. 
A copy of Dr. Weinberg’s February 25, 2009 letter of exemption is 
available through the SFU library.   
1.6. Conclusion 
The journey undertaken through this project has brought me back to my starting 
point as a student of communication studies. The right of citizens to know the business of 
government has long been a central interest of my research, both as a journalist and as a 
student of communication rights. The right to information about government also raises 
questions about the need for that information to be authentic. The risk that poses for 
parties in power is that negative information about government can and often does 
threaten a government’s hold on power. So there is incentive, from a partisan perspective, 
to ensure that information about government helps rather than hinders the party in power 
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to stay in power – hence the growing and increasingly central importance of strategic 
political communication in government. Message control, as it is known, is a key plank in 
the political machinery of turning authority, the right to represent, into a means of 
sustaining power – the ability to impose and operationalize ideas and ideologies. As 
Chapter 3 demonstrates, strategic political communication is therefore focused on 
controlling information, rather than its authenticity.  
My purpose was summed up by rights scholar and former Liberal Party Leader 
Michael Ignatieff during an interview conducted in Toronto in May, 2011. “The thing is, as 
I understand it, you want to provide a principled rationale for a citizen’s right to 
information.” That is the salient point of the exercise captured in a single sentence. My 
purpose is to make the case that citizens have a right to expect and receive access to 
adequate authentic political communication that allows understanding about how they are 
represented and governed.  
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Authentic Political Communication and the Right to 
Know  
2.1. Introduction 
On May 24, 2011, I interviewed human rights scholar Michael Ignatieff who had 
just stepped down as leader of the Liberal Party following his party’s then very recent and 
decisive defeat in the May 2 federal election17. At the time of our interview, Ignatieff was 
in the process of moving into a sparse-looking office at the University of Toronto’s Massey 
College where he had accepted a one-year appointment as a Senior Fellow. Prior to 
entering politics in 2005, Ignatieff had been a Harvard professor and an author of a number 
of books on human rights. He had also delivered a lecture at Massey College titled The 
Rights Revolution that was published in 2000, and focused on the civil rights movement 
in Canada and the United States following the Second World War, and resulted in 
increased recognition and legalisation of rights for marginalized groups including women, 
racial minorities and gay individuals. My interest in interviewing Ignatieff was two-fold: his 
scholarly interest in rights, and also because of his recent political experience which 
provided him with unique insight into rights praxis from a political perspective. I explained 
my thesis argued that in a democracy the public has a right to know how it is governed in 
order to control and legitimate government. Secondly, that because the public has a right 
to know how it is governed, by extension it also has a right to authentic information about 
government that allows that understanding. Further, if we accept that government is 
accountable to the citizens who elect it to power, it is obligated to facilitate that 
accountability by making itself sufficiently transparent to facilitate processes of 
legitimation. Ignatieff agreed that “office holders” have an “accountability obligation…to 
communicate truthfully to those who put the person in a position of power”. However, while 
agreeing that the public deserved to know how they were governed, his own experience 
in political office made Ignatieff pessimistic about actually achieving greater accountability, 
at least in the Canadian federal government. He doubted that a governing party, even it if 
it agreed with the principle of transparency as most parties claim, would willingly expose 
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themselves to greater transparency which might lead to politically-damaging criticism from 
political opponents and the public:  
Arguments of principle are very weak against arguments of 
interest. And the arguments of interest are: it is in the 
manifest interests of any political leader, regardless of party, 
to control information and to manipulate it to the max…as it 
plays out politically, what plays out is ‘let’s meet our 
obligations in as minimal a way as we can’ – not because 
we are hiding something. Not because there is some big 
secret, but because competitively why should we do more 
of a striptease than the other party (Ignatieff, Interview, May 
24, 2011).  
As this dissertation shows, all governing parties resist greater transparency, particularly in 
Canada where the executive branch operates behind a carefully-constructed wall of 
secrecy. As scholar Donald Savoie has established in numerous works, power is 
increasingly concentrated in the hands of the prime minister. Among the powers accrued 
to the PM and his political staff is almost complete control of what government information 
will be made public, or will remain secret. The single exception is the Access to Information 
Act (ATIA) which allows individuals to request government records be released in 
accordance with the provisions and restrictions of the 1983, disclosure law. However, as 
Chapter 6 shows, ATIA has been under attack by the executive branches of the federal 
government since it was introduced, and is now considered among the least effective 
disclosure acts in any advanced democracy. In addition, Parliament and other institutions 
of government lack the mandate, especially when a majority government controls the vote 
in Parliament, to challenge PMO information control, as Ignatieff pointed out. “Our 
institutions are extremely weak,” said Ignatieff. “Your thesis is absolutely at the centre of 
the democratic dilemma that our country faces.”   
The Conservative government of Stephen Harper was defeated in the federal 
election on October 19, 2015 and was replaced by the Liberal Party. Between 2011 and 
the election, the extent of PMO information control for political advantage has become not 
only more evident, but more extreme, as the following chapters will show. During the 2015 
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federal election campaign, neither the Conservatives nor the NDP offered to lessen the 
PMO grip on government information control and flow. Only Liberal leader Justin Trudeau, 
now Canada’s Prime Minister, promised during the election campaign to reform the 
centralization of power and control in the PMO, a trend which he admitted began when his 
own father, Pierre Elliot Trudeau served as Liberal PM of Canada. In a wide-ranging 
interview with CBC News anchor Peter Mansbridge on September 8, 2015, Trudeau said 
if elected a Liberal government would make the PMO more transparent. The following is 
the Liberal leader’s promise during that interview to make his government more 
transparent and accountable to the public:  
 Well, one of the things that we've seen throughout the past 
decades in government is the trend towards more control 
from the Prime Minister's Office. Actually, it can be traced 
as far back as my father, who kicked it off in the first place. 
Uh, and I think we've reached the endpoint on that...and I 
think I actually quite like the symmetry of me being the one 
who'd end that. My father had a particular way of doing 
things; I have a different way, and his was suited to his time 
and mine is suited to my time. I believe that we need to trust 
Canadians. I believe that it's not just about restoring 
Canadians' trust in government by demonstrating trust 
towards them, I think we get better public policy when we're 
done, when it's done openly and transparently. I think part 
of the problem, what we're seeing in the kind of government 
and plan that Mr. Harper has put forward, is he's 
disconnected from the reality that people are facing every 
day, and from the scrutiny that actually would lead to a better 
level of decision making (Mansbridge, September 8, 2015). 
While there is no question that democratic governments everywhere increasingly rely on 
information control as a means to manage public opinion and support, the argument for 
greater transparency is not dead. This chapter argues that in a democracy government 
has an obligation to facilitate the publics’ right to know through greater transparency and 
access to information that allows public understanding of government. Failure to meet that 
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obligation is, as Ignatieff said, an “issue which is at the centre of the democratic dilemma” 
in this and any other democratic country.  
2.2. Defining rights 
An argument must begin by defining its terms of reference. Two themes in 
particular require clarification: transparency and rights. Therefore, before making the 
argument for greater transparency as a right in a democracy, I would like to clarify what I 
mean by those two key terms. I will begin by considering the meaning of rights. In his 2000 
Massey lecture, Ignatieff described rights as more than legalistic phrases and rules. Rights 
also express and protect the deeply-held values fundamental to democracy, of justice and 
fairness grounded in a fundamental principle of equality for all citizens, he argued.  
Rights…represent our attempt to give legal meaning to the 
values we care most about – dignity, equality, and respect 
…Rights are not just instruments of the law, they are 
expression or our moral identity as a people…When we see 
justice done…we feel a deep emotion rise within us. That 
emotion is the longing to live in a fair world. Rights may be 
precise, legalistic, and dry, but they are the chief means by 
which human beings express this longing (Ignatieff, 2000: 
p.2). 
Ignatieff points out that rights are granted to individuals, and also to groups of individuals 
as has been the case in developed democracies such as Canada where, for example, 
aboriginal rights and the rights of French speaking minorities are enshrined in the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  
The “rights revolution” described by Ignatieff has taken place – albeit primarily in 
developed and Western democracies – as a result of growing demands by marginalized 
groups whose actions prompted understanding and acceptance of the essential justice in 
extending equality to include all. The marginalized individuals who fought for and won 
equality rights include women, religious and ethnic minorities, and more recently, lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, trans and queer (LGBTQ) people. The diversity of individuals represented 
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means rights must not only serve the will of the majority, but also serve to protect 
individuals and minority groups from the majority. The risk of democracy, as Alexis de 
Tocqueville famously warned in 1831, is “tyranny of the majority.” Rights help guard 
against a tyranny which imposes majority views that harm an individual or minority of 
individuals. The “essential challenge” of the rights revolution has been to protect 
“vulnerable” individuals and minorities against such tyranny, argues Ignatieff.  
Rights enacted into law by democratically elected 
representatives express that will of the people. But there are 
also rights whose purpose is to protect people from that will, 
to set limits on what majorities can do. Human rights and 
constitutionally guaranteed rights are supposed to have a 
special immunity from restriction by the majority…So the 
rights revolution has a double aspect: it has been about both 
enhancing our right to be equal and protecting our right to 
be different (p.2). 
At the core of rights talk, is an understanding that the entitlements rights convey are both 
legal and moral – the just and fair thing to do – precisely because they are always based 
in an organizing principle of an equality of citizens. Rights therefore guarantee, or should 
guarantee, that even if the majority view is at odds with that of the individual or group, 
equality rights stand as what Ignatieff describes as a “bulwark for the freedom of the 
vulnerable” (p.2) and protect against the imposition of majority will or rule.  
It is important to stress, as does Ignatieff and other rights scholars, that rights are 
always contentious. Those who have existing rights, are often reluctant to extend those 
rights to others. “The rights revolution is a history of struggle,” writes Ignatieff (p.4). The 
struggle for moral and legal rights, at least in Western civilizations, has been ongoing for 
almost 1,000 years, and found it first legal expression in the British Magna Carta of 1215, 
which first established the principle of an equality in terms of the equal application of the 
rule of law for citizens and rulers alike. This principle is foundational to all other human, 
civil and political rights, and as I am arguing here, also lays the foundation for 
communication rights in a democracy. Therefore for the purposes of this dissertation I am 
also incorporating David Beetham’s definition of rights which considers human rights in 
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the context of rights in a democracy. Beetham begins from the perspective of human rights 
“which seek to guarantee to individuals the minimum necessary for pursuing a distinctively 
human life…such rights have always been defined as universal in their scope and subject 
to international definition and regulation” (Beetham 2008/1999: p.89-90). This is the 
standard definition of human rights which is widely accepted by scholars, advocates and 
international institutions such as the United Nations, which we will return to in this chapter. 
Beetham’s definition is of particular relevance here because he expands and refines the 
definition of human rights in the context of democracy, which is the form of government 
considered in this dissertation. He begins by noting that “the core idea of democracy is 
that of popular rule or popular control over collective decision-making” (p.90). Its defining 
principles are that all citizens are entitled to a say in public affairs, both through the 
associations of civil society and through participation in government, and that this 
entitlement should be available on terms of equality for all.” Political equality is therefore 
a citizenship right in a democracy. “Control by citizens over their collective affairs and 
equality between citizens in the exercise of that control are the basis democratic principles” 
(p.91). Equality of rights therefore serves as a central mechanism of democracy by 
allowing citizens to “control” governance, at least over time, by holding it to account and 
removing it from office should they so decide. Citizens may exercise this right in a number 
of ways including direct participation in decision-making by running for political office, or 
indirectly by voting, through deliberations with other equal citizens, through protest, and 
by any other legal means of holding “government to account” (p.91). These political rights 
are dependent on communication rights, which include freedom of thought and freedom 
of speech and assembly, all of which are necessary to facilitate deliberation, dissent and 
other forms of direct and indirect control of government. 
At the heart of democracy thus lies the right of all citizens to 
a voice in public affairs and to exercise control over 
government, on terms of equality with other citizens. For this 
right to be effective requires, on the one hand, the kind of 
political institution – elections, parties, legislatures etc. – 
with which we are familiar from the experience of the 
established democracies. On the other hand, it requires the 
guarantee of those human rights which we call civil and 
political, and which are inscribed in such conventions as the 
 25 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights…Both 
are needed to realise the basic principle of democracy 
(Beetham: p.92) 
The key provision of the United Nations International Covenant referred to by Beetham is 
Article 1 which states: “All people have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right 
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development” (United Nations December 19, 1966).” While it is possible, although 
as yet not demonstrated on any significant scale, that other forms of government might 
allow for equality of rights among citizens, it is certain that democracy does not fulfil its 
mandate unless it recognizes and protects equality of rights for all citizens. It is equality of 
rights which allows citizens to hold government to account, to challenge government 
actions and decisions, to deliberate freely with other citizens, and to exercise their equal 
right to vote as a means to change or remove representation.  
In his 2001 book titled Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, Ignatieff notes that 
the fundamental purpose of human rights is to protect individuals from any infringement 
by other individuals, a group or the state. Rights reside with the individual, not with a group 
or public. However, individual rights may serve to protect a particular group or public, and 
group rights also help to protect the rights of individuals as in the case of a religious right 
to wear a turban or niqab. “For this reason group rights are needed to protect individual 
rights,” writes Ignatieff (2001: p.67). However, that does not change the basic purpose of 
rights, which is to protect individuals, meaning that group rights do not trump individual 
rights: 
The ultimate purpose and justification of group rights is not 
the protection of the group as such but the protection of the 
individuals who compose it. Group rights to language, for 
example, must not be used to prevent an individual from 
learning a language besides the language of the group. 
Group rights to practice religion should not cancel the right 
of individuals to leave a religious community if they choose 
(2001: p.67).  
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This aspect of human rights protecting the individual is also important for communication 
rights, including the right to obtain meaningful information about governance. It supports 
an argument for the individual right of each citizen to obtain information about governance, 
and thereby challenges any assumption that limiting information to experts or scholars, for 
example, satisfies that communication right. If rights are individual rights which apply 
equally to all individuals, then no one individual is more, or less, equal. Satisfying the rights 
of one individual while excluding another individual from the same rights does not satisfy 
the criterion of equal individual rights. Therefore, if a right to know about governance 
exists, and I am arguing that it does, then it exists for each and every individual and is not 
extinguished because certain privileged individuals are given privileged access to the 
information that informs knowing. One caveat, which will be discussed further, is 
information might be shared with an elected representative on behalf of the individuals 
they represent, to share with those individuals, provided the information is qualified to be 
released to the public. However, if information is only shared with representatives in 
government, then arguably, the equal right of all individuals to know how they are 
governed has not been satisfied. This point has obvious implications and challenges for 
the democratic process as it currently exists in Canada and other Westminster models of 
government. By this definition, communication rights are more closely served in the United 
States where Congress holds public hearings on important issues, and where members 
of all parties are briefed on significant issues such as security. This is in no way to suggest 
that the American model of government is perfect. As further discussed, it is crippled by 
partisan polarizations that increasingly interfere with the most basis functioning of 
government. Nor is the committee system exempt from such partisanship, as the 
Republican-led mammoth and pointless 11-hour interrogation of lead Democratic 
presidential candidate Hilary Clinton over the killings of American embassy staff in 
Benghazi amply demonstrated.18 If anything, the abuse of the committee process by 
Republicans demonstrates the risks posed by elected representation which is bent on 
using the powers of public office to serve its own partisan interests, at the cost of the 
publics’ interests. The abuse of public institutions is always a potential. However, the 
American system allows far more power to counter partisanship because, as 
demonstrated in this case, the same records for discussion were made available to both 
Republicans and Democrats on the committee. It was a level information playing field, and 
allowed both sides to lay out their case, and to challenge one another on the basis of the 
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same evidence, and to do so in a very public setting where the American public could also 
view the evidence and judge for themselves. That said, the separation of powers in the 
American government allows for partisan obstructionism, as seen throughout the second 
term administration of Democratic Party President Barack Obama, with a Republican-
dominated Congress and Senate deliberately and consistently opposing any and all 
measures proposed by the president, purely on the basis of partisan division. The U.S. 
government is often deadlocked as a result. However, in terms of information access, it is 
far more difficult to deny along party lines to committees and panels in the U.S. system 
than in the Canadian federal system of government. This is because the Canadian system 
allows the governing party to control the distribution of information to committees, 
excluding non-governing representatives and even government backbenchers, from 
obtaining crucial information about the decision-making process. I return to this point in 
Chapters 4 and 5. Finally, Ignatieff makes one other point that is important for rounding 
out the definition of rights as it applies here. Rights are always political. “Rights are 
inescapably political because they tacitly imply a conflict between a rights holder and a 
rights ‘withholder,’ some authority against which the rights holder can make justified 
claims.” In this context the resistance of the rights “withholder” is not only irrelevant, it is 
wrong. This is an important point to keep in mind in future chapters which consider the 
extent to which governments have gone, particularly the federal government in Canada, 
to deny communication rights to individuals.  
2.3. Defining government transparency 
Scholars and laypersons alike frequently refer to transparency but often confuse it 
with quantity rather than the quality of information provided. The Internet is often cited as 
a medium of increased transparency which has exponentially increased the volume of 
information available to everyone about almost everything. But transparency of 
government is much more than a multitude of government-controlled websites touting the 
benefits of various government programs and decisions. In fact, as other chapters in this 
dissertation show, increasingly, much of the information made available to citizens by 
government is designed to persuade or even mislead voters, rather than to inform them in 
a way that allows them to become critical citizens with regard to governance practices. 
What I mean by government transparency was perhaps most simply and succinctly 
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defined by British Lord Nolan in 1995 in the first report to the House of Commons of the 
Committee on Standards in Public Life. His definition builds on a central thesis of 
democracy which is that in a democracy those who govern are required to give reasons 
to those they govern. Nolan wrote:  
Holders of public office should be as open as possible about 
all the decisions and actions that they take. They should 
give reasons for their decisions and restrict information only 
when the wider public interest clearly demands (Nolan, 
1995: p.114).19 
As Lord Nolan implies, secrecy is at times necessary and justifiable when it is in the 
publics’ interest to withhold information. However, secrecy is not justified when the 
purpose is to protect and promote the political interests of the governing party by 
preventing public scrutiny and accountability for actions and decisions. Transparency by 
Nolan’s definition, takes the role and right of citizens to be informed about the actions and 
decisions of government as a given. What is also implied by Nolan is that transparency is 
not merely about the quantity of information a governing party is willing to share with its 
electorate. It must provide “reasons” or insight into “all the decisions and actions.” To be 
of value to the process of citizen deliberation central to democracy, information must 
provide understanding about governance. Transparency is therefore not simply concerned 
with the quantity of information a government provides the public. Rather, what is meant 
by transparency, as Nolan states, is providing reasons which facilitate enlightenment or 
understanding about government.  
It is important to point out that while this dissertation argues for greater and more 
meaningful government transparency, it does not argue for absolute transparency. Rather, 
it argues that citizens have a right to know information about governance that is justified 
for release because it is in the publics’ interest to do so. This is known as “qualified” 
information. Secrecy is also justifiable when it serves the publics’ interest. That said, this 
dissertation argues that greater transparency of qualified government information is 
required to provide citizens with the understanding necessary for them to legitimate and 
control government as required in a democracy. To that I would like to add two other 
qualifiers, first that citizens have a right to choose whether or not they wish to become 
 29 
informed about, or to engage in the political process. And secondly, that transparency and 
the right to obtain information that provides understanding of government should not be 
predicated on the volume of usage of that information. On the first point, citizens have a 
right to decide whether or not to engage politically, and if so, to what extent. That is a 
freedom which citizens enjoy. Only Australia requires that everyone vote, but even then 
there is no requirement that people study up prior to voting. In most democratic countries, 
including Canada you are free to choose your level of political engagement, and a high 
percentage of citizens do not even vote.  
In Democracy and Its Critics, (1989) Robert Dahl defines “enlightened 
understanding” as the ability to determine, in advance:   
…experience resulting from that choice and its most 
relevant alternatives. The criterion of enlightened 
understanding, I suggested, could now be interpreted to 
mean that persons who understand their interests in the 
sense just given possess an enlightened understanding of 
their interests (Dahl: p.307).   
By this definition, transparency would provide the information necessary for citizens to 
determine and understand the consequences of political actions and decisions in order to 
judge how personal or public interests will be affected, and in order to engage in informed 
deliberations with fellow citizens about governance. Dahl believes it would be utopian 
thinking to expect that all citizens will engage in full and direct participation. “Such a goal 
exceeds human possibilities” (1989: p.340), he wrote. However, he also argues, it is not 
necessary for democracy that every citizen be informed or engaged in politics for those in 
power to be held to account. “What is required instead is a critical mass of well-informed 
citizens large enough and active enough to anchor the process.” One reason is that even 
if we consider participation or the lack thereof at the most basic level as voting, 
governments change and win and lose power even though a considerable percentage of 
voters opt out of the entire election process. Governments understand that reality which 
is why, as several chapters show, they expend so much time and energy attempting to 
hold and build a supportive “base,” rather than the entirety of the electorate. A key 
communication strategy in achieving that goal, is information control, including secrecy, 
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censorship and strategic communication for purposes of persuasion, none of which have 
enlightened understanding as their primary communication goal, and therefore fails to 
meet the definition of transparency.  
Speaking to the second point, attempting to qualify usage as a justification for or 
against making information available to the public limits the publics’ right to know, and 
therefore limits democracy. Nor is it sufficient to only make information available to 
‘experts’ such as academics who are working in a certain specific area, for example, the 
implications of a certain policy. If information is qualified to be made public – meaning that 
it would be released if requested under a disclosure law for example – then it should be 
made public to all, and the experts may also dip into the information pool. In fact, several 
Canadian governments have already accepted this premise with regard to completed 
ATIA or, in the case of provinces, Freedom of Information requests. For example, 
Newfoundland posts summaries of all completed requests on access to information 
requests. It posts a summary of the records released following an FOI request, and other 
individuals may request and receive the same package of records. The provincial Access 
to Information and Privacy Office website links to the summaries20. This is legitimate first 
because government information is collected on behalf of the public, and therefore is 
public information. However, it may or may not be qualified to be made public depending 
on whether it is covered by the many exemptions and exclusions for release. For example, 
private data is held by public institutions but is excluded from release to the public and 
must by law be protected as private, even if it is collected for public benefit. With that 
caveat in mind, once it is determined that the information is qualified for release under 
ATIA and the request is completed, it is public information that has now been made public. 
While ATIA is a means to qualify information for release, it does not affect the public status 
of the information, which also applies to all other information that is deemed qualified for 
release – including the sort of data and information provided to individual researchers such 
as academics. I use ATIA as an example of how information might be qualified, or not, for 
release. As I will discuss further in Chapter 6 and the conclusion, disclosure laws might 
even provide a framework for determining whether information that is not requested, is 
none the less qualified for release and should be made public on a proactive basis rather 
than merely by request.  
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Further, knowing is an equal right of all citizens in a democracy, not merely the 
privilege of a few. Dahl addresses this point in thinking through enlightened understanding: 
“Each citizen ought to have adequate and equal opportunities for discovering and 
validating (within the time permitted by the need for a decision) the choice on the matter 
to be decided that would best serve the citizen’s interests” (Dahl: p.112). Dahl is referring 
to real-time decisions. However, as ATIA request have shown, citizens may also want to 
consider decisions and actions after the fact, including from an historical perspective. So 
time is not always a consideration, particularly because as Dahl, Dunn and others note, 
modern democracies are representative and as a result citizens delegate decision-making 
powers to their representatives and are not involved in real-time decision-making process. 
However, the fact is that decisions are reviewed by citizens as part of a legitimation 
process that is central to democracy. And for that they require access to information that 
provides understanding about the decisions made by their representatives. As Dahl points 
out, citizens are in the best position to gauge what is in their own best interests and are 
equally entitled to the information that allows them to do so: 
The criterion implies, then, that alternative procedures for 
making decisions ought to be evaluated according to the 
opportunities they furnish citizens for acquiring an 
understanding of means and end, of one’s interests and the 
expected consequence of policies for interests, not only for 
oneself but for all other relevant persons as well. Insofar as 
citizen’s good or interests requires attention to a public good 
or general interest, then citizens ought to have the 
opportunity to acquire an understanding of these matters. 
Ambiguous as the criterion may be, it provides guidance for 
determining the shape that institutions should take. Thus the 
criterion makes it hard to justify procedures that would cut 
off or suppress information which, were it available, might 
well cause citizens to arrive at a different decision, or that 
would give some citizens much easier access than others to 
information of crucial importance; or that would present 
citizens with an agenda of decisions that had to be decided 
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without discussion, though time was available; and so on 
(Dahl: p.112).  
Dahl notes that most democracies fall far short in achieving this transparency goal. “A 
great many political systems – perhaps most – operate according to the worse not the 
better procedures” (Ibid).  
While transparency and disclosure laws, ideally at least, increase pathways for the 
public to obtain government information, there has been little discussion about what sort 
of information is required to provide understanding about government. Therefore, while 
this chapter is an argument for the public’s right to know how it is governed, it is also 
concerned with facilitating routine public access to what is defined as “authentic” 
information that provides understanding about government. I use the term access not in 
the narrow sense of disclosure laws that allow citizens to make requests to government 
for the release of qualified government records. Rather, I use the term more broadly to 
include all government records, including those requested by citizens under disclosure 
laws, and all other forms of political communication in which government informs citizens 
about its decisions, actions and policies. Not all government records are qualified for 
release, as explained earlier and in Chapter 6. But enough information should be provided 
on a routine basis that citizens understand governance and the actions and decisions of 
elected representatives. That includes access to qualified information about decision-
making, policies, implementation and operations, and about the actions and behaviours of 
those who hold the power of political office. Exactly which categories of qualified records 
should be routinely available is beyond the scope of this project, but should rely first on 
the exemptions and exclusions of a revised ATIA, and then seek examples from other 
countries which have more advanced transparency regimes than Canada (See Chapter 
6). What is argued here is that it is simply not sufficient to merely invoke rhetoric about 
citizens’ right to hold government to account, as so many scholars, politicians and even 
judges have done. In order to make rhetoric reality, steps must be taken to provide the 
public with access to authentic information that provides understanding of governance and 
its consequences of governance. Therefore, this dissertation argues that citizens in a 
democracy have a right to know how they are governed through routine access to 
authentic information that provides understanding of the decisions and policies of 
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government. Later chapters will also consider strategic political communication practices 
increasingly employed by governments to persuade voters and popular support, rather 
than provide citizens with the understanding necessary for meaningful political 
deliberation. 
2.4. The right to know as authentic information that facilitates 
understanding   
What is missing from statute and from most of the communication literature is a 
recognition that in order to know, citizens require access to meaningful or insightful 
information that would allow them to know how they are governed. I do not mean by this 
that they only require better access or disclosure laws, which as Chapter 5 shows, while 
an important supplement, are limited in their effectiveness for a number of reasons 
including that they fail to provide predictable or systematic access to information. Clearly 
the ability to deliberate effectively about governance depends on an ability to understand 
that governance. Knowledge of governance is central to all other communication rights. 
Meaningful deliberation is impossible without understanding. However, current legal 
statutes in Canada falls far short of ensuring political communication rights that would 
ensure citizens are able to obtain the information they require in order to understand 
governance actions and decisions. This leaves a significant information deficit for citizens, 
which in turn constitutes a deficit for democracy. In his forward to a book called The Right 
to Know: Transparency for an Open World (Florini 2007) Joseph E. Stiglitz explains that 
the publics’ right to know is essential to democracy. “Democracies have hailed the right of 
free speech and a free press. But a free press with little or no information about what 
government is doing cannot provide an effective check on government.” Editor Ann Florini, 
a public policy scholar, argues in the same book that what the public is allowed to know 
determines whether they are empowered to act as a check on the power of government, 
or not. “The cliché is not quite right: information by itself is not power. But it is an essential 
first step in the exercise of political and economic power. Opening up flows of information 
changes who can do what. That is why there are few more important struggles in the world 
today than the battle over who gets to know what” (2007: p.1). The public’s right to know 
and thereby understand how it is governed is fundamental to facilitating all other political 
and communication rights of citizens in a democracy. 
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Transparency facilitates what John Dryzek (2000) describes as “authentic political 
deliberation.” Dryzek argues the negative dialectic to explain what this means in terms of 
the sort of information required for such political communications to occur between 
citizens. He argues that deliberation, and therefore democracy itself, is undermined when 
the purpose of government communication is to persuade or mislead citizens for political 
gain. Such communication tactics tip the power balance from political equality, to one 
weighted unfairly in favour of those who govern, Dryzek argues. It does so by shifting 
control of the exercise of power from citizens to the governors who control the information: 
By authenticity I mean the degree to which democratic 
control is engaged through communication that encourages 
reflection upon preferences without coercion...this condition 
is met to the degree that domination via the exercise of 
power, manipulation, indoctrination, propaganda, 
deception, expressions of mere self-interest, threats and the 
imposition of ideological conformity are all absent. These 
distorting agents will diminish to the extent of equality in 
deliberative competence across political actors.  (Dryzek 
2000: p.8)21 
While he is arguing against government propaganda and manipulation of the 
communication process, he is at the same time arguing for undistorted political 
communication. Legitimate democratic control of government by citizens depends on the 
authenticity of the information provided to citizens. Authentic political communication, 
particularly between government and citizens, informs understanding of government and 
therefore allows for informed and rational deliberations concerning the legitimacy of 
governance. Distorted or misleading political communication therefore undermines 
democracy. It denies citizens the ability to become informed, a democratic ideal as old as 
democracy.  
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2.5. Authentic deliberation through access to authentic information and 
understanding  
Before turning to further arguments about the role of active citizens in a democracy, 
I would like to flesh out the definition of authentic communication, and to clarify how and 
why it differs from strategic political communication. For that clarification, I would like to 
consider Jürgen Habermas’ “theory of communicative action” from The Theory of 
Communicative Action: Reason and Rationalization of Society (1984). Habermas writes 
that language has a purpose, which is to create understanding. Communicative action is 
language that “serves mutual understanding, whereas actors, in coming to an 
understanding with one another so as to coordinate their actions, pursue their particular 
aims” (1984: p.101).22 In fact it is society’s need to “coordinate action” that creates a 
“certain need for communication, which must be met if it is possible to co-ordinate actions 
effectively for the purpose of satisfying needs,” he writes (p.274). Habermas argues that 
communicative action is only possible where the information provided by the sender allows 
understanding by the receiver. Communicative action is therefore a process by which 
individuals are concerned with reaching understanding, and “are not primarily oriented to 
their own individual successes” (1984: 286).  
Dakroury explains Habermas’ “four basic validity claims” which are required to 
enable the “rational communicative discourse” necessary to “understanding” in any 
communication process. Dakroury cites the “universal validity claims” outlined by 
Habermas’ in Communication and the evolution of society. In order to meet Habermas’ 
criterion or validity claims, the messenger must be:  
a) Uttering something understandably. 
b.) Giving [the hearer] something to understand;  
c.) Making himself thereby understandable; and  
d.) Coming to an understanding with another person 
(Habermas1979:2 as cited by Aliaa Dakroury 2009: 
p.126).23 
Dakroury notes that in establishing a criterion for understanding Habermas is defining “the 
basic characteristics for an ‘undistorted communication’ where the message-sender has 
specific ‘obligations’ toward the message receiver” (2009: p.126). Dakroury argues that 
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this gives the messenger an obligation to speak or communicate “comprehensibly and 
responsibly [means] giving the receiver a plausible account of what he or she means” 
(Ibid). 
Meeting the criterion of creating understanding means that the person has been 
provided with the ability to argue or dispute the claims, and may even correct them if they 
are erroneous. Communicative Action translator Thomas McCarthy writes in his forward 
to his book that: “Because validity claims can be criticized there is a possibility of 
identifying and correcting mistakes, that is, of learning from them,” (McCarthy (trans.) 
Habermas 1984: p.xi). Communicative action offers another advantage for democracy 
because it increases the potential for political equality between the governors and the 
governed. By providing citizens with understanding, it allows them the capacity to argue 
on an equal footing with those who govern. McCarthy writes:  
In the model of communicate action, social actors are 
themselves outfitted with the same interpretive capacities as 
social scientific interpreters; thus the latter cannot claim for 
themselves the status of neutral, extramundane observers 
in the definitions of actors’ situation (McCarthy (trans.) 
Habermas 1984: p. xvi).  
Communicative action thereby sets the foundation for authentic political deliberations in a 
democracy because it provides citizens with the understanding of government necessary 
to engage in debates and discussions with one another, and to call government to account. 
Habermas contrasts communicative action, which he also describes as an “orientation to 
reaching understanding,” with “an orientation to success” (p.286). The latter approach is 
also described as “purposive rational action” or “strategic” action intended to “influence 
the decisions of a rational opponent” (p.285). By focusing on influence or persuasion as 
its end, strategic communication does not require that the person to whom the 
communication is directed be presented with sufficient facts or information to reach their 
own conclusion. If the end is pre-determined as achieving agreement with the intended 
conclusion, then it is not necessary that the individual or groups to whom the 
communication is directed be provided with the means to make their own determinations. 
In fact, communicative action that provides authentic understanding might even prove 
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counterproductive as it allows for critical analysis and authentic deliberation which might 
result in a challenge or even rejection of the preferred position. Strategic communication 
seeks to circumvent reason and instead take a shortcut to agreement with the intended 
goal or end of the communicator.  
Habermas argues that “strategic” or “instrumental” actions are motivated by the self-
interests of actors who manipulate the communication process as a means to his or her 
own pre-determined end. (p.285). The intention is to impede or direct the “rational choice” 
by using the communication process to influence their decisions in a direction that gives 
advantage to the person initiating and controlling the information provided. Habermas 
describes this process as “purposive-rational action” in which “the actor is primarily 
oriented to attaining an end (which has been rendered sufficiently precise in terms of 
purposes), that he selects means that seems to him appropriate in the given 
situations...Success is defined as the appearance in the world of a desired state, which 
can, in a given situation, be causally produced through goal-oriented action or omission” 
(Habermas: p.285). Purpose-rational action includes political propaganda and other forms 
of strategic political communication that deliberately mislead citizens, especially as a 
means to provide advantage to those who govern. These extreme forms of strategic 
political communication seek to circumvent the individual citizen’s right and ability to 
reason for themselves about government. Such strategic forms of communication deny 
citizens understanding and therefore deny them the ability to engage in authentic 
deliberations about governance. Strategic political communication for partisan advantage 
impedes the publics’ right to legitimate and control representation in a democracy. 
Chapters 3 and 4 are a deeper examination of theories and praxis of strategic political 
communication in representative democracies, including Canada’s federal government. 
For our purposes, it is simply necessary to understand the difference between strategic 
communication and communicative action for authentic deliberation, which I refer to as 
authentic communication or understanding. While Dryzek does not directly define the type 
of information required for citizens to engage in “authentic political deliberation,” he does 
so indirectly, as argued earlier, by requiring that communication must be free of 
“manipulation, indoctrination, propaganda, deception” that inhibits authentic deliberation 
and therefore inhibits democracy. Therefore, producing vast quantities of propaganda 
clearly does not make a government transparent, instead it fails to provide the public with 
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legitimate justification or reasons. Neither does the production of political marketing 
materials such as self-promotional advertising and pseudo “news releases” attempting to 
win public support for the party in power. These are “strategic” or instrumental actions” 
(1984: p.85) which are intended to manage and control citizens’ opinions and 
understanding of government, rather than allowing citizens to manage and control 
government based on authentic understanding.  
Iris Marion Young argues further that to be deemed democratic, communication 
must be inclusive of the demos. This means that the criterion for communicative legitimacy 
cannot be restricted to the formal and insular discourse of academics; nor limited to 
rational, as opposed to emotional discourse. The political conversations of ordinary people 
are equally legitimate, as are political protests and other acts of opposition to the status 
quo, she argues (Young: 55). Neither should political communication be prioritized as 
legitimate talk because it “appeals to the common good” because prizing majority rights 
described as the “common good” risks excluding or even harming the rights of minority 
groups and individuals who comprise pluralistic democratic societies (Young, 2000: 50-
51). Young argues that all such approaches are exclusive, rather than inclusive, and 
therefore fail to meet her definition of “communicative democracy:”  
A conception of a discussion-based democracy that 
emphasizes inclusion as a means for enlarging the ability of 
opinions and experiences to be voiced in public should be 
careful not to assume too restrictive a notion of legitimate 
political communication. Because for many the term 
‘deliberation’ carries connotations of the primacy of 
argument, dispassionateness, and order in 
communication…I will…use the term ‘communicative’ 
democracy instead, to denote a more open context of 
political communication (Young: 40). 
As both Young and Dryzek point out, the purpose of authentic political deliberation or 
discursive democracy is not to reach consensus, nor is consensus or even agreement 
required or necessary. Young also defends the right of the public to engage in 
deliberations that lead to disagreement rather than consensus-building. Much more 
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important from the perspective of Young, and other influential deliberation theorists such 
as Carole Pateman (1970) is that the deliberative process be expansive and inclusive of 
as many interests as possible, including those who disagree with one another. In fact, 
disagreement is important as it enables citizens to hear, and hopefully fairly consider, how 
certain decisions affect others who are their political equals in the same or different ways 
from themselves. The endgame is not agreement, but rather “justice” writes Young. “I 
argue that the model of deliberative democracy implies a strong meaning of inclusion and 
political equality which, when implemented, increases the likelihood that democratic 
decision-making processes will promote justice” (2000: p.6). Political deliberation or 
discursiveness is therefore an examination of governance decisions from both the 
perspective of personal impacts, but also from the perspective of others who are also 
engaged in the communication processes. What Young argues for is reasonableness on 
the part of citizens as they engage in discussions with one another with a willingness to 
be challenged and an ability to challenge others with whom they might disagree. 
Reasonable deliberation between citizens in a democracy is about being open to 
consideration of other positions, perhaps even accepting opposition or correction of your 
own opinions. Yet, as Young argues, reasonableness does not guarantee agreement or 
consensus. Rather, reasonableness is essentially predicated on acting in good faith – a 
commitment to deliberate out of a genuine desire to solve “collective problems.” (p. 24).  
While actually reaching consensus is thus not a requirement 
of deliberation reason, participants in discussion must be 
aiming to reach agreement to enter the discussion at all. 
Only if the participants believe that some kind of agreement 
among them is possible in principle can they in good faith 
trust on another to listen and aim to persuade one another. 
Thus reasonable participants in democratic discussion must 
have an open mind….Nor can they assert their own 
interests above all others’ (Young: p. 24) 
Being reasonable in a discussion means being open to listening to others and having them 
influence one’s views, and expressing one’s own claims upon them in ways that aim to 
achieve understanding. However, Young points out that reasonableness is only achieved 
if the actors agree not to “assert their own interests over others.” This is particularly salient 
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to any discussion of strategic political communication for the purpose of advancing the 
interests of a particular party. By Young’s definition, reasonableness is not possible in 
such a scenario. The desire and ability to be reasonable in this sense lies in the practices 
of communicative action themselves, in so far as when people talk, they aim to understand 
one another. Being reasonable facilitates understanding, even if it does not produce 
agreement. The purpose of reasonable, authentic deliberation is to inform citizens about 
a range of views in order that they may legitimate and control government by considering 
its actions and decisions. Deliberative political communication in this sense is at the heart 
of the democratic process whereby members of the public authorize representation on the 
basis that it can and will be held to account, and further, where representation is informed 
by public deliberation, argues Young: 
The representative is authorized to act, but his judgement is 
always in question. Whether he acted on authority is a 
question deferred to a later time, when he will be held 
accountable. The representative acts on his or her own, but 
in anticipation of having to give an account to those he or 
she represents…representation is stronger when it bears 
the traces of the discussion that led to authorization or in 
other ways persuasively justifies itself in public accounting 
(Young: 131).  
Young and Dryzek both reject the classical definition of deliberative democracy as seeking 
“unity” through “dispassionate, reasoned and logical” discussion (Dryzek: p.64), which 
they argue is exclusive rather than inclusive because it seeks a singular or majority 
solution, rather than a hearing of all sides. What matters is that deliberation produces 
understanding of representation and its consequences, which differs from consensus and 
may result in disagreement among affected actors. However, even in cases of 
disagreement, other sides will be heard, and if considered in an open and reasonable 
manner, may result in changes and accommodations both by other citizens and by the 
representation which is held to account. An excellent example of this would be relatively 
recent and controversial public deliberations about gay marriage. Although contentious 
and often fueled by emotion rather than rational thought, the debate has none the less 
resulted in several democratic governments around the world changing laws in order to 
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honour principles of political and legal equality by allowing same sex couples to marry, 
regardless of ongoing opposition among factions of the public, and regardless of the 
representatives’ personal views.  
2.6. Understanding and accountability 
 Obtaining meaningful information about government is essential to legitimating 
government because that process depends on citizens first knowing how they are 
governed. Information which allows understanding is essential to citizens’ right to exercise 
control of government, writes John Dunn. However, increasingly, governments are turning 
to sophisticated strategic communication tactics which exercise control of information as 
a means to control citizens. This upside down formula for governance undermines 
democracy itself by impeding citizens’ ability to legitimation and control government. “The 
more governments control what their fellow citizens know the less they can claim the 
authority of those citizens for how they rule” (p.186). Dunn is arguing, in effect, that access 
to meaningful information is so essential to democracy that government control of 
information for its own partisan or personal purposes is anti-democratic.  
The more governments withhold information from their 
fellow citizens the less accountable they are to those who 
give them their authority. Even to fit its own name, modern 
representative democracy would have to transform itself 
very radically in this respect (Dunn 2005: p.185-186).   
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (2004) argue the need for access to 
meaningful information from another perspective, which is that it is the basis of 
deliberations between citizens which are the primary means of citizen control of 
governance in a democracy. They argue further that government has an obligation to 
“justify” their decisions to the citizens to whom they are accountable. Democracy requires 
not only that leaders provide citizens with reasons for their decisions, but also that they 
respond to responses and reasons provided by citizens, they argue (p.3). The “moral 
basis” for this argument is that citizens are not merely “passive subjects to be ruled, but 
…autonomous agents who take part in the governance of their own society, directly or 
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through their representatives, write Gutmann and Thompson in Why Deliberative 
Democracy? “At the core of deliberative democracy is the idea that citizens and officials 
must justify any demands for collective action by giving reasons that can be accepted by 
those who are bound by the action” (p.178). As did Dunn, Gutmann and Thompson argue 
that democracy relies on the communications rights of citizens to know how they are 
governed, so that they may exercise popular control over how they are governed.  
Similarly, David Beetham argues in Democracy and Human Rights (2008) that the 
right of citizens to know how they are governed is essential to democracy because it 
facilitates other political communication rights such as freedom of speech and a free press 
which are necessary to allow citizens to legitimate and “control” government. Beetham 
(p.5) argues that in modern democracies, citizens’ control of representation and decision-
making is operationalized, not through direct engagement as in ancient Athens, but rather 
by exercising “mediated” control on an ongoing basis through deliberations with one 
another as equal citizens.  
…at the level of a whole society, whose members have 
decided for reason of time and space to entrust decisions to 
elected representatives, democracy is realized to the extent 
that they exercise control, not over the decision-making 
itself, but over the decision-makers who act in their place; 
control is mediated rather than immediate.  (Beetham 2008: 
p.5). 
Public control of government is exercised through protected rights of freedom of speech, 
freedom of association and a free press that allow citizens to deliberate openly about 
government. However, these goals and outcomes are only instrumentalized through public 
knowledge and understanding of the actions and decisions of government and its elected 
representatives. Public understanding relies on the publics’ ability to obtain authentic 
information from government about how it exercises power. 
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2.7. Authentic political communication versus strategic political 
communication 
What the public knows – whether it is accurate or misleading -- forms the basis of private 
and public deliberations, including through a free press and social media, in order to 
influence and/or change government policies, or government itself. Understanding 
depends entirely on the ability of citizens to know how they are governed by obtaining 
authentic information. Only when they are informed – rather than merely persuaded – is it 
possible for citizens to make rational decisions about governance. However, increasingly, 
government communication with citizens is strategic, and intended to persuade rather than 
inform. The use of strategic communication tactics is examined in depth in Chapters 3 and 
4. However, for the purposes of this chapter it is important to note that strategic political 
communication, especially when it becomes the primary form of communication between 
government and its citizens, poses a threat to democratic processes because it fails to 
provide citizens with the means to understand how it is governed. Beetham argues that 
misleading government information undermines fundamental freedoms such as freedom 
of speech. “What is the point of freedom of speech if one is poorly informed?” (2006: p.54). 
Legitimation through understanding of government relies on access to “authentic” political 
communication (Dryzek) or “undistorted communication” (Dakroury 2009: 126) between 
government and its citizens, as the basis of deliberations between citizens engaged in 
legitimation of government. And that brings us back to the question of communication 
rights in a democracy.  
2.8. Stitching together the communication rights argument. 
During our 2011 interview, Ignatieff suggested a strategy for “stitching together” a 
communications rights argument would be to begin with “jurisprudence” which first 
included the right to communicate with other human rights. “You have to look at all the 
jurisprudence, all of the language of free speech rights, all of the debates that go in there. 
Have a sound legal basis for the word ‘right.’ And if that is the case then you are in good 
shape” (Ignatieff, May 24, 2011). He pointed to the 1948 United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights as the starting point in terms of jurisprudence that first 
established communication as a basic human right. It is the gold standard of the 
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communication rights which are foundational to democracy. As several other scholars 
argue, in order to “hold opinions without interference” political communication between 
government and its citizens must be free of coercion and distortions that interfere with the 
knowledge necessary to form reasoned opinions and understanding of government. 
Human rights are intended to secure and protect the basic needs and rights of individuals 
from infringement by other citizens, or by the state. The United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights was written in 1948 in reaction to the atrocities of World War 
II and adopted by most of the world’s nations, including Canada, the United States and 
Great Britain. The Declaration lays the cornerstones of democracy in calling for equality 
of rights for all human beings, and the establishment of rights principles protected by law 
to prevent the rise of “tyranny and oppression.” It opens with a moving preamble and then 
defines human rights to be upheld:  
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal 
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is 
the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world… 
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have 
resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the 
conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which 
human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and 
freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the 
highest aspiration of the common people… 
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the 
Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, 
in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the 
equal rights of men and women and have determined to 
promote social progress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom,  
Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to 
achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the 
promotion of universal respect for and observance of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms...  
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Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity 
and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience 
and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood... 
Article 3. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security 
of person. 
As Ignatieff points out, the UN Declaration was in reaction to the atrocities of the Second 
World War and an attempt to provide individuals with protective human rights that existed 
outside of the nation state, which had proven capable of turning on its own citizens as well 
as those of other states in the case of both the Nazi and Stalinist regimes.  
The human rights instruments created after 1945 were not 
a triumphant expression of European imperial self-
confidence but a war-weary generations’ reflection on 
European nihilism and its consequences. Human rights was 
a response to…the discovery of the abomination that could 
occur…when the Westphalian state was accorded unlimited 
sovereignty, when citizens of that state lacked normative 
grounds to disobey legal but immoral orders...a return 
intended to restore agency, to give individuals the civic 
courage to stand up when the state order them to do 
wrong…Historically speaking, the Universal Declaration is 
part of a wider reordering of the normative order of postwar 
international relations, designed to create fire walls against 
barbarism…Before the Second World War, only states had 
rights in international law. With the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights of 1948, the rights of individuals received 
international legal recognition. For the first time individuals 
– regardless of race, creed, gender, age, or any other status 
– were granted rights that they could use to challenge unjust 
state law or oppressive customary practice. (Ignatieff 2001: 
p.4-5) 
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As history has shown, while the UN Declaration and other international agreements on 
human rights offered a moral grounding for rights, they lack legal enforcement 
mechanisms and could be ignored by state governments. Even the United States which 
was a leading agent in writing the 1948 Declaration continued to practise racial 
segregation of African Americans after signing the declaration. However, the UN 
Declaration offered moral justification and inspiration for the individuals who fought racial 
repression through the American civil rights movement, as well as those who fought for 
equality for women and gays, often by resorting to protest in defiance of the state. Ignatieff 
explains the power of “rights talk” as a moral imperative. “Rights talk…helps us to know 
when deliberation and compromise have become impossible. Hence human rights talk is 
sometimes used to assemble the reasons and constituencies necessary for the use of 
force…when human rights as politics becomes a fighting creed, a call to arms” (2001: 
p.22). 
 Ignatieff pointed to Article 19 as the most significant section in terms of 
establishing communication rights. The Article states: “Everyone has the right to freedom 
of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference 
and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless 
of frontiers.” It is concerned with communication rights, as a means to protect and enhance 
human rights against an oppressive state or government which used propaganda and 
censorship as a means to suppress protest and dissent and to subjugate and control 
populations. Ignatieff is not alone in pointing to the significance of the UN Declaration’s 
Article 19 as the statutory basis for establishing the right to communicate as a human right. 
Canadian communication rights scholar Aliaa Dakroury describes the article as being first 
to acknowledge “the basic human right to information” (Dakroury 2009: p.45). Although 
the focus is on the right to “information,” the article is also the “original concept of the right 
to communicate,” writes Dakroury. It has inspired scholars and communication rights 
advocates around the world and “represents the first stage and basic foundation for the 
evolution of the Right to Communicate,” (Dakroury: p.45.) The 1948 UN Declaration is also 
significant because it links information rights, guaranteed in Article 19 with citizen’s 
democratic rights as described in Article 21, which states: (1) Everyone has the right to 
take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives.” The combination of these rights inspired disclosure law scholars and 
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advocates to push for and achieve Freedom of Information (FOI) laws in countries around 
the world, beginning with the United States in 1966. FOI, including Canada’s 1983 federal 
Access to Information Act (ATIA), give individuals the right to request and receive qualified 
government information, known as records, that would otherwise remain secret and under 
the control of government. By qualified, I mean that the records are qualified for release 
under provisions of the disclosure law, which also contains exemptions and exclusions 
that prevent information from being released. It is therefore both a codification of access 
rights and secrecy practices.  
Article 19 of the UN Declaration is credited for setting up an argument for citizen 
access to government information through disclosure laws or freedom of information laws 
such as Canada’s Access to Information Act. These laws allow individuals to file requests 
for government to information which is qualified for release under the disclosure law. The 
article establishes the right of individuals to “seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” Birkinshaw (2006: p.48-57) argues 
that the declaration opened the way for the establishment of FOI laws. Birkinshaw writes: 
Within the frameworks of internationally agreed concepts of 
human rights, FOI deserves to be listed with those rights. 
Not only is FOI instrumentally important in realizing other 
human rights such as freedom of speech and access to 
justice or other desiderata such as accountability, it is 
intrinsically important: the right to know how government 
operates on our behalf (Birkinshaw 2006: p.47) 
Article 19 is also an important starting point for modern communication rights because it 
exists as part of the single most important document on international human rights of the 
past century. As Chapter 5 argues, disclosure laws allow citizens to challenge government 
control of information, provided that it meets the requirements of the law for release to the 
public. But as the chapter also shows, ATI in Canada and elsewhere falls far short of 
allowing the public routine access to authentic government records. Because access is 
citizen-generated, it is unpredictable, often targeted at specific events and issues. It 
therefore provides little understanding of processes of government, and due to extensive 
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exclusions and exemptions – including in Canada the exclusion of any records held by 
members of the executive branch – provides little insight into the decision-making process.  
FOI and ATI are discussed in depth in Chapter 5. For the purposes of this chapter, 
disclosure law serves, in the words of Christopher Hood as a “subset” of transparency in 
government. Several decades of disclosure law history shows that disclosure laws alone 
do not serve to make government transparent or “open” (Hood, 2006: p.14) particularly, 
as is the case in Canada, when the executive branch of government is resistant to 
disclosure law. However, disclosure law is an important first step in establishing the right 
of citizens to know how they are governed as central to the democratic process. A much 
deeper examination of Canada’s access and secrecy regimes is contained in Chapter 5. 
However, there are a few brief points worth making here in the context of the importance 
of disclosure laws for the future of communication rights. First, disclosure laws are an 
important if limited first step towards implementing the right of citizens to access accurate 
information about government through the application of legal guidelines, rather than 
relying on government as sole arbiter of what information will be made public. The strength 
and weakness of disclosure laws is that information access is triggered by citizens, and 
also it challenges governments’ total control of information, it is random rather than routine 
in its application, and is limited and lacks systematic effectiveness in making government 
transparent to the public. However, as we will see in recommendations made in Chapter 
7, disclosure laws such as the ATIA could serve as a blueprint for determining what types 
of government information should be targeted for regular and routine release – as opposed 
to filing an ATIA request – as a means to better inform citizens about government.  
2.9. Communication rights and democracy  
Dakroury describes the UN Declaration as the first stage of the “Right to 
Communicate” movement, which has inspired all subsequent movements for 
communication rights. The second stage of the movement took its lead from Jean d’Arcy, 
a French broadcaster who wrote an article in 1969 building on Article 19 by arguing that 
information rights should be expanded to become communication rights, which he 
believed was the most fundamental of all human rights. D’Arcy was inspired by French 
philosopher Saint Simeon’s call for “universal solidarity” between human beings through 
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communication (Dakroury: p.24). He was also concerned that corporate and government 
control of communication media posed a threat to communication between individuals. 
Dakroury writes: “His aim was to influence the broadest possible spectrum of the French 
public, especially those less fortunate and uneducated. His desire was to transform the 
means of communications from an ‘elitist’ cultural tool to one for the general public…d’Arcy 
also cautioned about the threat of powers (be they government, private owners, etc.) that 
might try to control the media, which would be in violation of the human right to 
communicate,” (p.26-27). While d’Arcy inspired communication scholars, advocates and 
movements, including the 2003 World Summit on Information Society (WSIS), what is 
most salient for this dissertation is, as Dakroury describes it, his “linking of enhanced rights 
to information with communication rights,” (p.53.) The right to information about 
government for the purpose of communicating – through direct or mediated mediums of 
discourse – is at the heart of this thesis, and of democratic rights. Public information 
access which leads to an informed and engaged citizenry is also at the heart of democratic 
theories of participatory and deliberative democracy. Dakroury argues that despite the 
movements of the past and present century, no formal and specific declaration yet exists 
that specifically addresses the right to communicate as a human right. “The right to 
communicate does not exist, as such, as a provision of international law (Dakroury: p.72).  
2.10. Communication rights and the revolution  
Communication rights such as freedom of speech are protected in a number of national 
constitutions and charters. The right to “communication of ideas and opinions” was 
included in the 1789 French National Assembly’s Declaration of the Rights of Man which 
reads: 
The free communication of ideas and opinions is one of the 
most precious of the rights of man. Every citizen may, 
accordingly, speak, write, and print with freedom, but shall 
be responsible for such abuses of this freedom as shall be 
defined by law (Section 11).  
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The French Declaration was intended to make legal the speech and publishing rights of 
citizens to enable critical discourse, in print and between individuals, about the state and 
other powerful interests, provided it was done within the constraints of the law. This 
intention was echoed in the 1791 American Bill of Rights, which contains a series of 
amendments to the 1776 American Declaration of Independence. The Bill of Rights also 
establishes and protects communication rights, albeit they are not described as such, and 
at the time they only applied to an elite of free, male citizens as was also the case with the 
French Declaration. However, although limited in the scope of application, the Bill of Rights 
guarantees freedom of religion, and freedom of: “speech, and the press; rights of assembly 
and [to] petition…the government for a redress of grievances” (Amendment 1 [1]). The 
amendment thereby legalized the right of citizens to challenge government through the 
use and application of communication rights of freedom of speech, a free press, and 
through the deliberations of citizens in peaceful assemblies and through petitions to 
government. As with the Rights of Man, American citizens were legally entitled to 
challenge the decisions of government through private and public communications with 
fellow citizens, through their media, through peaceful assemblies with like-minded citizens 
in a show of the strength of their opposition, and by petitioning government for change. 
Canada’s own 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms which lists several communication 
rights as “fundamental freedoms.” The Charter states:  
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms… 
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, 
including freedom of the press and other media of 
communication; 
(c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and  
(d) freedom of association (Charter, 1982) 
Communication rights facilitate choice and choice is control even though the power to 
make decisions in government is granted only to those who hold elected office. That 
arrangement depends first on the ability of citizens to deliberate on government and its 
actions and decisions. Communication rights therefore allow citizens to challenge and 
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thereby exercise control or influence over government, which is key to democracy. 
Although not specifically stated as such, these are essentially political communication 
rights which allow citizens to deliberate with one another about government and to make 
those deliberations known by communicating through media. Such communication rights 
give meaning to the right to vote because they provide understanding and choice 
concerning which individual or party to support or reject as their representatives.  
2.11. Understanding and control of government  
The principle of citizens controlling government is a defining feature of democracy. 
“Democracy as a method of government is not whatever the people at a given moment 
may happen to decide, but a set of arrangements for securing their control over the public 
decision- making process on an ongoing basis,” writes Beetham (2008: p.36). He argues 
that “these two principles of popular control over collective decisions and equality in its 
exercise, comprise the core meaning of democracy” (p.6). Virtually all writings on 
democracy from classical political philosophers such as Aristotle, Rousseau and Mill, to 
more modern-day theorists such as Dewey, Pateman, Dahl, Beetham and Dunn take as 
a starting point for democracy that it is a political system in which the public controls 
government. While they differ in terms of implementation and degrees of participation in 
the political process, these political theorists all agree that government can only be 
controlled by citizens if they have the knowledge or enlightenment required to understand 
and thereby judge governments’ actions and decisions. Citizens have a right to control 
government in a democracy precisely because government draws its legitimacy from the 
electorate, writes Dunn in Democracy: A History (2005). Dunn argues that democracy has 
endured as a form of government precisely because it enables the public to hold 
representatives to account, including voting them out of office if they fail to maintain 
popular support or trust.  
What we mean by democracy is not that we govern 
ourselves…what we have in mind is something quite 
different. It is that our own state…draws its legitimacy from 
us, and that we have a reasonable chance of being able to 
compel each of them to continue to do so (2005: p.19).24  
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Democracy is therefore not merely a vision of an ideal society where ”the people rule 
themselves,” (Dahl 1989: p.3), but rather a political system grounded in systems, laws and 
institutions that citizens consent to obey on the condition that they are provided with the 
means necessary to control these same apparatus of governance. What is implied, if not 
usually stated in definitions of democracy, is that the means to exercise controls rests on 
the ability of citizens to know how they are governed. Just who should be informed remains 
perhaps the greatest division between classical perspectives on democracy, and modern 
interpretations of participatory and deliberative democracy. Without meaningful 
transparency of government, the ability of citizens to legitimate government is stymied if 
not disabled. I therefore wish to build on Nolan’s definition of transparency to specify that 
government is transparent when it provides citizens with information that truthfully and 
accurately informs citizens about government actions and decisions in order to facilitate 
critical thought and deliberations between citizens about those actions and decisions.     
2.12. Authentic communication and citizen enlightenment  
Beginning with Aristotle, democracy scholars have argued for the importance of an 
informed and enlightened citizenry. However, it was not until the last century that political 
theorists argued that all members of the public were both capable and entitled to become 
enlightened. Political equality of all citizens is a modern concept, arguably first raised by 
John Dewey in his influential 1927 book, The Public and its Problems. Dewey put the 
public at the centre of the democratic process, not merely as voters, but as the voices of 
social “needs and troubles” necessary to guide government towards serving the publics’ 
interests rather than the interests of the few. He wrote that democracy’s greatest strength 
as a form of government is that even in its most basic level, it involves at least some public 
consultations that serve to inform both citizens and government about governance. A 
government which ignores the public and makes decisions without their input, is “an 
oligarchy managed in the interests of the few,” Dewey warns (p.208).  
The strongest point to be made in behalf of even such 
rudimentary political forms as democracy has already 
attained, popular voting, majority rule and so on, is that to 
some extent they involve a consultation and discussion 
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which uncover social needs and troubles. This fact is the 
great asset on the side of the political ledger…popular 
government is educative as other modes of political 
regulation are not. It forces a recognition that there are 
common interests, even though the recognition of what they 
are is confused; and the need it enforces of discussion and 
publicity brings about some clarification of what they are. 
The man who wears the shoe knows best that it pinches and 
where it pinches, even if the expert shoemaker is the best 
judge of how the trouble is to be remedied (Dewey 1991: 
p.206-207).  
Failure to consider the needs of the public is tantamount to dictatorship, he argues. 
Therefore it is essential that leaders be “enlightened’ through public deliberations about 
the needs of the publics’ they are elected to serve. To achieve this, Dewey argues, 
government decision-makers, whom he describes as “experts” must provide the public 
with “the facts upon which [they] depend.” Dewey is making an argument not only for trust 
in the publics’ ability to “judge” government, but also for the publics’ right to know how, 
through access to “the facts” on which experts relied in making their decisions. Dewey is 
making the case for authentic communication, rather than strategic communication. He is 
also making the case for political equality of citizens.   
Dewey challenges the many scholars and critics who denigrate the abilities and 
reliability of “the masses” to take part in the democratic process beyond choosing their 
leaders and representatives by voting in elections. The problem of the public, Dewey 
argues, is not the publics’ ability to provide rational judgements about government, but 
rather the lack of information provided to the public for a perceived lack of knowledge and 
enlightenment on its part. He criticized the state of political communication in American at 
the time because: “the data for good judgement are lacking; and no innate faculty of mind 
can make up for the absence of facts’ (p.209). Knowledge, according to Dewey, depends 
on facts, not on expertize. It is a revolutionary perspective for the time which challenged 
not only his contemporary political theorists, but scholars across all social disciplines who 
not only held the public in disregard, but feared the masses posed a threat to democracy 
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and civilization itself. Dewey turned the argument on its head, arguing that the problem 
was not with the public, but with ‘the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and 
persuasion. That is the problem of the public. We have asserted that this improvement 
depends essentially on freeing and perfecting the processes of inquiry and of 
dissemination of their conclusions” (p.208). Arguably, it is Dewey’s work that first clearly 
states that not only does the public have a right to be informed about government, but that 
democracy itself depends on that right.  
Dewey therefore disputes the theory that guardianship governance by experts and 
elites, constitutes democracy. He argues that experts and elites do not have a lock on 
intelligence, but rather are more informed than others because they have access to 
information that is denied to non-elites. Dewey writes that it is insight and education that 
determine “actuality of mind” (p.209). Conversely, ignorance is fed through misinformation 
and the distortion of facts through propaganda, or by secrecy which denies access to facts 
and information. 
 Until secrecy, prejudice, bias, misrepresentation, and 
propaganda as well as sheer ignorance are replaced by 
inquiry and publicity, we have no way of telling how apt for 
judgement of social policies the existing intelligence of the 
masses may be. It would certainly go much further than at 
present. In the second place, effective intelligence is not an 
original, innate endowment. No matter what are the 
difference in native intelligence (allowing for the moment 
that intelligence can be native), the actuality of mind is 
dependent upon the education which social conditions 
effect. Just as the specialized mind and knowledge of the 
past is embodied in implements, utensils, devices and 
technologies with those of a grade of intelligence which 
could not produce them can now intelligently use, so it will 
be when currents of public knowledge blow through social 
affairs…Capacities are limited by the objects and tool at 
hand (Dewey: p.209-210) 
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Dewey’s argument for political equality of citizens is revolutionary in its argument that 
experts could and should inform and be informed by “the masses.” He argues that given 
access to authentic information currently available only to the experts and elites inside 
government, members of the public were capable of the informed judgement necessary 
to guide those same experts and insiders.  
2.13. The undeserving masses and guardianship democracy 
To understand just how much of a departure this was from current thinking, you 
need only compare it to Sigmund Freud’s highly influential work The Future of an Illusion, 
which was also written in 1927. No mere fringe academic, Freud had a significant impact 
on the thinking and works of the Frankfurt School of critical theorists Theodore Adorno 
and Max Horkheimer who provided him with office space at Frankfurt University. Freud 
argued that for the sake of civilization, the masses must be controlled by elite and 
enlightened rulers, including through the use of “coercion.”  
For the masses are lazy and unintelligent; they have no love 
for instinctual renunciation, and they are not to be convinced 
by argument of its inevitability; and the individuals 
composing them support one another in giving free rein to 
their indiscipline. It is only through the influence of 
individuals who can set an example and whom masses 
recognize as their leaders that they can be induced to 
perform the work and undergo the renunciations on which 
the existence of civilization depends. All is well if these 
leaders are persons who possess superior insight into the 
necessities of life and who have risen to the height of 
mastering their own instinctual wishes. But there is a danger 
that in order not to lose their influence they may give way to 
the mass more than it gives way to them, and it therefore 
seems necessary that they shall be independent of the 
mass by having means to power at their disposal. To put it 
briefly, there are two widespread human characteristics 
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which are responsible for the fact that the regulations of 
civilization can only be maintained by a certain degree of 
coercion – namely, that men are not spontaneously fond of 
work and that arguments are of no avail against their 
passions (Freud 1964/1927: p.6).  
Freud’s assessment of the masses could hardly be more dismissive and condescending, 
not to mention insulting. That is simply fact. However, why his perspective matters at all is 
that this view was pervasive among scholars of his era, with Dewey as a notable 
exception.  
Freud’s 1922 book Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego builds on the 
work of earlier social theorist Gustave Le Bon’s finding that when individuals joined 
together as part of “the crowd”, that same individual succumbed to unconscious and 
irrational behaviours which threatened to destroy civilization. In fact, Freud acknowledged 
the “social psychology” of Gustave Le Bon’s 1896 work The Crowd: The Study of the 
Popular Mind as inspiring his own analysis of group psychology, which he says reflects 
his own views (Chapter 3, para 1). He cites Le Bon’s analysis of individuals in a group as 
“barbarians….acting by instinct” in a chapter titled “Le Bon’s Description of the Group 
Mind:”  
‘Moreover, by the mere fact that he forms part of an 
organised group, a man descends several rungs in the 
ladder of civilization. Isolated, he may be a cultivated 
individual; in a crowd, he is a barbarian—that is, a creature 
acting by instinct. He possesses the spontaneity, the 
violence, the ferocity, and also the enthusiasm and heroism 
of primitive beings.’ (Le Bon as cited by Freud, 1922: 
Chapter 2, para 19) 
In summing up Le Bon’s social theory of the masses, Freud states: “A group is impulsive, 
changeable and irritable. It is led almost exclusively by the unconscious… A group is 
extraordinarily credulous and open to influence, it has no critical faculty, and the 
improbable does not exist for it” (Chapter 2, para 22). In a later chapter, titled “The Herd 
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Instinct,” Freud explores Wilfred  Trotter’s social psychology in which he describes 
individuals in a group as acting “from herd instincts…which is innate in human beings just 
as in other species of animals” (Chapter IX: para 4). Freud’s only objection to Trotter’s 
suggestion that human beings operate on herd instincts, is that it downplays the 
importance of leadership in influencing group behaviour. Freud believed that all groups 
required leadership, a “herdsman,” in order to survive. He therefore offers a refinement of 
Trotter’s theory. “Let us venture, then, to correct Trotter’s pronouncement that man is a 
herd animal and assert that he is rather a horde animal, an individual creature in a horde 
led by a chief.” Freud’s group consists of members who are “equal to one another, but 
they all want to be ruled by one person. Many equals, who can identify themselves with 
one another, and a single person superior to them all—that is the situation that we find 
realised in groups which are capable of subsisting” (Chapter IX: papa 11). Freud envisions 
a public comprised of equally unconscious individuals who seek and require strong 
leadership to provide direction, and whom they identify with as their ideal. 
Freud would not live to see this play out as the Nazi holocaust and the destruction 
wrought by World War II. However, Frankfurt School critical theorists Max Horkheimer and 
Theodore Adorno would cite his work as visionary in explaining the effectiveness of Nazi 
propaganda on the German public. The two leading communication scholars were greatly 
influenced by the pseudo-science psychology of Freud, in particular as it applied to 
individuals in groups. In an essay titled “Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist 
Propaganda” (1951) Adorno merged Marxian theory with Freudian psychoanalysis of the 
crowd. Adorno credited Freud’s analysis of group psychology with correctly anticipating 
and explaining the effectiveness of fascist Nazi propaganda in the “appropriation of mass 
psychology by the oppressors.” In a reworking of Marxist material determinism as 
explaining the unconsciousness of the proletariat to the exploitation of their labour by 
capitalism, Adorno argues that the masses are rendered vulnerable to manipulation by 
fascist “oppressors” because they are “unconscious” of the exploitation.  
My purpose here is not to argue for or against the merits of Marxist or critical theory, 
but rather to show the differences between Dewey’s hopeful perception of the publics’ 
potential for enlightenment, and the pessimistic, at best, Freudian-influenced perception 
of “the masses” as unconscious, irrational and incapable of understanding when 
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individuals join together as a mass. By this latter view, the public is not a mechanism for 
deliberation and control of authority as many contemporary communication and political 
theorists argue (Pateman, 1970; Young; Tully 2008; Norris 1998), but rather its inevitable 
victim. In explaining the vulnerability of the masses to oppressive leadership such as the 
Nazis, Adorno cites Freud’s “dynamic interpretation of Le Bon’s description of the mass 
mind” (1991/1951: p. 134) as “de-individualized, irrational, easily influenced, prone to 
violent action and altogether of a regressive nature” (p. 135). His own conclusions about 
the psychological vulnerabilities of the masses, are just as devastating:  
It may well be that the secret of fascist propaganda that it 
simply takes men for what they are; the true children of 
today’s standardized mass culture, largely robbed of 
autonomy and spontaneity, instead of setting goals the 
realisation of which would transcend the psychological 
status quo no less than the social one...While there certainly 
exists potential susceptibility for fascism among the masses, 
it is equally certain that the manipulation of the unconscious, 
the kind of suggestion explained by Freud in genetic terms 
is indispensable for actualisation of this potential… 
Psychological dispositions do not actually cause fascism, 
rather, fascism defines a psychological area which can be 
successfully exploited by the forces which promote it for 
entirely non-psychological reasons of self-interest. What 
happens when masses are caught by fascist propaganda is 
not a spontaneous primary expression of instincts and urges 
but a quasi-scientific revitalization of their psychology – the 
artificial regression described by Freud in his discussion of 
organized groups. The psychology of the masses has been 
taken over by their leaders and transformed into a means 
for their domination. (Adorno, 1991/1951: p.150-151).    
Hitler plays the role both of authoritarian and hypnotist in causing individuals to regress to 
a state of unconscious passion when they are part of a group or crowd. “This is where the 
techniques of the demagogue and the hypnotist coincide with the psychological 
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mechanism by which individuals are made to undergo the regressions which reduced them 
to mere members of a group.” (Adorno 1991: p.138). I cite Freud’s influence in he lping to 
shape Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s understanding of the masses only as a means to show 
how deeply Freud’s suspicion of the public penetrated scholarly thought and argument in 
the first half of the 20th century. Translated into democratic theory, this meant that the 
masses were incapable of rationally understanding governance and therefore were 
unqualified to participate in government beyond voting. The rest should be left to experts 
and elected leaders, according to this view.    
2.14. Epistemological standpoint: A view from inside the rabble 
 As a reporter I was taught that I must always declare a conflict of interest in order 
to avoid biasing a story. For journalists this translates into not covering stories that involve 
people you know personally, or not writing stories about stocks that you own and might 
benefit from promoting, at least not without letting the reader know where you stand. I 
therefore feel compelled to declare my bias against outside and often elitist interpretations 
of the working classes, however well meaning. Among the well-meaning I would include 
Marx and Adorno, writers I greatly admire, and perhaps even Joseph Schumpeter. There 
are also many contemporary scholars whose work I otherwise admire, which suffer from 
what I view as an undertow of an assumed intellectual elitism – manifest in a declaration 
of others as less than intellectually equal – that drags the work down because there is an 
underlying assumption of human difference that has no legitimate basis in science, 
psychology, biology or reality. The question of who among us is conscious and therefore 
enlightened about their lived experience is always troubling for me. This is particularly 
troubling when the elitism takes the form of a broadly applied framework, as Marxism, 
which literally classifies some people as conscious and others, the proletariat, as not. 
Marx, whose intentions were good, as they say, is just one example among scholars who 
have judged as lacking the critical thinking capacities of the vast majority of people, who 
are referred to and categorized as the working classes, the proletariat, the masses, the 
crowd, the horde, the herd and the rabble. Some of these terms are derogatory and some 
are not. The problem for me is what they signify in terms of intellectual capabilities, and 
what they imply in terms of equality as citizens in a democracy. The terms share in 
common an agreement by those writing from outside, that the rabble are not like us. They 
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are not equal. Often the argument is that they could be equal, but first they need to be 
enlightened about their own lived experience. The well-meaning, and Marx certainly fits 
here as do many other modern-day scholars, see the possibility of unlocking the mental 
chains that condemn the ordinary, the masses, to a life of exploitation. That exploitation 
may be at the hands of the corporate owners who profit from their labour; or from the 
capitalist propaganda of the entertainment industry, which variously includes everything 
from jazz in Max Horkheimer and Adorno’s “Dialectic of Enlightenment” (1947) to Noam 
Chomsky and Edward Herman’s “Propaganda Model (1988) of mainstream news outlets. 
The argument is that capitalism is capable of duping the masses into a state of compliance 
because, just like Marx’s proletariat, they are unconscious of their exploitation. It is 
essential to acknowledge that the critical theorists see themselves as, if not identifying 
with the masses, at least as acting on their behalf by identifying harmful realities, as would 
the canary in the mineshaft. I get that. Further, there is no question of corporate influence 
in news media and coverage – a topic which is not the subject of this dissertation. What 
troubles me is the classification and stereotyping of the vast majority of ordinary people 
as dupes to the system. Especially so because so many of these same scholars see 
themselves as conscious and immune. For anyone who counts themselves and their 
families, present and ancestral, among the masses, it feels like an elitist perception of a 
world that they simply do not know and will never understand. First of all, the idea of the 
great majority of people sharing a single mind is patent nonsense. So is the implication 
that no rational, independent or intelligent thought exists among the public – a perception 
that would have a profoundly limiting effect, were it not false, on any argument for the 
publics’ right to access information that would allow understanding of governance. Which 
is why it is relevant to challenge this elitist myth in this dissertation. 
It is also fair that I openly declare my personal conflict of interest on the issue of 
the masses. My Welsh parents and grandparents were members of the proletariat and in 
the eyes of many also rabble. I am the first person in my family to go beyond high school. 
My father is the first person in his family to graduate from high school. His father had to 
quit school at nine to support his mother and the younger children in the family when his 
father died. Both of my grandmothers were “in service” at 14 years of age, living in and 
cleaning for people who had money. My other grandfather went down the mine at 14 years 
of age but after a horrific fatal accident which he witnessed, left the mine and set off for 
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the city where he found a job selling pop, a job which he held for the rest of his life. He 
wrote a memoir about his life, including the accident. He knew. He understood. He was 
conscious of his exploitation. He was even a terrific writer. But selling pop was his only 
realistic option for making a living. There was no escaping, however conscious. My mother 
failed to pass a test at age 11 years which determined whether or not she would attend 
high school or become a stenographer at age 15. It was World War II, her parents were in 
the midst of a divorce, her younger sister had just died and she and her mother were 
sharing a room in someone else’s home while my grandmother scraped together a living. 
Her mind was not up to the test. So she went to secretarial school. My father passed his 
“11 plus” exam and went on to high school, often braving the taunts of the other kids who 
did not attend, and thought, probably because of his uniform, that he was abandoning 
them and rising above his rabble status. When my dad finished high school he took up an 
apprenticeship as an electrician. University was not even a consideration. Working class, 
yes. But rabble? Unconscious? Certainly not. At a young age my parents packed up their 
three very young children and immigrated to Canada, hoping that both they and their 
children would find better opportunities. They were fully conscious of the limitations and 
exploitation they endured as working class citizen in Britain. I am the immigrant child of 
working-class parents. I am descended from the ranks of the rabble. So I have a conflict 
of interest which I wish to declare as my epistemological standpoint. It biases my view of 
even well-meaning interpretations of how ordinary people think, or worse an assumption 
that they fail to think about their exploitation as evidenced by their willingness to comply 
by showing up for work every morning, or by watching bad TV, or by voting for Stephen 
Harper. In fact, when it comes to our intellectual lives we are not a class, we are not a 
crowd, we are not a herd or a horde and we are not unconscious. We are individuals. 
Conscious human beings. We know what is happening to us, even if there is little choice 
or opportunity for change. Luck and fate decides if we are born poor, or rich enough to go 
to good schools and spend our lives studying and developing our understanding of bigger 
issues. That said, many among the rabble are voracious readers, or followers of politics, 
or people who found organizations like Greenpeace and change the world. Rabble 
defined, in the mind of Le Bon. Intelligence is random, not class or circumstance based. 
Some of the smartest people I know have little or no education. There are many smart and 
engaged individuals among the rabble. Conscious by any meaningful definition. This 
personal history is relevant here not because it is special or unique, but rather because it 
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is so typical and common. Scratch the surface of any family tree and it more likely that 
rabble will appear than an ancestry of royals and recognized intellects.  
The lesson of not prejudging by class, profession, education or income is a lesson 
I take not only from my own family history, but also from my 20-plus years as a working 
journalist. Every person I have ever interviewed – sex worker, mathematician or politician 
– each was fully conscious of their own condition. The ordinary are often extraordinary, 
but not always. Privilege does not guarantee reason. I am therefore biased against 
frameworks that stereotype and characterize the vast majority of people as a class or a 
field (Bourdieu 2005) of like-minded individuals, especially when that dismisses the 
potential for agency on the part of any, or all individuals in that described group. Sit around 
the dinner table at our house and you will find individuals who argue vehemently about a 
wide range of topics, mostly disagreeing with one another as sport, rather than thinking as 
a herd. Listen to the radio program Cross Country Checkup on CBC on a Sunday 
afternoon as people from all walks of life call in and dazzle with their insight and critical 
thinking on issues of national significance. We are individuals. We have individual minds. 
We think as individuals, rather than as a group. Some individuals make good decisions, 
and some reason their way into voting for Donald Trump. Either way, it is a conscious 
choice. At least, that is my epistemological standpoint. And I am not alone. Dewey warns 
that political equality should not be “denied on the ground that ideas are without potency” 
as is the case if we are to accept that the public thinks and acts as a group or herd. Thought 
is an individual experience, Dewey writes, noting what should be perfectly obvious: 
For ideas belong to human beings who have bodies, and 
there is no separation between the structures and 
processes of the part of the body that entertains the ideas 
and the part that performs acts…Appeal to a gregarious 
instinct to account for social arrangements is the 
outstanding example of the lazy fallacy. Men do not run 
together and join in a larger mass as do drops of quicksilver” 
(Dewey 1927: p.9-10).  
I choose to imagine us as Dewey’s public – comprised of thinking individuals. However, 
that is not a view that has always been held by scholars across a range of social science 
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disciplines, including political science and democratic theory. As a result, some seminal 
scholars have questioned the ability of the public to understand governance or engage in 
and influence the decision-making process.  
2.15. Schumpeter, guardianship democracy and the unconscious masses 
Harvard economist and former Austrian finance minister Joseph Schumpeter in 
1943 is perhaps the leading proponent of restricting the role of the public in governance, 
a theory which he explained in what would become a seminal book on democracy theory 
titled Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Schumpeter is unequivocal in his view of the 
need to limit the role of the great mass of people, whom he describes as “rabble”, citing 
as proof social scientists such as Freud and Le Bon (Schumpeter 1943: p.256-257). Their 
studies of crowd psychology have shown “those features that stand out so glaringly in the 
case of the rabble, in particular a reduced sense of responsibility, a lower level of energy 
of thought and greater sensitiveness to non-logical influences” (p.257). Schumpeter 
expanded the definition of a crowd beyond the physical gatherings of groups of individuals 
diagnosed by Freud to include media and its audiences, a line of thought that at about the 
same time both Adorno and Horkheimer were also exploring. Writes Schumpeter: 
Newspaper readers, radio audiences, members of a party 
even if not physically gathered together are terribly easy to 
work up into a psychological crowd and into a state of frenzy 
in which attempt at rational argument only spurs the animal 
spirits. (Schumpeter 1943: p.257). 
Schumpeter also warns about the effects of advertising on the irrational and therefore 
susceptible masses, who were incapable of distinguishing their needs from the wants 
instilled by the marketers of consumer goods. 
On the one hand they are so amenable to the influence of 
advertising and other methods of persuasion that producers 
often seem to dictate to them instead of being directed by 
them. The technique of successful advertising is particularly 
instructive. There is indeed nearly always some appeal to 
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reason. But mere assertion, often repeated, counts more 
than rational argument and so does the direct attack upon 
the subconscious which takes the form of attempts to evoke 
and crystallize pleasant associations of an entirely extra-
rational, very frequently of a sexual nature (p.257-258). 
The influence of Freudian analysis is clear in Schumpeter’s assessment of advertising 
effects on the public. While he is not alone in drawing such conclusions – as Chapter 3 
shows, Freud’s nephew Edward Bernays had pioneered public relations and advertising 
campaigns based on his uncle’s analysis – he is if not first, then certainly the most 
influential scholar to draw conclusions about what this vulnerability to marketing means 
for the democratic process. Chapter 3 examines the implications of political marketing for 
democracy in some depth, but for the purposes of this chapter I am concerned with how 
conceptions of the masses as irrational and vulnerable to influence has shaped 
democratic theories, in particular how it has shaped thinking about the ability of citizens to 
understand and control government. According to Schumpeter, social scientists such as 
Freud had proved conclusively that individuals in a crowd were unconscious and irrational. 
Now the economist would take that logic one step further, citing what he described as a 
“realist” perspective of democracy, to argue that ordinary people knew no reality beyond 
what they experienced in their own lives, and therefore had no understanding of politics, 
which was foreign to their own reality, and therefore had no ability to be involved in political 
decisions. Schumpeter writes: 
And so it is with most of the decisions of daily life that lie 
within the little field which the individual citizen’s mind 
encompasses with a full sense of its reality. Roughly, it 
consists of things that directly concern himself, his family, 
his business dealings. His hobbies, his friends and enemies, 
his township or ward, his class, church, trade union or any 
other social group of which he is an active member – the 
things under his personal observations, the things which are 
familiar to him independently of what his newspaper tells 
him, which he can directly influence or manage and for 
which he develops the kind of responsibility that is induced 
 65 
by a direct relation to the favorable or unfavorable effect of 
a course of action (p.258-259).  
However, while ordinary people, whom he refers to as “the typical citizen” (p.262), might 
well be familiar with what they directly experienced and observed, that did not in any way 
guarantee that they were either conscious, in the sense of being “definite” or in control of 
their lives, nor that they thought or behaved in a rational manner, according to 
Schumpeter. “Once more: definiteness and rationality in thought and action are not 
guaranteed by this familiarity with men and things or by that sense of reality or 
responsibility” (p.259). People were not rendered rational beings simply because they 
were familiar with their own life experiences, even if they were demonstrably responsible 
in how they lived their lives. Essentially, whether in a crowd or in society, ordinary people 
were irrational beings.  
Schumpeter’s “realist” perspective also extended to his theory of democracy. 
Essentially, Schumpeter argued that democracy should be judged according to existing 
practice and structures, rather than the classical democratic theory ideals of Mill and 
Locke, who argued, at least in a limited way, for the equality and rights of individuals in a 
democracy (Dahl). The reality, according to Schumpeter, was that ordinary individuals 
lacked the ability to understand any reality beyond their own – and were therefore totally 
incapable of understanding politics. Nor is it even possible to educate the typical citizen 
about the political process, according to Schumpeter. Unless it has real and direct 
application, it would not have an impact on their understanding, he argued. “Information is 
plentiful and readily available, “ wrote Schumpeter. “But this does not seem to make any 
difference…without the initiative that comes from immediate responsibility, ignorance will 
persist in the face of masses of information however complete and correct…Result are 
not zero. But they are small. People cannot be carried up the ladder” (p. 262). This has 
obvious resonance for an argument for the right to information that allows citizens to 
understand how they are governed. Schumpeter argues that making information available 
does virtually nothing to inform citizens about governance. It is for this reason that I have 
taken such care to deconstruct the elitist pseudo-science logic which led him to this 
conclusion. If there is any doubt, in the next paragraph Schumpeter returns to the 
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teachings of Freud and Le Bon concerning the mind of the group as sub-human and 
irrational, which the economist applied to the thinking of individual citizens.   
Thus the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental 
performance as soon as he enters the political field. He 
argues and analyses in a way which he would readily 
recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real interests. 
He becomes a primitive again. His thinking becomes 
associate and affective. And this entails two further 
consequences of ominous significance. First…the typical 
citizen would in political matters tend to yield to extra-
rational or irrational prejudice and impulse…Second…the 
weaker the logical element in the processes of the public 
mind and the more complete the absence of rational 
criticism and of the rationalizing influence of personal 
experience and responsibility, the greater are the 
opportunities for groups with an ax to grind (p.262-263).  
The inevitable result will be manipulation of the masses by special interests for their own 
advantage – political or otherwise.  
Schumpeter argues that these “groups” have the capability of creating “the will of 
the public” (p.263). This builds on Schumpeter’s earlier argument that there was no such 
thing as a legitimate public will or “will of the public” as described in the “Classical Doctrine 
of Democracy” (p.249) of Rousseau or Mill. Nor does he accept the idea of a “Common 
Good…which every normal person can be made to see by means of rational argument” 
(p.250). In fact, the typical citizen is incapable of understanding rational argument. It is not 
surprising then that after rejecting classical democratic theory, largely based on the 
findings of Freud, Le Bon and other social scientists, Schumpeter proposes his own 
“Theory of Democracy” which reduces the role of citizens to electing a leader and then 
leaving governance to their representatives and to the experts who inform the “deciders” 
decisions. Schumpeter turns classical democratic theory on its head: 
It will be remembered that classical theory centered in the 
proposition that “the people” hold a definite and rational 
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opinion about every individual question and that they give 
effect to his opinion – in a democracy – by choosing 
“representatives” who will see to it that that opinion is carried 
out. Thus the selection of the representatives is made 
secondary to the primary purpose of the democratic 
arrangement which is to vest the power of deciding political 
issues in the electorate. Suppose we reverse the roles of 
these two elements and make the deciding of issues by the 
electorate secondary to the election of the men who are to 
do the deciding. To put it differently, we now take the view 
that the role of the people is to produce a government 
(Schumpeter: p.269).   
The role of citizens is reduced to a vote for leadership, and democracy becomes a system 
of competitions among individuals competing for their votes. Whoever wins, makes 
decisions on behalf of voters but without their input and beyond their control. As the next 
sections will show, Schumpeter’s democratic theory has been widely-challenged as 
undemocratic, which it clearly is. However, his underlying theories of the masses – and 
the individuals who comprise those masses – continue to undermine democratic theory 
that calls for active citizenship, as being at the core of the democratic process, as this 
chapter and the following chapters on contemporary Canadian politics will show.   
2.16. Taking Schumpeter to task 
Democratic theorist Frank Cunningham describes Schumpeter’s theory of 
democracy as a “mask of oppression” (Cunningham 2002: p.68). He notes that 
Schumpeter is concerned only with the “functioning of democracy in the modern 
world…Schumpeter thus reduced democracy to a method [defined as] ‘that institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political decisions.’ ”25 Schumpeter’s  view of a successful 
democracy was one in which “experts and not the public decide matters requiring special 
knowledge or talents; a well-trained bureaucracy; and a public whose members were 
tolerant of one another and are prepared to allow politicians a relatively free hand in 
governing.”26 Government would be allowed to operate without the input or scrutiny of the 
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public between elections. They are excluded from participating in governance between 
elections, which Cunningham describes as “oppressive,” and impeding democracy: “When 
oppression involves being politically subordinated to the will of members of other groups 
or excluded from effective participation in political activity, democracy is directly impeded 
(p.68). 
 Robert Dahl (1989) also challenges Schumpeter’s prescription for democracy as 
failing to meet the criterion of “political equality.” He describes Schumpeter’s model of 
democracy as “procedurally democratic in a narrow sense” because it falls far short of any 
requirement that citizens are granted the means to understand governance, which he 
describes as “the criterion of enlightened understanding,” and further, fails to allow “for 
final control of the agenda by its demo.” Dahl concludes that as a result, Schumpeter’s 
model cannot be described as “fully democratic” (Dahl: p.130). Beetham is also critical of 
Schumpeter’s approach which he says is based in an inaccurate definition of democracy 
as “a particular institution or set of institutional arrangement, rather than with the principles 
they embody or are designated to realise (2008: 3). The inaccuracy lies in equating 
democracy with elections, which Beetham argues “is to elevate a means to an end, to 
confuse an instrument with its purpose” and thereby reduces democracy to a “facade (3).”  
Beetham and Carole Pateman (1970) note that the elitist approach of limiting 
citizen participation to voting that was trumpeted by Schumpeter and his followers stems 
from a shared lack of confidence in the ability of ordinary citizens to make rational and 
informed choices. Beetham notes that Schumpeter believed that “average citizens were 
incapable of rational reflection or realistic consideration about public affairs” (Beetham 
2008: p.2) and therefore should “choose between elites, who would decide on their behalf” 
(Ibid). Pateman concurs and adds that Dahl also accepts the thesis of the limited 
capabilities of the mass of citizens, arguing that as a result very few citizens would have 
an interest in “decision-making opportunities” should they be made widely available. It 
should be noted that Pateman is highly critical of Dahl for dismissing the possibility of 
participatory government involving widespread political engagement as exceeding 
“human possibilities” (Dahl: p.340).” She rather unfairly categories him as a supporter of 
Schumpeter, when in fact Dahl strongly challenges Schumpeter’s theories of democracy 
as undemocratic. In fact Dahl supports citizen engagement and enlightenment, but 
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acknowledges that such engagement is not of interest to all citizens, but neither is that 
essential for democracy, in his view.  
2.17. Enlightened understanding and deliberative democracy  
Dahl (1989: p.172) describes enlightened understanding as a “primary right” in a 
representative democracy. Dahl describes the right to enlightened understanding as the 
“third criterion” of the democratic process, without which democracy does not exist. 
According to Dahl, citizens have a right to acquire “an understanding of means and ends, 
of one’s interests and the expected consequences of polices for interests, not only for 
oneself but for all other relevant persons as well.” It is therefore difficult to “justify 
procedures that would cut off or suppress information which, were it available, might well 
cause citizens to arrive at a different decision (p.112).” Dahl also argues that such 
deception by government prevents citizens from exercising what John Stuart Mill (1861) 
described as “self-protecting” rights. Dahl quotes Mill on the need for citizens to exercise 
those rights as a fundamental mechanism in the balancing of powers in a democracy: 
“Human beings are only secure from evil at the hands of others in proportion as they have 
the power of being, and are, self-protecting” (Dahl: p.76). Without the right to understand, 
citizens lose their ability to make rational decisions based on their perception of 
consequences. What is also inherent, although not stated explicitly, is that the right to 
“enlightened understanding,” requires access to knowledge about governance that 
facilitates understanding.  
Dryzek argues for an engaged and informed citizenry capable of conducting 
“discursive democracy” which requires that government justify significant decisions to 
citizens in order that they may consider and discuss, or deliberate, about governance. He 
notes that increasingly citizens of advanced democracies are demanding that they be 
engaged in governance on an ongoing basis, rather than simply called on to choose their 
leaders at elections. He says democratic theorists began to recognize this demand for 
increasing deliberative forms of democracy beginning in about 1990 (p. v), which involve 
an increasing role and ability for citizens to legitimate government during its term in office, 
and not merely at elections. Elected representation in and of itself, no longer stands as 
sufficient legitimation for governance between elections. 
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Under deliberative democracy, the essence of democratic 
legitimacy should be sought instead in the ability of all 
individuals subject to a collective decision to engage in 
authentic deliberation about that decision. These individuals 
should accept the decision only if it could be justified to them 
in convincing terms. (Dryzek 2000: p. v) 
Authentic deliberation therefore involves the engagement of citizens in critical political 
discussions – public or private – about the legitimacy, or lack of legitimacy of justification 
provided by government. What Dryzek and other deliberative or discursive theorists imply 
but do not explore explicitly is the importance of the justifications provided to fuel and 
inform the tone and validity of discussions.  
2.18. Legitimation and the right to know 
Beetham argues that citizens’ voluntary subordination in a democracy is 
predicated on, and conditional to, three key points of mutual agreement and understanding 
that he describes as “the rules of power” (2001/1991: p. 15).27 Essentially, to be legitimate, 
powers of representation must be exercised in accordance with the rules of law, which are 
“justified by reference to the beliefs shared by both the dominant and the subordinate. 
Finally, for power to be exercised legitimately, there “there must be “evidence of consent” 
in the form of actions by subordinates that demonstrate their support of the power structure 
(15).28  
Contributing to legitimacy, then, are to be found a number 
of different factors, operating at different levels. There is the 
legal validity of the acquisition and exercise of power; there 
is the justifiability of the rules governing the power 
relationship in terms of the beliefs and values current in the 
given society; there is the evidence of consent derived from 
action expressive of it. These factors, successively and 
cumulatively are what make power legitimate. To the extent 
that they are present, it will be legitimate; to the extent that 
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they are absent, it will not. Together, these criteria provide 
ground not for a belief in legitimacy’, but for those subject to 
power to support and cooperate with its holders; grounds, 
that is to say, not for belief, but for obligation (p.12-13). 29 
Democracy is a dynamic agreement rather than a fixed contract, and must be constantly 
revised and renewed to ensure that it meets the conditions of legitimation as described by 
Beetham (1991). In a democracy, “political legitimacy…requires both a morally 
authoritative source for government and an ability to satisfy the ends which justify its 
enormous concentration of power” (Beetham: p.137). In Canada the ability to legitimate 
government is protected in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms which guarantees the right 
to hold elections and vote: “freedom of conscience and religion; freedom of thought, belief, 
opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of 
communication; freedom of peaceful assembly; and…freedom of association. This right is 
buttressed by the rule of law which applies equally to all residents of the country, including 
elected officials.  
Political legitimacy is predicated on an understanding by all parties – electors and 
the elected – that the right to represent is based on mutually agreed rules, including the 
ability of the subordinated to revoke the powers of the dominant elected elite if a majority 
of subordinates so choose. The legitimation of power consists of three components, 
according to Beetham. “Most basic is to elaborate the threefold structure of legitimacy as 
rule-derived validity, the justifiability of power rules, and expressed consent” (1991: p.64). 
Abiding by rules is “the first condition of legitimacy…Any form of power should be acquired 
and exercised as in accordance with established rules” (p.64). The second condition of 
legitimacy is that the rules are justifiable because they are agreed to by both the electors, 
who are subordinates, and those who are elected to power and therefore dominant. 
…power is legitimate to the extent that its rules are justifiable 
in terms of shared beliefs…contained in the specification 
that the relevant beliefs be shared between dominant and 
subordinate. Without a common framework of belief, the 
rules from which the powerful derive their power cannot be 
justifiable to the subordinate (Beetham 1991: p.69). 
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Finally, political power is legitimate only if there is ”expressed consent” on the part of the 
subordinate citizens to the exercise of power by the dominant citizens (Beetham 90-97). 
Forms of consent include “mass consent” expressed through an election (Beetham: 94), 
and other “specific actions that publically express it” (Beetham: 91).   
Legitimation relies first on the right of citizens to know how they are represented in 
a democracy and second, in their legal right to manage and control their representation 
through deliberations which both inform citizens and their elected officials, and allow 
citizens to hold them to account. The electorate seeks to legitimate their representation 
on an ongoing basis by scrutinizing the actions and decisions of those they elect, and 
thereby determining whether or not it poses the risk of negative or unwanted 
consequences. (Chapter 7 considers risk and representation). In addition to rule of law, 
this accountability is realized through political communication among citizens in what 
Habermas describes as the “public sphere” (Habermas 1991 and 2006).30This imagined 
public communication arena includes “everyday conversations” between citizens 
(Marques and Maia 2010)31; through open and peaceful protest and public dissent; and 
through free and critical discourse amplified through public media spheres such as news 
media and social networking. What is also implied by Habermas, Dewey, Dunn, Dakroury 
and Beetham is that citizens’ right to know requires that they are provided with authentic 
information that allows them to understand how they are governed. This is essential for 
citizens to exercise control over government and to therefore legitimate government by 
holding it to account.   
2.19. Citizens as moral agents 
Beetham rejects a “rational choice’ approach that assumes that “social action is to 
be explained by the agents’ calculations of their own self-interest” (Beetham 1991: 27) 
because it fails to explain why people agree to comply with rules that may not directly 
serve their own self-interest, such as paying taxes or respecting other people’s property 
or rights. What is missing from the “rational choice” approach is an understanding of moral 
behaviour. Beetham writes “that people are also moral agents, who recognize the validity 
of rules, have some notion of a common interest, and acknowledge the binding force of 
promises they have made – all elements involved in legitimate power” (p. 27).32 
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Our expectation of the “binding force of promises” as a moral legitimation of power 
develops at an early age. For several years I shared my office with my two granddaughters 
who spent a day each week in our care. While they have full use of the room, there were 
rules that comprised promises to one another, that if they would refrain from pulling out 
certain belongings, such as my books, they could play with other things such as pencils, 
chalk and a box of glass cleaners, which both girls prized in their first year or so. The girls, 
though infants at the time, each willingly complied with the agreement. In return for keeping 
their promise to avoid specified objects, they expected and were given access to other 
agreed objects. Both girls understood and accepted this reciprocal agreement by the age 
of a year or so. Both respected the boundaries between my stuff and their stuff. And they 
expected nothing less in return. The expectation was that neither side would break its 
promise. However, on two separate occasions, when each girl was about the one year of 
age, the promise was broken, albeit by a parent rather than their Nana. Each girl 
responded with justifiable and uncharacteristic outrage in the form of throwing a tantrum 
when their expectation was denied. In the first case of my first granddaughter, her father 
took away a box of metallic packages of glass cleaner because he did not understand our 
agreement, and probably out of fear that his baby might be poisoned. Not unreasonable. 
However, what he did not know, but soon learned, is that I had promised her that she 
could play with the packages, as long as she left other objects alone. She liked to tip them 
out and then put each one back in the box. It was a routine she loved, and importantly for 
her, access was the result of a promise that I had made to her. She was inconsolable until 
she was given the box of glass cleaners to dump and refill. Order was restored, along with 
her sense of justice and fairness.  
Two years later in similar circumstances my youngest granddaughter, then also 
about a year old, launched into a similar uncontrolled rage when her mother refused to 
give her a box of sidewalk chalk on the basis it was raining outside and the chalk could 
not be used indoors. Not an unreasonable assumption. However, unknown to her mother, 
I let the girls use the chalk to write on large sheets of colored paper when the weather was 
too wet to use the sidewalks for their artwork. It was, in effect, another promise. Now that 
expectation had been denied. Like her sister two years earlier, she was outraged when 
this reciprocal agreement on the division of private property was broken. She 
demonstrated this sense of outrage by protesting loudly and with great conviction until the 
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rules were fairly enforced, and she was given the chalk and some colored paper.  
While there is an element of self-interest in each of these scenarios – playing with 
their toy of choice is clearly in the child’s self-interest – there is also evidence that each 
infant was willing to deny her own self-interest by respecting rules related to ignoring my 
property. The promises to one another were in our common interests as it allowed us to 
share the office/playroom. Both little girls were willing, and able, to deny their self-interest 
in playing with forbidden objects, and they therefore lived up to their promise to respect 
the rules. Many might argue that the children obeyed the rules because, as the adult, I am 
in the dominant position in our power relationship, although anyone who has lived with a 
toddler would question that logic. However, the girls did not hesitate to challenge other 
dominant adults who broke our reciprocal agreement. Their acceptance of the rules was 
therefore not purely a “rational choice” based on self-interest, and depended, at least in 
part, on whether or not they felt the rules were enforced as promised in a fair and just 
manner. The power that I and other adults might hold in making and enforcing rules which 
they had in effect promised to follow, was honoured only if the subordinate actors – in this 
case my granddaughters - accepted the criterion, not merely on the basis of rational self-
interest. Beetham questions the “’rational choice’ approach, whose explanatory force 
depends upon the assumption that social action is to be explained by the agents’ 
calculations of their own self-interest” (p. 27). Rather, Beetham’s “theory of legitimacy” 
argues that the reasons for obeying rules is much more complex and social than mere 
self-interest explains. There also exists in this relationship a degree of trust that each actor 
will comply with “agreed expectations” and that failure to do so will result in a 
reassessment of the legitimacy of the promises. In this case failure to meet “agreed 
expectations” was expressed through the communicative action of a tantrum which clearly 
imparted understanding of consequences. Further, if two mere infants are capable of first 
understanding agreed rules of social order, and second of actively disputing the violation 
of those rules, then it calls into question any theory which postulates that most adults are 
incapable of similar understanding and therefore should leave government decision-
making to a wiser elite of chosen representatives. In fact, active citizenship is central to 
democracy.  
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2.20. Participatory democracy as training ground for active citizenship  
The movement for public access takes as its foundational theory classical 
democratic theories of natural law (Rousseau); equality of informed citizens (Mill) and the 
rights of the autonomous individual in a society (Locke). The notion of access to 
government records as a citizen right is based on the idea that individuals surrender their 
authority in a social contract with others in exchange for the protection of certain 
fundamental rights. Bobbio (1988) argues that natural law is the “philosophical 
presupposition of the liberal state” which justifies and necessitates state recognition of 
certain “natural rights (or natural law). This holds that man – all persons without exception 
– possesses by nature…certain fundamental rights such as the right to life, liberty, security 
and happiness”(p. 5). 33According to natural law theory these rights are “natural,” and 
therefore must be maintained and protected by the state because they existed in the 
natural state, prior to the existence of political states. Although based on what Bobbio 
describes as the “imaginary reconstruction of the presumed original state of man,” they 
are nonetheless underlying assumptions on which the guiding principles of democracy, 
which in Canada and the United States are enshrined as Charter or Constitutional rights 
respectively. 
In her seminal 1970 book Participation and Democratic Theory, Carole Pateman 
points to Jean Jacque Rousseau and John Stewart Mill as “theorists of participatory 
democracy.” Rousseau’s Social Contract “is vital for the theory of participatory 
democracy,” Pateman writes (p.22). Most importantly for Pateman is Rousseau’s theory 
that individual participation in decision-making, even outside of the institutions of 
government, simulates the individual’s interest and enthusiasm for political ongoing 
engagement. She argues that participation not only teaches individuals about “social 
order”, it creates a sense of belonging and commitment to good government as a means 
to protect the social order. In other words, participation in decision-making either at the 
social or political level, creates a sense of the role and importance of active citizenship. 
 Rousseau’s entire political theory hinges on individual 
participation of each citizen in political decision making and 
in his theory participation is very much more than a 
protective adjunct to a set of institutional arrangements; it 
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also has a psychological effect on the participants, ensuring 
that there is a continuing interrelationship between the 
working of institutions and the psychological qualities and 
attitudes of individuals interacting within them (Pateman 
1970: p.22) 
…As a result of participating in decision making the 
individual is educated to distinguish between his own 
impulses and desires, he learns to be a public as well as a 
private citizen (p.25). 
Pateman argues that Mill similarly argued that an “active character would result from 
participation” (p.45). Pateman builds on Mill and Rousseau’s argument that participation 
outside of government decision-making – particularly in democratized environments such 
as unions where all members stand as equals – serves as a training ground for citizenship 
interest and engagement in democratic institutions of government. Pateman argues that 
at its core, participatory democratic theory argues that participation is what educates and 
prepares citizens to play an essential role in the democratic process. “The theory of 
participatory democracy argues that the experience of participation in some way leaves 
the individual better psychologically equipped to undertake further participation in the 
future” (p.45). The public right of access is also very much concerned with making it 
possible for citizens to play an active role in a democracy, and in particular to participation 
in the regulation and control of government over time, rather than simply by choosing 
representation in elections. Perhaps the most important aspect of Pateman’s theory of 
participatory democracy is the belief that through the act of participation in decision-
making at all levels of social interaction, all citizens are capable of understanding 
governance and of engaging in decision-making process that extend beyond electing elite 
representatives. She is essentially arguing that joining a protest against oil pipelines on 
B.C.’s Burnaby Mountain are as useful in educating and engaging individuals as active 
citizens as obtaining a degree in political science. In fact arguably, joining the protest might 
even prove more educational in terms of understanding the need and role of citizens in 
influencing and controlling the decision-making processes of government.  
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2.21. ‘Relations of power’  
An essential difference between democratic governance and non-democratic 
governance is that in a democracy the relationships of power between citizens and those 
who govern are founded in legal and political institutions which both define and limit the 
rights and powers of government and citizens. Canadian political philosopher James Tully 
argues that democratic societies are both empowered and constrained by “canonical 
institutional preconditions” (2008, Vol. I: p.9)34 developed over time through the dynamic 
interaction of governance praxis and the responses of citizens. The relationship is also 
informed by an understanding that government regards citizens as both free – albeit within 
the limits of the preconditions – and as “partners” in the relationship. 
Because an intersubjective relation of power or governance 
is always exercised over an agent who is recognised and 
treated as a partner who is free, from the perspective of the 
governed the exercise of power always opens up a diverse 
field of potential  ways of thinking and acting in response. 
(Tully: p.23)35 
While it may occur, force and coercion by government lies outside of the legitimate 
relations of power in a democracy, according to Tully. “They are not relations of force that 
act immediately on unfree and passive bodies and constitute subjects without the 
mediation of their thought and action” (p. 23).36 If government or citizens resort to force, 
they do so with the understanding that there are sanctioned negative consequences. For 
example, individuals who move beyond peaceful protest to rioting can expect legal 
consequences. The consequences for governments that violate constitutional rights can 
be legal, political or both. For government, political consequences are the most likely and 
include removal from office by the electorate it has alienated through a violation of relations 
of power.  
Tully’s view of power relations implies an active and essential role for citizens in 
shaping governance practices within a democracy, based on a dynamic process of 
continuous negotiation between government and citizens who have historically exercised 
their legal and political right to question and even dissent against government decisions, 
 78 
actions or inactions. One example evident in the summer of 2015 came when citizens 
demonstrated against government immigration policies slowing acceptance of refugees 
from Syria. This followed the world-wide publication of a little boy named Alan Kurdi who 
drowned along with his mother and older brother when their boat capsized as the refugee 
family attempted to reach Europe. The family had hoped to come to Canada but were not 
eligible (CBC News, “Alan Kurdi Memorial” September 5, 2015). In this way citizens serve 
to inform, regulate and reform government practices. Most of the remaining members of 
the little boy’s family were finally granted refugee status in Canada in late December, 2015 
following the election of the Liberal’s as part of the party’s election promise to bring 25,000 
government-sponsored Syrian refugees to Canada. This was a sharp reversal of 
Conservative polices which made it extremely difficult for refugees, including Syrians to 
seek permanent settlement in Canada. There can be little doubt that the widespread 
outrage and outpouring of compassion of citizens which resulted from Alan Kurdi’s death 
played an influential role in the Liberal promise. Such “negotiation and reform” between 
citizens and their government is central to democratic governance, according to Tully.   
The practices of freedom and their institutions of negotiation 
and reform constitute the ‘democratic’ side of practices of 
governance: the extent to which those subject to forms of 
government can have an effective say and hand in how they 
are governed and institutionalise effective practices of 
freedom (Tully: p. 25).37  
The legal right for citizens to dissent openly with one another about those in power – 
including the right to deliberate among themselves and through various media, and the 
right to peaceful protest – serves as a warning to those in power to heed the will of the 
people. And finally, when an election is called, the public has a right to vote en masse to 
remove from office anyone who falls out of favour and fails to win sufficient support to hold 
public office. This can only come into play if an informed and active citizenship is at the 
core of this dynamic, and thus central to “negotiation and reform” is authentic 
understanding on the part of electors. Without authentic knowledge and understanding of 
governance practices, the process of negotiation cannot take place.  
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By contrast, deceptive political communication practices, in particular when they 
are designed to meet the strategic ends of the party in power, undermine practices of 
freedom such as the right and ability to dissent, to resist and to reform government by 
rendering the offending practices either invisible, or by presenting them in a falsely positive 
light. No justification on the part of voters is required for dumping one group of 
representatives and replacing them with another. What matters, in the operationalization 
of that right to choose, is the right to know how power is exercised on an ongoing and 
continuous basis. This process in a democracy is described by Beetham as “the 
legitimation of power” (1991). Beetham distinguishes his meaning of legitimation of 
government representation from the once-predominant definition of Weber, which 
Beetham describes as the “belief in legitimacy.” This definition, according to Beetham, 
“misrepresents the relationship between legitimacy and people’s beliefs.”  38 Legitimation 
of power, says Beetham, is not, as Weber holds, a matter of belief, or faith, or unconditional 
trust in those who are elected to represent citizens’ interests. Rather, legitimation is an 
active process of justifying beliefs by confirming that power is exercised in accordance 
with those beliefs – or what Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt and Camerer describe as “confident 
expectations.”   
However, the legitimation process may also reveal dissonance between the 
operationalization of power by representatives, and the agreed beliefs or expectations 
which were the basis on which they were elected. In that case power is not justified and is 
in fact delegitimized by the review process. By comparison with Weber’s definition of 
legitimation, Beetham’s definition of legitimacy focuses not on whether citizens’ believe 
government is legitimate, but rather on an assessment of whether or not that belief is 
justified. Beetham says that while this “may seem a fine distinction” it is “fundamental” 
(p.11). Legitimacy by Beetham’s definition (1991) is an entirely different and much more 
active process which involves citizens, who observe and assesses those who hold power. 
When we seek to assess the legitimacy of a regime, a 
political system, or some other power relations, one thing 
we are doing is assessing how far it can be justified in terms 
of people’s beliefs, how far it conforms to their values or 
standards, how far it satisfies the normative expectations 
they have of it. We are making an assessment of the degree 
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of congruence, or lack of it, between a given system of 
power and the beliefs, values and expectations that provide 
its justification (Beetham, 1991: p.11).39 
If legitimation of power is a process of assessing power in order to justify power, then there 
must be a means of assessment. This can only be achieved through knowledge of power 
– the ability to scrutinize the actions and decisions of individuals or institutions of power – 
to determine if citizens’ trust or “confident expectations” are justified. The legitimation 
process itself is justified by an underlying “awareness of vulnerability”, which means that 
citizens anticipate the potential for harm, otherwise described as risk. In addition to the 
rule of law, to which all citizens including representatives are subject, citizens in a 
democracy also have a right to question and challenge authority when it operates outside 
of its mandate.  
All of these consequences are played out at various times in democratic societies 
and are amplified through “everyday political talk” (Kim & Kim 2008) and by more public 
means of communicating such as through news media, which as part of its democratic 
mandate seeks out stories of corruption and abuses of power. Kim and Kim explain that 
this “political talk” takes place, and in fact constitutes what Habermas describes as the 
public sphere. Habermas describes the public sphere as ‘‘an intermediary system of 
communication between formally organized and informal face-to-face deliberations in 
arenas at both the top and the bottom of the political system’’ (Habermas 2006: 415). Kim 
and Kim describe Habermas’ imagined political discourse as “unruly” and taking place 
between private and autonomous citizens  who “engage in “free and spontaneous 
communicative action – usually in the form of non-purposive and informal political talk. 
Thus, the public sphere is the arena for everyday political talk and dialogic deliberation. 
Or, to be more precise, everyday political talk produces the public sphere. (As cited by 
Kim and Kim 2008: p. 63). 
The informal arenas for public political dialogue which comprise the public sphere 
include deliberations over a number of personal, social and professional communication 
platforms. These include personal conversations between individuals, institutional 
communications, and professional news media and, increasingly through social media. 
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Kim and Kim argue that the combined formal and informal conversations about politics are 
foundational to deliberative democracy: 
The paradox of deliberative democracy is that the 
prerequisites of deliberation must be produced through 
deliberation itself. This essay, thus, proposes that 
deliberative democracy requires two levels of deliberation: 
One is instrumental deliberation, a procedural tool, through 
which people negotiate and make decisions; the other is 
dialogic deliberation, or dialogue, through which people 
construct the concept of the self and other, the sense of 
community, and public reason (p.51). 
Conclusion: authentic understanding as a communication right 
Understanding how government exercises power is not only a citizens’ right in a 
democracy, it is essential to the democratic process of citizens legitimating and ultimately 
controlling government. Access to authentic information about governance is essential to 
allow citizens’ understanding of governance, and thereby to legitimate and exercise 
control over their representation. Citizen legitimation of government serves several 
mechanisms of democracy which have been outlined by political theorists included in this 
chapter. However, it is not enough to establish that the public has a right to know how it is 
governed, alone. What has also been established is that the right to know depends for its 
operationization on government praxis of transparency. Citizens require routine and 
systematic access to authentic information that provides understanding of governance 
practices and consequences, and about the actions and decisions of those who exercise 
the powers of representation. However, current government information praxis falls far 
short of satisfying the publics’ right to understand governance. As Chapters 3 and 4 will 
show, instead of access to authentic information, the public is bombarded with strategic 
political information about governance that is intended to persuade rather than inform 
understanding. Political communication between the state and its citizens is increasingly 
co-opted by the executive branch and its political appointees to serve the partisan ends of 
the party in power, rather than citizens’ communication rights in a democracy.  
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Strategic political communication as “credit seeking” 
and “blame avoidance” 
3.1. Introduction 
The rise of strategic political communication (SPC) has been well-documented 
over the past two decades in the executive branches of governments in the United States, 
Britain, Australia and Canada (Morgan, 1986; Franklin, 1994; Scammell, 1999 and 2003; 
Rose, 2000; Seymour-Ure, 2003; Benoit, 2006; Tieirnan, 2007; Savoie, 2008 and 2010; 
Martin, 2011; Marland, Giasson, Lees-Marshment, 2012; Kozolanka, 2014). The fact that 
governing parties increasingly rely on politically-appointed, partisan SPC specialists to 
manage what the public knows about how it governs is beyond dispute. This chapter is an 
attempt to understand the consequences for communication with the public, and the 
resultant implications for the publics’ ability to legitimate government by holding it to 
account both at the ballot box and through “authentic deliberation” (Dryzek) in the public 
sphere. I use the term strategic political communication to describe a politically-mediated 
information process which is managed by partisan public relations specialists appointed 
by the governing party to promote positive aspects of the party’s actions and decisions in 
power, and also to help manage and avoid negatives which could damage or threaten the 
public support essential to maintaining power. In The Blame Game (2011), Christopher 
Hood describes political management of government information flow as focused on 
“blame avoidance” and “credit claiming.” Hood explains that blame avoidance is practised 
at the highest levels of government to manage political risks posed by “the act of attributing 
something considered to be bad or wrong to some person or entity” (p. 6). Hood calls this 
“blame risk.” He notes that all democratically-elected politicians have reason to be 
concerned about “blame risk” because it may lead to a loss of public trust or support. 
“Elected politicians will care about blame if they think it will reduce their chances of re-
election” (p. 8). For the same reasons of winning and maintaining political support from 
the public, SPC is also focused on “claiming credit” for the executive branch of the 
governing party (p. 9).  
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The opposite of blame is credit, and we can define credit as 
the act of attributing something considered to be good or 
positive to a person or entity. Just like blame, credit is also 
directional, temporal and based on perceptions of gain…So 
politicians, organizational leaders, and governments are 
normally concerned with painting a relentlessly upbeat 
picture of progress and improvement within their domains of 
responsibility and with associating any such progress with 
their own personal sagacity and hard work…Such players 
can be expected to seek credit for exactly the same reason 
that they will want to avoid blame – because credit can be 
expected to increase their chance of re-election (Hood, 
2011: p. 9).   
Managing blame risk through SPC tactics therefore shifts political communication priorities 
away from providing the public with understanding of government, and towards managing 
blame risk and claiming credit.  
The propensity towards credit claiming and blame avoidance is heightened by an 
awareness on the part of politicians and the SPC professionals they appoint of what Hood 
describes as “negativity bias,” which he describes as the tendency for individuals including 
voters, and for news media in particular to pay more attention to negative developments 
than positive developments by government.  
Negativity bias denotes a commonly observed cognitive 
tendency for more attention to be paid to negative than to 
positive information and for losses to be valued more highly 
than gains of an equivalent amount. The causes of 
negatively bias are debated…but the existence of the 
phenomenon is well established and several studies have 
suggested that losses are commonly weighted at between 
two and four times more than equivalent gains (see Heath 
et al. 1999, as cited by Hood: p. 9-10). 
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Therefore, while elected government expends considerable energy and expense in 
“claiming credit” (Hood: p.9) through advertising and the promotion of positive news 
through various staged events, avoiding the risk of blame remains a crucial component of 
SPC as a means to counter expected “negativity bias.” However, as Hood also explains, 
negativity bias alone is not sufficient to turn public opinion and support into opposition. 
Because of this, as Hood says, establishing a pattern of positives actions through 
advertising and other SPC tactics can serve as a counterbalance to negative bias: 
…negativity bias does not always seem to sweep all before 
it. There must be some other and countervailing behavioural 
processes that work to limit such bias, or trust of any kind 
would seldom or ever exist or survive. Moreover … 
government, public managers, and political leaders put a lot 
of effort into countering negativity bias. In fact, in their 
constant search for ways to accentuate the positive, modern 
governments and public managers put out stirring tallies of 
achievement, facts and figures about their claimed 
successes, and carefully selected research findings that 
support their position and reform programs (Hood: p.13).  
That said, Hood argues that negatively bias “produces a strong drive to avoid blame in 
public services and government, even sometimes at the cost of claiming credit” (p.14). 
And more often than not that means managing media, including promoting partisan 
actions and decision through social media, but more importantly, managing the risk of 
blame apportioned through news media and professional journalists. The result of blame 
avoidance, credit claiming, and an anticipation of negativity bias, is a SPC emphasis on 
the positive aspects of government, including “spin,” which is an attempt to turn a negative 
into a positive, even if it is misleading. The SPC reaction to negativity bias, is what I wish 
to describe as a positivity bias – including managing the risk of blame – that skews SPC 
communication towards promoting and protecting political interests, even at the cost of 
the publics’ interest in understanding how it is governed. 
One approach to SPC credit-claiming and blame avoidance is an adaptation of 
corporate marketing techniques described as political marketing. Political marketing is 
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essentially the application of business marketing and sales techniques to the promotion of 
a political candidate, party, government or ideology. Primarily, political marketing employs 
strategic business communication practices as a means to promote a political brand to 
voters, who are viewed as consumers, or potential consumers, of that particular brand. 
According to the editors of an important political communication book called Political 
Marketing in Canada (2012) it is primarily concerned with communications, including 
extensive market research and analysis through polling and other means of information to 
understand consumer interests and expectations. This helps in the planning of SPC tactics 
intended to promote the party, its members and leadership as a product and brand in what 
is also known as “packaged” politics (Giasson et. al, 2012: p.3). As in business marketing, 
the SPC techniques employed by politicians and political parties include advertising, public 
and media relations, and product placement such as signage identifying and thereby 
crediting the party in power with funding a particular public project. In her seminal 1999 
article, Margaret Scammell argues that political marketing is a continuous and ongoing 
process that increasingly is integral to the process of governance, and is no longer 
reserved as strategies for election campaigns. As a result, the study of political 
communication extends into the “high politics of government and party management” and 
is interdisciplinary in its scope. The focus is on understanding voters, and how they react. 
However, unlike authentic political communication, the purpose is not to create 
understanding for voters, but rather to understand voters in order to persuade them to 
support a particular party. It is political communication in which “the key continuing interest 
in persuasion”, “writes Scammell (p. 719). She argues that the “use of marketing changes 
the relationship between leaders, parties and voters. It has consequences for democratic 
practice and citizen engagement, (p. 719). Further, its influence extends beyond the 
campaign periods leading up to elections, and instead shapes all political communication 
between citizens and the governing party throughout its period of governance ” (p.719). 40 
Persuasion of voters is always a consideration, resulting in a permanent political 
communication campaign of strategic political communication which seeks credit and 
avoids the risk of blame. Political marketing, as with all forms of marketing,  requires 
control of information about the product, in this case the governing party, is managed in 
the same way as are other products – with a goal to promoting the brand, while avoiding 
or minimizing negative publicity from influencing consumers, whom in reality are voting 
citizens in a democracy.  
 86 
Political Marketing in Canada editors Giasson, Lees-Marshment and Marland 
argue that SPC is not only a crucial component of political marketing, it is doing nothing 
less than “changing Canadian democracy” (p. xi). Not only does the application of 
business-like marketing strategies reduce citizens to the role of consumers, it also 
promotes political parties and policies as products on offer, and in the process turns 
politicians into salesmen and women who represent their political product or brand and 
market it to voters as consumers, rather than as citizens in a democracy. “The most 
professional of these packaged politicians and their handlers use market intelligence, such 
as opinion research, to tailor their political offer to reflect constituent priorities.” The editors 
argue that political marketing has an upside for voters and democracy because essentially 
it involves gauging what consumers want, and providing that ideological product. 
Politicians and political parties are conducting research to understand voters’ preferences 
and priorities. They then attempt to tailor their product or service – themselves and their 
party – to satisfy the “dominant needs and wants expressed in the electorate” (p.9) who 
comprise an “electoral market” (p.5). They are listening to the public, and the public, 
indirectly at least, thereby helps to determine policies, the editors argue.  
When applied to politics, marketing entails a political 
organization using business techniques to inform and shape 
its strategic behaviours that are designed to satisfy citizen’ 
needs and wants. (p.4) 
There is no question that to some extent political marketers seek to satisfy the popular 
demands of voters in the hope that they will choose their particular brand as government. 
However, as with all business marketing, the primary purpose in analysing the market, is 
not simply to satisfy the needs and wants of consumers, it is to sell the product for profit. 
Profit for politicians and political parties is power in the form of election to public office, 
and preferably to be chosen by voters as the dominant brand or party elected to run 
government. 
Power may be achieved during an election campaign through the effective 
application of electoral market analysis and product tailoring to fit demands, and then 
selling that product through strategic marketing techniques that promote the brand to 
electoral consumers. That goal poses the central challenge for political parties. 
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Promotional techniques are not as easily applied to selling governance performance, 
which by its very nature may please some voters, but will not please others. For example, 
while some people may approve of a government stiffening penalties for crimes, others 
may feel it is unnecessary or overly punitive. Marketing policies are, after all, intended to 
address the “dominant needs and wants” of a sufficient majority to win election, rather than 
the needs and wants of the plurality of voters. Further, voters expect that promises made 
during elections will be kept once the party is elected to government. Political marketing 
in campaigns must therefore shape policy making in governance, or there will be political 
consequences in the form of lost support (Giasson, Lees-Marshment & Marland: 5). 
…the notion of promise is central to marketing in both 
services and politics insofar as once promises have been 
made, the relationship between consumers/voters and the 
service provider/political actor can be greatly damaged if 
they do not materialize. Scammell (1999, 728) aptly 
summarizes the issues at stake by noting that in each 
context, the supplier must continue to nurse its reputation if 
it seeks to be a long-lasting player in the market. Reputation 
can be relatively easily destroyed if promises are not fulfilled 
and the costs of re-building are considerable (Giasson, 
Lees-Marshment & Marland: p.5). 
The need to nurse its reputation does require that at least some promises made are kept. 
Once elected, governments will often act on key election platforms and priorities, such as 
tougher crime legislation and lower taxes. However, most of what happens in government 
is not about fulfilling promises made during an election campaign, and instead involves a 
myriad of small but impactful decisions that are often made out of the public eye, if not in 
total secrecy. The lack of transparency on the day-to-day activities of a governing party 
means that, for the most part, the public is blind as to the actions and decisions it takes, 
as long as government can control the communication process. Message management 
and control is therefore also central to the political marketing process. Without question, 
total message control is not entirely possible. Unlike a business product, where the 
manufacturer can ensure consistency through quality control, backed up by warranties 
when quality fails to meet promised standards, the massive and diverse operations of 
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government are often beyond the control of the party in power. Government approval of a 
drug that turns out to have unexpected, or worse, untested side effects, or findings by 
government scientists that run contrary to the ideological interests of the governing party 
may call government into account, especially by news media, which acts as a constant 
watchdog on government in any democracy. Things go wrong. People screw up, 
intentionally or not. Calgary floods and suddenly the issue of global warming becomes 
personal for Prime Minister Harper’s Calgary constituents, whom previously could be 
counted on to back his dismissal of global warming implication in favour of developing the 
Alberta oil sands. Government needs to be responsive to these changes, even if it means 
a shift away from earlier promises. Politics, particularly as government, is a hard sell.  
There are also obvious ethical questions raised by tailoring ideology, and 
especially tailoring policy to attract electoral consumers. It also raises questions of 
leadership – do you lead or do you follow? This is most obvious in dire situations. For 
example, if a sufficient number of voters support the death penalty is it ethical for a party 
to adopt that policy purely in order to win their votes? Similarly, if a majority of citizens are 
opposed to accepting Muslim immigrants, or any other religious or racial group of 
immigrants for that matter, would it be moral and ethical for a political party to adopt that 
policy in order to win their votes? Clearly not. Politics and governance is also about 
reflecting and respecting commonly held values, both those protected by law and those 
that are widely-understood as rights and values. Voters expect politicians and political 
parties not only to cater to their own particular interests, but at the same time to reflect 
commonly held values, which include, in Canada at least, opposition to the death penalty 
and open rather than discriminatory immigration regulations. We see these values as 
intrinsic to our civil society, and not as mechanisms to be manipulated for power. Again, a 
hard sell if you attempt to apply business marketing logic and tactics to governance. It is 
a full-time preoccupation.  
Although the application of business marketing principles 
and techniques to politics is nothing new, the progressive 
complexity of those strategies and tactics is significantly 
changing how political actors behave…competition brings 
pressures to edge out rivals, necessitating product 
differentiation, salesmanship, mass communication, and 
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perhaps hyperbole…Those seeking to attract the custom of 
the plurality or majority of the mass market, and hoping to 
remain or become market leaders, nowadays must 
rigorously research the marketplace, understand 
consumers’ preferences, and attempt to appropriately 
shape the image and market positioning of themselves and 
their competitors – think of Tim Hortons and Starbucks, and 
of the Conservative and Liberal Parties (Marland, Giasson, 
Lees-Marshment 2012: p.xi). 
Treating governance as a marketing exercise raises serious questions about the 
legitimacy of policy decisions that parallel the differences between authentic 
communications for the purpose of creating understanding versus strategic 
communication that is intended to persuade, even at the expense of understanding. It is a 
question of means and ends, and more importantly perhaps, whose ends are being 
served. As established in Chapter 2, authentic communication is intended to provide the 
receiver with understanding that allows rational analysis of the message, which in the case 
of a political action, for example, might allow voters to understand the consequences of a 
particular policy or decision. This is not necessarily the case with strategic communication, 
which is intended to serve the interest of the messenger, rather than the receiver, and 
therefore may include denying the messenger an understanding which might lead them to 
question or even reject the message. By the same token, treating citizens as consumers 
prioritizes the sell over the consumer’s right and ability to understand and therefore to 
exercise rational choice. Managing the message means managing citizens’ ability to 
choose. 
 
3.2. Strategic political communication and deliberation in a democracy 
Jürgen Habermas’ defines strategic communication as “instrumental 
communication” (Habermas 1984: 285) which is intended as a means to meet the 
messenger’s end or ends. This requirement therefore advantages the messenger, 
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potentially at the expense of authentic understanding by the receiver. Further, if we accept 
authentic communication as intended to result in understanding, then conversely, strategic 
communication disadvantages the receiver by making it more difficult, or even impossible, 
to understand the reality of the situation conveyed in a manner intended primarily to 
promote the interests of the messenger. Strategic communication in a political context 
means that voters are denied authentic information about governance, and instead are 
deceived into making decisions that they might not make were they given the full array of 
facts necessary for understanding. In his 2006 essay “Political Communication in a Media 
Society”, Habermas considered the deliberative role of a public sphere in legitimating the 
political process. Ideally, the public sphere facilitates the “political participation of as many 
interested citizens as possible through equal communication and participation right” 
(p.412). He describes the deliberative process of democracy as the “co-operative search 
of deliberating citizens for solutions to political problems,” (p. 413). The necessary pre-
conditions include “democratic citizenship, the inclusion of free and equal citizens in the 
political community, and…”the independence of a public sphere that operates as an 
intermediary system between the state and society” (p. 412). The public sphere functions 
more through “discourse and negotiation than in rational choice or political ethos,” 
Habermas argues. (p. 413). Finally, the main purpose of deliberation is to “generate 
legitimacy through a procedure of opinion and will formation that grants: (a) publicity and 
transparency for the deliberative process, (b) inclusion and equal opportunity for 
participation, and (c) a justified presumption for reasonable outcomes (mainly in view of 
the impact of arguments on rational changes in preference)” (p. 413). The ultimate goal of 
deliberation in the public sphere is “truth-tracking” (p. 411). However, the “truth-tracking 
potential” relies on both the influence and independence of media, which Habermas 
questions because of an overreliance on government as a source of information, on the 
assumption, it would seem, that government information is untruthful and lacks 
authenticity. However, Habermas does not develop this concept in terms of questioning 
why government information lacks authenticity, and whether it is government rather than 
media which stands in the way of truth-seeking. He simply does not deal with the quality 
of government information itself, nor with how government uses and abuses its control of 
information. Rather, Habermas is focused on media ownership as, perhaps, the 
explanation for why media sometimes fails in its mission to tell the truth. In fact, it is 
governments that adopt SPC tactics as a means to avoid blame and claim credit who 
 91 
interfere with not only the media’s attempts at ‘truth-telling’, but also the public’s right to 
authentic communication that allows them to understand the truth about governance. 
Rather than recognizing the strategic control and use of information for political advantage 
by government, Habermas spreads the blame, primarily targeting big news media.  
The dynamics of mass communication are driven by the 
power of the media to select, and shape the presentation of 
messages and by the strategic use of political and social 
power to influence the agendas as well as the triggering and 
framing of public issues (p. 415). 41 
Habermas does make one oblique reference which recognises the importance of public 
access to authentic “institutional” information for communicative action: 
The presumption of reasonable outcomes rests in turn on 
the assumption that institutionalized discourses mobilize 
relevant topics and claims, promote the critical evaluation of 
contributions, and lead to rationally motivated yes or no 
reactions (Habermas, 2006: p. 413). 
While there is obviously merit to this critical approach to strategic communication, it fails 
to consider the strategic production and marketing of politically-advantaging information 
by government, which is the central focus of this dissertation. 
John Dryzek (2000) recognizes the detrimental role of government in controlling 
information for its own advantage. He defines government manipulation and distortion of 
its communications with the public as coercion because it is a form of domination, which 
he says diminishes the principle of equality in a democracy:  
 …the degree to which democratic control is engaged 
through communication that encourages reflection upon 
preferences without coercion…this condition is met to the 
degree that domination via the exercise of power, 
manipulation, indoctrination, propaganda deception, 
expressions of mere self-interest, threats and the imposition 
of ideological conformity are all absent. These distorting 
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agents will diminish to the extent of equality in deliberative 
competence across political actors (p.2).42 
Dryzek argues further that by distorting information for purposes of influence, SPC denies 
authentic understanding of the actions and decisions of those who hold power – thereby 
denying “equality of deliberative competence” necessary for critical engagement about 
government. It denies the right to hold government to account for its actions and decisions. 
In so doing, SPC undermines the right and ability to legitimate democracy through 
deliberation among voters (p.29) who are subject to the vast powers and influence of 
government. By this logic, denying authentic understanding is a denial of democracy, in 
particular deliberative or “discursive” democracy, because it denies “the authenticity of 
control” which must “be real rather than symbolic, involving the effective participation of 
autonomous and competent actors” (p.29). Without “authenticity of control” by voter 
legitimation of government, democracy itself is indefensible as a theory of governance, 
Dryzek argues: 
Deliberation as a social process is distinguished from other 
kinds of communication in that deliberators are amenable to 
changing their judgements, preferences, and views during 
the course of their interactions, which involve persuasion 
rather than coercion, manipulation, or deception. The 
essence of democracy itself is now widely taken to be 
deliberation, as opposed to voting, interest aggregation, 
constitutional rights, or even self-government. The 
deliberative turn represents a renewed concern with the 
authenticity of democracy: the degree to which democratic 
control is substantive rather than symbolic, and engaged by 
competent citizens" (1)…a defensible theory of deliberative 
democracy must be critical in its orientation to established 
power structures (Dryzek: p.3). 
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3.3. Defending strategic political communication in government 
Some scholars defend SPC tactics on the part of government, and argue that 
provided that their motive is pure, then so is the method. The end justifies the means. This 
alternative position is argued by public relations scholars Gary A. Copeland and Karen S. 
Johnson-Cartee, who also work as SPC consultants (LinkedIn 2013). They defend SPC 
as “social influence” or “social marketing” that involves both persuasion and propaganda 
and relies on emotional appeal or “resonance” rather than facts and rational argument 
(Johnson-Carlee & Copeland 2004). Their book SPC: Rethinking Social Influence, 
Persuasion, and Propaganda primarily focuses on the use of propaganda techniques for 
strategic influence, both for economic and political marketing. They cite Kecskemeti’s 
(1973: 844) definition of propaganda as “streams of instrumentally manipulated 
communications for the purpose of persuading it to a new view that the propagandist 
prefers” (p.4). Building on this definition they argue that propaganda has been 
misunderstood as brainwashing when in fact it is a strategy which seeks to find 
“resonance” with its audience (Johnson-Cartee & Copeland: p.4):  
Propaganda is not brainwashing – or the introduction of new 
ideas, attitudes, and beliefs – contrary to the individuals’ 
cognitive structure. Rather, propaganda is a resonance 
strategy, the discovery of culturally shared beliefs and the 
deliberate reinforcement and ultimately aggrandizement of 
those beliefs (T. Schwartz 1972, 1976). A resonance 
strategy takes advantage of cultural or group beliefs, values, 
and so on, in order to “evoke” meaning within people. Thus, 
the resonance strategy utilizes messages “harmonious with 
the experience of the audience” (Patti and Frazer 1988: p. 
301). 
While they admit most scholars do not agree (p.2), they argue that propaganda techniques 
are necessary and central to the political communication process, and further, that the use 
of such techniques do not automatically raise ethical concerns about audience, or in the 
case of politics, voter manipulation. Rather, the use of propaganda strategies should be 
judged on the basis of outcome. 
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 In contrast to Habermas’ “communicative action” for understanding, SPC scholars 
Johnson-Carlee & Copeland argue that the end does justify the means, even if it requires 
propaganda techniques to achieve that end, provided that it is, presumably in the view of 
the messenger rather than the receiver who is not privy to a rational understanding, a 
moral end. 
 …it is not the propaganda tactic that is moral or immoral, 
ethical, or unethical; the tactic in and of itself is without moral 
or ethical values. Rather, it is the effects or end results that 
should be judged on the grounds of morality and the 
propagandist’s intent that should be judged on ethical 
grounds (Johnson-Carlee & Copeland 2004: p. 161). 
In this approach, Johnson-Carlee and Copeland also find resonance with the earlier works 
of Edward Bernays, who invented the term public relations, and is said to be the father of 
that profession. The power of mass media was evident to professional public persuaders 
led by Bernays who was Freud’s nephew. He applied his famous uncle’s conclusions 
concerning the psychoanalysis of the individual in a group (Freud 1921)43 in laying the 
ground rules for marketing political leadership, ideologies and parties by manipulating 
public opinion by strategic use of the mass media. Bernays’ essay is the original textbook 
for what more recently has been described as “political marketing” (Scammell 1999). 44 
Like Johnson-Carlee and Copeland, he saw the use of propaganda techniques as a 
legitimate part of the democratic process. Rather than “resonance strategy”, Bernays used 
the term “engineering of consent” to describe the propaganda techniques he 
recommended to political leaders and parties to convince the voting public of their singular 
value.  
The engineering of consent is the very essence of the 
democratic process, the freedom to persuade and suggest. 
The freedoms of speech, press, petition, and assembly, the 
freedoms which make the engineering of consent possible, 
are among the most cherished guarantees of the 
Constitution of the United States (Bernays, 1947). 
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However, Bernays’ views on engineering public consent through deception, and Johnson-
Carlee and Copeland’s definition of acceptable propaganda are not widely-accepted as 
morally-defensible. Problematic for most scholars is the dependence on public deception, 
the intent to mislead, and to do so to advantage the messenger, even if that advantage 
comes at the expense of the receiver. This communication approach puts the receiver at 
a distinct disadvantage in that they lack the authentic understanding necessary to make a 
rational judgement based on the information provided, and therefore may make a decision 
that they would not make were they to fully understand the consequences. In his study of 
propaganda (2002) Randal Marlin argues that however “well-intentioned” – and often they 
are not at all well-intentioned – propaganda techniques are never justified because they 
deny the receiver the ability to act rationally on the basis of authentic understanding, and 
instead mislead the receiver into making the decision preferred by the propagandist: 
…propaganda is likely to involve deceptions of some sorts 
– for example, by facts selected so as to give an incomplete 
picture, one shaping the sort of belief the propagandist 
desires. These may be harmless deceptions, and they may 
correspond in fact with what a reasonable person would 
conclude on being fully informed, but that judgement is one 
the propagandist makes, since the target audience is not 
given the fuller picture from which they might make such an 
evaluation themselves. Here we are speaking of well-
intentioned propaganda. There is also, of course, 
propaganda consisting of lies, where anything that the 
propagandist can get away with will be used if it helps the 
objective. Thirdly, propaganda tends to involve, by 
definition, psychological influences, which bypass rational 
determination of belief on the part of message 
receivers…This does not mean avoidance of rational 
arguments; rather, it means that at some point in a chain of 
reasoning a hidden, or otherwise unexamined 
presupposition will affect the outcome in a way not 
consciously assessed by the propagandee (Marlin 2002: p. 
22). 
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In the case of democracy, the use of propaganda techniques, which Johnson-
Carlee and Copeland equate with SPC, means citizens are denied access to the authentic 
understanding that allows them to assess the risks of representation and thereby mitigate 
or prevent the risk from becoming reality. Therefore, the definition adopted for the purpose 
of this paper is the one proposed by Marlin which implicitly recognizes the right of citizens 
to authentic information that allows reasoned and rational decision-making: 
PROPAGANDA = (def.) The organized attempt through 
communication to affect belief or action or inculcate 
attitudes in a larger audience in ways that circumvent or 
suppress an individual’s adequately informed, rational, 
reflective judgement (Marlin: p.22).45 
By this definition, good intentions, even the very best of intentions, do not serve as moral 
grounds for public deception by those who hold the powers of public office because 
propaganda denies citizens the ability to understand how they are governed and to 
understand the consequences of governance.  
Denying citizens or voters the ability to understand the consequences, further 
denies them the ability to legitimate representation because they are unable to conduct 
reasoned deliberations in the public sphere without access to authentic communication 
that allows understanding of representation. Propaganda tactics, however well meaning, 
are fundamentally anti-democratic because they deny the right to authentic deliberation, 
which is essential to the legitimation of representation. Dryzek explains the central 
importance of deliberation to democracy: 
Under deliberative democracy, the essence of democratic 
legitimacy should be sought …in the ability of all individuals 
subject to a collective decision to engage in authentic 
deliberation about that decision. These individuals should 
accept the decision only if it could be justified to them in 
convincing terms (Dryzek 2002: p.v). 
The anti-democratic essence of propaganda techniques fails entirely to meet the criterion 
for democracy as spelled out by Dahl and others in Chapter 2.  
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3.4. From engineering consent to captains of spin 
Arguably the first spin doctor was Edward Bernays who coined the phrase “public 
relations” and advocated the “engineering of consent” as a means to win and hold pub lic 
support for political actors. American social and political historian Stuart Ewen (1996) 
traces the role and influence of leading public relations practitioners such as Bernays on 
the development of political marketing, from the end of the Second World War through its 
growth under the Ronald Reagan US presidency, and under the presidency of the first 
George Bush. Bernays is without question the most influential of the pioneers of political 
communication. “’Engineering of Consent’” (1947) offers a revealing look at the ideas that 
have come to inform the exercise of political and economic power in our time,” Ewen writes 
(p.373).46 A brilliant public relations strategist, Bernays was also effective as a political 
consultant because he adapted his pro-capitalist sales pitch to the language of liberal 
democracy and invoked the rights of the individual and the American constitution. This 
was critical, writes Ewen. Bernays also couched his pitch in the politically-neutral language 
of science, as Ewen also points out:  
Assisted by experts, ‘who have specialized in utilizing the 
channels of communication’… leaders will be able – 
wherever expedient – to ‘accomplish purposefully and 
scientifically what we have termed the engineering of 
consent (Ewen, 1996: p. 12).  
Bernays was also among the first to fully understand the power of mass media, and the 
way in which it could be engaged strategically to promote both corporate and political 
products. One of the ways in which he managed the media was to manufacture news, as 
he explains in his1947 essay:  
Primarily...the engineer of consent must create news. News 
is…an overt act that makes news, and news in turn shapes 
the attitudes and actions of people. A good criterion as to 
whether or not something is or is not news is whether the 
event juts out of the pattern of the routine. The development 
of events and circumstances that are not routine is one of 
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the basic functions of the engineer of consent (Bernays: p. 
119).47 
Ewen argues that the “engineering of consent” finally came to full fruition in the presidency 
of Reagan, who had first been groomed for leadership in the corporate sector under the 
careful tutelage of James Kelleher, a political marketing expert who pitched appearance 
over substance. The election of Reagan, says Ewen, represented the victory of public 
relations over democratic process. “He was the issue of a society in which public relations 
had grown into an indispensable, increasingly universal expedient of power…Democracy 
and its antithesis – the domination of the public sphere by moneyed elites – were 
reconciled as one.” 48 
Political scientist David Morgan (1986) begins and ends his book The Flacks of 
Washington, in the Reagan years as president. Morgan chronicles the attempt by the 
Reagan administration to “centralize and control the flow of information from departments 
and agencies to the public.” 49 His perspective on the relationship between the reporters 
who work the White House beat and the SPC officers working for the executive branch is 
distinctly different from the typical political economist’s perspective of reporters. While the 
journalists are “the focus of agency news management efforts,” writes Morgan, “The artful 
flack is met by the artful reporter.” From this perspective it becomes more evident that 
news management is a complex and unpredictable task for political communications 
managers. It is perhaps the most hopeful perspective offered because it does not concede 
complete victory to those who would manage the public sphere for their own ends. In the 
more than 60 years since Bernays’ essay on “engineering consent” was written, the 
propaganda techniques of SPC have moved far beyond what even the father of public 
relations might have envisioned, and now function as part of the everyday modern 
democratic governance process. What has emerged in Canada and in other developed 
democracies is the application of marketing techniques, working in tandem with 
propaganda methods, as the primary means of communication between government and 
the electorate. 
Analysis of political marketing and the subset field of SPC is a relatively new area 
for political scholars in Canada. Perhaps the earliest work of its kind is Making “Pictures 
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in Our Heads” (2000) on government advertising in Canada by Queen’s University political 
scientist Jonathan Rose. He notes that “increasingly, governments are resorting to 
Madison Avenue techniques as methods of political mobilization.” The consequences for 
democracy are a serious concern when political marketing replaces political 
communication. In the commodified world of political marketing, citizens become political 
consumers, and the public sphere becomes a marketplace in which to promote policies 
and ideologies as commodities offered for sale. “The mass public becomes objects of 
persuasion rather than people involved in a dialogue with each other” (Rose: p.209). 50 
The consequences for democracy in Canada are disturbing, according to Rose. He 
pointed to the rhetoric of political advertising in the form of 30-second television spots as 
the commodification of politics, and the damage to democratic political discourse in the 
public sphere.  
If one of the assumptions of democratic polity relies on an 
informed electorate, this latest trend may be worrisome, as 
such an approach to politics discourages reflective thought. 
Ads do not attempt to enlighten, but rather are intended to 
seduce, cajole, or persuade through the manipulation of 
images; there is no semblance of reflective thinking in these 
sound bites. As such, these advertisements…are 
reductionist. Political ads take complex issues and 
necessarily reduce them to simple images...The rise in the 
use of advertising by governments is symptomatic of the 
decline of our public conversation…Communication of this 
kind commodifies politics. Politics is not similar to but is 
transformed into another commodity, and the selling of 
politics becomes no different than the selling of soap (Rose: 
p. 2).51 
The critique of political marketing through mass media has from the beginning been 
concerned with the detrimental implications for democracy of “engineering consent,” which 
was seen as diametrically opposed to the principles of classical democratic theory which 
espoused the necessity of informed and enlightened citizenry (Mill, Madison, Adam). 
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Although political marketing on a mass scale through media is a relatively new 
phenomenon, the critical debate concerning its consequences for democracy also finds 
its roots in the classical political theory of Aristotle and concerns the question of what is 
“proper” and what is “improper” governance. Aristotle’s schematic of proper and improper 
governance, according to Frank Cunningham, rested on the premise that: “Proper (or 
‘right’) rule is undertaken for the common good while improper rule aims to serve private 
interests, whether of the one, the few, or of the many themselves” (Cunningham: p. 7).52 
The common good is defined by modern theorists as “the public interest,” which defines 
the mandate of democratic government, including the bureaucracy who are “public 
servants,” and the officials who are elected to represent the public. Public relations 
operates on an entirely different ethos, which is the representation of a client’s interest.53 
The distinction between public relations as serving the private interests of a client, and 
governance, which has a mandate to serve the common or public interest of pluralistic 
communities of citizens has become all the more significant since the 1980s as a result of 
the ever-increasing and influential role of public relations professionals inside government.  
Governments in Canada, Britain and the United States increasing rely on the 
advice of public relations specialists in political marketing for advice on governance 
between, as well as during, election campaigns. However, political media communications 
is different from the PR professionals who work mostly for corporations and other non-
governmental institutions. Often they have no background training in PR, and instead, as 
this chapter will show, are hired primarily on the basis of their political loyalty to the party 
in power. Their purpose is to promote and protect the partisan interests of that party to 
maintain power. Most of their training in media relations is on the job – taught by other 
partisan actors on how to manage the media, and by extension, the public, for political 
advantage. For this reason political staff, often referred to by the derogatory term “spin 
doctors” are not held in high regard by PR or media relations professionals who work by 
the codes of ethics that guide their profession. The Canadian Public Relations Society 
Code of Ethics requires that practitioners represent only their employer or client: “Members 
shall personally accept no fees, commissions, gifts or any other considerations for 
professional services from anyone except employers or clients for whom the services were 
specifically performed” (CPRA 2013).54 While SPC practitioners honour employer loyalty, 
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they do not honour all aspects of the profession codes. The most crucial section of the PR 
code ignored by SPC professionals is the following: 
A member shall practice the highest standards of honesty, 
accuracy, integrity and truth, and shall not knowingly 
disseminate false or misleading information (CPRA 2013). 
This part of the code breaks down in political communications when it involves the use of 
spin or propaganda which, as has already been established, is the deliberate attempt to 
mislead the receiver in order to gain advantage. Spin is similar, and equally as problematic 
for journalists, for opposition parties and for members of the public because it cannot be 
accepted as true or authentic. 
 In his 2008 book In the News: The Practice of Media Relations in Canada, William 
Wray Carney traces the history of spin to political communication and defines it as follows: 
Spin has its roots in political communications and is 
generally understood as taking a partisan approach to an 
issue, aggressively arguing one side of it while denigrating 
the other, often on the grounds that there are two sides to 
every issue and both deserve equal merit. This, in the world 
of spin, a story noting that cigarettes cause cancers should 
have as much space devoted to the counter-evidence(even 
though there is none) as is given to the scientific evidence 
(Carney 2008: p.25-26). 
The problematic from an effective communications perspective is that when spin becomes 
an entrenched and therefore expected communication practice, it undermines the 
credibility of the source. That not only creates tensions between the political 
communicators who rely on spin and journalists, it also causes tension with other members 
of the PR profession who feel that their credibility is also damaged by association. Carney 
writes that: “Great tension exists between spin and public relations, and there is a 
difference in the practices”. Carney describes spin as “deception” (p. 25). He notes that 
“spin has its roots in in political communication and is generally understood as taking a 
partisan approach to an issue, aggressively arguing one side of it, while denigrating the 
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other, often on the grounds that there are two sides to every issue and both deserve equal 
merit” (p. 25-26). Carney admits that spin “sometimes works.” But he warns that: 
“Pragmatically, all reporters and a good deal of the public (which is more media-savvy 
than it is usually given credit for) can spot spin at a first glance and are skeptical of it” (p. 
27). Perhaps that awareness helps to explain some of the public’s and news media’s 
“negativity bias”, cited by Hood. 
3.5. From marketing to manipulation  
Kirsten Kozolanka (2012) traces political marketing in Canada from its early 
applications under the Liberal government of Jean Chretien, which first adopted the “New-
Right-led” private sector business and marketing “results-based” techniques and 
assessments, known as “new public management” (NPM), to streamline and downsize 
the cost and size of delivering government services (107-108). The ethos of governance 
was no longer simply a matter of providing services in the public interest. NPM required 
that the value of these services must be justified and quantified in the interests of citizens 
as clients, or consumers whom as taxpayers were ultimately paying for the service. It was 
therefore a logical step to also consider citizens as consumers when it came to justifying 
policies and the exercise of elected power. Bureaucrats were no longer expected to merely 
deliver public services and provide policy advice to elected government. They were also 
expected to sell those programs to citizen-consumers, changing the purpose of 
government communication from informational to promotional marketing of often 
controversial downsizing policies (Kozolanka p.108). In effect, public servants were 
expected to market government policies and decisions, seriously undermining any 
meaningful principle of political neutrality on the part of public servants (Kozolanka: p.108). 
The politicization of the public service was led by the Privy Council Office (PCO) which 
both administers and co-ordinates the public service and the Office of the Prime Minister.  
The shift in the Canadian public service, which is 
administered by the Privy Council Office (PCO), from policy 
advice to a service delivery model and its creeping 
politicization by successive government had unexpected 
repercussions for communication in the public service. Once 
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confined to disseminating information on policy, 
communications took on new importance. Growth in the 
size, functions, and prestige of communications began in 
the late 1990s after massive cutbacks to the public service 
as it became clear that it was needed in order to sell 
controversial policies that shifted away from the Keynesian 
post-war social welfare policies toward a market-driven 
ethos. As communication began to be seen as a strategic 
function for government, other shifts took place, including 
what I have elsewhere referred to as institutionalization and 
centralization (Kozolanka: p.108-109). 
As Chapter 4 illustrates, the central role of strategic political communication in the 
Canadian federal government, in particular under the Conservative governments of Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper, has contributed to an overall centralization of power in the hands 
of the PMO.  
The centralization of power in the hands of the PM and his political staff has been 
explored most extensively by Donald Savoie, whose perspective is widely-accepted and 
often cited by Canadian political scientists and public administration scholars. Savoie 
recently summed up this thesis in an opinion piece published by the Globe and Mail 
concerning the political communication crisis arising from the PMO’s attempts to cover-up 
questionable expenses filed by Conservative-appointed senator Mike Duffy, who would 
subsequently be charged with several counts of fraud. The evidence at Duffy’s trial has 
shown that the PMO was calling the shots in the attempt, which would prove spectacularly 
unsuccessful, to prevent the public from becoming aware of irregularities in Duffy’s 
expenses. Savoie points out that the case strongly confirms his argument, made over the 
past 16 years in several books, that not only is government controlled from the centre of 
the PMO, controlling communication as a means to avoid accountability for mistakes, “the 
blame game” is a primary concern for the PMO’s unelected politically-appointed staff. 
Savoie’s August 13, 2015 editorial is worth quoting at some length as it summarises the 
role and extent of PMO message management: 
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When I published Governing from the Centre: The 
Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics in 1999, some 
political aides in Ottawa insisted that I had overstated the 
case. I hear no one making the argument today, and for 
good reason. One only needs to look at the pile of e-mails 
that were made public from the Mike Duffy trial this week to 
appreciate the extent to which governing from the centre 
now drives everything in Ottawa, from major policy 
decisions down to minor management issues, if the centre 
decides it needs to go there. 
Staffers from the Prime Minister’s Office roamed the 
corridors of the Senate as if it were an extension of their 
office. Audit reports were regarded as little more than 
briefing notes to be carefully managed by the centre. What 
truly matters in government now is the ability to manage the 
“blame game,” and it seems that only those operating at the 
centre have the required political clout to dictate how it 
should be managed. If PMO staffers think that they are free 
to tell the Senate how it should go about its work, one can 
only imagine what it must be like for ministers, their staffs 
and senior public servants whose careers are tied directly to 
the wishes of the prime minister. 
We have created a two-tier system of government in 
Ottawa, or an upstairs-downstairs to governing. More to the 
point, governing from the centre has created a fault line in 
the government where things that matter to the prime 
minister and his immediate advisers are brought above the 
line and dealt with quickly and effectively. Only the prime 
minister and his advisers will decide what belongs above the 
fault line. It can be anything from a decision to go to war 
while not consulting the relevant ministers – let alone the 
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cabinet – down to a $90,000 problem considered sufficiently 
important to generate 450+ pages of e-mails... 
What does not matter to the prime minister and his advisers 
is pushed down below the fault line. Here, ministers and 
departments are expected to run on their tracks and not 
create fodder for the blame game. Here, public servants are 
also expected to attend countless meetings and deal with a 
growing array of oversight bodies that would not be tolerated 
in any other sector…  
An upstairs-downstairs to governing and treating our 
political institutions as an appendage of the PMO is fraught 
with danger for democracy, for national unity and sound 
public policy and for the pursuit of the public interest 
(Savoie, August 13, 2015). 
Savoie argues that what is on trial in the Duffy case, is not just an individual who has 
broken the rules, and possibly the law, but democracy itself as it exists in the Canadian 
context. Too often the point of the communications exercise so central to governance is 
avoiding “blame”, which might also be described as avoiding being held to account for 
actions by attempting to keeping information about the blameworthy incident from public 
view. Avoiding the risk of being blamed is a priority in government that places its own 
partisan interests at odds with the public’s interest in knowing how it is governed.  
3.6. It’s Like Herding Bad-Tempered Cats: Why Spin Sometimes Fails 
Canadian political studies scholar Paul Thomas notes that one of the reasons why 
government is not always successful in managing news media, is because reporters 
operate on the understanding that the SPC professionals are always trying to win credit 
or avoid blame for their employer. Journalists increasingly identify the spin, and have 
become increasingly more effective in calling it out. 
The media have become more defensive against being 
manipulated and more aggressive in exposing problems 
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that government would prefer would be ignored. Indeed, so 
numerous, continuous, instantaneous and relentless is 
media coverage, including by so-called new media, that 
governments often find themselves in a reactive stance 
trying to improvise communications responses to 
unforeseen events and managing the political damage 
arising from negative news (Thomas, 2011: p. 14).  
There was an interesting example of how this plays out during the Liberal’s August 2013 
caucus meeting which was held on Prince Edward Island to plan for their return to 
Parliament in the fall. The Liberal gathering was covered by political reporters, both 
national and local, and drew coverage and attention for the party. The Conservative Party 
countered by making several major P.E.I. funding announcements, also designed to win 
media attention, and to thereby at least share the limelight. Instead of simply reporting the 
government funding announcements, Hill Times reporter Tim Naumetz, pointed out the 
location and timing of the government announcements, and sought Liberal reaction. His 
lede, the journalistic term for the first sentence of a story, reads as follows: 
 
Prime Minister Stephen Harper has dispatched several top 
Cabinet ministers to flood Prince Edward Island with millions 
of dollars in federal contracts and grants this week in what 
Liberal MPs claim is an attempt to shift public attention away 
from Liberal Leader Justin Trudeau’s first regional retreat 
with his Parliamentary caucus (Naumetz, Hill Times,  August 
28, 2013).55  
Naumetz reported that two Conservative cabinet ministers had made public 
appearances on the island during the Liberal caucus, one to give awards to veterans, and 
another to announce that the government would contribute $8.6 million towards a 
convention centre to be built in Charlottetown. The reporter sought reaction from Liberal 
P.E.I. MP Wayne Easter on the timing and location of the announcements. “I don’t think 
there’s any question there’s a blitz on to try and draw attention away from Trudeau and 
the Liberal caucus,” Liberal MP Wayne Easter (Malpeque, P.E.I.) told The Hill Times. He 
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also sought a response from Conservative PEI MP and Fisheries Minister Gail Shea, who 
had announced the convention centre. One of Shea’s political staff responded with a 
denial that the timing of the announcements had anything to do with trying to divert 
attention from the Liberal caucus meeting. 
A spokesperson for Ms. Shea, Mr. Harper’s political minister 
for the province, said the events were not planned to deflect 
public attention away from Mr. Trudeau and the Liberals. 
“No, that’s not the reason,” Ms. Shea’s communications 
director, Sophie Doucet, told The Hill Times in an email, 
noting that a string of senior Cabinet ministers made official 
visits to the island province even prior to the Liberal meeting 
(Naumetz).  
This sort of reporting is often cited as seeking conflict – setting opposing sides one against 
the other. However, in the absence of an ability to obtain authentic or even complete 
information which would allow verification of truth on either side, the reporter’s only option 
in truth-seeking is to present negative dialectics and let the reader decide for themselves 
whether to believe either or neither of the actors. Both sides were heard. At the same time, 
the reporter challenged the Conservative attempt to spin positive news coverage away 
from the Liberals and towards their own party. The Conservatives had been seeking credit 
through their announcements, but were met instead by what they most certainly saw as a 
negativity bias from the reporter. In fact, he was simply reporting the story at a more 
complex and sophisticated level than the party communication strategists had anticipated. 
He refused to be spun.  
3.7. Journalists and the political spinmeisters: dysfunctional co-
dependence   
Journalists and SPC professionals are fundamentally and constantly at odds with 
one another. It is the job of the partisan communications staff working for elected 
government, to seek credit for their bosses and party. However, it is equally as important 
to avoid controversy which might damage the political brand by avoiding what Hood 
describes as “blame risk.” Therefore, the relationship between journalists and SPC 
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specialists is difficult, to say the least. Journalists seek out controversy, for reasons far 
more complicated that is often expressed by scholars focused on capitalist mass media 
monopolies and ownership – relevant topics though they most certainly are – than on 
journalists and their contentious working relationships with partisan government 
communications actors. Journalists and their editors must rely, to a significant degree, on 
SPC specialists for information about government policies, for information about executive 
branch actions and decisions. As this and the following chapters demonstrate, they are in 
a constant battle for access to non-SPC or political actors such as public servants, or even 
ministers. At the same time, it is the job of the journalist to avoid becoming a promoter or 
sales person for a particular interest, including a governing party – hence their negatively 
bias. That means that they are expected to call the politically-marketed product into 
question and to bring in oppositional voices, if legitimate, or at least to provide a non-
partisan perspective through differing voices and perspectives. The relationship is 
symbiotic and interdependent, and at the same time highly oppositional. The normative 
view offered by many communication scholars is that professional journalists, those who 
are paid for their work, if acknowledged as actors at all are seen as either passive players 
or worse, as unconscious propagandists for the interests of their corporate owners and 
capitalist government (Chomsky and Herman 1982). It is not my purpose in this thesis to 
argue for the agency of journalists. But it is important to understand the role of journalists 
if only in order to understand the purpose and practices of SPC. Interpretations of 
journalism as inconsequential or worse suggests a flawed lack of depth of understanding 
both of journalism and of how journalists interact with government and its SPC staff. To a 
large extent SPC tactics have increasingly become a central part of the political 
communication process precisely because journalists cannot be relied on to act as either 
cheerleaders or propagandists for the governing party’s actions and interests. In fact, 
managing the flow of information about government is primarily intended to limit journalists’ 
ability to report negative information which might increase the risk of blame for the 
governing party.  
The adversarial relationship between journalists and government in Canada was 
the focus of a 2014 M.A. Thesis by Canadian Press senior parliamentary reporter Jennifer 
Ditchburn. Her thesis focused on how parliamentary press gallery reporters “became 
pathfinders to get around the newest information roadblocks” imposed by … the federal 
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government’s strategic communication tactics” pp. 1). Ditchburn focused specifically on 
political marketing tactics of promotion and persuasion, as well as on strategic restrictions 
on information and source access imposed on the Ottawa press gallery during the 
government of Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper. Ditchburn therefore 
considers SPC from the perspective of how it affects the work of journalists, including 
herself. It is influenced, as she admits, by a “practitioner’s perspective” resulting from 
almost 20 years of experience covering federal politics in Ottawa. However, she also relies 
on journalism literature, historical records and analysis, and on interviews with 14 senior 
members of the parliamentary press gallery. She notes that journalists are often criticized 
for being “sensationalist, overly focused on process, lazy and biased.” But is this not an 
overly simplistic view of the work of the media in a changing political landscape? 
Recognizing my own bias in this regard, I tend to take the perspective of Michael 
Schudson, who writes that “attachment to a particular vision of journalism – fact-centered, 
aggressive, energetic, and non-partisan – remains powerful, practically sacred, among 
American journalists” (Why Democracies 32 [as cited by Ditchburn p.8]). As Ditchburn 
points out, managing news media is not new to governance communications operations. 
She cites a definition of government news management by German scholar Barbara 
Pfetsch, which explains why by making the link between managing news media and 
managing public opinion, or at least setting that as a goal. Pfetsch defines government 
news management as: 
A strategic variant of public information whereby political 
actors manage communication in order to influence public 
opinion by controlling the news media agenda. It is a top 
down process of communication whereby the media are the 
means and targets while the strategies are determined by 
the political objectives of the specific actor (As cited by 
Ditchburn: p.10).  
News media and the journalists who write and report for them are targeted because they 
provide a conduit to public opinion. Ditchburn acknowledges that increasingly SPC also 
includes attempts to bypass journalists and reach the public directly through social media 
such as Twitter and Facebook (Examples of this approach are explored in Chapter 4.) 
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That is obviously another communication path for government, but it is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation. That said, news media still matters as a primary target for SPC. 
News media remains an important starting point for the study of SPC, because it 
opens the door to a discussion of influence – in particular the ways in which government 
seeks to influence news media – which is largely irrelevant and unnecessary if you accept 
the view of media complicity with government as a theoretical standpoint. It would hardly 
seem necessary to go to so much trouble if that were the case. Also important to 
understanding SPC tactics by government is Kozolanka’s acknowledgement that despite 
the revolutionary changes in communication technology, and the financial crisis it has 
brought to traditional news media, most individuals still turn to traditional news media for 
an understanding of political issues and governance. A chapter by Frederick Fletcher in 
the book edited by Kozolanka reinforces the view that traditional news media still plays a 
significant role in influencing the public discourse on politics. His chapter Journalism, 
Corporate Media, and Democracy in the Digital Era considers the important and significant 
influence of “emerging online influences as an increasingly important ‘force’ along with 
traditional news media in shaping “the public agenda…in public policymaking and what is 
often called civic engagement, or the involvement of citizens in the political process” 
(Fletcher, 2014: p.28). His analysis is useful in understanding the significant role news 
media, as well as online media, also play in helping to shape the decisions and policies of 
political strategists who are acutely aware of the influence all forms of media exert on 
public opinion: “Policymakers ask themselves how a government decision will play in the 
media – or at least the media they care about – and with their political base” (Fletcher, 
2014: p.28). He also makes clear that the media they care about still included traditional 
mass news media. In fact, the digitization of traditional news media, would appear to have 
only increased their influence, despite falling revenues for print media due to declining ad 
revenue and subscriptions: 
Although the Internet is gaining on traditional media, the 
latter are still the most important sources of news for 
Canadian. For national and international news, the major 
sources identified by Canadians are television at 40 per 
cent, Internet at 33 per cent, and newspapers at 15 per cent. 
For local news, printed newspapers are most important (38 
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per cent), followed by television (26 per cent) and radio (18 
per cent). Among those who go online for news, the most 
visited sites are newspaper Web sites (66 per cent); portal 
Web sites, which derive their news from traditional news 
organizations (64 per cent) and television network Web sites 
(52 per cent) (Logan et al. 2010, as cited by Fletcher, 2014: 
p.37).   
There is no question that traditional news media remains a primary focus for political 
strategists in the Harper PMO, as the next chapters will demonstrate.  
In his 2008 textbook for public relations students, media relations expert Carney 
(2008) writes that government communication with the public relies heavily on news media 
because it has strengths that other forms of communication, including advertising, do not. 
Chief among these are the immediacy of the medium, the size of audience, the lack of 
cost compared to advertising, and finally, because it has credibility with the public, a 
reason that Carney admits might prove confusing for some, given that opinion polls show 
that the public holds journalists in low esteem (p.6). Paradoxically, news media is also 
where people turn for information they believe they can trust, according to Carney. 
However, Carney also warns that while there are advantages to reaching the public 
through news media, there are also risks, or “disadvantages.” The first of these is “lack of 
control” over how the issue will be portrayed: 
This is the most important issue most practitioner and 
organizations need to consider. At the end of the day, the 
reporter will write the story she feels is best. You do not get 
to see it before it is sent to the wire; you won’t know what it 
looks like until it runs…Some professions perceive control 
as a major value…and many traditional government and 
business organizations retain tight control on their image 
and messages. Having to deal with media can be 
enormously frustrating for such bodies, because they can’t 
control the media (p. 7-8).  
 112 
Carney also warns of what Hood has described as the “negativity bias” of news media 
which Carney describes as “Bad press. Just as media can be helpful in building support 
for a cause or issue, they can also turn against it” (p. 10-11).  
3.8. Manage the message, manage media 
Among the most interesting observations about traditional news media in an age 
of the expanding influence of social media, is how much it still matters to politicians 
seeking to win public support and approval. Historically, news media has played a central 
role in communication between government and the public. That fact has been 
acknowledged, albeit as troubling, by even the strongest critics of professional news media 
organizations. In her introduction to the 2014 book Publicity and the Canadian State, 
Kirsten Kozolanka cites several of the best known mass-media critics, including Edward 
Herman and Robert McChesney whom she quotes as calling media the “pre-eminent 
vehicles of communication through which the public participates in the democratic 
process” (1997: p. 3, as cited by Kozolanka, 2014: p.15). She adds that “media act as a 
“communications channel” for political elites who get to define the issues”. Kozolanka, 
while largely sympathetic to the critical theory perspective of a shared dominant capitalist 
political and media discourse, admits to a more nuanced view of the relationship between 
politicians and the media.  
The relationship of the media to the political sphere 
particularly has been described as an ongoing struggle in 
which politicians, supported by an expansive publicity 
apparatus, seek to frame the issue and set the political 
agenda. The task of both politicians and media is 
complicated by dwindling resources for newsrooms within 
media conglomerates, concurrent with growing perceptions 
by politicians of their increased need for publicity. There 
appears to be no easy conclusion to draw on which set of 
actors – the media or the politicians – has the upper hand, 
and the continual scrutiny of that relationship in recent years 
seems too narrow, as well as misplaced…The media still 
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remain the general public’s primary source in shaping the 
dominant discourse (Kozolanka, 2014: p.15).  
The fact that the public still turns to news media, albeit increasingly indirectly through 
social media and Twitter links to mainstream news stories, means that news media 
remains a central focus of SPC tactics.   
3.9. Blaming the media 
Communication studies is not alone in dismissing or challenging the role of 
journalists in the political communication process. Even some highly respected political 
scholars such as Donald Savoie question the motives and professional integrity of political 
journalists. In Court Government and the Collapse of Accountability, arguably the most 
important contemporary work on the centralization of power and politicization of 
governance in the Canadian federal government, Savoie attacks both the Access to 
Information Act, and the journalists who use it as engaging in a “search for sleaze.” 
The search for sleaze in government is never ending and 
often dominates the media. This is not to suggest that 
sleaze in government is new…The difference today is that 
journalists spend a considerable amount of time hunting 
down unsavoury stories, and the hunting has been made 
considerably easier (Savoie, 2008:69) 
Savoie then blames journalists for the rise of government spin, and in effect complains 
about media’s negativity bias, without acknowledging the effects of the centralization of 
SPC in the PMO and the resultant positivity bias it entails in terms of the information made 
available about governance. Savoie characterizes media’s political coverage in Ottawa 
with the term “gotcha’” journalism which is shorthand for sensationalized reportage, often 
characterized as intended to sell newspapers or garner audience, rather than to tell a 
legitimation story. The reference shows a complete lack of understanding and respect for 
the serious professionals who cover Parliament and government daily and interpret events 
for the public. Rather, Savoie argues that what he sees as their search for “sleaze” forces 
government to manipulate and control information through the use of spin. 
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The advent of ‘gotcha’ journalism has given rise to a new 
class of political assistants and government employees – 
spin doctors. Spin doctors are not only to sell a message but 
to contain the political fallout from negative development or 
news stories. Politicians now have to be on their guard lest 
present and past events are brought up, however small 
(Savoie 2008: 68-69). 
This interpretation of journalists as irresponsible mischief-makers responsible for, and 
thereby deserving of, strategic communication tactics by government is problematic from 
a number of perspectives, even if we set aside the legitimate role of journalists in a 
democracy in holding government to account on behalf of the public’s interest. It also 
trivializes the rise of SPC tactics at the highest level of government, and the ways in which 
partisan political interests are changing and influencing the structures of government for 
partisan advantage. Ironically, it is these same structural changes, the centralization of 
power and influence under the control of the PMO and his courtiers, which is at the heart 
of the Savoie thesis. As Thomas points out, communication and control of government 
and political communication for strategic political advantage lies at the heart of this 
centralization process. There is also a link between the effectiveness of journalists in 
holding government to account and attempts by government to counter that scrutiny.  
However, that does not mean that journalists are failing to do their jobs 
professionally, as Ditchburn’s M.A. thesis shows. Many examples of muckraking reporting 
also exist to disprove this theory, as the Liberal government learned to its regret in the 
Sponsorship scandal. Given the level of information control in government and restrictions 
on the access to information, political reporters are remarkably effective in keeping tabs 
on government. And they do so, almost without exception, in accordance with the rules 
and laws that guide and govern the practice of journalism. Rather than blaming and, 
ironically at the same time, dismissing journalists and news media, as serious actors in 
the political communications field, it is much more informative to understand just how 
significant they have become. Thomas argues that news media has significant influence 
on the operations of government, and in particular on its increasingly sophisticated 
attempts to control political communication for its own strategic ends.   
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As the media have moved increasingly to the centre of 
politics and policy-making, the communications functions 
within government have become more extensive, 
professional, specialized and politicized (Kozolanka, 2006 
[as cited by Thomas]). Governments rely on the media to 
reach diverse audiences and they take the amount of media 
attention given to issues as one indirect indicator of public 
opinion. In their reliance on the media to reach the public, 
governments have become more systematic and 
sophisticated in their efforts to control the timing, 
presentation and reception for messages and disclosure of 
information (Thomas 2011: p.13-14).  
Indeed, the news media is often highly effective in influencing public opinion. Thomas cites 
a study by Stefaan Walgrave and Peter Van Aelst (2006) who reviewed 19 academic 
studies of mass media’s ability to influence public opinion on political issues, in effect 
setting the agenda. 
Of the 19 studies they reviewed, almost half established a 
strong media impact on the political agenda, four attributed 
considerable impact, three found only weak impact and four 
found hardly any impact. These mixed findings were 
attributed to weak theorization and variable research 
designs (Walgrave and Van Aelst, 2006: 9 [as cited by 
Thomas 2011: p.14]). 
It is impossible, I would argue, to understand the motives and techniques of SPC without 
understanding the role and importance of news media journalists, in particular, because 
they are the primary target and focus of SPC professionals. As the spin doctors try to 
influence voters, the most effective way to do so is to influence the journalists who are 
assigned to cover their political bosses. Therefore, in the interests of fairness, balance and 
increased understanding, I would like to provide an insiders’ perspective on working 
journalists and the rules and responsibilities of journalism. I clearly declare my own bias 
as a practising journalist for over two decades, and as a journalism instructor for the past 
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decade. However, as a former journalist and as a journalism instructor, I am also a critic 
and believe in meeting the standards of journalism that legitimize the profession when 
followed, and delegitimize when not. I would like to begin by laying out some ground rules 
for journalism. These rules are not obscure, they are central to the practice and profession. 
Journalists, and in particular those who cover government, take this task and the duties it 
implies seriously. The role and tasks of journalism are not left to individual choice or whim, 
but rather are taught in journalism schools and newsrooms and shaped by a number of 
factors, not the least of which is the rule of law, and in particular media law which all 
journalists must understand and respect if they are to function in the profession. 
Journalists seek truth not only because it is ethical, but also because it is far too risky for 
the journalist or her employer if she does not. 
3.10. The logic and rules of journalism: Canadian journalism and the law 
The first step in understanding journalism is to recognize that journalists operate 
under strict legal and ethical codes. Journalists, if they are to legitimately assume that title, 
must be guided by media laws, guidelines and codes of ethics that include accuracy, 
fairness, balance and independence from all interests other than the public interest. While 
freedom of the press is protected under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, that does 
not mean freedom to report whatever a journalist pleases. The first rule is that whatever 
is reported must not only be true, but the journalist and his or her publication must be able 
to prove it to be true in court if necessary. Canadian journalists are governed by some of 
the strictest libel laws in the world, which means that the burden of proof lies with the 
journalist who must prove the truth of what was reported if challenged in a court of law. 
The supposition under Canadian media law is that a claim of libel is true until proven false, 
rather than the standard legal assumption of innocence until proven guilty. The Canadian 
Press Stylebook, which is the standard operating manual for all newsrooms in Canada, is 
unequivocal about not publishing a defamatory libel, and about the actions to be taken if 
there is even the slightest concern that a story might be libelous: 
Libel is the publication of a false and damaging 
statement…Defamation is a statement that tends to lower a 
person in the opinion of others, or exposes the person to 
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hatred, contempt of ridicule. Defamation is also a statement 
that injures another’s reputation in a way that affects that 
person’s livelihood – work, trade or profession – or financial 
credit.  
When a story is known to be libellous, kill it at once. 
When even a slight doubt exists, withhold the story from 
publication immediately while a check is made. 
Then either kill it or release it promptly. (Canadian Press 
2008:p.226) 
The only justification for releasing the story is provable truth. The CP stylebook warns 
reporters and editors that: “Truth is difficult to prove (p.227).” Making it up is not an option 
for a journalist. Further, even if the story can be proven to be true and is therefore not 
libellous, if it is defamatory and damaging, journalists must also consider the ethics of 
publication, and in particular, whether or not it is in the public interest to do so, according 
to the CP stylebook. 
Public interest and lack of malice are not specified by law 
[other than in Quebec. However professional ethics dictate 
that before publishing a truthful but damaging statement, the 
press will weigh carefully whether the public interest is 
served by publication. And absence of malice must be a 
foregone conclusion in the publication of any news report 
(p.227).  
Under Canadian libel law, journalists cannot report defamatory information unless they are 
able to confirm, and if necessary, prove it to be true. So while there is often a negative 
bias in reporting on an issue, the negative information must be true if it is to be used. 
3.11. Sleazy stories and ‘gotcha’ journalism, or a matter of public interest? 
There is no question that some stories reported by journalists are sleazy – involving 
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unsavoury characters and tawdry circumstances. But that doesn’t necessarily mean that 
the stories should not be reported, in particular when it involves powerful people who have 
influence over other people’s lives. In fact a politician who is caught up in what might be 
described as sleazy behaviour has probably failed to live up to the agreed expectations 
on which he or she was elected to office. Voters have a right to know that and to decide 
whether or not their continued support is in order. Nor does the fact that a story concerns 
sleazy content mean that the journalistic methods involved are necessarily sleazy – and 
here I am referring to legitimate political reporting, and not to the celebrity stories pursued 
primarily by American entertainment media such as TMZ and the National Enquirer. This 
sort of reporting falls well short of journalism ethics and standards and undermines the 
profession.  
In fact, it is often the case that the most questionable subject matter requires that 
journalists exercise the highest standards of journalism, first because it involves 
defamatory information and therefore might be subject to libel. But also because in order 
to be credible, the story must be beyond reproach in terms of journalistic standards and 
ethics. The bottom line is that when it comes to public officials who exhibit sleazy 
behaviour, it is in the public’s interest for the information to be reported. A useful way of 
evaluating a story is to ask whether it is true and accurately reported, and whether it is it 
presented in a fair and balanced manner. You might also ask whether or not it serves the 
public interest to report the story, although that is not essential. If however, it is in the 
public interest, there is little justification for not reporting the story. One could certainly 
argue that there is a large element of sleaze to the story of Toronto Mayor Rob Ford’s 
alleged use of illicit drugs, but it can equally be argued that it is in the public interest to 
know about the involvement of their mayor in such activities.  
There is no denying that there is also a great deal of bad journalism, including 
sensationalism, sleaze and exploitation for profit. Ward notes that the business of news 
and seeking profit also threatens standards of journalism. He is not alone among 
journalism scholars in his concerns about media companies subverting the journalism 
process for profit, and journalists who seek personal fame and fortune over veracity and 
credibility– although in fairness, the latter is much more apropos to big American news 
media such as Fox News and Bill O’Reilly, than to smaller and less lucrative Canadian 
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news outlets, where the biggest news media stars are CTV’s Lisa LaFlamme and CBC’s 
Peter Mansbridge.  
Journalism becomes debased if it falls into the hands of 
unethical media owners and journalists or when editorial 
resources are squandered on merely entertaining stories. It 
falters when it fails to question the power that be and when 
budget cuts strangle investigative journalism. It degenerates 
when its business overwhelms its democratic functions, 
seeking profit through every cheap trick in the history of 
popular printing – jingoism, sensationalism and fear-
mongering. Journalism is an anti-democratic art when news 
organizations wield power without responsibility and 
journalists forsake their public responsibility for fame and 
money. Five centuries after the first periodic papers, 
journalism still struggles to avoid debasement, let alone live 
up to its democratic duty (Ward: p. 10). 
The current budget crises facing print media in Canada and elsewhere can only serve to 
exacerbate the concerns about a diminishment of the quantity and quality of news 
coverage. However, it is important in dealing with political journalism, to realize exactly 
that political journalism tends to be a serious endeavor, with serious consequences not 
only for the politicians and parties it targets, but also for any journalist who fails to play by 
the professional rules of conduct. Having a high public profile is no protection, as former 
CBC superstar host Evan Solomon can attest. Once touted for the top spot as the next 
anchor for The National news program, he was fired after it was discovered he had abused 
his influence as host of Power and Politics to sell art to guests of the program and then 
secretly collect commissions. A news report posted on its website on June 9, 2015, cited 
a breach of journalistic ethics and practices as the reason for the firing:  
CBC spokesman Chuck Thompson told reporter Ioanna 
Roumeliotis that based on information that came to the 
broadcaster's attention on Monday, CBC determined that 
some of Solomon's activities were inconsistent with the 
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organization's conflict of interest and ethics policy, as well 
as journalistic standards and practices. 
Solomon’s TV show Power and Politics was the most watched live program on CBC TV. 
His Saturday morning radio program The House drew a weekly audience of one million. 
Clearly he was a draw for the corporation, but he was fired anyway. Solomon’s career at 
CBC is finished, although he has picked up what appears to be freelance work with 
Maclean’s magazine and other media less visible than CBC.   
3.12. Managing the messenger: strategic political communication and the 
media 
It is impossible to understand the motives and techniques of SPC without 
understanding the role and importance of news media journalists. That means 
understanding journalism itself, and specifically the rules that govern political journalists 
who report on government. It is important to consider their role and influence, if for no 
other reason than that there is no question that understanding and managing individual 
journalists is a major preoccupation for those who work in SPC. Stephen Ward (2004) 
describes the journalist’s role in democratic society as a social contract with the public. 
The ethical duties of the profession of journalism are the 
duties that arise from the distinct social role of journalists. 
We can consider that role as defined by a contract between 
journalist’s and their society. To seek the duties of 
journalism is to look for the legitimate principles that ought 
to govern the social practice of journalism – principles that 
free and equal participants in the journalism-public process 
could recognize…A  social contract in journalism is an 
agreement that journalists make with the public to balance 
the freedoms and the responsibilities of their profession. 
The interpretation of the social contract may vary according 
to society, but in all contracts journalists promise to act 
responsibly in return for some measure of freedom and 
independence. “Responsibility” usually involves both a 
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negative and a positive dimension: a negative responsibility 
not to do harm by reporting inaccurately, sensationally, and 
recklessly; a positive responsibility (or general promise) to 
provide a public benefit. In becoming a journalist, a person 
enters into that contract (p.26).  
Ward argues that journalists have “special duties” as a result of this “social contract. These 
duties require that they are: “impartial, independent communicators. Journalists come 
under the general duties of truthful communication…They must speak to the public in a 
manner that is different form partial public communicators such as social advocates, 
government officials, lobbyists, and public relations people promoting a product,” writes 
Ward (p. 27). When it comes to covering government, this social duty is all the more 
essential, even if, as is often the case, it means reporting on negative information: “The 
journalist’s role is to attempt to discern, amid the clash of partisan voices, what is 
reasonable and factual and how such facts may affect the public good” (p. 26). Ward also 
clarifies a point which is often confused by the public and other non-journalists: the 
question of whether or not journalists are expected to be neutral, or “objective” a term 
which is often misunderstood as implying neutrality.  
Journalism is not the politically-neutral activity of 
disseminating bits of data. It is the dissemination and 
analysis of the most important information for a self-
governing polity that aspires to be self-governing. 
When covering a story, the individual journalist must use their own judgement – applied 
within the bounds of journalistic standards, ethics and practises, to determine what matters 
to the public, whether it is true, and whether it is presented in a fair and balanced manner. 
Any editors who then handles the story to check for correct grammar, story flow, legal 
issues and factual errors, are expected to apply the same journalistic standards.  
One major element that is ignored in the meta-theories of mass media, and by 
scholars of political communication is the influence of the individual journalist covering a 
story. While the owner and even senior managers may wish otherwise, the reality is that 
the person at the keyboard or behind the camera, and their line editors have the greatest 
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influence on what is covered on a day-to-day basis. They gather and present the materials 
for publication or broadcast. They present their personal and professional interpretation of 
the news event they cover to their news organization unless someone higher up has a 
serious objection and refuses to publish. But such events are rare and spark serious 
debate within newsrooms, and between journalists from outside of the various 
newsrooms. Should such censorship become a public issue, it can and does undermine 
the credibility of the news organization and therefore also undermines the business of 
selling news for the owners and shareholders. So while owners and senior managers have 
the ability to censor news, it is rarely exercised for reasons other than legitimate problems 
with meeting the legal and journalistic requirements of journalism. For the most part, the 
individual journalist delivers their interpretation of events (Ward 2004)56 to their 
newsrooms for publication or broadcast, and now also communicates directly with the 
public through Twitter and online blogs. The role and tasks of journalism are not left to 
individual choice or whim, but rather are taught in journalism schools and newsrooms and 
are shaped by a number of factors, not the least of which is the rule of law, and in particular 
media law which all journalists must understand and respect if they are to function in the 
profession. Journalists seek truth not only because it is ethical, but also because it is far 
too risky for the journalist or her employer if she does not. 
3.13. Journalism and Negativity Bias 
The need to get things right in no way means that journalists are looking for happy, 
uplifting or even informative public service stories. News is often about what goes wrong. 
While there is coverage of feel-good human interest stories, news coverage is usually 
about negatives rather than positives. News media and journalists, as Hood suggests, 
have a “negativity bias”. One way to explain, as opposed to excuse this bias, is through 
an often-retold journalistic anecdote which says: “You don’t report on the 999,999 people 
who drove home safely from work today. You write about the one who didn’t. That is news.” 
In Why Democracies Need an Unlovable Press (2008), sociology and journalism scholar 
Michael Schudson explains that while journalism has many flaws – dependence on official 
sources that include government among them – it is often salvaged from those who might 
seek to control its content, including government and the news media owners, by 
“eventfulness.”  
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There is a fundamental truth about journalism recognized by 
all journalists but almost no social scientists: things happen. 
Not only do things happen, but as the bumper sticker says, 
shit happens. That is what provides a supply of occurrences 
for journalists to work with. Shit even happens to the rich 
and powerful and it makes for a great story when it does.  
Because “shit happens”, journalists gain some freedom from official opinion, professional 
routines, and conventional wisdom. Journalism is an event-centered discourse, more 
responsive to accidents and explosions in the external world than to fashions in ideas 
among cultural elites. The journalists’ sense of themselves as street-smart, nose to the 
ground, adventurers in places where people don’t want them has an element of truth to it 
and it is very much linked to event-centeredness. 
News, like bread or sausage, is something people make. 
Scholars emphasize the manufacturing process. Journalists 
emphasize the raw material their work brings them to; they 
insist their jobs recurrently place them before novel, 
unprecedented, and unanticipated events. While 
sociologists observe how this world of surprises is tamed, 
journalists typically emphasize that the effort at 
domestication falls short. Journalists have a point. 
(Schudson 2008: p.54-55). 57 
News as eventfulness is the lifeblood of journalism. SPC professionals understand 
this and go to great lengths to stage events that will show their leader or party in a positive 
light. Depending on the status of the politician, staged events are covered by journalists 
and their news media outlets, regardless of the full understanding that the elected official’s 
staged announcement of a new bridge/school/policy is designed for his or her own 
personal and political promotion. The fact that managed events, often called “pseudo-
events,” are frequently reported clearly stands up a number of news media critiques, 
including over-reliance on official sources (Schudson; Herman and Chomsky). That is a 
reality, both for reasons of expediency – filling news holes is happening at an ever-
increasing pace as reporters are required to file tweets update stories, write blogs and 
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also file complete stories on a regular basis. This is increasingly falling to fewer and fewer 
reporters and editors whose numbers have been radically reduced over the past decade 
as digital media has eroded the advertising base for most mainstream media, and in 
particular newspapers. This vulnerability to the well-timed, easy-to-cover official event is 
understood and exploited by SPC professionals. However, there is another perspective to 
consider, and again this is also understood by SPC professionals. Things can go wrong. 
Every managed event is also an access portal for reporters, and that, from a SPC 
perspective poses “blame risk.” Access to high-ranking elected officials such as the PM 
are infrequent and highly controlled. In-person announcements mean that reporters might 
gain access that would otherwise be denied. The pseudo or managed event will also be 
covered if it involves the PM or other high-ranking politicians because it is news. If the PM 
visits a shipyard in Vancouver, it is a news event because it is out of the ordinary; because 
the PM is a celebrity of sorts; and because it is in the public interest given that what the 
PM does is of interest to a wide audience that is comprised of electors and other members 
of the public. It will also be covered out of respect for the office he represents. All of this is 
true even if the event is also an obvious opportunity for political promotion. Further, 
reporters want to be on hand in case “shit happens:” protesters, a pie in the face, or worse. 
They may even be able to shout an off-the-agenda question that would otherwise not be 
on the publics’ radar. There is even a slim possibility that it will be answered, depending 
on whether the PM and his SPC staff believe it should be addressed publically. They see 
journalists as a conduit to the public – for better, which means “credit”, or worse which is 
the “blame risk” they hope to avoid. Whatever the outcome, make no mistake that 
journalists, from the newest reporter to the most cynical old editor, know they are being 
spun and they take measures to counter the spin, as is their professional duty. In his paper 
on communication in the PMO, Thomas notes:  
The media are conscious of the attempts by government to 
control information and to proactively manage the news. 
When governments have a large, professional public 
relations machine to tell their story in the most positive way, 
journalists believe it is their job to question and challenge 
government communications. In a competitive media 
environment, there is also pressure on journalists to uncover 
abuses, blunders and even run-of-the-mill errors that 
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counterbalance the “spin” of government news releases and 
photo ops (Thomas 2011: p.45).58 
Journalists, at least those who work in news, are not paid to promote private or political 
interests, quite the contrary. To do so would put them in conflict of interest with their duty 
to represent the publics’ interest. Therefore, put in the awkward position of covering a 
purely promotional story, it is their professional duty to seek out other voices, some or 
even all of whom are critical. That can also justifiably be seen as a negativity bias. 
However, understood from a journalistic perspective it is the result of fairness, balance 
and independence, none of which have any value without accuracy.   
3.14. Countering spin 
Ward notes that “at its best” journalism “is one of the arts of democracy. Journalists 
provide that news and analysis by which a society communicates with itself, allowing it 
some measure of self-government…Citizens following the major issues in the press, 
become aware of their shared and competing values. Through journalism, a society 
debates how to reform its institutions and face the future. Journalism should be the 
lifeblood of a deliberative democracy” (9-10). However, journalism’s value is lost when it 
is subverted by those who hold power for their own political advantage, Ward argues. 
Journalism, at its worst, is an art of the demagogue and the 
despot. It is the propaganda tool of powerful interests that 
subvert popular self-government by manipulation the 
channel of information (Ward: p.10). 
It is therefore the duty of the journalist to challenge manipulation of information, 
whether by the elected officials themselves, or by those they employ to sell their 
brand as a means to further their own political interests, rather than that of the 
public. Journalist counter spin because they must. Journalists counter spin through 
a number of approaches: they seek out other voices including critics; consider the 
consequences and get responses from representatives of those who will be 
affected; and seek out expertise where necessary to explain the issues and 
consequences to the public. So the announcement of new money for ship-building 
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in Vancouver, if it is covered as it should be, will be accompanied in the news story 
with questions about budgets and reminders of previous unfulfilled promises by the 
same government. While that will be perceived by the messenger and perhaps 
also by a portion of the audience as negative bias, it is also the correct 
professional response. That said, positive government announcements are often 
covered without serious critique for a number of reasons, including an inability to 
obtain authentic information from government that would highlight the full range of 
benefits, risks and consequences. Not promoting a particular interest, at least not 
happily, is the fundamental divide between journalists and public relations 
professionals, who are paid to do just that. Taken together, journalists can rightly 
be accused of having what Hood describes as a “negativity bias,” which SPC 
professionals seek to spin towards a more positive view in order to avoid “blame 
risk” and garner credit instead.  
3.15. Strange way to do business: SPC positivity bias meets negativity 
bias in the public sphere 
The idea of political marketing is a favoured SPC model, however it has a limited 
use as an analogy for political communication in the public sphere. It sounds great, from 
a SPC perspective at least, to be able to put out a product and make sure that all the 
promotion is positive, and that negatives are avoided. If this theory worked and the public 
sphere was an actual marketplace, you could put your product in a showroom or store 
when salespeople are invested in selling the product to consumers. You could talk it up 
and customers would see the product as you wanted it to be seen, and maybe even buy 
into the sales pitch. But political communication is more complicated than most marketing 
models. First of all, you don’t get to sell your product in a big friendly showroom. The 
middleman is news media which has a negativity bias – in part because they anticipate 
your positivity bias towards your product and don’t accept it as truth. Their job is to call 
you out. Question your product. It’s like putting a bright, shiny new bike up for sale in a 
store and the salesperson does nothing but talk about how it is too heavy, costs too much 
and lacks the necessary gears to actually get you up the hill. Worse, they go out and talk 
to other bike manufacturers – opposition political parties – and ask them what they think 
of your competing product. They too pick it apart and suggest that they have a better bike. 
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The worst-salesperson-in-the-world then passes along all of that information to any 
customer who enters their salesroom. Negativity bias checks positivity bias. Many 
consumers lose confidence in your product as a result.   
There are alternatives to using the news media to market your product, although 
as much as consumers hate the salesperson, they are inclined to believe what they say 
because the public also has a negativity bias when it comes to political parties and 
government. You can advertise elsewhere, or paste your sales pitch on the news media’s 
storefront window. However, there is still a risk that the same unfriendly sales staff will 
point out to any consumers who enter that the ads are false or misleading, that there are 
other products out there. Or worse, they will point out to the customer that they are 
themselves paying for the ad through their taxes, and if possible, point out just how much 
that ad is costing them. Eventually the sales person doesn’t even need to point that out. 
The consumer-citizen will find out when you table the required authentic information about 
the actual costs for your partisan but taxpayer-financed ad campaign. The unfriendly news 
media sales people will then do their best to amplify the fact that taxpayers are paying for 
government ads that sell governments’ own political brand. The consumers will talk. They 
will be critical. They will deliberate with one another about whether they should be paying 
for ads to promote your product. They may deliberate about other perceived faults, real or 
imagined.  
 The public sphere marketplace, comprised in Hood’s terms of “everyone 
else…clients, customers, applicants, inquirers, detainees, patients, students, and all the 
many other guises in which the individual meets organizations providing public services” 
(2011: p. 38).. “In one sense, we can think of this would as comprising blame makers, 
rather than blame takers” (Ibid). This is not a neutral space. This is the world where 
negativity bias thrives. The marketplace known as the public sphere is a vicious place to 
do political business. Here the product analogy is not Apple with customers lining up 
overnight to purchase the next upgrade. It is more like a Volkswagen sales lot the day 
after consumers learn that the company has been cheating on the emissions from its 
diesel engines (Bradshaw, September 28, 2015).They are more likely to vote you out of 
office than to buy into the excuses. SPC tactics are in this sense almost hopelessly 
optimistic. In the end the sales pitch is destined to fail. No amount of spin will prevent a 
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fall when the public sphere marketplace turns, although it might serve to delay the 
inevitable and buy time in office. Hood writes:  
High level spin machines that appear formidably effective at 
one moment…can find themselves apparently unable to do 
anything right at the next moment as the public mood swings 
(p. 65) 
One thing is certain, even when times are good, news media can be 
depended on to exercise its negativity bias to counter any positivity bias 
towards your product produced by in-house SPC specialists.  
An alternative is to avoid this difficult news media middleman and sell directly to 
public sphere consumers via social media. This can be as positively biased towards your 
partisan product as you like, with the added benefit of no cost to the party it promotes. In 
Canada at least, taxpayers finance all SPC costs for executive branch offices and officials. 
The first step might be to set up a PMO website to claim credit by promoting the positive 
activities of the leader. The problem, unlike news media which manages its own 
distribution system, is that there is virtually no foot traffic. It’s like being at the far end of a 
mall with no anchor store to bring by impulse shoppers. Even if you know it exists, there 
is no compelling reason to go there because the result is predictable – positively biased 
and therefore unreliable reports. It is positivity-biased like emissions readings on a VW 
diesel rigged to override reality. It is not authentic and can’t be trusted. 
The same can be said for marketing via Facebook. You are at one end of the mall, 
but everyone is way down at the food court talking to their buddies. Even if you can get 
your product into the food court and people say they “like” you, you end up sitting alone 
while everyone else looks at pictures of other people’s children. You want to show pictures 
of yourself. But pictures of other people’s children and drunken vacations are way more 
fun, and involves people they know and have voluntarily “friended.” Twitter is another way 
to go, but it has elements that make message management extremely difficult, if not 
impossible. The first hurdle is that before you can talk to customers, you have to convince 
them to follow you. Some people will do that. And you can also get all the members of 
your team – cabinet ministers, MPs, the PM, political staff – to follow you. They will also 
follow each other, and invite everyone following them to get on board for your party 
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participants. However, this is not an exclusive party, anything but. Among the people who 
will follow you are those unfriendly media which also cruise the Twitter-sphere and are 
only signing on to see if you say anything that should be reported – usually for negative 
rather than positive reasons. Meanwhile, you have a whole team of well-meaning so-called 
“followers” taking the lead on impulse and tapping out 140 characters of mostly 
uncontrolled messages, any one of which has the potential to go wrong. The media are 
not only watching for what goes wrong, they are also using Twitter to get their followers to 
link to their media sites where they will elaborate on why it is wrong. And that will go out 
to hundreds of thousands of people, many of whom think letting your people say whatever 
they think on Twitter is a dumb idea to begin with, and with good reason. In addition to the 
media people, the Twitter-sphere is also peopled by members of opposition parties who 
are policing your tweets. Then there are sensible members of the public who will not only 
critique your tweets, they will engage with other critical thinkers and deliberate among 
themselves. And then there are people called trolls who just get their kicks out of saying 
bad stuff about everyone else. Besides which, everything flips by so quickly that you might 
not even be read. It is very hard to control the marketing message on Twitter. The other 
problem is that news media use Twitter to promote links to their negative stories about 
your product. Not a great market for a product attempting to sell itself based on a positivity 
bias. Also, Twitter’s lack of efficiency as an advertising vehicle is reflected in its own 
inability to attract enough advertisers to create the revenue necessary to maintain its 
relatively small workforce of about 4,000 employees – forcing it to lay off about eight per 
cent of its employees in October, 2015 (Wong, October 13, 2015). 
Then there is Instagram which comes with its own limitations. First of all, it has 
some protocols to follow. You should be invited to join others. If you impose yourself, as 
PM Harper apparently did, you will be viewed as a party crasher: unwelcome and 
somewhat suspect. Next, post good pictures. Juggling babies might work. But you can’t 
complain if people make fun of you or say bad stuff. Sure you could cut out the bad 
comments and leave only the positive stuff, as the PM’s SPC staff did with the Instagram 
posted below. But that might come back to bite.  
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Figure 3-1:  Censored Instagram page with negative comments about picture removed. 
Negativity bias will really kick in if it is obvious that your purpose is purely 
promotional. So if you try to post ads expect some negativity, as the PM discovered. He 
was called out first on Instagram, and then on a website called Marketing, which 
apparently thought it so gauche as to be newsworthy. Headline: Canada’s first party leader 
to post an ad on Instagram is…Prime Minister Stephen Harper using ads on social media 
as part of election campaign.” 60 The ad is embedded in the picture of Harper and his wife 
awkwardly holding babies to promote some Conservative policy involving babies. 
Unfortunately, several Instagram followers posted negative comments on the PM’s 
Instagram page. Next, and perhaps even more unfortunately from a marketing 
perspective, the PM’s staff appears to have taken down the negative comments, leaving 
only the positive comments. That’s when what was intended as a positive social media 
marketing exercise became a negative news story. CBC News, which has a much larger 
following than the PM’s Instagram page, reported the following: “Anti-Tory comments 
disappear from Harper's sponsored Instagram posts” (Watters, September 2, 2015). The 
story also included a copy of the original negative posts, which a disgruntled Instagram 
user had saved from a screenshot. She gave CBC permission to use her saved shot. 
Positivity bias trumped by negativity bias.  
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Figure 3-2:  Stephen Harper’s Instagram page with critical comments before censoring 
61 
The point of this admittedly light-touch analysis, is actually quite serious. While 
SPC specialists base their communications practices on a business marketing model – 
and with some success, particularly when it comes to running down the other guy’s product 
– it falls apart when we consider the actual marketplace: the public sphere. SPC is about 
promoting a brand – the political party and usually the party in power – by claiming credit 
and avoiding blame. The problem is that the public, most of whom were not born 
yesterday, and news media know, or at least suspect how it works, in part because they 
deliberate with others. They understand that SPC has a positivity bias, and they, in turn 
have a built-in negativity bias towards SPC products. Watch any of the 24/7 videos 62 
posted on Prime Minister Harper’s website to understand why that is so. Clearly this badly-
manufactured product is being falsely sold as something of value, with taxpayers footing 
the bill. News reporters have pointed that out. The public has joked about it. Yet even with 
that exposure and the potential for ironic viewing, only a few thousand Canadians bother 
to view the product, let alone buy into it. It is possible that they might pay more attention, 
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in a negative way, if they knew just how much it was costing them to produce the weekly 
pat on the back for the PM. That authentic information is currently unavailable.  
3.16. Conclusion 
This dissertation is an argument for public access to authentic information about 
government that will allow understanding of governance so that citizens are able to 
legitimate government. The SPC positivity bias towards partisan interests fails to serve 
the public’s right to know about governance. It is a marketing tactic, not an authentic 
communication commitment. In his book Democracy: A History (2005) British political 
philosopher John Dunn warns of the importance of providing citizens with the information 
necessary to scrutinize government, hold it to account through public deliberations, and to 
thereby legitimate government. Authentic information that allows understanding of 
governance is central to sustaining democracy. Dunn calls for greater transparency and 
warns about government control” of “the flow and structuring of information” amongst 
citizens. Secrecy and “seclusion” of the political communication process undermines the 
legitimacy of those who govern as the publics’ representatives, he argues: 
Governmental seclusion is the most direct and also the 
deepest subversion of the democratic claim, sometimes 
prudent, but never fully compatible with the literal meaning 
of the form of rule. The more governments control what their 
fellow citizens know the less they can claim the authority of 
those citizens for how they rule. The more governments 
withhold information from their fellow citizens the less 
accountable they are to those who give them their authority 
(Dunn 2005: p.185-186). 63 
Yet the reality is that the executive branch of many democratic governments exercise SPC 
tactics of information control to claim credit and avoid blame as a means to maintain the 
powers of office. All promise transparency which few deliver. SPC fails to satisfy the 
public’s right to know because it is intended to promote the political interests of the party 
in power, and not to provide understanding of governance. It denies the public access to 
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authentic information, and thereby denies the public’s and media’s ability to determine the 
truth about governance. This matters because increasingly SPC has come to dominate 
government communication at all levels, as a means to manage public opinion and avoid 
accountability as a means to maintain power. The following two chapters are case studies 
of how SPC tactics have become increasingly central to the exercise of power in the 
Canadian Prime Minister’s Office.   
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The Prime Minister’s Office: A case study of strategic 
political communication  
Events unfolding over the summer of 2015 as a result of testimony and evidence 
at the trial of Conservative-appointed senator Mike Duffy have shown just how deeply 
political considerations have affected, even tainted, various institutions of government 
under Prime Minister Stephen Harper. At the core of the issue is the Conservative 
government’s determination to control and manage the flow of information to the public for 
strategic political purposes. Although most of the following chapter was written in advance 
of the Duffy trial, it does provide a background on the Conservative government’s ongoing 
determination to manage and control government communications through the Prime 
Minister’s Office (PMO), and often to do so for strategic political advantage. The Duffy 
scandal is perhaps the strongest example of the consequences of such an approach. The 
following case study of strategic communication in the Conservative PMO stands in 
contrast to its own promises of greater transparency of government. The study also 
bolsters the argument presented here for the public’s right to obtain authentic information 
about governance as a means to understand how they are governed. 
Some of the recent developments from the Duffy trial have been incorporated into 
the chapter. More of the implications of the “Duffy Affair” for political communication in a 
democracy have been cited in Chapter 6. What the PMO handling of the Senator Duffy 
scandal illustrates about the Harper PMO’s approach to political communication is 
perhaps best summed up in an August 19, 2015 column by the Globe and Mail’s Jeffrey 
Simpson: 
Throughout the affair – and this is the takeaway lesson of 
how the Prime Minister’s Office operates – everything in the 
Harper entourage revolved around image, reputation, 
damage-control and spin. That the truth might and should 
be told, openly and immediately, never occurred to any of 
them (Simpson, August 19, 2015). 
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The Duffy case is just one illustration of how dominant and routine SPC has 
become in the Harper Conservative PMO, and how PMO SPC considerations guide and 
influence actions and decisions throughout government, including attempting to interfere 
with an “independent” audit conducted on behalf of the Senate which is meant to be an 
independent arm of government. Most of all, the purpose of SPC tactics in the Duffy case 
and in general, was to present the Harper Conservatives to the public in a politically 
advantageous light, which included attempting to avoid blame by covering up the fact that 
Conservative-appointed senators were being audited for filing questionable expenses. 
The Duffy expenses cover-up on the part of the Harper PMO demonstrates how SPC for 
political advantage took precedence over any sense that the public has a right to know 
how it is governed through access to authentic information that provides voters with the 
necessary understanding to hold government to account.   
4.1. Introduction  
Stephen Harper and the Conservative Party were elected on a promise to make 
government more accountable to the public. However, that promise was called into 
question within a week of becoming a minority government on February 11, 2006. 
Certainly it was evident to reporters from the first week of the new Parliament that the 
Conservatives had no intention of being open and accessible for the members of the 
Canadian Parliamentary Press Gallery, who cover federal politics. On March 29, 2006 the 
Globe and Mail reported that the new PM’s Director of Communications, Sandra Buckler, 
had banned reporters from the third-floor hallway outside the room where cabinet meets. 
This meant that they would no longer be able to question the ministers as they emerged 
from their meetings. Further, they would no longer be notified as to when cabinet was 
meeting, a long-standing courtesy which would now be cancelled. “Cabinet meetings are 
private,” Harper later told reporters. “That’s a constitutional thing,” he told parliamentary 
press gallery reporters concerning his decision to cease informing reporters about when 
cabinet was meeting (Curry; Den Tandt, March 29, 2006). 
Rather than the informal cabinet hallway scrums – impromptu interviews in which 
the subject answers questions from a group of waiting reporters – Ms. Buckler said the 
PM would prefer to hold press conferences in the National Press Theatre, which is where 
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PM’s had traditionally met to take more formal questions from members of the press 
gallery. But there were new rules concerning who would be allowed to ask questions of 
the PM. The PM and his staff would pick and choose from the gathered press corp. His 
press secretary would call on the person to ask the next question. That strategy was 
roundly rejected by the press gallery, who refused to allow the PMO staff to pick their 
favorite reporters, and instead insisted that it would be the press gallery’s journalist 
moderator who would decide who asked questions, and not the PMO. However, it was the 
first indication of just how controlling the Harper PMO intended to be in its interactions with 
news media. 
The Prime Minister’s Office is not only the centre of power in the Canadian 
Westminster system of government (Savoie), it is also the centre and controlling office for 
all government communication, both in terms of its own production of information about 
how it governs, and in overseeing and controlling the production and release of all other 
potentially politically sensitive communications with the public. PMO strategic political 
control of government communications has been building for decades in Canada under 
both Conservative and Liberal prime ministers, but as this chapter will show, 
communication management and control has reached new heights under the 
Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, who has made it a defining 
feature of his governance approach. Strategic control of government information for 
political advantage is one of the primary responsibilities of the PM’s politically appointed 
partisan staff, who number around 100 at any given time and oversee about 500 additional 
political appointees who act as political and communication advisors in all ministries and 
agencies. As well, they monitor and manage the activities of the more than 3,300 career 
public servants who are employed in supposedly politically neutral capacities as 
communications officers across government (Gregory Thomas, August 4, 2014).64 This 
chapter is an examination of the Harper government’s SPC practices, and the political 
influence the PMO increasingly exerts throughout government over government 
communications with the public. The end result, this chapter argues, is a diminishment of 
the public’s right and ability to understand how it is governed.  
.  
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4.2. Strategic political communication and the PMO: a case study 
Communication has always been at the centre of the democratic system, first 
because the individuals who run for elected office must persuade voters that they are the 
best choice, and second because once in office they must persuade voters that they 
deserve to remain there. As Chapter 2 argues, communication is also central to 
democracy in order to allow citizens to understand how they are governed and thereby 
legitimate their choices through public deliberation about governance. Legitimation 
requires access to authentic information about government that allows understanding of 
the actions and decisions of those who are elected to represent citizens. However, as 
Chapter 3 and later, Chapter 6 demonstrate, governments’ SPC tactics which seek to 
manage and control information access and understanding, are increasingly the dominant 
form of communication between government and its citizens. The SPC tactics employed 
by the executive branch of Canada’s federal government are not only typical of 
communication practices in modern developed democracies, they may even be at the 
cutting edge of information control and management for political purposes. Information 
control, disguised behind a rhetoric of accountability, defines and directs political 
communication in Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s Conservative government, which 
behaves in office as if it were in permanent campaign mode for the next election. Where 
once campaigning was confined to elections, political studies scholar Paul Thomas argues 
that the executive branch of the federal government in Canada “has entered an era of the 
“permanent campaign” in which the techniques for winning power have been transferred 
increasingly to the processes of government” (2011: 2).  
The blurring of the line between government and political 
communication increased as Canada entered the era of “the 
permanent campaign”. The phrase refers to the transfer of 
such election techniques as polling, focus groups, the use 
of symbols, brands and advertising, direct targeted 
messaging, “opposition research “and “attack ads” into the 
processes of governing. The phrase originated in the U.S.A. 
and reflected the frequency and intensity of 
campaigning...The professionalization of election 
campaigns in general …also affected the relationship 
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between political parties and the apparatus of the state, with 
governing parties insisting on more “packaging” and 
“marketing of their policy products” to various segments of 
the “political marketplace” through “messages” meant to 
appeal as much, if not more, to emotion as reason (Weston, 
2007 [as cited by Thomas: 19]). There are more attempts to 
use government advertising to gain short-term political 
advantage. In short, the frenzied, headline-grabbing 
approach of the election period is carried over into the 
governing process (Thomas 2011: p.18-19)  
The permanent campaign of strategically marketing government and governance to voters 
has impacted the way in which policies are developed and evaluated – in effect making 
policy decisions subject to indirect public approval through polling research and other 
measures of public opinion such as media monitoring – and then marketing the policies 
through government advertising and “messaging,” most often through media. Thomas 
argues that political marketing through the use of SPC tools and tactics has become “an 
organizing concept applied systematically to how power is exercised at the centre of 
government.”  
The centralization of government communication operations has also been 
recognized by prominent public administration scholar Donald Savoie as part of a process 
of greater concentration and centralization of power in the hands of Canadian prime 
ministers and their appointed PMO political staff (1999, 2004, 2008, 2010, and 2014). 
Thomas calls for a refinement of “the Savoie thesis by bringing communications more 
explicitly and thoroughly into the analysis of prime ministerial power.” This challenge has 
been both an inspiration and a guiding principle for this chapter of my thesis.  
4.3. Centralize power: centralize communication 
Another result of the permanent campaign approach is the increasingly central 
importance of communication control by the executive branch. Building on the “Savoie 
thesis” of centralization of power in the hands of the prime minster and his political staff 
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and advisors, whom Savoie refers to as the PM’s “courtiers” (2008, 2010, 2012), Thomas 
points out that as part of the redistribution of power to the centre, communication has also 
been centralized under the control of the PMO, which manages and oversees all politically 
sensitive communications in government with the help of the Privy Council Office (PCO). 
So crucial is the permanent campaign for support, that communication has become “a 
strategic and dominant preoccupation at the centre of the governing process within the 
Government of Canada,” (Thomas 2011: p.1). Furthermore, SPC considerations are 
influencing policy and decision making, he argues: 
Communications has, of course, always been a major part 
of politics and governing. Increasingly, however, 
communications considerations related to the development 
and maintenance of a government’s image, reputation, 
credibility and political support with key segments of the 
electorate are seen to drive priorities, policies, decision-
making and actions on both the political and the 
administrative side of government (Thomas 2011: p. 1).  
Political communication is “politically-centered messaging” (Thomas: 18) intended to 
make the public aware of the policies and practices of the governing party, either to seek 
“credit” or to avoid “blame risk” (Hood). As has already been explained, in the Canadian 
federal government the executive branch, and in particular the PMO, has absolute 
authority over all communication, government or political. For the most part, routine 
government communication is handled by bureaucrats in each of the various departments 
and agencies, under the guidance of the PCO, which is both the administrative arm of the 
PMO and the go-between administrative arm of the PMO. However, where the information 
is likely to have political implications, Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS), the Privy Council 
Office (PCO) and the departments and agencies responsible notify executive branch 
political staff and seek their permission and approval before releasing the documents 
requested. In theory, the minister responsible has final say over what will be released and 
what will remain secret. However, in practice it is the PM and his political staff who 
strategically manage any communication of political consequence. 
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4.4. Strategies for avoiding the risk of blame 
There are a number of methods to avoid negative news coverage, including, as 
explored further in Chapter 5, attempting to prevent or delay the release of information 
that poses the risk of blame and is therefore politically-sensitive for government. But given 
that the bad news leaks out, Hood describes three key communication strategies for 
avoiding, or mitigating blame. The avoidance strategies are: presentational strategies, 
agency strategies and policy strategies. Of these, the strategy most relevant to executive 
branch strategic communication is “presentational strategies”.  
“Presentational strategies” involve various ways of trying to 
avoid blame by spin, stage management, and argument. 
The presentational strategist aims to work on the loss or 
harm perception dimension of blame, for example by 
accentuating the positive to counter negativity bias, and 
focuses primarily on what information to offer, when and 
how. Presentational strategists aim to find ways of showing 
that what might be perceived as a blameworthy problem is 
in fact a blessing in disguise, for instance as short-term pain 
that will produced long-term gain. They may also search for 
plausible excuses to mitigate blame on the part on particular 
officeholders, at the point where loss perception and agency 
meet. They many actively create diversions (Hood: p. 17).  
As Hood also explains, presentational strategies to avoid blame can do just the reverse 
and invite unanticipated blame when it becomes evident that the event is intended as a 
means to avoid blame. “Presentational strategies…reach their limits when spin doctors 
and their devious arts start to serve as blame magnets rather than blame deflectors” (p. 
21). Hood identifies “four worlds of blame avoidance”, with “the generals” in “leadership 
roles” at the top. The second category is the bureaucrats described as “infantry”; the third 
is comprised of “consultants and advisors”. Finally there is a “heterogeneous” group of 
“civil society players…who deal out the blame to officeholders and public service 
institutions via their impact on public and media opinion and the way they cast their votes” 
(Hood: p.24-25).. Interestingly, Hood does not have a category for news media, nor does 
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he have a specific category for SPC specialists, although the political advisors and 
consultants who work in the PMO and minister’s offices (MO) would seem to fit in category 
three. Hood notes that the generals – prime ministers, cabinet ministers – “tend to be 
constantly searching for ways to draw credit upwards to themselves (by means such as 
making good-news announcements in person and appearing in flattering phot-ops…) 
while pushing blame downwards or sometimes outwards to others” (Hood: p. 25-26). One 
example of Hood’s theory of presentational strategies used to deflect blame was 
demonstrated by PM Harper in his handling of the Duffy affair.  
4.5. Blame Avoidance and the Harper Conservative Government  
The first stage of the strategy to avoid blame occurred in Ottawa on May 21, 2013 
when journalists were invited to attend what was billed as an “open” session of the 
normally closed weekly caucus meeting between PM Harper and Conservative Members 
of Parliament (MPs). Dozens of reporters and photographers from the Canadian National 
Press Gallery were crowded into the back of the room behind rows of seated party 
members to listen in as the prime minister addressed the caucus following the resignation 
of his chief of staff two days earlier (Campion-Smith, May 19, 2013). Robert Fife of CTV 
News had reported on May 14, 2013 that Wright had written a personal cheque for 
Conservative Senator Mike Duffy to repay improper expenses. Duffy refused to co-operate 
with an audit of his Senate expenses after repaying $90,172, which Wright provided from 
his personal funds. Harper had refused to answer questions about Wright’s resignation in 
the two days leading up to the weekly Conservative caucus meeting, which is normally 
held in camera. The unusual invitation to attend caucus (Chase and Leblanc, May 21, 
2013) led journalists to believe that they would finally be allowed to question the prime 
minister on the growing controversy. They were wrong. 
The prime minister began his weekly caucus address by saying: “I’m not happy. 
I’m very upset about some conduct we have witnessed, the conduct of some 
parliamentarians and the conduct of my own office” (Harper, Globe and Mail, May 21, 
2013). And that was it. No mention of Wright’s name, let alone an explanation of what had 
happened, and more importantly, what Harper knew about the deal, and when. For the 
remainder of his ten-minute address, Harper congratulated his own government for what 
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he described as a positive record of improving government accountability since it was first 
elected in 2006. He finished with what sounded like a dismissal of the mounting political 
scandal: “So let’s go back to work.” He then left the microphone and sat down at the head 
table, refusing to take a single question from the press gallery journalists standing at the 
back of the room. It was clear that they had been invited merely to listen and repeat. The 
staging of the event amounted to a SPC photo opportunity intended to promote the 
Conservative agenda rather than explain to the public what had led to Wright’s resignation. 
Outraged, reporters shouted questions at the seated PM from the back of the room. “What 
about Nigel Wright?” shouted one unidentified reporter. The PM sat in silence, smiling 
nervously as the media were asked to leave, but refused to go. “Take a question. Take a 
question,” demanded another unidentified reporter (Graham May 21, 2013). The standoff 
continued for several minutes until the Conservative caucus stood en masse and 
applauded their leader, drowning out the shouts from the press gallery, who finally filed 
out of the room.  
Opening the normally secretive weekly Conservative Party caucus meeting to 
journalists was intended to create a news event, which the PM could then control. There 
was no question that journalists would not cover the event for a number of reasons, 
including a rare opportunity to ask direct questions of the PM, and because the invitation 
itself was unprecedented. Harper and his staff, it would seem, knew the invitation would 
be accepted, but that the event – including any attempt at questioning the PM, could be 
controlled by the PM. According to a Conservative source who spoke to the Globe and 
Mail in advance of the meeting, the intention was to deliver a politically-strategic 
“message” to the public via the news media. “The message will be we need to remember 
our roots and political accountability and why it’s important we push hard on 
accountability,” (Chase and Leblanc, May 21, 2013). By changing the subject, and 
claiming to have no prior knowledge of the Wright/Duffy arrangement, Harper hoped to 
avoid blame for the debacle. If he refused to take questions, the party line would be the 
only message available for journalists to report, or so the Conservative PM and his political 
communication staff hoped. It was a textbook example of a “presentational strategy” for 
avoidance of blame risk (Hood, p. 47-66).  
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Instead of addressing journalist’s questions about the brewing scandal, Harper 
ignored them. Rather than explain how the situation had occurred under his notoriously 
close watch, Harper set himself up as a victim: “I’m very upset about some conduct we 
have witnessed.” He attempted to pass the blame entirely to his former chief of staff, 
thereby seeking to “to mitigate blame on the part of a particular officeholder.” Following 
the presentation strategies described by Hood, Harper then sought to “create diversions” 
by seeking credit and avoid blame by congratulating his government for its record of 
accountability and transparency, thereby turning a “blameworthy” problem into a “blessing 
in disguise.” (Hood: p. 51). While an RCMP investigation would clear Wright of any 
wrongdoing for writing the check, Duffy was charged with 31 counts of fraud, breach of 
trust and bribery related to his 2013 expense claims (Coyne August 24, 2015; Reevley, 
August 24, 2015)). He pleaded not guilty. No verdict was rendered at the time of this 
dissertation. 
4.6. Practising to deceive: the Mike Duffy affair 
Message control in the Duffy affair began to unravel for the PMO on July 4, 2013. 
An RCMP statement of interviews with Nigel Wright obtained by CTV News and the Globe 
and Mail explained that Wright’s job was to “deal with matters that could cause 
embarrassment” (Fife & Ling, July 24, 2013). Wright said he paid Duffy money to 
reimburse the Senate expenses in exchange for a promise that he would stop talking to 
reporters about his expense claims. CTV and the Globe and Mail filed a joint ATI request 
to receive copies of records of a June 19, 2013 meeting between the RCMP and Wright’s 
lawyers. Surprisingly, given that long delays have become the routine, the records were 
received on July 4, 2013 and made public the same day by the news outlets. The report 
written by the RCMP includes a summary of the information Wright’s lawyers voluntarily 
provided to the RCMP concerning Wright’s payment to Duffy. CTV reported the following:  
“Wright then offered to cover the cost for Duffy, the RCMP said, but under two conditions: 
“pay back the money right away” and “stop talking to the media about it.” Wright covered 
the cost, “believing it was the proper ethical decision that taxpayers not be out that amount 
of money,” the RCMP wrote, based on the interview with Wright’s lawyers. “Wright’s role 
was to manage the Conservative Party, part of which was to deal with matters that could 
cause embarrassment.” The RCMP document also showed that three other political staff 
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in the PMO were aware of Wright’s plan to enable Duffy to pay back expenses questioned 
by the Senate. Wright’s lawyers said the three staff were Harper’s former special adviser 
and legal counsel Benjamin Perrin; Wright’s executive assistant David van Hemmen; and 
Chris Woodcock, PMO director of issues management, the PMO communications unit 
charged with managing political risk issues. 
The first member of the PMs political staff to testify was former chief of staff Wright, 
who reaffirmed in testimony his earlier statement that the PM did not know that he had 
paid Duffy’s expenses from his own pocket. He admitted that Ray Novak who is Harper’s 
closest personal aide and who replaced Wright as chief of staff, had been in and out of a 
meeting where the repayment was discussed. However, Wright did not believe that Novak 
had heard him talking about the repayment plan. This is significant because Novak is 
personally close to the PM and his family, in addition to his professional role. Harper 
spokesperson Kory Teneycke said in an interview with CBC a week earlier that it was 
“unfathomable” that Novak would not have told Harper of the arrangement had he known, 
according to Globe and Mail reporter Campbell Clark ( August 18, 2015). Teneycke denied 
that Novak knew about the deal. This was consistent with Harper’s claim that he was not 
informed. Wright backed Harper up on this several times over his six days of testimony. 
However, Wright’s testimony about what Novak knew of the plan to repay Duffy’s 
expenses was directly contradicted by Perrin, who testified on August 18, 2015 that Novak 
was in the room and heard Wright say that he planned to replay Duffy’s disputed Senate 
expenses from his own pocket. “Ray was in the meeting, and Ray heard this, and I 
remember looking at Ray to see his reaction,” Perrin testified (Clark). As Clark also reports, 
Perrin’s contradictory testimony raised questions about what the PM and his closest 
member of staff knew, and whether they had been truthful in their public denials of 
knowledge. “It is a contradiction of Mr. Novak’s denials – one that raises new political 
question for Mr. Harper,” Clark wrote in the same article.  
The Mike Duffy trial began April 7, 2015, adjourned until June 18, adjourned again 
until August 12 and then adjourned until November 2015 when testimony will be resumed. 
The August portion of the three-part trial was particularly instructive in terms of providing 
detailed insight into how the PMO worked over a period of months to limit the negative 
publicity about Duffy’s expense claims from reaching the public – thereby limiting, if not 
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avoiding the blame risk for the Conservative Party. Three key witnesses who had worked 
inside the PMO testified: Wright, PMO lawyer Benjamin Perrin, and former Director of 
Issues Management Chris Woodcock who testified: “Mainly my job was to spot trouble, 
and try to identify it and come up with a strategy for dealing with it” (Ditchburn, 
Macleans.ca: August 26, 2015). What is evident is that to a considerable degree, “finding 
a strategy for dealing” with potential political “trouble” was a key consideration for all senior 
PMO staff involved in managing the Duffy and senate expenses file in early 2013. In 
addition to the testimony, more than 500 emails written to or by PMO senior staff were 
entered into evidence, shedding further light on how the Duffy affair was handled at the 
top (Prime Minister’s Office, PMO Emails #1 to 562: 2012-2013). While the details of the 
unfolding cover-up by the PMO are not relevant here, some of the testimony delivered by 
the three key former PMO staffers does shed light on just how central managing 
communications for strategic political purposes was to decision making in the Harper 
PMO.  
Wright was the first to testify when the case resumed on August 21, 2015. The 
former Chief of Staff for the PMO, the top political staff position, testified that his primary 
concern was to clear up the issue and prevent it from going public by paying back Duffy’s 
questionable expenses which were about to become public through an independent audit, 
commissioned by the Senate.  He wrote a personal check for more than $90,000 to repay 
the money the Senate said Senator Duffy owed. Wright said he took the unusual step to 
keep the issue of the Conservative-appointed senator’s controversial expenses from 
becoming an “embarrassing” political problem. He intended to avoid blame risk for the 
Harper government. “If it became public, I thought it would be somewhat embarrassing,” 
Wright testified on August 12.   “But there were a whole lot of connotations associated with 
it that I didn’t really think through. If I had, I might not have done it” (Canadian Press, 
August 12, 2015). It is also evident from the emails between Wright, PMO exempt staff 
and Duffy and his lawyer that Wright was attempting to convince Conservative leaders in 
the senate to drop the independent audit of Duffy’s expenses for the same reason, to avoid 
blame risk. Asked in later testimony if he regretted “misrepresenting” the affair by 
misleading the public into believing Duffy had repaid his own expenses, Wright defended 
his SPC tactics: “I just don’t think it was a bad misrepresentation,” he said under oath 
(Gollom, August 19, 2015). Wright testified that he never told Harper about his plan to 
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personally repay Duffy’s expenses, backing up the PM’s ongoing insistences that he did 
not know about the plan until it was made public on May 14, 2013 by Robert Fife.  
Contradictory testimony was presented by former PMO lawyer Benjamin Perrin, 
who worked for the PMO for just under two years before returning to his position as a law 
professor at the University of British Columbia. Perrin testified that then-secretary Ray 
Novak, who took over as chief of staff when Wright was dismissed, was in the room when 
Wright said he planned to pay Duffy’s expenses from his own pocket. Emails also showed 
that Wright told Novak and Woodcock that he planned to use his own money to repay the 
expenses. Both Novak and Woodcock testified that they did not read the emails and were 
therefore not aware of Wright’s plan. Given the closeness of Novak to the PM, many critics 
have expressed doubt that he would have kept it a secret if he knew of the plan, which 
Perrin insisted under oath that he did know about. Novak continued to deny any prior 
knowledge of Wright’s plan in an interview with CTV’s Robert Fife on August 28, 2015. 
Harper insists that he had no knowledge of the plan either. 
What is clear from the emails submitted as evidence is that Novak played a lead 
and highly active role in attempting to prevent the Senate from auditing Duffy, including 
encouraging him not to go along with the repayment and avoid being audited by the 
Senate-appointed auditor. Novak says that the PMO had a communication plan to manage 
the problem, which included writing a script – testimony and other emails confirm – that 
he was to follow in interviews about his repayment of the expenses. In an email numbered 
207 from Novak to Duffy on February 22, 2013 Novak writes:  “As I think you’ve discussed 
with Nigel, we can put a com strategy around repayment that I think will work. Best to seize 
the initiative and not wait for audit.” Woodcock testified that he wrote the script that Duffy 
was instructed to follow, even though he argued that he had not done anything wrong. 
Duffy was instructed to say that he had repaid his expenses, but not how. Nothing was 
said about Wright’s personal check. Woodcock was also asked by Duffy’s lawyer, Donald 
Bayne, whether he was concerned about misrepresenting the facts to the public. CBC 
News journalist Mark Gollom reported on Woodcock’s August 25 testimony:  
Bayne asked Woodcock whether he was troubled ethically 
by this secret deal and the fact that he was crafting media 
lines for Duffy that were misrepresentations. 
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Woodcock said that at the time it didn’t seem significant or 
a misrepresentation, and that the focus was on repaying the 
expenses to taxpayers. 
However, Woodcock said, with the benefit of hindsight, “I 
think that’s a judgment call that I don’t necessarily agree with 
today.  
It is important to note that Harper has not apologized for the actions of his staff, other than 
to blame Duffy and Wright who he has said repeatedly are personally responsible. In an 
interview on August 19, 2015 the PM told reporters: 
I told Mr. Duffy in February that he should be repaying 
expenses that I simply thought were not justifiable. In March, 
I was told that he was repaying those expenses. When I 
found out in May he wasn’t, I took the appropriate action. 
Obviously I dealt with Mr. Duffy because he had not repaid 
his expenses, and Mr. Wright because he had paid those 
expenses for Mr. Duffy (Fraser, August 19, 2015). 
Harper is also not critical of anyone other than Duffy and Wright, refusing to hold other 
members of staff to blame or even accountable for their attempts to mislead the public as 
a means to control the flow of authentic information which might prove to be politically 
embarrassing. What mattered most to Harper’s PMO, it is clear from the testimony of his 
staff, was to avoid blame through being held accountable, by controlling the flow of 
authentic information that would allow the public to understand what had actually 
transpired.  
4.7.  Controlling the flow of information 
Whatever the final outcome, the Wright/Duffy affair was from the first an attempt at 
controlling the flow of information about government in order to control the message. It is 
a common and widely-accepted communication strategy, at least from the perspective of 
those who wish to control the message, even if it has dark origins in the history of 
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propaganda. Strategic information experts Karen Johnson-Carlee and Gary Copeland 
argue that “Information Flow Control” of the news agenda is an essential technique for any 
party which hopes to gain and maintain power:  
It has been said that information control of information is at 
the root of power, and for this reason, management of 
information is a carefully guarded domain within 
organizational structures and a heavily analyzed process. 
Since the days of [Joseph] Goebbels, we have known that 
the news-making process is yet another means by which 
leaders exercise information flow control, for they simply 
withhold information from the news media… Today 
propagandists often practice omission, or not giving all the 
details, when the details would likely hurt the propagandist’s 
cause (Johnson-Carlee and Copeland: p.181-182). 
However, the authors cite an important caveat that seems to have been overlooked by the 
SPC managers of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO): “But this is only effective as long as 
it remains unlikely that details will be disclosed from another source” (p.184). In this case 
the news of Wright’s resignation, and the indiscretion that led to his resignation were 
already known. Harper’s job was to explain what happened and restore public confidence. 
Instead, at the earliest stage of the emerging communication crisis, Harper staged what 
he hoped would be a well-managed “news event” intended to control the information flow. 
However, Harper’s purpose and intent was quickly evident, which resulted in a news frenzy 
and criticism from all directions, including everyone from Twitter enthusiasts to Canada’s 
most respected news media sources. A week later as the Harper government’s handling 
of the Duffy-Wright affair continued to dominate headlines, Globe and Mail columnist 
Jeffrey Simpson wrote this devastating critique of Conservative SPC tactics: 
The reaction to the Senate affair is typical of the way Mr. 
Harper’s government does politics – indeed, government. 
Hunker down, deny, blame the media, give out as little 
information as possible, try to ride out the storm. But under 
no circumstances provide a full and fair accounting of what 
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happened. Canadians can see this attitude on display every 
day in the way the government spends money for partisan 
purposes through television advertisements at the public’s 
expense, the vicious attack ads levelled at leaders of other 
political parties, the use of MPs’ household mails for similar 
attacks, the constant spin-doctoring, the roundhouse swings 
at opponents in civic society, the attacks on “lickspittle” 
media. Canada has moved over time from a friendly 
dictatorship (to borrow a phrase) to elements of a 
thugocracy (Simpson. May 29, 2013). 
There were hundreds of reader comments on the Simpson column, most of which agreed 
with his point of view. A reader identified above his comment as Mark Shore, wrote: 
“They've been sailing close to the wind for years. But now they are taking on water and 
starting to list” (May 29, 2013). However, the fact that the tactic failed, in no way diminishes 
its intent: To control the message. This was quickly realized by reporters who took matters 
into their own hands and changed the game from one of follow the leader, to holding the 
leader to account for attempting to control the flow of information in the most literal sense. 
The criticism that reporters interviewed for this thesis level at the Conservatives 
about deliberately misleading, or even lying, have proven accurate in light of the evidence 
and testimony that emerged from the Duffy trial. Wright and Woodcock both admitted that 
they deliberately “misrepresented” the facts concerning how Duffy’s expenses were 
repaid. And that they wanted to prevent an independent audit of Senate expenses from 
exposing that truth. Further, as conservative-leaning National Post columnist Andrew 
Coyne pointed out, the testimony of senior PMO staff at the Duffy trial demonstrate that 
misleading the public via the media had become so routine that it was unquestioned as a 
communication strategy:  
It is noteworthy that, almost without exception, no one at any 
point raises any objection to what is going on; not the public 
deception, not the attempts to tamper with the audit, not the 
whitewashing of the committee report. The lies are so 
habitual, so instinctive, so much a part of the normal run of 
 150 
things that no one seems to think them even unusual. Let 
alone unacceptable. It matters, in the end, because the 
things that should have mattered to them, like honesty and 
integrity, didn’t. (Coyne, August 24, 2015) 
What mattered was protecting the political interests of the party, even if that meant 
misleading the news media, and the public. There was no sense that the public was 
entitled to know how it was governed, and that they required authentic information to do 
so. The Duffy trial demonstrates how, when the political interests of the party conflicted 
with the public’s interest in transparency of government, the Conservative PMO chose 
their own partisan interests over the public’s.  
While reporters have long understood that media relations specialists, whether 
working for a corporation or government, will not voluntarily reveal information that might 
prove damaging to their employer, there is both an understanding and ethical codes which 
require that they do not attempt to deliberately mislead, and certainly not to lie to reporters. 
It violates the section of the Canadian Public Relations Society Code of Ethics previously 
cited but worth repeating: 
A member shall practice the highest standards of honesty, 
accuracy, integrity and truth, and shall not knowingly 
disseminate false or misleading information (CPRA 2013). 
Lying is not only unethical, it is unprofessional. It is unprofessional because it undermines 
the credibility of the spokesperson, and therefore undermines their ability to influence 
media. Political communication consultant and CTV political analyst Scott Reid was both 
Senior Advisor and Director of Communications for Liberal Prime Minister Paul Martin from 
2003 to 2006. During the 2011 interview Reid noted the difference between the way he 
managed his communications staff, and the way Harper’s communication staff behaved 
towards news media. The first difference was in controlling the flow of information between 
the public service and reporters: “They vary in two ways: one, their willingness to direct 
the public service is extraordinary,” he said in an interview in his Toronto office on May 25, 
2011. But an even more puzzling difference was what appeared to be a systematic 
strategy to mislead reporters and the public, said Reid. 
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To be honest there are things that they do that I would never 
have contemplated doing, that are at a minimum 
unprofessional, and in some cases unethical. The second 
thing is, and this I find terribly denigrating, that they will 
systematically insist upon things that they know to be untrue 
as a means of political strategy. There are always going to 
be examples where people, ministers or staffers might 
mislead people, might literally say something that is untrue. 
But the ethic used to be that that was inappropriate. And if 
that happened it was an aberration. It was unprofessional 
and if it was revealed then it was something that ought to 
have consequences. It certainly wasn’t an orchestrated, 
intended strategy. And if you were a communications official 
or director in the prime minister’s office, and someone was 
to say: My intention is to deliberately mislead.’ Then among 
your jobs was to say: ‘No. That is not what we are going to 
do.’ It is inappropriate as a strategy because you will lose 
credibility. It is wrong (Reid, interview in Toronto, May 25, 
2015). 
Reid said aside from the ethical issues, the problem with what he described as “hard spin” 
was that it was destined to fail as a communication strategy. “In my form of business we 
call that hard spin: A line that is so loaded with bullshit that no reasonable journalist would 
be able to consume it without grimacing…It is all send. It is send hard and it is hard spin. 
No candor.” 
Tom Flanagan, Former Harper campaign manager and PMO insider, explained how this 
works in explaining the 2009 campaign strategy for the minority government 
Conservatives, should the opposition parties force an election. The plan, said Flanagan, 
was to remind voters of the unpopular attempt by the Liberals and NDP, with the support 
of the separatist Bloc Party, to form a coalition to replace the Conservatives, whom they 
intended to defeat in a vote of non-confidence. Harper killed the plan in a controversial 
move by proroguing Parliament in December, 2008 and preventing the vote from going 
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ahead. Flanagan said the idea of joining forces with a separatist party was unpopular 
outside of Quebec, and planned to build fear that the Liberal Party, which had recently 
elected Harvard scholar Michael Ignatieff as it leader, who did not support the idea of a 
coalition. But that was of no concern to the party strategists, according to Flanagan. In a 
September 8, 2009 interview with the Globe and Mail he noted that the Conservatives 
would play on the fact that Ignatieff had spent decades outside of the country as a world 
scholar. Globe reporters Steven Chase and Campbell Clark explained the strategy as 
Flanagan saw it playing out: 
Conservative strategists want to remind their base, and 
swing voters, of the alliance the Liberals forged with the 
NDP and Bloc – and frighten them with the notion Liberal 
Leader Michael Ignatieff might try it again. The accusation 
plays right into existing Tory attacks that paint the recently 
installed Liberal chief as a political carpetbagger who’s 
returned to Canada after a long absence merely to win 
power.  
The reporters then quoted Flanagan’s explanation of the strategy:  
“They can tie the two together and say…’He will force an 
election even the there is no reason for it and there is no 
policy distance between the two parties on any major 
issues,” Flanagan told the Globe reporters. It was clearly a 
case of hard spin: “It doesn’t have to be true,” added 
Flanagan. “It just has to be plausible and it strikes me as 
plausible.” 
But hard spin is not without its risks. More recently, the attempt by the Harper 
government to manage the message in the emerging scandal involving Wright backfired 
and therefore failed miserably either to promote a positive image of the Harper 
government, or to counter negativity bias by diverting attention away from the scandal. 
However, it is a blatant, and therefore instructive example of a government’s attempt to 
employ tactics of blame risk avoidance, and also of the central importance of managing 
the message in the PMO of Stephen Harper’s Conservative government. Even if they did 
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not succeed, these tactics illustrate that the primary dual-purposes of government-
controlled political communication has become the avoidance of the risk of blame, and the 
marketing of government to citizens as consumers of political brands. 
4.8. Challenging control of information flow: the PMO and the press 
gallery 
The journalists who cover Canada’s Parliament are among the most senior, 
respected and high-profile journalists in the country. The national political beat is among 
the most prestigious assignments and generally falls to experienced and talented 
journalists with proven records of competent journalism. In addition, it is primarily major 
news outlets who have the funding to send a reporter to Ottawa to cover federal politics, 
so the reporters in Ottawa are not only among the most talented in their own newsrooms, 
they have often worked their way up from smaller publications and broadcasters before 
being hired to work for national news outlets such as CBC or the Globe and Mail. They 
are at the top of their profession. In order to be accredited to cover Parliament, journalists 
must be members of the Canadian Parliamentary Press Gallery in Ottawa. On August 25, 
2013 368 journalists were listed as members of the CPG,65 according to the CPPG official 
website. This number is surprisingly consistent, given the staff cuts in newspaper 
newsrooms across the country. On August 6, 2011 there were 367 journalists registered 
with the parliamentary press gallery, according to the official website. Not all of the 
members are actively covering politics in Ottawa on a full-time basis. For example, former 
journalist Jim Munson, who is now a Senator, is still a member and writes a column for the 
online publication iPolitics. The membership are overwhelmingly drawn from mainstream 
and traditional Canadian news media. Of the 368 members; 168 worked in television, 
including seven journalists working for ethnic stations such as OMNI and New Tang 
Dynasty; another 22 members worked for CPAC, a non-profit television and online 
broadcast service that covers Parliament exclusively. The second highest group was 85 
members who worked for a major Canadian news agency such as Canadian Press or for 
a newspaper chain, and another 12 worked for independent newspapers such as the Hill 
Times. Thirteen members worked for media outlets such as iPolitics and Rabble.ca which 
are available online. Eight members worked for magazines, with six of the eight working 
for Maclean’s. Only nine members work for radio, with nine of the eight working for CBC. 
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Four members worked for specialty publications such as The Catholic News. There were 
18 freelancers listed as members, with 10 of the 18 producing work for mainstream media 
outlets, and in some cases also for online publications such as iPolitics. Two were 
freelancing for iPolitics alone. Only two members appear to write blogs for their personal 
websites, and another freelancer was the director of a private productions firm and another 
works as an editor of an independent publication. It was unclear where the other two 
freelancers publish or broadcast their work. Finally, 22 members worked for foreign news-
gathering agencies, including the Wall Street Journal, the Huffington Post, Bloomberg 
News, the Russian news agency Itar-Tass, and for the Chinese government-controlled 
news agency Xinhua News. The press gallery consists overwhelmingly of senior reporters 
working for mainstream media in television and newspapers and for news agencies such 
as CP and Reuters. While all of these media outlets also have online publications, only a 
minority of members worked for publications available strictly online. Only two appear to 
write personal blogs, although there may be a large number of mainstream reporters who 
are also writing blogs. A number of the freelancers write personal blogs in addition to 
working for mainstream media. While blogs and other social media such as Twitter 
increasingly provide forums for public discussion of political issues, since few if any private 
citizens or independent bloggers are accredited to cover Parliament directly, it would 
appear that for the most part social media commentary relies on mainstream media 
sources for the original content on which to base their comments and opinions.  
In her M.A. thesis on journalists’ response to the SPC tactics of the Harper 
government, senior press gallery reporter Jennifer Ditchburn cites its all-consuming 
attempts at controlling information flow and access as the most notable way in which the 
relationship between government and reporters has changed and become much more 
controlled under the Conservatives. The change was noticeable despite the fact that 
governments from Pierre Elliot Trudeau’s Liberal government through to Harper’s 
Conservatives have all increasingly attempted to limit and control information as a means 
to control media coverage and public knowledge of their actions and decisions (Ditchburn: 
p. 94-98). Once-routinely available background information and interviews with expert 
public officials and responsible cabinet ministers virtually ceased. Instead all 
communication with media was centralized under the direct control of the PMO. Nobody 
could speak without its permission, and often that permission was denied. Ditchburn 
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interviewed 14 other senior parliamentary press gallery journalists about their experience 
with Harper government communications. They agreed that limiting access to information 
and sources, including the PM and his ministers, was the greatest shift since the party 
took power in 2006: 
The heavy and centralized layers of control and approvals 
for media relations have become de rigueur since the 
Conservatives took power in 2006, having grown on the 
foundations left by the Chretien-Martin governments. But 
there were also important differences with prior 
governments. As the reporters interviewed for this thesis 
repeatedly emphasized, background briefings used to be 
commonplace. Personal interaction with communications 
staff was just part of day-to-day life, and rudimentary 
information was fairly easily and quickly obtained 
(Ditchburn: p. 100). 
The two main themes that emerged under the Harper Conservatives were: “the curtailment 
of access to government politicians and the curtailment of access to the bureaucracy, and 
government information,” Ditchburn concluded, based on both her personal experience 
and the interviews with her journalistic colleagues (2014: p. 106). However, Ditchburn 
argues that the Harper PMO attempts at controlling information flow met with mixed 
success, a fact borne out with the politically-damaging testimony and email evidence of 
routine use of SPC tactics that emerged from the Duffy trial.  
My own interviews with four senior parliamentary press gallery journalists in May 
and June 2011 were echoed in Ditchburn’s findings. The four journalists I interview were:   
o Martin Lawrence, Globe and Mail political columnist. Author of books on 
Prime Ministers Jean Chretien (2003) and Stephen Harper (2011) 
o Dean Beeby, Deputy Bureau Chief, Canadian Press, Ottawa 
o Jim Bronskill, Reporter, Canadian Press, Ottawa. Focused on security, 
intelligence, information and privacy. Lecturer at Carleton University 
Journalism School. 
o David Akin, National Bureau Chief (Ottawa) Sun Media 
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All four were experienced reporters who had covered federal politics, and Parliament in 
particular, through several governments prior to the Conservative’s election to office. All 
four, including Akin who works for the Sun Media, which is known to be more sympathetic 
toward the Conservatives than other media outlets, noted the constrictions to access 
noted by Ditchburn and her interviewees. They too noted the curtailment of both access 
to government sources and information under Harper. Senior CP journalists Beeby and 
Bronskill noted another disturbing new factor: an inability to trust the truth of the 
information that PMO and ministerial political communications staff did make available. 
They felt they were often being deliberately misled by the Harper government’s political 
staff. Beeby, who has covered politics for decades and through several successive 
governments said in part the problem lies with the youth and inexperience of the powerful 
PMO political staff. Beeby was unequivocal. 
I think that happens every day. I think we are misled every 
day. I think the omission of information can be misleading. I 
understand the government wants to spin us in their 
direction which is fine, but I can think of in my own work, lots 
of statements that were misleading. Lots of statements that 
I would consider to be untrue (Beeby, interviewed in Ottawa 
on June 1, 2011). 
His CP colleague Bronskill also said that he and several of his colleagues felt they had 
been deliberately misled. “I think there have been a number of examples where people in 
our office have said the PMO has lied, like just outright lied,” he said during a joint interview 
with Beeby on June 1, 2011.  
Although my interviews were conducted several years prior to Ditchburn’s, her 
M.A. thesis backs up her journalism colleagues’, and Reid’s perspective on hard spin, or 
lying to reporters. She determined that as the PMO closed avenues of reliable information 
about government, reporters turned to alternative means of obtaining credible information, 
including using the ATIA.  
If the experiences of the reporters interviewed for this are 
any indication, information is still making its way into news 
articles and broadcasts, but not necessarily the information 
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that the government desired. External interest groups 
(including other governments), the access to information 
system, and investigative reporting are all sources of 
information that are much harder for a government to control 
and manipulate. …Journalist faced with stringent news 
management have no alternative but to turn to these other 
sources (Ditchburn: p.154) 
One reason why this happens is that reporters stake their professional reputations on 
breaking, accurate news stories before their competitors and therefore must seek out 
original and accurate information about government. They are also required to serve the 
public’s interests rather than special interests, including employers, advertisers and 
political parties. This also puts them at odds with SPC specialists who serve the interests 
of the political party that appoints them. 
4.9. Canadian journalists and professional codes of ethics 
Journalists are constrained by ethical guidelines. While journalists are not 
regulated by government, which would be an obvious conflict of interest given that they 
cover government and are seen as its critics, they are governed by professional codes of 
ethics and principles. Journalists in all democratic countries that have a free press, are 
bound by detailed guides for reporting on all subjects. Failure to meet the standards of 
these codes, which in Canada is written by a panel of the Canadian Association of 
Journalists (CAJ)66 is grounds for dismissal from employment and censure by journalistic 
peers. Fiction is not on the table in coverage of government or any other story or issue. 
There are also requirements for fairness, balance and independence of the journalist. 
Independence is particularly important. Perhaps most importantly, journalists are to serve 
the public interest, and not to use their positions to promote any other interest including 
that of their employer or advertisers.  
We serve democracy and the public interest by reporting the 
truth. This sometimes conflicts with various public and 
private interests, including those of sources, governments, 
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advertisers and, on occasion, with our duty and obligation to 
an employer. 
Defending the public’s interest includes promoting the free 
flow of information, exposing crime or wrongdoing, 
protecting public health and safety, and preventing the 
public from being misled. 
We do not give favoured treatment to advertisers and 
special interests. We resist their efforts to influence the 
news (Canadian Association of Journalists 2013).67 
The independence requirements for journalists mark a significant difference from 
codes of ethics followed by professional public relations practitioners, who declare loyalty 
to their employer and clients.68 Further, journalists are held to account by the public, by 
the readers and viewers. If they lose credibility, or worse, if they damage the credibility of 
their news outlet and employer, they will not be able to continue working as a journalist. 
Failing to follow ethical codes and professional standards are grounds for termination for 
those who are employed by big newsrooms, and would destroy any opportunities for 
freelance. It would also damage the credibility of the news organization, which means that 
it could lose readers or audience. Bad journalism can also make for a bad business model. 
Parliamentary reporters are powerful people, provided that they play by the 
extensive rules of their own profession. They have risen to that position in the newsroom 
by proving that they are exceptional reporters and are both capable and deserving of what 
remains a prestigious posting. Provided that they can verify the truth of what they report, 
they have the power to inform the public when governments behave in questionable ways, 
which can immerse the government in a scandal. That is not to say that stories are simply 
personal vendettas. They are not. But not only have the Harper Conservatives lost the 
trust and confidence of powerful press gallery journalists, it has in effect challenged the 
journalists to show that they are so good at their jobs that they can ferret out information 
that the government has attempted to misrepresent or conceal. What Ditchburn argues is 
that journalists seek alternative avenues for information, when and because information is 
denied, or has proven to be unreliable, as is the case when a source is known to lie or 
 159 
deliberately mislead for their own advantage. The stories they seek out may include 
scandal, provided it is verified as accurate.  
I would argue that the result of the change in journalistic 
routine, brought on by the crackdown on access, has only 
increased the intensity of scandal-centered coverage as 
reporters try to dig up what is hidden. Herein lies a vicious 
cycle: governments argue their message is not getting out, 
so they crackdown on access and rely more on politicized 
communication. In turn, reporters become fixated with what 
they might be missing. A chronic state of partial war… 
(Ditchburn: p.154). 
As Ditchburn’s thesis argues, SPC tactics may therefore not prove to be the smartest way 
to deal with reporters in the long run as it pushes them to seek out alternative sources of 
information beyond the government’s control, and often entirely opposite to the 
government’s partisan interest in maintaining power through positive public opinion. 
4.10. Muzzling bureaucrats 
Controlling the information flow involved more than misleading journalists in the 
Harper PMO. It also involved controlling exactly who could speak about or for government 
issues and decisions. Numerous news stories have been written about the Harper 
government preventing bureaucrats from speaking to reporters. This included refusing to 
allow government scientists69 to discuss their work publically, even when it concerned 
previously published peer-reviewed scientific findings. One such example involved a 
Fisheries Canada scientist who released a peer-reviewed paper in which she speculated 
that a virus might have infected salmon and contributed to a collapse in the sockeye 
salmon run in 2009 (Miller 2011). Kristi Miller was approached by Postmedia science 
reporter Margaret Munro who wanted to talk to the scientist in more detail to seek 
clarification of the paper. The request for an interview was denied (Munro, July 27, 2011). 
Miller later testified at a commission into the salmon run collapse that she wanted to speak 
to reporters to clarify her work, in particular the idea that a virus was the “smoking gun” in 
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the unexplained collapse. However, as Miller testified, she was prevented from doing so 
by the Privy Council Office (PCO) which is the administrative and supplemental 
communications arm of the PMO. Even though the Fisheries Department had argued that 
Miller should be allowed to speak, she was prevented from doing so by the PCO, a ban 
which was only lifted for the duration of her testimony before the commission. She was 
not even allowed to speak to reporters about her testimony (Hoekstra, August 25, 2011). 
(As Chapter 3 shows, the executive branch alone has the right to decide what government 
information can be made public, and therefore has a right to ban public servants from 
speaking publically, a power which the executive branch exercises with increasing 
frequency in Canada.) The Vancouver Sun reported that Miller testified that she was 
frustrated about being denied the right to discuss her report with media:  
...under cross-examination by Conservation Coalition 
lawyer Tim Leadem, Miller stressed she was frustrated she 
was not allowed to speak publicly about her research. "This 
is why I put up resistance," Miller, DFO head of molecular 
genetics, told the inquiry. (Hoekstra) 70 
The salmon fishery is politically sensitive in B.C. where a strong coalition of anti-
fish-farm advocates has expressed concern about the possibility that farmed salmon are 
infecting wild salmon with diseases and sea lice. The Miller findings might have supported 
that view, although during her testimony she said there was no indication that the virus 
had come from farmed salmon. But anything involving the salmon industry in B.C. is a 
political hot potato, particularly for the federal Department of Fisheries which has 
jurisdiction over wild salmon stocks and fisheries. Whatever the reasoning, it is clear that 
PCO communication, which acts at the direction of the PMO through its PCO 
communications secretariats, did not want a public discussion of the scientific issues 
raised in Miller’s research. She was therefore banned from speaking to the media or any 
other members of the public. When this happens in governance, a darker side of political 
marketing emerges, which is information control and manipulation, often as a means to 
control the message produced and broadcast through mass media. As Chapter 5 shows, 
in Canada the federal executive branch has almost exclusive control of public access to 
government information. The exception, other than the rule of law, is Access to Information 
and, more recently the exercise of parliamentary privilege to demand records the 
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government has deemed secret. It is important to note that the executive branch of 
government is not subject to ATI, following a 2011 Supreme Court ruling that the PMO 
and minister’s offices are not considered institutions of government as defined by the Act. 
4.11. Controlling the information flow: Message Event Proposals 
Anyone in government who wishes to speak publically about the work and 
workings of government must first seek permission through a recently established process 
implemented and ultimately controlled by the Harper PMO. The system, known as 
“Message Event Proposals” or MEPS was devised by politically appointed PMO Director 
of Communications Sandra Buckler (Thomas 2011: p. 27) and was initially implemented, 
with the blessing of Prime Minister Harper in late 2006 and early 2007 as a means to 
manage ministerial interactions with news media. The public communications 
management system was quickly imposed across government to control all media access 
to government employees and elected officials, and also to direct and manage any public 
appearances on behalf of government. Prior to any public appearance or media interview, 
all government employees and elected officials were required to submit an MEP request 
for approval to the Privy Council Office, which makes MEP decisions in consultation with  
PMO staff. The requests are evaluated to determine the value of the ‘event’ and are often 
denied if they fail to meet approval. If approved, the MEP would then provide detailed 
directions, including a script, or talking points that were to be followed exactly, and even 
what sort of attire should be worn and the backdrops for the public appearances or 
interaction with news media. From the outset, MEPs were highly-controversial, especially 
with high-ranking bureaucrats and diplomats who had previously been allowed to use their 
own judgement in attending and speaking at public events. 
The MEP system was intended to strengthen PMO control over an existing system 
which already required that institutions consult their minister's office when planning media 
campaigns or strategies that could involve ministerial participation, or when preparing a 
response to a media enquiry that could have implications for the minister. 71  In politics, 
any issue could have “implications for the minister,” opening the door for political 
intervention via the minister, PM and their political staff. The MEP system therefore helps 
to keep a tight lid on interactions with media. Anyone in government who wants to speak 
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to media – from the lowest civil servant to the minister of the department – must seek prior 
permission through the MEP system.  
The MEP system has a dual purpose, first to control who in government can speak 
or appear publically, and second, to control what they say. Everyone from low-ranking 
government scientists to ministers and their staff are required to submit a request to the 
PCO for permission prior to accepting invitations to give a speech, attend an event, or 
grant an interview. If the request is approved, and it is far from a given that it will be, the 
individual who made the request is given a scrip to follow and instructions on how to 
appear, and how to present the scripted material. The purpose of MEPS is strategic and 
political. They fit the Hood model of communication for purposes of seeking “credit” for the 
Conservative brand of government. MEPs are therefore used as a political communication 
strategy both for seeking credit, as in the MEP detailed here, and for avoiding what Hood 
describes as blame risk. Thomas describes the dual purpose of MEPs and other forms of 
PMO message control.  
 The all-controlling approach to public communications and 
media relations was extended to other cabinet ministers and 
the Public Service. It was during Buckler’s time as Director 
of Communications (February, 2006-June, 2008) that the 
government put in place the Message Event Proposal 
(MEP) system. MEP was intended to predict and manage 
how messages would play out in the media as a way to 
maximize political credit for the government or to prevent 
damage to its reputation…to accomplish these aims nearly 
all external messaging that could be captured by the media 
has to receive approval from political staff in the PMO before 
news releases go out, speeches are given or interviews are 
granted (Thomas.2011: p. 27). 
The MEP system first came to light in 2010 when Canadian Press reporters Jim 
Bronskill and Mike Blanchfield (June 8, 2010)72 used ATI to obtain copies of the 
communications gatekeeping process. Among the many insights their work provided, it 
showed evidence of resistance to the MEP system inside government. The CP reporters 
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received copies of a 2007 MEP sent by PCO communications to James Wright, who at 
the time was Canada’s high commissioner to Britain. Wright had been invited to speak by 
the University of Birmingham’s Canadian Studies Department, which intended to post the 
speech on the Internet. According to the MEP obtained by the reporters, the intention to 
record the speech meant that there would have to be a “communications strategy,” 
according to the reporters. The two-page MEP outlines “strategic objectives,” “key 
messages,” and a “desired soundbites” for Wright to include in his speech. He was to refer 
to: “The historic, cultural trade and investment links between Birmingham/the West 
Midlands, and Canada, and the strength of the Canada/U.K. relationship.” The reporters 
pointed out that Wright had been appointed in 2006 by the newly-elected Conservatives, 
and had previously served as a “high-profile federal spokesman.” No matter the 
experience or expertise, all “messaging” would be controlled and directed by the centre, 
the PMO to whom all ministries, departments and agencies of government answer.  
Bronskill and Blanchfield cited several examples of credit-seeking political 
messaging which the PCO – supposedly a politically-neutral department of government – 
had suggested in a number of specific MEPs they obtained through ATI. The documents 
clearly revealed the political purpose at the root of the MEP system. The reporters noted 
a number of the MEPs were intended to win votes by scoring political points for the 
Conservatives with specifically targeted ethnic diaspora living in Canada. 
The MEPs have been used widely in embassies and 
diplomatic missions across the world. In some cases, the 
government has weighed so-called diaspora politics — how 
the handling of an event in a far-off land will play with a 
particular ethnic group in Canada. 
In November 2007, after a cyclone tore through the Bay of 
Bengal killing more than 5,000 people, the PCO prepared a 
three-page plan for Barbara Richardson, high commissioner 
to Bangladesh, to respond to "potential interviews" with 
Canadian and international journalists. 
There is no sign that any happened with mainstream media, 
but one of the "strategic objectives" for having Richardson 
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speak with journalists was to "build confidence" in the 
government's ability to respond to disasters.  
A "target group" for the exercise was "Diaspora communities 
from Bangladesh" in Canada. When the CBC and Radio-
Canada requested an interview with Canada's ambassador 
to Ethiopia, Yves Boulanger, in October 2007, one of the key 
"target groups" was Africans in Canada (Bronskill and 
Blanchfield, June 8, 2010). 
I also used Access to Information to obtain copies of the MEPS previously released 
to reporters for the purposes of this thesis. (Please see Appendix B for copies of the 
English language MEPs obtained from the PCO ATIP office on June 17, 2010 under ATIP 
file number A-2010-00106/NW.) The copies show that the following categories are listed 
in each of the MEPS, with specific instructions for each event. At the top of the form is the 
name and title of the government representative, the date and time of the event, and the 
location. The “EVENT” is described along with who is expected to attend. The MEP then 
lists a preferred “HEADLINE,” that, presumably, the communications staff responsible for 
writing the MEP hopes will appear in news media. For example, A MEP dated August 27, 
2008 lists an event in Thunder Bay for “MP [Joe] Comuzzi,” a former Liberal MP who had 
crossed the floor in 2007 to join the Conservatives. The event was an announcement of 
$2 million in federal funding for a Multicultural Association, according to the MEP. The 
headline the Conservative government hoped to see was “GOVERNMENT OF CANADA 
ANNOUNCES OVER $2 MILLION TO HELP NEWCOMERS SUCCEED IN THUNDER 
BAY.” The script then lists “KEY LINES” for the MP to follow. All credited the Government 
of Canada with being committed to good deeds related to the new funding: “Helping 
newcomers and their families…investing more than $2M…in turn helps ensure a stronger 
Canada.” And finally, “Since 2006, the Government of Canada is investing more than $920 
million in settlement funding over a five-year-period [it was two years into the mandate in 
2008 when the MEP was written] for Ontario to help newcomers integrate into the 
community.” Next the form explains the “DESIRED SOUNDBITE: The Government of 
Canada is providing $2 million to the Thunder Bay Multicultural Association to help 
newcomers succeed and fit into the community.” It also points out the government plans 
to spend even more money across Canada, to integrate “newcomers.” Nothing is left to 
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chance. Next to “TONE” is typed “Celebratory. The “BACKDROP” is to be Flags and a 
sign proclaiming “HELPING NEWCOMERS SUCCEED” with the same sign on the 
podium. The speech is to take “five minutes” and the tone of the speech is described as 
“positive.” The MP is instructed that his “ATTIRE” should be “business.” Under 
“ROLLOUT” is listed various communication strategies: 
News release to be issue locally/provincially and target to 
ethnic media 
Speech 
Post-event media – media availability 
Other (describe) media lines and Qs and As [scripted points, 
anticipated media questions and the answers to be given] 
for media availability”  
Comuzzi was at the time aged 75 and had been an MP for Thunder Bay since 1988 – 
about two decades. It is hard to imagine that he needed advice on how to interact with the 
familiar citizens, who had re-elected him to Parliament several times. However, nothing 
was to be taken for granted by PMO/PCO communication, not even the type of dress 
appropriate for the veteran MP to wear –“business” – while giving his “five minute” speech. 
4.12. Claiming credit: the PMO and the Economic Action Plan 
As Hood explains, the opposite of blame avoidance is seeking credit, which is a 
primary goal of political marketing. This is a relatively new area of academic study which 
dates from the 1980s onward, with contributions to our understanding of political marketing 
primarily by British and American scholars. The area of study is much less developed in 
Canada. However, an important 2012 collection of essays titled Political Marketing in 
Canada published by UBC Press was the result of the first academic conference on 
political marketing in Canada held in 2009 in Montreal. It is concerned with the application 
of market values and techniques to the political sphere and governance practices in 
Canada and says “for good or for bad” (Marland; Giasson & Lees-Marshment: p.xiv) it is 
“changing Canadian democracy. (p.xi). The good, the authors argue, is that selling a 
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product – including a political party or government – requires extensive research into the 
preferences and interests of “the electoral market” otherwise known as voters. The 
language of business applied to governance – voters as consumers for example – might 
make traditional democratic theorists uncomfortable, but it is the language and logic of 
modern governance communication practices. Political communication is increasingly a 
marketing process. It is important first to recognize that government communication has 
two main streams, the first of which is information about government services and 
programs which have no political impact or consequences. This would include information 
about where to get a passport, apply for a pension or mail your tax form. The second 
stream is political communication, which is any form of government that has political 
consequences or implications for an institution of government, or for the party in power. It 
is political communication of consequence to the party in power that is the focus of this 
thesis.  
While ideally, elected representatives live up to the public trust by governing in an 
open and transparent manner which serves the public interest, no such commitment 
guides the marketing mandate of the increasingly pervasive political communications staff 
who are hired to market government as a brand to voters as consumers of that product. 
Information, if it is truthful and complete, is a double-edged sword for government because 
it can reveal not only what went right, but also what went wrong. Truth about government 
apportions responsibility for actions, good or bad. Being held responsible and accountable 
for unpopular actions or misdeeds presents a risk issue to be managed, which any skilled 
political communications practitioner understands. That was most certainly the case 
presented for the Conservative Party in the 2013 scandal involving Duffy and Wright.  
4.13. PMO advertising and claiming credit 
Taxpayer-financed advertising to promote government programs is also an 
important tool in the governing party’s SPC kit at a cost of millions per year. The Globe 
and Mail reported on January 25, 2014 that the Conservative government had spent $69 
million “last year promoting such programs such as Canada’s Economic Action Plan” 
(Curry). The article notes that the term “Canada’s Economic Action Plan” was a 
“catchphrase first created by the Conservative government to promote stimulus spending 
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the ended nearly two years ago. Reporter Bill Curry adds that in fiscal year 2012-13, 
“taxpayers spent $14.8 million” on ads to promote the program – an increase of $5 million 
over the budget approved by Treasury Board for the previous fiscal year 2011-2012. 
In her 2012 article “Buyer” Beware: Pushing the Boundaries of Marketing 
Communications in Government,” Kristen Kozolanka examines the PMO’s role in 
promoting the Economic Action Plan as part of a broader assessment of the 
communications processes within the PMO. Her paper considers their influence in the 
political marketing of the Conservative government brand through both the management 
of blame risks, and through the promotion of positive images of governance – with the 
common goal of promoting the particular political brand of the Conservative government. 
Her work builds on Liane Benoit’s earlier work on exempt staff (2006)  which was recently 
followed up by Jennifer Robson’s article on the costs of hiring political staff for executive 
offices between 2007 and 2012, the most recent budgetary statistics available. Author and 
newspaper columnist Lawrence Martin’s book Harperland (2010) provides remarkable 
insight into the structure and operation of the PMO under Harper. Thomas’s 2011 paper 
is perhaps the most comprehensive overview to date of PMO communications. All of these 
authors have provided background information and have had a considerable influence on 
my own research and understanding of communication in the PMO.  
Kozolanka (2012) examines the use of political marketing techniques by Stephen 
Harper’s Conservative government from “a critical communications perspective (Mosco 
2009) to examine political marketing by a governing political party” (p.106). As already 
established, SPC tactics such as political marketing were not invented by Harper’s 
Conservatives. Such tactics are widely in use across all developed democracies, including 
Britain and the United States. In fact, the trend towards governance as a political marketing 
exercise, in defiance of the ongoing rhetoric of transparency and accountability by 
successive government (see Chapter 5), has increased in Canada over several decades 
through both Liberal and former Conservative governments. That said, Harper, it is widely 
acknowledged, has taken political marketing and information control to new heights. In the 
process his government has seriously eroded the Canadian public’s right to know how 
they are governed through access to authentic information about governance. The 
Conservative’s handling of the recessionary bailout Economic Action Plan from a strategic 
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communications perspective, is a case in point, according to Kozolanka. She argues the 
“political marketing” strategies, employed by the Harper PMO in promoting this program 
to the public is having a negative impact on Canadian democracy. 
In Canada, earlier transformations in communications 
practices in government, the rise of new practices of 
governance concurrent with the development of political 
marketing, and the case of the Stephen Harper 
government’s use of political marketing to promote its 
Economic Action Plan in 2009 collectively demonstrate the 
increasing centralization of power that crosses between the 
political and the administrative arms of government. This 
raises ethical questions about the use of political marketing 
in government and its impact on democracy (Kozolanka 
2012: 107).73 
The Economic Action Plan was the government’s response to the global recession of 
2008. As the economic impacts of the global financial meltdown began to be felt in 
Canada, the Conservative government took steps to stimulate the economy by injecting 
government funds for much-needed infrastructure projects, to support housing 
construction and to prop up the banks to ensure that they would continue to loan money 
to consumers and businesses, including bailing out General Motors in Canada with loans. 
Under the 2009 federal budget initiative the Conservative government promised to pay 
$39.942 billion over two years to prevent Canada from slipping into a severe recession or 
depression. According to the 2009 Federal Budget Report: 
The Government’s Economic Action Plan is based on three 
guiding principles—that stimulus should be timely, targeted, 
and temporary to: 
• Support the economy when it is most needed. 
• Support Canadian families and sectors most affected. 
• Ensure maximum impact for Canadian jobs and output. 
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• Protect Canada’s fiscal position by targeting new spending 
in the next two years. 74 
From the outset, the Economic Action Plan was much more than the government’s fiscal 
response to an economic crisis, it was also an opportunity to market the Conservatives as 
responsible and responsive fiscal managers of the Canadian economy. 
The ad campaign began in 2009 along with the Economic Action Plan. The 
Conservative government established the ad campaign, in part to make Canadians aware 
of the actions it was taking to stimulate the economy, and to make the public aware of 
government services that were available as a result. More than four years later, that 
communication strategy is still in place, including an “Action Plan ad campaign through 
television and other media, and prominent placement of signage at all federal government 
funded projects. The Globe and Mail reported in an editorial on July 23, 2013 that by that 
point advertising for the “Action Plan” had “cost at least $113 million since 2009.” 75 It is a 
substantial amount by any measure. In May 2013 the Conservatives “issued a tender for 
more such ads over the next year, and perhaps running to 2016,” according to Canadian 
Press Ottawa bureau chief Dean Beeby (July 21, 2013).76 Added to that is the cost of 
government polling, required by law (Beeby) to determine how Canadians were 
responding to its “Action Plan” advertising campaign and website. It turns out, not well. 
Beeby used Access to Information to obtain the results of a Harris-Decima poll conducted 
for the Finance Department in April 2013 which showed almost none of the individuals 
interviewed for the survey had visited the government website, even if they were aware of 
the ads: 
Slick television ads this year for the Harper government’s 
“economic action plan” appear to be inspiring a lot of, well, 
inaction. 
A key measure of the ads’ impact is whether viewers check 
out actionplan.gc.ca, the web portal created in 2009 to 
promote the catch-all brand. 
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But a survey of 2,003 adult Canadians completed in April 
identified just three people who actually visited the website. 
(Beeby July 21, 2013). 
Beeby also reported that the polling for the advertising campaign has cost taxpayers an 
additional $330,000 since 2009.  
Despite the cost, it is clear that the advertising campaigns do not always either 
reach the hoped-for audience, and even if they do, the audience is not always persuaded 
by what they read. A Globe and Mail editorial which ran on July 22, 2013 blamed the lack 
of genuine content in the ads for the cool public response.  
Canadians are not responding to the Conservative 
government’s “action plan” ads, and the reason seems 
clear: Intended to illuminate programs and services, they 
have been overly vague and have felt too much like partisan 
self-promotion. If they were more targeted and informative, 
they might merit closer attention… 
It is nothing novel to see a government pump its own tires, 
or project an aura of progress in a tough economy. But the 
polished and cheery ads – which have cost at least $113-
million since 2009 and have become fixtures on television – 
are often replete with broad allusions to “better infrastructure 
to make us more competitive,” or “more efficient government 
to keep taxes low.” No wonder most people tune them out. 
As the Globe editorial points out, the advertising campaign had more to do with promoting 
the government’s partisan interests – SPC – than with providing authentic information of 
use to Canadians either in understanding the services offered, or making use of them. In 
this case the strategic communication failed to resonate, perhaps because they did not 
deal with specifics, as the editorial suggests. Certainly the intent of the ads had less to do 
with authentic understanding of the program on the part of the audience, than with 
attempting to persuade the audience that the Conservative branch was a positive choice 
for political consumers. 
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But strategic political marketing is obviously often successful – obvious in part 
precisely because governing parties seeking re-election have come to rely on the tactic. 
Earlier polling cited by the Globe and Mail showed different results from the public in 
response to an advertising campaign to announce a tax credit for renovations. This was a 
clear and easily understood program that offered a particular service.  
By contrast, when the government promoted a home 
renovation tax credit in some detail in 2009, one in four 
people polled later said they had taken advantage of it – a 
lesson that bears remembering (July 22, 2013). 
Since this was a genuine and existing program, government advertising served to alert 
the public that the program was available and that they could apply for funding. The 
advertising in this case informed the public about a government service, rather than merely 
promoting the government for implementing the program. But informing the public was not 
always the purpose of Economic Action Plan advertising.  
The Economic Action Plan was originally intended to deal with what the Finance 
Department described as “extraordinary times for the global economy,” and was not 
intended to be a permanent mode of operation for the government. The Economic Action 
Plan continued as this dissertation was written. It morphed from a specific program 
designed to boost the economy in a time of recession, to include everything that the 
government funds. The government Action Plan website (http:www.actionplan.gc.ca) lists 
“Economic Action Plan Initiatives” that appear to include every government, action, agency 
and service. Included in the long list are the following: 
Atomic Energy Canada; … Canada Pension Plan; 
…Canadian Council of Arts; …Canada Excellence 
Research Chairs; … Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission; 
… Citizenship Program; ... Crown Corporations;…Excise 
Duty on Tobacco; … Family Violence Prevention Program; 
… Financial Institution Governance; … First Nations 
Education Act; ...Firearms Licence Fee Waiver; Old Age 
Security Age of Eligibility;…Phasing out the Penny. 
(Government of Canada, 2013).77 
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The list is so extensive as to be entirely meaningless in terms of understanding the 
program. In fact, the so-called Economic Action Plan appears to be a name used to “brand” 
all federal government funding, and thereby promote the Conservative government.  
The purpose of the plan is now “long-term,” and both vague and entirely 
promotional of government spending of all kinds. In reality, the stimulus plan is now 
primarily an ad campaign about ongoing and routine – rather than extraordinary – 
government works. The government Action Plan homepage describes the mandate for the 
Economic Action Plan as follows: 
The initiatives under Canada’s Economic Action Plan help 
to create jobs, economic growth and long-term prosperity 
from coast to coast to coast. They connect Canadians with 
jobs, help businesses succeed in the global economy, and 
foster research and innovation. They also support vital 
public infrastructure, as well as families and communities. 
Canada’s Economic Action Plan is doing all this, while 
continuing to protect Canada’s natural environment and 
returning the country to a balanced budget.78 
The Economic Action Plan political marketing program extends beyond existing programs, 
to promote a program that not only does not yet exist, but is unlikely to evolve in the way 
it is being marketed.  
In 2013, the Action Plan ads focused on promoting the Conservative government’s 
Canada Jobs Grant, ostensibly to help people train for jobs that are hard to fill because of 
a lack of trained workers. As the July 22, 2013 Globe editorial pointed out: “There is just 
one problem. The Jobs Grant doesn’t yet exist”. Approval and implementation depended 
on the agreement of provincial governments, many of which had expressed concerns 
about cuts to current employment programs, and to the added expense from the program 
that requires one-third of the grant to employers come from the provinces. Globe and Mail 
columnist John Ibbitson wrote on July 22, 2013: “as it stands, the chances of getting the 
provinces to support the Canada Job Grant hover between slim and hopeless.”79  That is 
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not the impression you would have had if you visited the Conservative Party website, 
which on April 19, 2013 stated: 
Announced as a part of Economic Action Plan 2013, the 
Canada Job Grant is an initiative that will transform the way 
Canadians receive skills-training… Canadians who have an 
offer for a new job or a better job will receive up to $15,000 
to learn the new skills that are required. Our Government 
will be providing $5,000 of that funding, and the remaining 
$10,000 will be matched by the provincial government and 
the business in question (Conservative Party, April 19, 
2013).80 
If taken at face value, the government-approved information would seem to suggest that 
a person seeking retraining could go to the nearest government employment office and 
apply for support during that retraining. That would be the expectation if the information 
conveyed was “authentic” and intended to help citizens understand the services available 
from government. But rather than authentic, the information was false and misleading. No 
such program was in operation at the time. Instead, the announcement was politically 
strategic – intended to garner the public’s support for government programs, which at the 
time did not exist because no agreement with the provinces had been approved to allow 
the program to proceed. 
4.14. Message alignment: Conservative Party and PMO mirror strategic 
political communication products 
Clearly the announcement of the Job Grant, which is found on a Conservative 
Party website, is intended to promote the partisan interests of the party. It is not a 
government website, so the partisan nature of the announcement may even be expected 
and excused. It should therefore come as no surprise that virtually identical language was 
published on the same day on the Prime Minister’s website (www.pm.gc.ca) which is an 
official government source: 
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The Canada Job Grant will transform the way Canadians 
receive training. Canadians who have an offer for a new job 
or a better job may qualify for up to $15,000 or more to learn 
new skills to accept the new or better job, from a $5,000 
maximum federal contribution and matching contributions 
from an employer and province or territory (PMO, April 19, 
2013)81 
The point of the PMO “news release” was to inform readers that the government 
had begun to consult with business and educational institutions on the implementation of 
the grant. There is no mention of the need to negotiate with provinces. Rather, like the 
Conservative Party website “announcement” the Jobs Grant program appears to be a 
certainty. Given that many unemployed workers would read the information hoping for a 
means to find work, it is not only misleading, it is cruelly so. However, beyond the ethical 
and moral issues involved in misleading people desperate for a solution to joblessness, 
the virtually identical language in between the Party website and the PMO, indicates that 
the purpose is partisan rather than informational. Rather than providing authentic 
information that enables understanding of governance, it is purely promotional – a means 
to brand government works as Conservative Party initiatives and thereby take credit.  
4.15. Public opinion polling and strategic political communication  
One of the many criticisms leveled against the ousted Liberal government by newly 
elected Conservative Party PM Harper in 2006 was its excessive use of taxpayer-funded 
public opinion polls, which Harper said were conducted for political purposes. Shortly after 
taking office, Harper ordered an inquiry into the amount of money spent on public opinion 
polls – clearly with the intention of embarrassing his political rivals with the result. 
However, the plan backfired when the independent investigator hired by Harper to conduct 
the inquiry reported back in December, 2007 that Harper’s own government had spent 
more on public opinion polling since taking office than the previous Liberal government. A 
story written by Canadian Press which ran on CTV news on December 13, 2007 reports 
that the Conservative government had “commissioned more than two polls per business 
day in the past year.” The investigator, Daniel Paille, termed the finding “quite astonishing.” 
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He further reported that the Conservatives had spent “$31.2 million on research last year”, 
which was almost double the $18 million spent by Liberals on polling in the previous year. 
CP reported that the Conservatives had “commissioned 546 opinion research projects” 
during their first year in office. CP reports that Paille had submitted his findings to the 
Conservatives two months prior to it being made public. To the government’s credit, Paille 
did say that he “found no evidence” that the polling was for partisan purposes. However 
he did cite one poll that asked respondents “whether they approve or disapprove of the 
way in which Harper and various premiers were doing their jobs” (CP, December 13, 
2007). According to more recent stories, the rate and cost of public opinion polling by the 
Conservatives has decreased significantly. A July 25, 2014 story by Toronto Star reporter 
Tonda MacCharles sites an annual report by Public Works and Government Services 
Canada which showed 81 public opinion polls were commissioned by federal departments 
in fiscal year 2013-14 at a cost of $4.9 million. That was up from 72 projects that cost $4.3 
million in the previous fiscal year. There is no explanation of why polling has decreased, 
nor is it possible to know whether the polling was for partisan purposes, as detailed 
information on specific polling is not made public. 
4.16. Strategic political communication and partisan influence in policy 
decisions 
The balance of power inside government has shifted increasingly from the 
bureaucracy and Parliament to the executive branch – and in particular the prime minister 
and the appointed political staff whom he directs to run his office, and also to follow his 
direction in other levels of government including cabinet ministers and backbencher 
members of Parliament, and federal bureaucrats. The centralization of power in the PMO 
has been well-documented by numerous Canadian political scholars, including Donald 
Savoie, Peter Aucoin (2011), Liane Benoit (2006), Peter Russell (2009), Nicholas 
d’Ombrain(2009), Paul Thomas (2011) and Ralph Heintzman (2015). As part of the 
centralization of power, communication control has also been centralized in the PMO and 
further serves to enhance the PM’s grip on government. MEPs are just one example of 
how centralization of communication allows the PMO to limit the scope and influence of 
all other public servants, including ministers who must seek PMO permission to speak in 
public or to media, and then must follow the script provided to them by the PM’s SPC staff. 
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Parliament itself is increasingly also undermined by the dominance and political agenda 
of the executive branch. As Chapter 6 illustrates, with the exception of Access to 
Information requests, and during debates in the House of Commons and before 
Parliamentary Committees, the executive branch controls what it will allow the public to 
know about how the powers of public office operate. All levels of government are subject 
to the partisan SPC agenda of a permanent campaign for public support and approval.  
The SPC tactics of the permanent campaign have even reshaped the policy and 
decision-making processes to serve the demands of “political-centered messaging” 
(Thomas: p.18). Thomas gives an example of how policy is influenced by partisan 
considerations, citing the Treasury Board of Canada (TBS) official communications policy 
which was updated in 2006 by the newly-elected Conservative Government. He 
summarizes the policy and the presumed differences between government and political 
communication as follows: 
[The communication policy document] provides the 
principles and general guidance to how ministers and public 
servants should communicate with Canadians for the 
purposes of designing and delivering programs and 
services. Communication is seen to be multi-directional in 
nature. Its aims include informing, listening, engaging and 
persuading for purposes of governing more effectively. This 
is different from, and meant to be separate from, political 
communication which is intended to promote political 
parties, ideologies, leaders and agendas (Thomas 18). 
As Thomas argues, ideally, government communication is meant to be “objective, 
professional and non-partisan,” in contrast to the partisan-driven SPC imposed by, and 
for, the PMO in service of its political interests in a permanent campaign for public support 
and power. The lines between political communication as a public service and SPC has 
increasingly become blurred, both at the level of communications and also in issues of 
policy. Thomas notes that while there have not been any “systematic investigations of the 
phenomenon” (p. 19): “Clearly the adoption of campaign-type techniques as part of the 
governing process has taken place to a significant extent (p. 19). He also points out that 
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“Stephen Harper has gone furthest [of any PM] in insisting on a centralized communication 
process, with a focus on a limited number of issues and strict control over messaging” (p. 
20).    
Some insight into just how far the PMO is prepared to go to control the message 
to the public was evident in the testimony of former PMO lawyer Benjamin Perrin in his 
testimony at the Mike Duffy trial in the summer of 2015. Perrin testified that the PM and 
his top political PMO advisors were concerned about potential backlash over his 
appointment of Duffy as the senator for P.E.I. when in fact he had lived for decades in 
Ottawa and only maintained a summer home on the Island he was appointed to represent. 
Harper and his staff asked Perrin to seek a clarification of the residency qualifications. 
Perrin, who holds a PhD from the University of Toronto faculty of law, had taken a leave 
from teaching law at the University of British Columbia in 2012 to act as a special advisor 
on legal affairs and policy for the PMO. He was well-qualified to offer advice on the 
constitutionality of the Duffy appointment, and a similar situation involving Conservative-
appointed Senator Pamela Wallin, who had been appointed to represent Saskatchewan 
even though she did not live there permanently. In February, 2013 Perrin sought advice 
and then notified then PMO Chief of Staff Nigel Wright, that an individual must be a 
resident of a province in order to qualify to serve as its representative in the Senate. He 
later testified: “I identified that it is the Senate who determines whether a senator was 
eligible to sit or not and … that a senator should be resident in the province of their 
appointment,” reported the National Post’s Chris Cobb, who covered Perrin’s testimony at 
the Duffy trial (August 20, 2015). However, that interpretation was not acceptable to either 
Wright, or the PM, who Perrin testified rejected his legal interpretation. It was clear from 
media reports and from testimony at the trial that the PMO was scrambling to avoid being 
blamed for appointing senators who would end up being investigated for filing false 
expenses, but whom should never have been appointed in the first place as they were not 
qualified to serve. Cobb writes: 
At the time, in February 2013, the Prime Minister’s Office 
was desperately trying to quash the Duffy scandal by getting 
him to repay his expenses and issue a public mea culpa in 
exchange for, among other things, a public statement by the 
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PMO that he, and other Harper Senate appointees, were all 
qualified to represent their provinces. 
It was clear, said Perrin, that the PMO and Senate 
leadership objective was to “protect” senators. 
“In reading through the entire chain (of emails) forwarded to 
me it was very clear to me that the objective being sought 
was to ensure that the test for Constitutional residence 
under the Constitution Act would not disenfranchise any 
currently sitting Conservative senators”(Cobb). 
Perrin testified that he was “taken aback” when the PM rejected his advice, 
and substituted his own interpretation. Instead, Harper seized on the 
requirement that a senator must own a property worth at least $4,000 in 
the province he or she represents as the lone requirement, ignoring the 
need for actual residency. Cobb reported Perrin’s testimony on the PM’s 
interpretation as follows:  
“I was immediately taken aback at the prime minister’s 
decision that if you simply own $4,000 of property that made 
you a resident. 
Both legally and practically, it seems untenable,” Perrin 
added. “I would not be able to consider myself a resident of 
Nunavut – having never visited there – simply by having 
$4,000 of real property.” Perrin said he replied “as 
diplomatically as possible” through the PMO chain of 
command that the view taken by the prime minister was not 
consistent with basic legal interpretation and that “I didn’t 
agree with it” (Cobb). 
Perrin left the PMO shortly afterwards and returned to teaching at UBC. On 
the eve of the October 19, 2015 federal election, Perrin broke his silence 
concerning his perspective on the Harper PMO and the Conservative Party 
he had supported since his teenaged years. In a written press release he 
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said that he had voted for another party in an advanced poll because: “The 
current government has lost its moral authority to govern” (Canadian Press: 
October 18, 2015). What is clear is PM Harper, who has a degree in 
economics, was not prepared to accept legal advice that was contrary to 
the SPC agenda for handling the Duffy/Wallin scandal. In effect he was 
prepared to reinterpret policy to suit his own partisan needs. The legality of 
Senate appointments of Duffy and Wallin appointments is not yet resolved, 
although both have been dropped from the Conservative caucus in Senate.  
4.17. Managing news media for blame avoidance 
Even while Prime Minister Harper and his staff have publically-derided journalists 
and largely dismissed their influence on governing, a significant part of the PM’s day is 
spent making strategic plans concerning how to manage news media. If there is any doubt 
as to the central importance to the PMO of managing news media – journalists – simply 
do the math on how much of the prime minister’s average day is taken up with media 
issues. Not only is managing news media central to the PM’s agenda, it is also one of the 
primary duties of at least half of the PMO staff, who monitor and manage news media 
around the clock in order to avoid the risk of blame and seek credit for the work of the 
Conservative government. The best insight into a day-in-the-life of PM Harper and his 
media managers is found in Globe and Mail columnist Lawrence Martin’s 2010 book titled 
Harperland: The Politics of Control. The author, who has covered Parliament Hill for 
several decades, conducted extensive interviews with former members of Harper’s PMO 
staff. Among Martin’s most important sources was former PMO Director of Issues 
Management Keith Beardsley, who was also interviewed for this thesis. Beardsley had 
been a member of Harper’s political staff while in Opposition and moved into the PMO 
when the Conservatives were elected as a minority government in February, 2006. Among 
his many duties as director of the issues management unit was to monitor media and 
prepare the PM and cabinet for issues they might face in question period that had either 
appeared via news media, or were likely to do so.  
In an interview for this thesis on May 30, 2011 Beardsley said management of 
question period was a priority for Harper, who met repeatedly throughout the day with 
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political staff and with ministers to prepare for the government’s daily encounter with 
opposition parties. It was of key importance because question period, which takes place 
every day while the House of Commons is sitting, is broadcast live and monitored by the 
influential journalists accredited as members of the Canadian National Press Gallery in 
Ottawa. Beardsley’s job was to know what had been reported and might be picked up by 
opposition members for questions in the House, and to predict what new issues might 
come to light. He would then inform the PM and other key communications staff, prepare 
briefing notes and “House notes” for the PM and any ministers who might be called to 
task. At around 12:30 each day the House was in session, Beardsley would meet with the 
PM and go over the notes and help him prepare for QP. Cabinet ministers, all of whom 
also had received briefing and House notes, were then brought in to face questions from 
Beardsley on their various media issues, and to answer them in front of Harper to ensure 
that they were fully prepared to face the media and the public who follow their dispatches. 
Beardsley explained his day and interactions with Harper and his cabinet as follows: 
My day started about 4:30 am. I was on my computer at 
home quarter to five, five o'clock. I would stay on it going 
through all the papers as they came in online. As would 
Jason...he would be doing the same thing. We would have 
our first staff meeting at roughly 7:15 in the morning, going 
through everything. Eight o’clock we had the senior staff 
meeting which would be all of the senior advisors to the PM. 
Sometime around quarter to nine, nine o’clock, the PM 
would come in and we would meet with him. That would 
wrap up usually around 9:30.And then from 9:30 to noon it 
was get ready for Question Period. Which was hectic. At 
12:30 I would basically prepare the PM for Question Period. 
Just literally going through all of the questions, just throwing 
questions at him. At one o’clock we would all go next door 
to the main cabinet room. And we would have every minister 
and every parliamentary secretary there and we would go 
through Question Period, just like it was the real thing. My 
job was to make up questions and just hammer them with 
questions.  
 181 
I would make a list all day long of stuff I thought might come 
up in Question Period. Because I was in charge of Question 
Period on in the Opposition side ...I can just do them off the 
top of my head and they can usually be at least as nasty if 
not nastier than what they were going to get... 
The ministers would have to answer without looking at their 
book and give their answers and I would go through them 
and I would have the PM sitting there watching. So they 
would actually get ready. They couldn't goof off either. They 
got hit with all this and you have got the PM looking at you. 
So one of the reasons why Question Period was relatively 
painless for us was because they were going in well-
prepared (Beardsley interview, May 30, 2011). 
From this explanation the central importance of controlling the government message 
delivered to news media and the public as a means to anticipate and avoid “blame risk” is 
evident. The hope is to avoid blame and spin the message instead to one that seeks credit 
for the government through the journalists monitoring QP. 
During the Duffy trial, Chris Woodcock, who also served as director of issues 
management also testified that he started each day by checking out stories of concern in 
news media that the PMO needed to manage. During the Duffy affair, it was his job to 
write media lines, which were scripted answers for Duffy to use in interview with news 
media. National Post reporter David Reeley reported Woodcock’s testimony. Woodcock 
told the court he worked with Duffy for months to come up with an SPC strategy. Reeley 
wrote (August 24, 2015):  
Sen. Mike Duffy co-operated with the Prime Minister’s Office 
for months as they tried together to manage the scandal 
over the expenses Duffy claimed from the Senate, Stephen 
Harper’s former director of “issues management” testified at 
Duffy’s criminal trial Monday. 
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Chris Woodcock’s job for three years was to spot and 
smother political brushfires before they turned into infernos, 
gathering facts and co-ordinating public responses by 
ministers, the prime minister and others to unexpected 
events that might have made the Conservative government 
look bad… 
Neubauer [prosecution lawyer] walked Woodcock through 
dozens of emails, beginning in December 2012 and going 
on until the following May, including tense but civil 
discussions involving both men about who would say what 
about Duffy’s expenses. For him, Woodcock said, Duffy was 
part of a larger problem for the Conservative government. 
“Suddenly we were encountering a bunch of unwelcome 
stories about members of the government caucus who were 
claiming expenses that they, on the surface, did not appear 
to be entitled to. Mr. Duffy would be one of those senators,” 
Woodcock said. “It was viewed as an entitlement issue, it 
was viewed as just not consistent with our approach to 
government and with our approach to expenses” (Reeley). 
Two things emerge from this testimony, aside from questions of ethics, first 
that the primary concern of the PMO was to avoid blame for the Duffy 
scandal, and second, that the primary focus for avoiding or at least 
mitigating blame to use SPC tactics to manage how the story would be 
reported by news media.   
Another notable observation from the Duffy trial is just how much power the PM’s 
political staff wield inside government. They are also privy to the decision-making process 
at the highest level. In a March 5, 2012 article in The Hill Times, reporter Laura Ryckewaert 
noted Woodcock’s appointment as director of issues management in early 2012. She also 
described the duties he would face in the position:  
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The job of director of issues management is a hectic one. 
Responsible for putting out political fires and Question 
Period preparation, Mr. Woodcock needs to know 
everything going wrong for the government, he needs to 
know the background of every issue and he needs to have 
the party-line response—he also needs to be able to 
withstand a good deal of displaced anger. The job requires 
long hours and comfortable shoes, but Mr. Woodcock has 
built a reputation for handling it with a laid-back air. In 
fact...his ability to deal with Mr. Harper and remain easy-
going amid political chaos has earned him respect. Working 
for a Prime Minister who is notorious for his extensive QP 
preparation and issue control, Mr. Woodcock is in constant 
contact with Mr. Harper and is privy to many upper-level 
meetings (Ryckewaert, Hill Times, March 5, 2012).  
As Ryckewaert also points out, top PMO staff attended high-level and confidential 
meetings along with the PM. Political staff, known as exempt staff because they are 
political appointees and not public servants, are not only privy to “high level” and top secret 
information, they also manage and control what all government officials, including cabinet 
ministers, are allowed to say in public, especially to media. Beardsley has provided the 
most extensive information about the power he exercised over members of cabinet with 
the backing of the PM, who not only decides who will be appointed to cabinet, but 
increasingly under Harper, exactly what public events they will attend and what they will 
say when they do attend any public event or talk to media.   
While the House of Commons is in session, much of news media’s attention 
centres on question period, when opposition parties are allowed to question the 
government directly in Parliament. The primary focus while the House is in session is 
therefore the preparation for anticipated questions that the government might face over 
the hour-long daily interrogation, all of which is broadcast live, and which reporters will 
peruse for their own stories for anything of news value. Just how time-consuming this is 
for the PM and his staff is explained in Martin’s detailed account titled, “A Day in a Life” of 
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the PM’s day (p. 40-46). Martin relies on Beardsley’s description of the PM’s average day 
at the PMO:   
Prime Minister Harper arrives around 8:30 and first meeting 
with senior staff shortly after chaired by the chief of staff and 
attended by his special advisor, the director of issues 
management, the director of communications and the press 
officer as well as other key advisors and assistants. Martin 
writes: “At the morning meeting the press briefing was a 
central focus…The media rundown started with the most 
watched television programs…and proceeded in 
descending order of importance, with Harper posing 
questions on the way. Local newscasts collectively had a 
much larger reach than national ones, so they usually came 
first. The Print journalists were typically last (Martin, p.40-
41) 
Following the senior staff meeting, the PM met with the Clerk of the Privy Council, who 
heads the public service. Martin notes that the meetings could go on for three to four hours 
when the House was not in session. But when the House was sitting, they would end in 
time for a “quick lunch” before preparations for QP began (p.43). 
Harper didn’t return home, like Chrétien often did, at noon 
hour. A believer in that old maxim that failing to prepare is 
preparing to fail, Harper wanted to devote maximum time to 
getting ready for the afternoon’s Question Period. He spent 
far more time on this than any other prime minister before 
him. He went to the extent of convening a full cabinet 
meeting every day beforehand, having already discussed 
possible questions at the morning staff meeting. As well, 
he’d already had a separate QP briefing with Beardsley, 
who gave the prime minister a yellow-paged book with 
suggested responses to a wide variety of questions. But the 
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big preparatory session was when the full cabinet met for a 
dress rehearsal. (Martin: 43). 
Martin makes an interesting point about the purpose of the QP prep sessions, which is 
that they were focused primarily on avoiding the risk of blame: The strategy was not to 
reveal information but to shield it and counterattack (45). While this is a common strategic 
communication tactic, it also fits with Harper’s now well-known, highly-secretive 
personality. Former friend and campaign manager Tom Flanagan, now estranged from 
Harper, gave an interesting example of Harper’s secretive nature in an interview for this 
thesis on May 13, 2011. He had been an academic and political mentor, as well as a friend 
of Harper’s for 15 years before he learned through published reports, that Harper played 
piano.  
He is an extraordinarily secretive person. This has nothing 
to do with politics. I think it is a personality characteristic. 
Just to give you some further examples of that. His piano 
playing has become well-known. But I worked closely off 
and on with Stephen Harper for 15 years before I even knew 
that he played piano. And I used to stay at Stornoway. There 
was no piano at Stornoway or if there was I didn’t see it. He 
never talked about playing the piano, never sat down at 
pianos in bars. He never referred to it. And yet he is a pretty 
accomplished piano player. I read about it by reading about 
it in Bill Johnson’s biography (Rees interview with Tom 
Flanagan, May 6, 2011).  
There is no question that the leader’s personality has an influence on governance, and in 
the case of Harper, both his secretive personality and the demands of strategic 
communication management have combined to make his PMO the most tightly-controlled 
PMO in the history of the country. Message control is a central-driving priority for the 
Conservative PMO, said Flanagan. “The organization does put a lot of emphasis on 
message discipline. Again this is a general trend in modern politics but I think Harper 
probably carries it further.”   
 186 
The central importance of controlling the message is reflected in his handling of 
QP, and also helps explain the extraordinary amount of time Harper spends in a normal 
day dealing with media issues. It is evident in his daily schedule. Question period ends at 
3:00 each day. But the obsession with message control continued, according to Martin’s 
book: 
Now came the post-game review. PMO staff always 
monitored the performance on television, and once the 
session was finished, Harper would come over and huddle 
with the group, which usually consisted of [Special Advisor] 
Bruce Carson, [Director of Issues Management] Keith 
Beardsley, [Director of Communications] Sandra Buckler, 
and one other, often [Press Officer] Dmitri Soudas, a young 
aide who had a close relationship with the PM and was 
capable of being frank with him. The prime minister would 
ask how it went, how he came across, how the others did. 
Harper, they found, was one of his own worst critics (Martin: 
45). 
It would appear that in addition to the time spent in question period, upwards of three hours 
of Harper’s time each day was devoted to managing the message that news media, and 
the public would receive about his government. That time does not include other 
communications exercises which his office also manages on the PM’s behalf. The primary 
target of this attention is news media.  
 
4.18. Bypassing news media: direct political marketing online  
Increasingly, politicians are turning to social media to bypass the journalism filter 
and negativity bias. The prime minister is no exception. In addition to the PMO website 
which has served as a promotional tool for several prime ministers, PM Stephen Harper 
and his political staff also communicate directly with the public through his Twitter account, 
Facebook page and emails sent to people who subscribe to the PMO website. These 
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communication tools were sampled in August of 2013 and again in August 2014. 
Screenshots of the pages are found in the following illustrations. Also part of the direct 
marketing process is the Conservative Party website and email communications with 
supporters. What is evident is, first, that relatively few members of the public follow either 
PMO social media sites. Secondly, it is also evident that the PMO website serves as an 
important content source for the Conservative Party website which runs many of the 
photographs produced by PMO staff photographers and videographers, and also 
duplicates much of the text content originated by members of PMO staff.  
One thing is certain when seeking information on official executive branch websites 
such as the PMO website: in contrast to journalism there is never evidence of a negativity 
bias against the government. Everything is presented as a positive and as a credit for the 
governance abilities and intentions of the government producing the website. This is also 
the case with social media sites produced by the PM’s partisan staff as a means to bypass 
negative media bias and go directly to the public with the approved political message. 
However, the entirely positive nature of strategically-managed government websites – 
which as this section shows mirrors and is mirrored in the Conservative Party websites – 
is whether what is presented is authentic information intended to impart public 
understanding, or whether it is a form of government advertising that may even cross over 
into misleading the public and therefore qualify as propaganda. In a 2014 article on 
government advertising, Jonathan Rose calls for “constraints and limits” on government 
advertising in Canada. He begins by defining what constitutes “advertising” by citing The 
Canadian Code of Advertising Standards, which regulates commercial advertising in 
Canada (Rose, 2014: 133). (Note the code does not cover government advertising, which 
is unregulated.) The code defines advertising as “any message (the content of which is 
controlled directly or indirectly by the advertiser)…communicated in any medium…to 
Canadians with the intent to influence their choice, opinion or behaviour. (Rose, 2014: 
p.133). Rose further explains that what is common to all advertising is that it is “a vehicle 
of persuasion because ads are consciously trying to sell you something” (Rose, 2014: 
133) In the case of the PMO website and the emails that contain the same content, and 
also Harper’s social media Twitter and Facebook sites, the brand that is being sold by the 
ads is the PM and the Conservative government he represents.  
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It is important to note that much of government advertising is intended to inform 
the public about a government product or service and is therefore informational, as Rose 
explains. He points to ads that are intended to inform and change public attitudes towards 
safety such as “wearing seat belts, or life jackets” (Rose, 2014: p.134). “The vast majority 
of what government advertises is non-controversial and performs legitimate functions of 
responding to citizens’ need and informing citizens about rights, responsibilities, policies 
or programs” (Rose, 2014: p.134. Information advertising of this sort is the responsibility 
of career public servants who work in communications across all departments and 
agencies of government. This is in keeping with the Treasury Board Secretariat’s 
communication policy. The first point listed in the Communications Policy of the 
Government of Canada (2006) is to: “Provide the public with timely, accurate, clear, 
objective and complete information about its policies, programs, services and initiatives”82  
As Thomas points out, according to this policy the aims of government communication 
“include informing, listening, engaging and persuading for purposes of governing more 
effectively”. 
However, this form of informational communication is quite different from SPC, 
including advertising, which is intended to promote political parties, ideologies, leaders 
and agendas. (Thomas: 18). The PMO website and the PM’s Twitter and Facebook 
accounts fit not only the definition of advertising as an attempt to persuade and to sell a 
brand – the Conservative government of Stephen Harper – but in some cases would fit 
Rose’s definition of propaganda as: “the deliberate attempt by the few to influence the 
attitudes and behavior or the many by manipulation of symbolic communication” (Rose, 
2014: 133). Rather than providing authentic information, the purpose and content of the 
materials provided by the Harper government on the websites produced by partisan PMO 
staff is intended to sell the Conservative party and policies, even to the point of misleading 
the public as a means to do so.  
4.19. Claiming credit:  PMO and direct political marketing 
One of the key ways in which the PMO engages directly with the public is through 
the prime minister’s website. In addition to presenting the PM and the Conservative 
government in an entirely positive light, it is also allows the Conservatives to identify 
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potential political supporters by encouraging people to sign up and provide their email 
addresses. People are then contacted directly by email, which PMO political staff use to 
send articles and messages from the PM that also appear on the website. Anyone who 
visits the prime minister’s website is greeted with an invitation to sign up for “email 
updates” from the Prime Minister’s Office. There is no way to know how influential the 
emails are, nor how many people are on the email list as the PMO does not provide public 
information on its operations and is not covered by ATI. One thing is evident, those who 
sign up receive frequent “updates” from the PMO. I signed up for the email service and 
over a 12-month period, from September 2012 to August 2013, I received 485 emails from 
the PMO. Since emails are generally sent out only on week days, the volume over this 
year indicates that the PMO sends out more than two emails to those who signed up on 
average on each day of the week other than Saturday and Sunday. 
As the screenshot of the website taken on September 8, 2013 shows (See 
Illustration 1), on first appearances it seems as if you are required to sign up in order to 
enter the main PMO website. However, there is a small note below the sign-up which 
allows the individual to bypass the sign-up if they prefer. The entry access is printed in 
much smaller white lettering below the email sign-up and reads in English: Continue to the 
website. The same direction is also in French. The entry link on the PM’s email sign-up 
takes the reader to the PM’s homepage, which streams a changing menu of pictures and 
stories written by PMO staff about the PM’s various activities and policies. The following 
are examples of PMO direct communication vehicles found either on the PMO website, 
mirrored on the Conservative Party website, through emails sent by the PMO to private 
citizens who subscribe to the PMO website or through social media outlets Facebook and 
Twitter. The illustrations are mostly from the summers of 2013 and 2014 as these partisan 
campaigns kick into full gear in election years. Some examples from summer 2015 were 
included for comparison purposes. 
 190 
Figure 4-1  PMO Website Home Page September 7, 2013 
 
 
A more recent example of the PMO homepage shown in a screenshot taken on 
September 2, 2015 (Illustration 4-B) also invites visitors to subscribe by submitting their 
email address. Once the address has been entered, the subscriber will receive almost 
daily and entirely positive “news” produced by PMO political staff concerning various 
events, actions and decisions by the Conservative Party. I subscribed to the PMO website 
and between February 20, 2014 and February 19, I received 574 emails notifying me of 
various events and actions, all of them credit-seeking in nature. Email is clearly another 
way in which the PMO attempts to bypass the news media and communicate directly with 
the public. 
 191 
Figure 4-2   PMO Homepage September 2, 2015  
 
The PMO website is not merely a passive communication site which Canadians 
might discover by chance or interest; once visited it serves as a portal for direct and active 
contact with Canadians who subscribe and thereby provide the PMO with contact 
information. This is important from the point of view of partisan advantage, because it 
clearly serves as a source of information so partisan in nature that it can be, and is, 
mirrored by the party website. However, it is presented as legitimate “news.” It is set up to 
mimic an online news website with “stories,” pictures and videos of events, most of which 
involve PM Harper. It also includes information about Conservative policies; government 
services; the Speech from the Throne; a portal that invites individuals to “Write to the 
Troops; and a pet-adoption project headed by Harper’s wife, Lauren Harper. Visitors may 
also view the photo gallery, which on this date included a series of photographs of the PM 
at the G20 Summit in Russia with other leaders. At the bottom of the page is a section 
called “Latest News” which features additional photo galleries and some of the “news 
releases” that are also sent to subscribers by email. 
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Figure 4-3  PMO official government website, August 29, 2014 
 
4.20. Mirroring the Conservative Party brand 
The PMO website is clearly partisan, so much so that the website content is often 
a mirror image of the Conservative Party website, which often cuts and pastes stories and 
pictures produced by the PMO. In addition to a direct marketing opportunity, the PMO 
website therefore serves as an important source of partisan materials for the party website. 
Identical pictures appear on the PMO website and on the Conservative Party website 
taken by PMO photographers during the northern tour of the Northwest Passage on 
August 24, 2014. 
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Figure 4-4   Picture of Stephen Harper on official PMO website August 29, 2014 
 83 
Figure 4-5  Duplicate picture on Conservative Party website with slight cropping. 
84 
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Not only do photographs on the party website match exactly the photographs on the PM’s 
website, stories are also exact or near duplicates of PM website stories, which are 
produced by PMO political staff who are paid by taxpayers – meaning that the party in 
power receives a considerable financial advantage over other political parties which do 
not have a similar public website, or similar-sized communication staff whose salaries are 
paid by the public. In some cases the stories have undergone a slight rewriting by 
Conservative Party communication staff, but they are essentially the same. One example 
of this is the predator legislation announcement dated August 29, 2013 on both the PMO 
and party websites. The headlines vary slightly: 
PMO website: “PM announces plan to toughen laws against those who exploit 
children” 85  
Conservative Party website: “Cracking Down on Child Sexual Predators” 
Figure 4-6  PMO Website September 8, 2013 
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86 
Figure 4-7  Conservative Party Website September 8, 2013 
87 
A paragraph by paragraph comparison shows just how closely matched are the partisan 
Conservative party website and the government website of the PMO. 
PMO: 
Prime Minister Stephen Harper today announced the 
Government’s plan to introduce comprehensive legislation 
that will better protect children against sexual exploitation. 
 
Conservatives: 
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On Thursday, Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced 
our Conservative Government’s plan to introduce 
comprehensive legislation to help better protect children 
from dangerous sexual predators. 
The PMO website then acknowledges the other two ministers attending the 
announcement, which the Conservative website does not do. It reads: “The Prime 
Minister was joined by Peter MacKay, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of 
Canada, and Julian Fantino, Minister of Veterans Affairs.” But the remainder of the 
announcements are very similar, both structurally and in terms of content. The 
PMO website next quotes the PM on the issue: 
Our Government continues to help make our streets and 
communities safer by cracking down on predators who 
abuse and exploit children,” said the Prime Minister. “New 
legislative amendments will be introduced this fall to better 
protect children from a range of sexual offences, including 
child pornography, while ensuring that offenders receive 
tougher sentences. 
Conservative Party paraphrases the PM’s quote: 
Since 2006, our Conservative Government has introduced 
a broad range of actions to better protect Canadian 
communities from sexual offenders who target children. This 
fall, we will build on that strong record by introducing new 
legislative amendments to further protect our children. 
The PMO next lists the amendments to the existing legislation it is proposing: 
The proposed amendments to Canadian legislation would: 
•Increase penalties for offenders who commit sexual 
offences against children, especially those who violate the 
conditions included in probation orders, prohibition orders 
and peace bonds; and, 
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•Ensure that sentencing takes into account each young life 
that has been devastated by a predator through ending 
sentence discounts for multiple child sexual offences. 
Through these new amendments, our Conservative 
Government is delivering on its commitment to hold 
dangerous criminals accountable and enhance the rights of 
victims. 
The Conservative Party website does not specify that these are proposed amendments, 
but rather leaves a sense that they are in effect: 
These new amendments include: 
 increasing penalties for criminals who commit sexual 
acts against children 
 ending sentence discounts for multiple child sexual 
offences 
The PMO website concludes with the reference to its time in office – “since 2006” – 
which was referenced in the second paragraph in the Conservative Party version. 
It concludes: 
This announcement is part of a broad range of actions our 
Government has taken since 2006 to protect communities 
from child sexual offenders, punish offenders to the full 
extent of the law, hold violent criminals accountable, 
enhance the rights of victims, and increase the efficiency of 
our justice system. 
The Conservative website concludes: 
Through these new amendments, our Conservative 
Government is delivering on its commitment to hold 
dangerous criminals accountable and enhance the rights of 
victims. 
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What is absolutely clear is that the PMO website is a partisan vehicle which 
serves SPC agendas of claiming credit and seeking blame.   
4.21. Blame avoidance and credit-seeking on the public tab 
Taxpayers pay for the PMO website and all other communication costs 
incurred by the PMO and his staff, which averages about 95 people, with more 
than half directly employed in communication. Chapter 6 examines the staff in the 
PMO in greater detail. The costs are considerable, and hard to discern accurately 
because government refuses to even say how many political appointees it has. 
Reports that do exist often combine public servants who are required to be 
politically-neutral and work in various capacities throughout government, often 
providing important information about government services, and the political staff 
who are not public servants and exempt from rules concerning political neutrality. 
Such is the case with a 2014 report by the Canadian Taxpayer’s Association which 
estimated 3,325 “spin doctors” worked for the Harper government at a cost of $263 
million (Editorial, Globe and Mail: July 28, 2014). In fact the vast majority of 
communications personnel are politically-neutral public servants and not “spin 
doctors.” They are in fact subject to the Treasury Board Secretariat’s (TBS) 
government communication policy, as cited by Thomas earlier in this chapter. 
More accurate reports, including a head-count by executive branch office which is 
found in Chapter 5, put the number closer to about 600 political staff, more than 
half of whom work in communication and would therefore qualify for the title. That 
is not an inconsequential number either, but it is important for public servants, 
many of whom are frustrated by attempts to force them to take on political duties, 
that the distinction is understood. Exactly what exempt political staff cost taxpayers 
is something of a guessing game as it is secret. The executive branch does not 
publish an official budget or report on its exempt staff and costs, unlike other 
Westminster governments such as Britain, as the next chapter will show. The 
executive branch is also excluded from Access to Information and therefore such 
records are not available for request from the PMO or Minister’s’ Offices (MOs). 
However, Chapter 5 does attempt to quantify the levels of staffing, using a range of 
unofficial sources and studies by other scholars.  
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Whatever the costs for taxpayers, and they are substantial, it would be 
naïve for the public to expect that they could turn to websites such as the PM’s for 
authentic information about government. They are entirely focused on claiming 
credit and avoiding anything which might result in blame, or even the need to be 
accountable to the public. While it is in the public’s interest, and as this dissertation 
argues, they have a right to authentic information that allows them to understand 
governance, you will only find SPC information on the PM’s website, and in other 
communications issued by the PMO. You will never find stories on the PMO 
website which blame government in any way, or even make it accountable for a 
policy or issue that has resulted in negative publicity in news media. Evidence of 
this is that not one story related to Senator Mike Duffy’s controversial expense 
claims is found in a September 2, 2015 search for “Mike Duffy” on the PMO 
website. As the following screenshot shows, the most recent story found on the 
controversial senator is August 20, 2010 when he joined the PM on a tour of P.E.I. 
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Figure 4-8  Screenshot of PMO search for stories containing “Mike Duffy” September 
2, 2015 
88 
Rather than authentic communication, the tone of all “stories” and “news” is 
credit-seeking for the PM and the Conservative government and, as the ability to 
mirror exact copies of stories show, also for the Conservative Party. The ability to 
mirror stories and pictures from the PMO on the Conservative Party website is 
evidence of the pro-partisan nature of information supplied by the PMO. Credit-
seeking is its standard mode of operation as demonstrated by the screenshot of 
‘news releases” on the PMO website on September 8, 2013. Every news release 
seeks some form of credit for the Conservative government and its leadership.  
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 The September 6, 2013 story on support for Syria points out that: “The 
Government of Canada stands with the people of Syria as they continue 
to face unfathomable hardships at the hands of the Assad regime,” No 
mention is made in the story of the complicated politics of a divided rebel 
force, which is reported to have been partially co-opted by Al Qaeda 
supporters. 
 The September 5, 2013 news release on reducing debt credits “Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper [who] today announced Canada’s commitment 
to achieve a federal debt-to-GDP target of 25 per cent by 2021.” No plan 
of execution or explanation of how this will be achieved is presented. 
 September 4, 2013: Positive news about greeting the Italian Prime 
Minister, which will allow PM Harper to “celebrate the entrepreneurial 
spirit and success of the Italian-Canadian community.” 
 August 30, 2013: The PM announces the appointment of a new senator to 
head up the Conservative caucus in senate.  
The news release congratulates the outgoing leader Marjorie LeBreton “for her exemplary 
service to Canada”. It fails to point out that LeBreton resigned as leader in the Senate after 
the RCMP initiated an investigation into false expense claims filed by several Conservative 
senators. Nor does it mention that the scandal reached into the PMO and resulted in the 
resignation of the PM’s Chief of Staff Nigel Wright. Instead, every story is a positive for the 
government. All negatives are ignored. The stories found on the PMO website are so 
partisan in approach, that the Conservative party can basically rip and run the materials 
without any significant alteration. The PMO communications are SPC, and not intended 
as authentic communication that provides understanding for the receiver.  
These stories are so closely matched that by academic standards, and by 
journalistic standards, they would be deemed as plagiarism. Clearly the PMO is 
not concerned about plagiarism by its own party, however, the parallel 
presentations of the two communications operations – the twinning of 
communications between the PMO and a political party devoted to its own partisan 
interests – raises questions about the legitimacy of PMO communications with the 
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public it was elected to represent. Specifically, it raises questions about whether 
PMO communications meets the standard set by its own communication policy.  
The information provided by the PMO is far from “accurate, clear, objective 
or complete.” It is therefore not authentic in the sense that it provides the public 
with an understanding of government’s actions and decisions. The stories on both 
websites – government and party – fail to include any factual or background 
materials that either justify the proposed amendments, or consider consequences 
such as additional costs to the correction and judicial services; evidence from 
credible experts concerning the effectiveness of tougher sentences in preventing 
recidivism; whether convicted pedophiles will receive additional therapy and 
rehabilitation to help deter recidivism; whether this approach has been tested 
elsewhere and what the results have been. Instead it is presented as certain to 
improve on existing circumstances and, as a result, to better protect children from 
sexual abuse. The proposal for tougher laws is presented as a motherhood issue: 
protecting children from harm is a good that nobody would deny. It appeals entirely 
to emotion, rather than to logic. There is therefore no ability, based on the 
evidence presented, for the reader of this information to use it as a basis for 
reasoned discussion and public deliberation about the pros and cons of introducing 
tougher legislation. The communication is a strategic tactic to promote the political 
interests of the party, by presenting an emotive argument which entirely ignores 
facts, data, and analysis of any kind. It is political communication as defined by 
Thomas as “intended to promote political parties, ideologies, leaders and agendas” 
(Thomas: 18). The story found on the PMO website is so partisan in its approach 
that the Conservative party can basically reuse the materials without any 
significant alteration. Like the party, the purpose of the PMO story is entirely 
concerned with seeking credit for the Conservative government and party.  
4.22. Direct marketing to subscribers through email 
In addition to bypassing news media and providing the Conservative Party website 
with free material, the PMO website is an important avenue for making direct contact with 
members of the public who sign up with their email addresses in order to “subscribe.” 
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Several emails are produced daily by PMO Communications and sent out to people who 
subscribe to the website. Anyone who signs up will receive up to six emails per day, as 
was the case on August 29, 2014. Articles found on the PMO website are often sent out 
directly by email to people who have signed up on the PMO website. Stories found on the 
PMO website on August 29, 2014 were also mailed to my Simpon Fraser University email 
account – which I had used to subscribe to the PMO website – on the same day as the 
PMO website.  
Figure 4-9   PMO articles the source for PMO emails 
 
 
Many of the articles which appeared on the PMO website were sent as emails to 
subscribers, as the screenshot in Illustration 8 shows.  
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Figure 4-10  PMO emails sent August 29, 2014 to PMO website subscribers  
 
As the list above shows, most of the credit-seeking emails sent to PMO email 
subscribers are events that are so technical, inconsequential or boring that they would not 
warrant coverage by news media. These include the email sent August 29, 2014 and 
highlighted in the screenshot which announces something to do with “stakeholders.” It is 
not only of no interest to reporters, it is hard to imagine how it would be of interest to 
anyone else, other than perhaps the stakeholders involved. Most are simply credit-seeking 
such as the two emails below. One (Illustration 13) is about a development in Canada US 
relations. The other (Illustration 14) was likely picked up by news media because it has to 
do with ISIL. So some recipients might have learned something new and of interest. For 
others who follow the news, it might simply have appeared redundant.   
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Figure 4-11 PMO News Release on The Harper Government and the Obama 
administration release the Canada-United States Regulatory Cooperation 
Council Joint Forward Plan 
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Figure 4-12  News Release titled “Canada completes first delivery of military supplies to 
forces fighting ISIL” 
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4.23. Direct marketing through Twitter: Stephen Harper’s Twitter page 
 
Figure 4-13  Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s Twitter Account Screenshot: 1:44 p.m. on 
September 7, 2013 89 
 
 
PM Harper’s Twitter account had 366,576 “followers” as of September 7, 2013. 
While several hundred thousand followers seems to be a significant number, it is important 
to put that number in the context of traditional news media to compare audience reach. 
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While that is a considerable number it is less than 10% of the number of Canadians who 
paid to receive a newspaper daily in 2014. More than four million Canadians subscribed 
to a newspaper, paying a   subscription to have it delivered to them daily. The number of 
people who actually read each paper is even higher, meaning that even at a time when 
newspapers are struggling to find a workable business model, their reach far exceeds that 
of Twitter. NewspapersinCanada.ca reports the following:  
Canada's daily newspaper circulation (paid and free) stood at 5,312,018 copies on 
an average publishing day and 31,765,434 copies over the course of a week. 
There were 91 paid dailies in Canada last year and 13 free dailies for a grand total 
of 104 daily newspapers… 
•Paid daily newspapers (91) accounted for a total of 4,043,553 copies on 
an average publishing day and 25,406,685 copies over the week. 
•Free daily newspapers (13) accounted for a total of 1,268,464 copies on 
an average publishing day and 6,358,749 copies over the week.90  
The following year on August 29, 2014 the Prime Minister’s Twitter page listed just 8,861 
followers, which is confusing because it is significantly lower than the previous year. It 
therefore raises questions about the relative effectiveness in reaching members of the 
public through official party Twitter accounts. It also raises questions about how seriously 
the PMO communications staff who write the PM’s entries regard Twitter as a tool to reach 
and inform members of the public. A screenshot of the PM’s Twitter account page on 
September 7, 2013 is shown in Illustration 1. 
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PMO Twitter Page, August 29, 2014  
 
 
By September 2, 2015 in the midst of the federal election, Stephen Harper’s Twitter 
account counted 880,206 followers, a massive increase of about 872,00 from the previous 
year. It is unclear why the number of followers varied so significantly from year to year. 
The number of followers exceeds that of Liberal leader Justin Trudeau, who had 728,683 
followers on September 2, 2015, and significantly higher than NDP Leader of the 
Opposition Tom Mulcair, who had just 163,971 followers on his Twitter home page on the 
same day. Harper’s tweets on his 2015 Twitter home page were entirely concerned with 
the election, including events and policy announcement.  
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Figure 4-14  Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s Twitter home page September 2, 2015 91 
 
4.24. Direct marketing through Facebook: PM Stephen Harper’s Facebook 
page 
The timeline on PM Harper’s Facebook page shows that it was set up in 2007, the 
year after his party was first elected as a minority government. The screenshot of the 
Facebook page taken on August 31, 2014 shows many of the same pictures found on the 
PMO website, including pictures taken during the PM’s summer 2014 official tour of 
Canada’s north. 
 
 
 
 211 
Figure 4-15  Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s Facebook Page, August 31, 2014 92 
 
The PM’s Facebook page shows it has been “liked” by 118,803 viewers, up from 
88,382 “likes” registered when the page was viewed a year earlier. The number of likes is 
well below the 169,851 received by Liberal Party Leader Justin Trudeau’s Facebook page 
(August 31, 2014). And it is inconsequential when compared to the more than 42 million 
Facebook followers who “like” American President Barack Obama (August 31, 2014) or 
even the 3.9 million likes received by former American Republican president George Bush 
(August 31, 2014). However, the number of people who click “like” may not be as important 
to the Conservative Party as obtaining Facebook contacts that can be targeted for direct 
political marketing, either by the PMO or by the Conservative Party. Twitter and the 
Facebook page also provide an opportunity to cross-advertise other PMO website 
marketing products such as the 24 Seven video produced by PMO political staff and 
posted by communication staff in the Privy Council Office.   
Harper’s September 2, 2015 Facebook page showed it had received 205,212 
“likes”, almost double the previous year. As with the Twitter page, it was almost entirely 
concerned with election-related announcements and events. Liberal leader Justin 
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Trudeau’s Facebook page counted 276,802 likes on the same day, and NDP leader 
Thomas Mulcair’s page counted 84,203 likes. An interesting aside, Mulcair’s Facebook 
page pointed out it was run by campaign staff. Neither Trudeau’s Facebook page nor 
Stephen Harper’s Facebook page make it clear that it is managed by campaign workers, 
although clearly that is the case, as it is with Twitter accounts.   
Figure 4-16  Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s Facebook page, September 2, 2015 
 
As with all social media, the message is impossible to manage or control because, 
in the case of Facebook, each and every one of its 1.5 billion active users (Facebook, 
September 2015)93 has the ability to challenge and change the message flow. This was 
brought home in a humorous Facebook posting that went viral which invited voters to 
attend a “going away” party for Stephen Harper on election night, October 19, 2015. The 
“invitation” posted on October 6, 2015 by Facebook user Chris Drennan was sent to 
727,000 Facebook users, 447,000 of whom “went.” 94 
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Figure 4-17  Stephen Harper Going Away Party Facebook posting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The hashtag #HarperGoingAwayParty posted under Drennan’s posting also 
generated anti-Harper commentary and images on Twitter. The following are a sampling 
of the hundreds of comments and images posted on election night, October 19, 2015. 
Clearly this is not the message the Conservative Party was seeking, and is an interesting 
example, although not conclusive, of negativity bias in social media. It is an area that 
warrants further examination but which is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
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Figure 4-18  Twitter postings under the hashtag #HarperGoingAwayParty on election 
night. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.25. How strategic is political use of social media?  
Social media is emerging as an important battlefield in the fight for votes and also 
as a means to raise campaign funds. President Barack Obama is widely credited for 
successfully pioneering the use of social media for campaign purposes. However, as the 
above examples show, social media is a double-edged sword which can produce a 
backlash that works against the candidate or party. Canadian scholars Tamara Small, 
Harold Jansen, Frederick Bastien, Thierry Giasson and Royse Koop (2014) point out that 
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only a small minority of people active on Facebook and Twitter in Canada use it for political 
purposes. While it will be interesting to see how significant a role social media played in 
the 2015 federal election – anecdotally my students say that it was influential in their 
decision-making process – the authors found that it was not a significant player in the 2011 
federal election. The article “Online Political Activity in Canada: The Hype and the Facts” 
notes that “social media, including Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, have become 
mainstays of political communication in Canada” and that by “October, 2014, 80 per cent 
of federal Members of Parliament were using Twitter” (p. 9). The phone survey of 2,021 
respondents conducted in May, 2014, showed 56.6 per cent of respondents had social 
media accounts on Facebook and/or Twitter (p. 10). Yet only a minority of respondents 
engaged in politics online. Small found 6.3 per cent of all respondents “followed a political 
actor on Facebook” and just 3.9% of all respondents used Twitter to follow “a political 
actor.” An interesting comparison is that almost half of the same respondents (49.5%) 
used the Internet to visit a “federal government website,” which would likely contain 
information and perhaps even facilitate access to government services and policies. Small 
concludes that many politicians and political parties fail to succeed on social media 
because they engage in obvious strategic political communication practices that are 
transparently promotional, and which fail to recognize the “two-way communication” 
culture of social media. The authors write: 
Sites such as Facebook and Twitter are great sources of 
instantaneous and unmediated political information for 
political junkies. Research shows that political parties and 
politicians typically use social media to broadcast party-
related information…However, political parties and leaders, 
especially the major ones, tend to avoid the interactive 
aspects of social media. Two-way communication between 
parties/leaders and citizens on social media is limited… 
[and] has done little to spur greater connection with citizens 
(p. 10). 
Clearly some politicians are better at engaging through social media than 
others. Again, anecdotally, many of my university students thought 
Trudeau managed his social media presence better than either Harper or 
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Mulcair. Many also thought that Green Party leader Elizabeth May made 
the most successful and meaningful use of Twitter in particular, this may 
be in no small part because they believed that May was actually posting 
her own tweets. Very few believed that the leaders of the bigger parties 
were actually authoring their own Facebook postings and tweets. There is 
also the possibility that talking about politics is perceived as too divisive for 
family and friend-based social media such as Facebook. Because it can be 
contentious, it may violate an old rule of polite society which forbid certain 
topics in polite company: politics, religion and money. Another factor may 
be a reaction by pioneering Facebook users against a taming down of the 
social media represented by political discourse, in particular when it is 
introduced by older, more conservative and less experienced Facebook 
members. During the election campaign, one of my nephews shared a post 
which said: “Enough f-----g politics. Whatever happened to pictures of 
naked people and beer bong parties?” It drew many “likes.” 
 
 
4.26. Direct marketing through video production 
The PMO “YouTube Channel” shows a weekly promotional video called 24 Seven showing 
highlights of PM Harper’s week. The video of selected activities by the PM are produced 
weekly by a seven-member PMO communication staff who also work in other PMO 
communication jobs such as speechwriting, photography and social media. 24 Seven 
“Behind the Scenes” video states that the production team “operates like any other 
newsroom” and that all members of staff hold other “full-time jobs” in the PMO. The 
webpage was accessed on August 29, 2014 at https://www.youtube.com/pmcanada. 
Produced in the week of August 21 to 27, 2014, the video shows highlights of the PM’s 
official tour of northern Canada. It was retrieved August 29, 2014. However, all 24 Seven 
videos were removed and could no longer be accessed after the Conservative Party lost 
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the October 19, 2015 federal election. 95  The screenshot below shows it was viewed by 
just 853 viewers by that date.  
  
Figure 4-19  Screenshot listing 24 Seven videos 
 
A November 4, 2015 story in the National Post describes the videos as “cheesy” and 
reported that critics called the videos “taxpayer-funded propaganda” (Berthiaume) The 
Post also reported that there were very few viewers for the weekly videos produced weekly 
by up to four exempt staff at a cost to taxpayers that the Harper government never 
revealed. The first and most viewed video attracted 25,000 viewers, however far fewer 
tuned in to later videos posted on the PMO website, according to The National Post. 
“Some weeks, fewer than 100 people tuned in. The French version was even worse, with 
around 20 people watching at times.” (Berthiaume, November 4, 2015). It is fair to say that 
this costly experiment failed to win the hearts and minds of voters as intended, given that 
they failed to even take notice. 
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4.27. Direct marketing on Instagram:  learning hard lessons about social 
media  
One social media experiment that also didn’t go quite as planned was the Conservative’s 
attempt to use Instagram, including being the first of the federal political parties to post 
ads. CBC reporter Haydn Watters posted a story about Tory advertising on Instagram on 
September 2, 2015. The CBC website reported that the party had begun posting ads on 
its Instagram account on August 27, 2015. Watters also reported that the party had been 
taking down any negative comments that appeared on the website. Pictures and ads 
concerning the Conservative’s childcare policies drew about 160 comments, Watters 
reported. Of these all but 13 were taken down, according to a woman she interviewed 
named Georgiana Laudi, who works in web marketing. Laudi took a screenshot of some 
of the negative comments and posted it to her Twitter page. The CBC story asks whether 
the Conservatives might have “targeted the wrong audience” on Instagram. Laudi’s tweet 
reads: “Ouf. [sic].. #Harper made the mistake of advertising on @instagram... Commence 
#stopharper wrath! 
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Figure 4-20  Negative tweet by Georgiana Laudi@ggiiaa posted on August 28, 2015 after 
Conservatives placed ads on Stephen Harper’s Instagram page 
 
96 
4.28. Conclusion   
While the PMO’s SPC tactics may meet with mixed results, what is clear is that the 
PMO’s purpose is to promote Stephen Harper and his Conservative government. Nothing 
which might serve to call the government to account in a negative way is published 
voluntarily by PMO political communication staff on PMO-controlled communication 
platforms, public or private. It therefore raises questions concerning whether PMO 
communications serves the interests of the public who finance the vast operations run by 
politically-appointed executive-branch staff, or whether it is a partisan operation serving 
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the interests of the party in power. If that is the case then funding of such an operation 
should be reconsidered. The legitimacy of such an operation at taxpayer expense is a 
subject which requires further consideration and although it is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, it is of interest to me for future studies. There are precedents for refusing to 
allow public money to be used for partisan purposes, and these will be discussed in the 
concluding chapter which will make some broad recommendations about how to make 
government communications more authentic, and therefore of value to the public. At the 
very least, it should be an issue that is a subject for public debate. The logical extension 
of this debate should also concern the public’s interest in funding the PMO’s politically-
appointed communications staff. That is the subject of Chapter 5. 
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Captains of Spin: PMO exempt political staff and 
strategic control of political communication  
Of the many footfalls heard echoing through Ottawa’s 
corridors of power, those that often hit hardest but bear the 
least scrutiny belong to an elite group of young, ambitious 
and politically loyal operatives hired to support and advise 
the Ministers of the Crown. Collectively known as “exempt 
staff” (Benoit 2006: p. 146) 
Liane Benoit’s 2006 article “Ministerial Staff: The Life and Times of Parliament’s 
Statutory Orphans” still stands as the most comprehensive study of the politically 
appointed staff who people the offices of the prime minister, minister’s offices, and who 
are also employed across agencies, commissions and all departments in the federal 
government. They are known as “exempt staff” because they are “exempt from the 
appointment procedures of the Public Service of Canada” (Guidelines for Ministers’ 
Offices January 2011)97. They are not part of the public service, and are not bureaucrats. 
Exempt staff are appointed by, and serve solely at the pleasure of the executive branch, 
including the minister, and also ultimately report to the PM through his chief of staff. The 
category is also appropriate because, unlike public servants, exempt staff are virtually 
exempt from public scrutiny. While Benoit’s submission to the Gomery Inquiry focused 
only on the political staff employed in minister’s offices, and excluded the PMO, it offers 
some valuable insight into the increasingly powerful ranks of the loyal partisan players 
who assist and advise the executive branch.  
…this group of ministerial advisors can, and often do, exert 
a substantial degree of influence on the development, and 
in some cases, administration, of public policy in Canada. 
Further, it is evident from the current and historic record that 
these powers can and are, on occasion, open to abuse. 
Though unelected, often uneducated in the theory and 
operation of the machinery of government and regularly 
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devoid of professional qualifications relevant to the 
ministries with which they are involved, these individuals, by 
virtue of their political relationship with the party in power 
and/or the minister they serve, are well placed to influence 
both the bounce and bobble of bureaucratic political 
interface and the pace and progress of public policy in 
Canada (Benoit 2006: p.146). 
Increasingly, exempt staff, in particular those who work in the PMO, operate the levers of 
power within government on behalf of their partisan political masters. It is often their job to 
carry out the wishes of the minister or the prime minister, which often means directing 
public servants, which is increasingly a matter of concern for the career civil servants who 
are duty-bound to avoid partisan politics while at the same time helping to implement the 
political policies of the party in power. Taking direction from partisan political staff has 
served to complicate, if not compromise, the public service principle of political neutrality, 
as the Public Service Commission of Canada, which represents public service workers, 
made clear in a special report to Parliament in 2011.  
From the outset, the establishment and growth of a non-bureaucratic layer of staff 
loyal only to the political actors who appoint them has been secretive and often 
controversial. It has perhaps never been more controversial than in the summer of 2015 
when three former PMO exempt staff testified at the trial of Conservative-appointed 
senator Mike Duffy. What was perhaps most evident from the testimony, and from emails 
also submitted as evidence was how much power exempt staff wield inside government 
as representatives of an extremely powerful PM. It also showed that PMO political staff 
were prepared to go to great lengths to control the message and prevent the public from 
understanding that a Conservative senator had filed questionable expenses, often while 
travelling to appear at fundraisers for the party. The editorial board of the Globe and Mail 
described the activities and powers of the PM and his staff as follows: 
Today the PMO is virtually a government until itself. It 
ruthlessly imposes its will on MPs, cabinet ministers, 
Commons committees and civil servants, and obscures 
expenditure and legislation in the dark corners of omnibus 
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budget bills. Any insubordination is, as a memo released in 
the Duffy trial on Tuesday reveals, viewed as a failure on the 
part of members of Parliament to “embrace” their status as 
minions of the executive – a complete distortion of how our 
system is meant to work. 
The PMO enforces its will two ways, through the prime 
minister’s power to appoint and fire cabinet ministers, 
committee members and deputy ministers; and his or her 
power to approve the nomination of everyone who runs for 
the party. A cabinet minister who fails to lip-sync the PMO’s 
talking points won’t be in cabinet for long. Deputy Ministers 
who question PMO directives find themselves shelved 
(Editorial, Globe and Mail, August 20, 2015). 
In a nutshell, the 562 PMO emails entered as evidence from the period January 5, 
2012 to May 16, 2013 show that the PMO was anxious to prevent the public from learning 
that Conservative-appointed senators, including Duffy and Pamela Wallin, had filed 
expenses which the Senate was questioning. In both cases the senators were appointed 
to represent provinces where they owned homes, but which were not their primary 
residences. Both senators had lived and worked in Ottawa for years. The Senate had hired 
the accounting firm Deloitte to conduct an independent audit and then report back to a 
Senate finance committee concerning expenses filed by several senators, including Duffy. 
The PMO spent months attempting to convince Duffy to pay back the expenses he owed, 
and in return promised to have him dropped from the audit. In an email written February 
16, 2013, Chief of Staff Nigel Wright explained to PMO lawyer Benjamin Perrin, Director 
of Communication Chris Woodcock and Patrick Rogers who was the PMO staffer in 
charge of parliamentary affairs that, in essence, their goal was to prevent the public from 
learning the facts of Duffy’s expenses as a result of the audit because that would reflect 
negatively on the government. After some discussion concerning how to manage the 
committee overseeing the audit, including replacing it with a more manageable sub-
committee, Wright wrote: “We’ll have to do this in a way that does not lead to the Chinese 
water torture of new facts in the public domain, that the PM does not want,” (Wright, 
February 16, 2013: Email #109). The attempted cover-up revealed in the emails says 
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much about abuses of power within the PMO which will no doubt be the subject of 
examination by political studies scholars for years to come. However, what is of particular 
interest to this dissertation is how the emails provide clear evidence of the central 
importance of managing what the public is allowed to know in the Harper PMO, and for 
that reason, how centrally important communications staff are to that key process. Just 
how key the communication staff were in managing the blame-risk crisis for the PMO is 
evident in their level of engagement in the evolving crisis. By my count, of the 562 emails 
submitted in evidence, 327 of the emails were sent or received by PMO staff actively 
engaged in communications. Much of the direct negotiations with Duffy, who was reluctant 
to publically admit any blame, was handled by Woodcock. Wright also dealt with Duffy 
directly, as did Harper’s close confident and aid Ray Novak. Communications staff wrote 
the scripts and question and answer materials that Duffy was instructed to read and follow 
in interviews. At every step their purpose was to prevent the public from learning and 
understanding the truth of the situation. This should come as no surprise. The role of 
politically-strategic communication staff is to avoid the risk of blame, and wherever 
possible to garner credit for the governing party. And that means managing the message 
delivered to the public via news media and social media through the use of strategic 
political communication tactics. This is not new to government in Canada, but it has 
increasingly become the dominant communication approach in the federal government, 
with a massive increase of both staff and information control under Harper’s 
Conservatives. In an August, 2015 article in the Globe and Mail, long-time Ottawa 
columnist Lawrence Martin summed up how the Conservatives, with PMO communication 
units at the centre, have tightened the prime minister’s grip and control of government 
information flow as part of a permanent marketing campaign intended to avoid the blame 
of risk and seek credit for the Conservative brand. 
The Conservatives brought to Canada a style of government 
often described as the permanent campaign. Governing 
was turned into an around-the-clock-marketing enterprise. 
Everything was about controlling the message. They 
changed the system so that all communications were 
centralized through the PMO and the Privy Council Office. 
Even the most minor of press releases – right down to one 
on the mating season of the black bear – had to be vetted 
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by the centre. The PMO increased in size by 38% from the 
previous government. New limits were placed on media 
access. Public servants were muzzled. Conservative 
caucus members spoke not from their own scripts but from 
PMO talking points (Martin, August 28, 2015). 
Harper’s Conservatives built a strategic political communication operation 
the likes of which has never been seen before in Canada. However, it did 
not happen in a vacuum and is not entirely new. The Conservatives simply 
built on a trend towards the PM’s increasing control of government, 
including government communication that began decades earlier. 
5.1. History of exempt political staff 
Benoit traces public awareness of political staff to a 1964 Liberal government’s 
scandal which, much like the Sponsorship scandal, prompted a judicial inquiry headed by 
Justice Frederic Dorian, who found that political ministerial staff had played a significant 
role. Dorian pointed out that this class or tier of political staff had been largely ignored by 
scholars, and by the public who were largely unaware of their existence. Further, 
according to Benoit, Dorian argued that the political staff, who were non-bureaucrats and 
exempt from membership in the Public Service Alliance, was inappropriate. Benoit cites 
Professor J.R. Mallory’s interpretation of the Dorian Report (1964):  
Professor J. R. Mallory observed that among the Dorion 
Report’s many contributions, it served to “illuminate certain 
facets of government which have hitherto escaped the 
attention of scholars.” In redressing this oversight, it was his 
assessment that, contrary to what some scholars had 
lauded as the Canadian constitutional system’s success in 
developing a “clear-cut dividing line drawn between the 
politician and the administrator,” there was, in fact, 
embedded within the machinery of government in Canada, 
“an intermediate class of persons in the Minister’s Office, 
who are political rather than bureaucratic in their functions, 
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appointed rather than elected, and who operate in an area 
which strict constitutional theory does not recognize as 
existing.” The presence of this emerging group of operatives 
in the Minister’s lair was, in Mallory’s estimation, 
inappropriate to the Westminster model of democracy. 
(Benoit 2006: p.148-149). 
Inappropriate or not, the ranks of exempt staff have continued to increase both in size and 
in influence in the five decades since the Dorian Report. They now form an unofficial third 
tier of government which is entirely separate from the public service. This exempt staff 
takes its direction entirely from the executive branch and interacts with the bureaucracy 
as a means to expand the governing party’s political influence over the processes and 
policies of government. As is illustrated in Chapter 6, exempt staff working in 
communications for the executive branch systematically interfere with the Access to 
Information process. Their influence is similarly felt throughout government.  
Carleton public policy and administration policy scholar Jennifer Robson, who 
worked as a politically-appointed exempt member of staff for a Liberal minister and in the 
PMO of Jean Chretien in the 1990s, presented a paper in May, 2014 at the annual 
Canadian Political Science Conference. Robson notes that partisan political appointments 
are far from a recent development and in fact were approved by the same 1908 and 1918 
Civil Service Acts that established a permanent public service (Robson, 2014: p.4). By the 
1950s most ministers had “two or three staff” and by the 1960s the average was about 11 
exempt staff per minister, including the PM. By the 1990’s that number had risen slightly. 
Robson cites a 2006 report by the Public Service Commission which “noted that there 
were 392 political staff on the federal payroll as of March 31, 1993 and 507 11 years later 
on March 31, 2003.” Robson also cites a breakdown of staff in the PMOs of Conservative 
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chretien, who showed 
similar rates of hiring: 
Brian Mulroney’s ministry stood at 35 – giving an average 
per ministerial office (including the Prime Minister’s Office) 
of 11 staff each. In 2003, Jean Chretien’s ministry was 38 
strong – generating a slightly higher average of 13 staff per 
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ministerial office. If adjustments are made to allow for much 
larger staffs in the Prime Minister’s Office, then the average 
ministerial staff size in both Mulroney and Chretien offices is 
much lower (As cited by Robson, 2014: p.4).  
Robson notes that the numbers of exempt staff increased relatively slowly between the 
1950s and 2003. Referring to the PSA study, she concludes: “This cursory comparison 
over time suggests that any major increases to the size of ministerial offices in Canada 
largely took place 50 years ago” (Robson: p.4). 
5.2. Top secret assignment: exempt staff and the public right to know 
Who are the mysterious men and women who toil in secret in the offices of the 
PM? They are among the most powerful actors in government and yet the Canadians who 
pay their salaries are officially not allowed to know who they are, how many of them work 
in government, what they are paid and, perhaps most importantly, what roles they play in 
the structure, operations and decision-making of government. They are quite accurately 
described as “exempt staff” – exempt from all transparency and accountability, as well as 
from the public service. What we do know, officially, is that they are political appointees 
who work for the executive branch of government, and also in agencies and other offices 
of government which are less apparent. They are first and foremost partisan actors with a 
demonstrated loyalty to the party in power. This was clearly a primary criteria for 
appointment as exempt staff in the PMO of Conservative Party of Stephen Harper, as this 
dissertation demonstrates. It remains to be seen if it will continue to be key criteria for 
appointment to the PMO of the Liberal government. However, one of the first acts of new 
Liberal Prime Minister Justin Trudeau following his October 19, 2015 election was to 
appoint three of his former Liberal Party campaign advisors to high-ranking exempt staff 
positions in the Liberal PMO (Campion-Smith & Boutilier, October 20, 2015).98 Exempt 
staff are tracked by government internally. For example, all exempt staff are subject to 
security clearance and their names and job titles must also be reported to the Office of the 
Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, according to the guidelines for Ministers’ 
Offices issued by the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS). However, that information is not 
for public consumption. There is no recourse through Access to Information to determine 
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their numbers because both the PMO, and minister’s offices, including the TBS, are 
exempt from the federal disclosure law. Nor are they identified as exempt staff in the phone 
directory. Nor is there a breakout of the number of political appointees in the PMO and the 
budgets of Minister’s Offices which are available annually through Public Accounts. This 
void means that a number of journalists and scholars, including this PhD candidate have 
attempted to piece together available data and information to attempt to define and 
describe this secretive third force of governance that operates behind the scenes, often 
as a liaison between the other two forces of the public service and the elected members 
of government.  
In her paper, Jennifer Robson cites a 2011 comparative study of ministerial staff 
in 27 countries conducted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and titled Ministerial Advisors: Role, Influence and Management. 
Each of the governments were asked to fill out surveys concerning the employment of 
ministerial advisors, known as “exempt staff” in Canada, and to provide information on 
their duties, salaries and guidelines for conduct. The report includes comparative case 
studies of ministerial advisors in Canada, Austria and the United Kingdom. One difference 
between Canada and the case studies of Austria and the United Kingdom is evident in the 
OECD report, and that is the lack of transparency required of government regarding its 
exempt staff in Canada. Unlike Canada, each of the two other countries examined require 
government to publically detail names, jobs and salary ranges of political staff members, 
according to the OECD study. The British government provides a detailed list of what are 
known as “special advisors” that is published by each department on a quarterly basis. If 
an individual’s salary exceeds public service guidelines, the exact salary must also be 
made public: 
Information on special advisors’ names, remuneration 
(which exact salary where over GBP 58,000 [EUR 66, 800], 
and gifts and hospitality received is published by 
departments on a quarterly basis. (OECD: p.97). 
In addition, the British government is required to provide a detailed list naming all political 
staff and their salaries to the House of Commons on an annual basis (Robson, 2014: p.4). 
In fairness, the Canadian government does post travel, hospitality and expense claims 
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submitted by exempt staff under the description “proactive disclosure.” But no other 
financial information, including salaries, is publically available.  
Political staff in Austria are also closely scrutinized by Parliament, with opposition 
parties conducting annual enquires to track staffing levels and costs, according to the 
OECD study. 
The federal Chancellor and each federal minister are asked 
for detailed information on the number of their political 
advisors at a given date, their employment status…and 
remuneration, which includes compensation for overtime, 
bonuses and perks. Enquiries and their findings are posted 
on Parliament’s website (OECD: p.82). 
The OECD found that in addition to the UK and Austria, “information on numbers of 
ministerial advisors can be accessed online in Brazil, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway 
and …the United States (OECD: p.63). In addition, profiles of political advisors are posted 
on government websites in Denmark, Norway and Poland. Profiles can be obtained by 
request in Belgium, Erupt [2011], Finland, Mexico and the United States, according to the 
OECD (pp: 640. The OECD further found that information on the numbers of advisors and 
the overall costs to taxpayers was also posted in the UK: “The United Kingdom has 
recently made it mandatory to post on the Internet both the pay of ministerial advisors and 
the ministers to whom they are accountable in order to strengthen public trust and place 
transparency at the core of the public service (pp. 69). Disclosure law in Chile requires all 
ministries to post the “names, job descriptions and salaries of …ministerial advisors” 
(pp.69). There is no such comparable transparency in Canada, as the report notes.  
5.3. Adding up the cost 
Robson’s 2014 paper quantifies, perhaps for the first time publically, overall costs 
for exempt staff salaries in the Conservative government of Stephen Harper between 2007 
and 2012, the most recent figures available through the Annual Public Accounts of Canada 
compiled by the Ministry of Finance. Robson notes that “public and objective data on this 
shadowed population is by no means easy to come across” (Robson, 2014:p.5). However, 
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Robson found a “line item expenditure,” added to Public Accounts in 2007, that gives total 
amounts “by cabinet portfolio and by the name of the Parliamentarian occupying the office” 
for “amounts spent on personnel through salaries and contracts for professional services.” 
The added reference provides the first, and apparently only, accounting of overall costs 
for exempt staff. Based on a five-year analysis of the Public Accounts references, Robson 
estimates that the federal government spends between $50 and $60 million per year on 
political staff for 28 departments and agencies, including the PMO. Her data analysis 
showed that the budget for PMO political staff “accounted for 15 per cent of total spending 
at an average of just over $8 million per year (Robson, 2014: p. 9). Robson also found that 
the actual amount spent by the PMO ranged from a low of $7.2 million in fiscal year 2011-
2012 (the first year of majority government) and a high of $9.6 million in fiscal year 2009-
10. 99  The average annual cost for exempt staff across government over five years was 
$53.9 million (p.9). Robson explains that increase in spending between 2008-09 and 2009-
2010 “Is due almost entirely to measures taken by the Department of Finance in the midst 
of the international fiscal crisis to stabilize the Canadian mortgage market” (Robson, 2014: 
p. 10). Robson speculates that a decrease in overall salary and contracts costs from a 
high of $61 million in 2009-2010, to $52.7 million the following fiscal year might be a case 
of political expediency, given that the government had introduced its Deficit Reduction 
Action Plan and wished to appear to be compliant with cuts in other areas of government. 
Given that the public is given no information, other than that now reported by Robson, on 
political staffing, it is unlikely that the government would be concerned about currying 
favourable public opinion by cutting staff. The public would have no knowledge of staffing 
levels either way. However, it is also possible that less political staff was required once 
the government was elected as a majority government in the election of May, 2011. Given 
that the next election was not scheduled for another four years, the executive branches of 
government could safely shift into a lower campaign gear, which might explain why fewer 
political staff were required.  
5.4. PMO: Stepping stone rather than long-term career 
The National Post newspaper puts the total cost of PMO salaries between 2006 
and 2013 at “approximately $57 million” The size of the staff over that period “ranged in 
size from 82 to 105 employees during that time,” according to the April 21, 2014 story by 
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reporter Jason Fekete. Based on ATI records obtained by Ken Rubin, Fekete also reported 
a high turnover of PMO staff, with between “one-third and one-fifth” of the political 
appointees leaving the PMO each year. In total, 196 exempt staff left their jobs in the PMO 
between 2006 and 2013, according to the records obtained by Rubins, an Ottawa-based 
ATI researcher who often provides government records obtained under ATI to journalists. 
The high turnover of staff in the PMO is an additional expense for taxpayers, according to 
Fekete. The ATI records released to Rubins in April, 2014 showed the PMO had paid $4.1 
million in severance pay and separation payments to departing exempt staff between 2006 
and 2013. Fekete breaks down the payouts as follows: 
Of the $4.1 million, more than $1.5-million was for 
severance payments automatically paid to the 196 departing 
PMO employees between 2006-07 and 2012-13 — or an 
average payment of about $7,800 each — regardless of 
whether they were laid off, fired, resigned on their own, or 
retired. 
Another $2.4-million was discretionary separation payments 
for 93 departing PMO staff between 2006-07 and 2012-13 
— an average payment of about $26,300 each — according 
to documents and figures obtained by Ottawa researcher 
Ken Rubin using the access to information law (Fekete, April 
21, 2014) 
The National Post reporter estimated that between “one-third and one-fifth of staff leave 
each year, often with both severance and discretionary separation payments.” Among the 
political staff to leave the PMO between 2006 and 2013 were four chiefs of staff and eight 
directors of communications, according to my own research. Turnover in the lower ranks 
is, if anything, even greater. In addition, the number of new hires is equally high. My 
research using the Electronic Government Directory System (GEDS) – an electronic 
phone book that lists all government employees showed staff-list changes between July 
2012 and July 2013 indicated that 29 replacement staff were hired over the one-year-
period, including seven interns. That means that more than one-third of the PMO staff 
were new hires over the 12-month period. Fekete estimates that over that same period, 
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the PMO also paid “approximately $57 million in salaries to its political staff,” for a total 
payout of about $61 million when severance and separation pay is included. In total, the 
Conservative government of Stephen Harper has paid out $31 million in severance and 
separation pay to departing political staff, including the PMO over that same period. Based 
on Robson’s estimate that the Harper government spends between $50 and $60 million 
per year on political appointees to staff the PMO and 27 other minister’s office and 
agencies, the total cost over the eight years since the Conservatives were elected might 
be as high as $480 million. If the cost of severance and separation pay is included, the 
total cost of employing political staff for the executive branch of the Harper government is 
about half a billion dollars.  
5.5. Serving the political advantage of the party in power 
Former Harper government Chief of Staff and political scientist Ian Brodie 
described the role of exempt staff in a 2012 paper titled “In Defense of Political Staff.” He 
first of all distinguished between political staff who work directly for members of Parliament 
in constituency offices and members’ parliamentary offices, whom he describes as 
“parliamentary aides” dealing with office and constituency administration, expenses and 
managing issues involving constituents; and the “political aides, headed by a chief of staff” 
whom in addition to organizing travel and expenses, also handle politically-strategic 
communication and political “issues management” for ministers and the Prime Minister. 
Brodie claimed that an average of 80 political staff were employed in the PMO (See 
Appendix A which was uploaded separately). An annual search of the Government 
Electronic Directory between 2011 and 2015 showed an average of about 90 exempt staff 
employed in the PMO – ranging from a low of 82 exempt staff on August 22, 2014 to a 
high of 105 exempt staff employed on July 6, 2012. The former chief of staff also said: 
“The largest branch of PMO is Tour, or Operations, which handles the onerous job of 
moving the PM around.” However, the snapshot GED provides of PMO staffing shows that 
only 13 to 16 exempt staff worked in Tours and Scheduling, comprising between 15 and 
19.5 per cent of total PMO staff in each annual analysis of PMO staffing. Compared to 
that, more than 50% were consistently employed in various political communication 
activities over the five-year-period reviewed through the GED. Communication work, 
including responding to politically-sensitive correspondence flagged and passed along by 
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the Privy Council Office (Thomas, 2009), is primarily partisan in the sense that they are 
there to protect and promote the political image and interests of the governing party, a fact 
that Brodie accepts, but says is justifiable. He argues that the partisan “commitment” 
political aides bring to the policy and decision-making process is essential to government, 
and therefore a justifiable expense for taxpayers.  
What is the justification for ministers having political aides 
paid out of tax revenues? Why should not political staff be 
paid out of the funds of the political party in power? Quite 
simply, it is because the government has long recognized 
that ministers require something more than the expert, but 
non-partisan, advice of the public service to meet the 
demands on them.  
Brodie cites a 1999 paper by Mark Schacter on cabinet decision-making: “To make 
wise policy decisions, ministers need “a combination of sound technical and political 
advice”. He also cites the 2011 Privy Council Office’s guide titled “Accountable 
Government: A Guide for Ministers and Ministers of State” as defining the role of political 
staff as complementary to “the professional, expert and non-partisan advance and support 
of the public service. Consequently they contribute a particular expertise or point of view 
that the public service cannot provide” (Brodie, 2012: p.33). Brodie thereby argues that 
the expertise political staff provide, which public servants do not, is their partisan 
perspective on governance. It is this distinction and particular skill that Brodie argues is 
essential to governing and not otherwise available, and therefore, he argues, a justifiable 
public expense.  
Brodie’s paper is transcribed from a speech he gave and appears to have been 
written primarily in response to a paper written by Paul Thomas for the 2009 Oliphant 
Commission of Inquiry into business dealings involving former Conservative Prime 
Minister Brian Mulroney. They were in agreement on one point, that PMO staff provide 
partisan advice not available from the public service. Where they differ is on whether this 
constitutes a benefit or concern for governance. While Brodie argued the necessity for 
partisan actors in the PMO, Thomas pointed out that the partisan nature and role of 
political staff, particularly in the PMO, raised concerns about “the potential for blurring of 
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the line between communication for partisan political purposes and more objective 
communications for the purposes of public administration (Thomas, 2009: p. 5). In his 
2009 paper, “Who is Getting the Message? Communications at the Centre of 
Government”, Thomas details a multitude of difficulties any government faces in protecting 
its public image – including a negative media and opposition parties seeking to reveal its 
failings. He notes that as a result: “political life resembles a permanent election in which 
campaigning and governing have become almost indistinguishable. Governing becomes 
a non-stop process of campaign-type actions designed to gain and retain public approval 
and support (p. 8).” The PMO took issue with Thomas’ analysis, strangely denying that its 
staff is partisan as Brodie explained in justifying their expense to taxpayers, and attempted 
instead to argue an overly fine distinction between political and partisan actors. Guy 
Giorno, Brodie’s successor as Chief of Staff, who would head the Conservative Party 
election campaign in 2015, argued ”the PMO is a Government office whose activity is 
political but not partisan” (Giorno, June 11, 2009: p.6). But the evidence is otherwise. 
Robson, who worked as a member of exempt staff for four years, including one 
year in the PMO of Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chretien, also notes that exempt staff are 
appointed by the party in power to conduct partisan work while on the public payroll. 
Exempt staff job descriptions and duties are ultimately determined by the prime minister 
or the ministers they serve, writes Robson. The work they do is highly partisan and 
political. It may include politically-sensitive policy advice “to complement the advice from 
public servants,” (p. 3) whom, officially at least, are meant to remain non-partisan in their 
policy recommendations. This might enable the governing party to ensure that policies are 
in line with ideological positions and political promises. Their work may also be directed at 
promoting the governing party among voters, Robson notes. Aides may be hired to “help 
build or maintain political networks, whether those networks are strictly partisan or not. A 
minister with a desire for better media coverage may put greater resources into hiring 
communication strategists and press secretaries (Robson, 2014: p.3). 
The budgets for political staff and salary classifications for various political staff are 
determined by the Treasury Board Office, Robson writes. However, despite the fact that 
political staff salaries are paid by taxpayers, in Canada the public has no access to even 
basic information about those employees, including what duties they perform and what 
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they are paid. Unlike the United Kingdom where government provides the House of 
Commons with “a complete list of special advisors, including the names and salary 
ranges,” the Canadian government is not required to provide any deta iled information on 
its political staff (Robinson, 2014: p.4). Robson points out that although exempt staff are 
paid either salaries or “contract wages out of public funds at rates comparable to selected 
federal Public Service classifications” (Robson, 2014: p.2), the exact salaries earned by 
political staff are a closely guarded secret in Canada, closed even to Opposition parties 
and other members of Parliament. “Opposition questions on the order paper regarding 
political staff in Canada are regularly returned with minimal or no information” (Robinson: 
4). It should also be noted that ATIA requests, including one filed by this researcher, for 
information about exempt staff are also returned with the notation “no records found.”  
In a follow-up phone interview on August 28, 2014 Robson called for greater 
transparency concerning “exempt staff” and also for clearer guidelines and directions on 
their roles within government. Robson is concerned that the secrecy and lack of 
transparency that surrounds the role and duties of political staff has resulted in a 
misunderstanding and mistrust of their work inside government. She says this lack of 
understanding and mistrust is reflected in the literature of public administration scholars, 
and has led to calls for cuts to “exempt staff’” which lack substantive grounds for such an 
action. She admits her former role as a member of exempt staff colours her own view. But 
she believes that the lack of understanding about the actual work of political staff has led 
to a somewhat naïve view that they are primarily hired as one of the “spoils of victory:” 
I think there is a view that these are the kids in the short 
pants. They do not add much in terms of substantive value 
but they are a kind of status and elected politicians like to 
have them around. They like to have an entourage (Robson 
Interview, August 28, 2014). 
This view has influenced both media reports and academic literature, she said. She cites 
a book by three prominent public administration scholars (Aucoin, Jarvis & Turnball, 2012) 
which calls for exempt staff to be cut by half. “And it is unclear why, quite frankly. Why half 
and how do you know that the current staffing levels are adequate or high. Even though it 
is a very naïve view of what political staffers do, there is something of that view that does 
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percolate into the public administration literature.” Greater transparency about the roles 
and duties of exempt staff might serve to improve the level of debate, she said. She argues 
that exempt staff perform an important advisory role within government, as well as other 
roles that serve the public interest. But, in part because of the wall of secrecy that 
surrounds their work, assumptions are made by the public, academics and the media 
which over-simplify their work as “spin doctoring.”  
Robson argues that a code of conduct that would define the roles of exempt staff 
would also make their jobs easier. Currently they are guided by what Robson describes 
as “an enormous web of rules” rather than a clear and dedicated code of conduct designed 
specifically for political advisors. The Code of Conduct for Special Advisors that has been 
adopted by the British government could serve as a model and would make clear not only 
what exempt staff should not do, but also what they can and should do as part of their 
responsibilities, she explained during the phone interview: 
One of the things I like about the special advisors guide for 
political advisors, it also gives them a guide on what you 
should be doing. It is not just a do not. We have a web of 
rules on conflict of interest and so on, that quite frankly a lot 
of it is convoluted… It is not that we have no rules. It is that 
they are indecipherable and they are all focused on thou 
shalt not. We should be providing staffers with good, clear 
reasonable guidelines.  
In the OECD study,  the Canadian government drew praise for establishing clear and 
detailed guidelines for the employment and conduct of exempt staff, which the OECD 
describes as a broader category than ministerial advisors that also includes 
“administrative and other support personnel” (OECD, 2011: 87). The OECD report notes 
that exempt staff are subject to the same “conflict of interest and post-employment and 
ethical guidelines as ministers.” It also notes that the Treasury Board’s 2011 Guide for 
Ministers and Ministers of State “makes clear what are the complementary but distinct 
roles of exempt staff and public servants” These guidelines are explored further later in 
this chapter. An interesting observation by the OECD is that the Treasury Board 
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Secretariat (TBS) guidelines specify “a clear division between exempt staff and public 
servants. 
Exempt staff can ask departmental officials for information, 
transmit the minister’s instructions or be informed of 
decisions in order to address communications and strategic 
issues. However, they do not have a role in departmental 
operations and have no legal basis for exercising the 
delegated authority of ministers. Nor may exempt staff give 
direction to departmental official on the discharge of their 
responsibilities (OECD, 2011: p.87).  
While it was beyond the scope of the OECD survey to determine whether governments 
lived up to codes of conduct, it is clear that this particular aspect of the 2011 TBS 
ministerial guidelines is routinely violated by exempt staff. As Chapter 6 on Access to 
Information in Canada demonstrates, exempt staff, including ministerial assistants and 
communication advisors, are embedded in departments to offer political advice to public 
servants on the handling of ATIA requests. It is also firmly established that scientists 
working for government are among the many public servants who must seek approval and 
advice from exempt staff before discussing their work in public, including interviews with 
news media. As already discussed, all public servants, and even federal ministers, are 
required to fill out Message Event Proposals (known as MEPs) requesting permission to 
speak or appear publically, which are then submitted to exempt staff working as political 
communication and media strategists and media relations for approval prior to the event. 
The MEPs are clear cases of exempt staff providing direction to public servants in violation 
of the government guidelines cited by the OECD. 
5.6. Putting numbers to hidden faces 
Despite their increasing power inside and throughout government, the public has 
little understanding of the key roles exempt staff play in policy-making decisions (Benoit 
2006), and in the political communications process (Thomas, 2011). It is impossible to put 
an exact figure on the number of staff in the PMO and offices of ministers as they are not 
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officially made public. Nor does the government publish information about the role or 
qualifications of exempt staff. In lieu of official records, I have attempted to quantify the 
number of exempt staff in the PMO and in the office of ministers by downloading the names 
and positions of staff working in the PMO and ministers’ offices from the Electronic 
Government Directory System (GEDS). In 2013, the total number of exempt staff 
employed by the Harper executive branch was about 600, according to the data 
downloaded from GEDS listings. It is important to note that the total figure does not include 
Crown corporations or agencies, and applies strictly to ministerial offices and the PMO. 
The actual number of exempt staff working for the federal government is likely higher, 
perhaps significantly higher than the available information indicates. The data downloaded 
for minister’s offices shows the following: 
5.7. Ministerial offices and exempt staff 
Ministers may appoint lower-level staff but senior positions are vetted and 
approved by the PM, who may, as he did in the case of Peter MacKay’s first choice for 
chief of staff, refuse to approve the appointment. All chiefs of staff appointments are 
therefore subject to the approval of the PM. Exempt staff in the PMO and working for 
ministers have become a significant component of government, both in terms of influence, 
and numbers. According to the August 24, 2013 versions of the GEDS, 500 politically-
appointed exempt staff were listed as working in the offices of ministers. It is important to 
note that this is not an absolutely accurate measure because two minister’s appointed by 
Harper on July 15, 2013, were not yet listed as ministers in the GEDS, and therefore do 
not show any exempt staff for their offices. Another junior minister was listed, but did not 
yet show any staff on the government-wide electronic directory. Unfortunately, the GEDs 
is the best public record available of exempt staff in minister’s offices, and the PMO, 
because they are exempt from ATI and ministries do not provide the public with lists of 
political staff. Given that at least three ministries were not up to date on the GEDS, it is 
reasonable to assume that the 500 positions listed represent a conservative count for 
exempt staff working for the executive branch. It is also important to note that exempt staff 
also work for agencies of government, therefore the number of exempt staff working in 
departments and agencies other than the PMO is at least 500, and most certainly higher. 
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A detailed breakdown by ministry is provided below. It is not possible to get a count on the 
number of exempt staff working in various agencies across government.  
Each senior minister had about 20 political staff working in their office. All ministers 
have a chief of staff who heads and co-ordinates the staff, and reports to the minister; and 
a director of communications. The GEDS shows three exceptions, which include the two 
ministers whose status as ministers and offices had yet to be listed, and one junior minister 
who works as part of the Foreign Affairs ministry, which does have a chief of staff. (See 
explanations below on minister’s names marked with an asterisk.) All large ministries, and 
some ministers of state also have a press secretary to deal with news media, and also a 
director for issues management who is concerned with identifying and handling politically-
sensitive issues. A typical example is the office of Minister of Industry James Moore, who 
had 20 staff as of August 24, 2013, according to GEDS. His staff includes a chief of staff 
and his special assistant; a press secretary; a director of communications and her special 
assistant; a ministerial correspondence co-ordinator; a director of parliamentary affairs 
and issues management and his special assistant for issues management. All of these 
positions are in one way or another concerned with communications, either with the media 
or correspondence with the public. There was also a director of policy and a senior policy 
advisor; a parliamentary secretary and an assistant parliamentary secretary; a director of 
regional affairs, a senior special assistant of regional affairs and a special assistant of 
regional affairs; a senior special assistant for caucus liaison and appointments; and a 
department advisor. In addition, the minister has a scheduling assistant and a driver. 
Former Finance Minister Jim Flaherty had 21 political staffers, according to the GED 
listings on August 23, 2013. There were only slight variations from Moore’s staff, with a 
listing for a correspondence and briefing notes co-ordinator, who is also concerned with 
communications; and a director of appointments-finance and Greater Toronto. Peter 
MacKay had 21 political staff in his office as justice minister and attorney general. He also 
had three additional political staff in his office as minister of the National Search and 
Rescue Secretariat, including a second chief of staff. 
The offices of ministers for smaller departments have far fewer staff, averaging 
between five and eight political staff. Kevin Sorenson, Minister of State for Finance had 
just five staff which included a chief of staff; director of communications; and a policy 
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advisor. Similarly, Maxime Bernier, minister of state, small business, tourism and 
agriculture had seven staff who included the chief of staff, director of communications, 
departmental advisor, senior special assistant, administrative assistant, an intern and a 
driver. Greg Rickford, minister of state, science and technology, and an agency listed as 
FedNor had eight staff who include: chief of staff; director of policy and two senior policy 
advisors; director of communications and parliamentary affairs, and special assistant 
(communications); and a special assistant.  
PM Harper appointed 38 cabinet ministers on July 15, 2013. According to listings 
in the August 23, 2013 GEDS, they had a total of 500 politically appointed exempt staff. 
The number of political staff in each Minister’s Office is as follows: 
1. Bernard Valcourt, minister of aboriginal affairs and northern development; 
22 political staff 
2. Rob Nicholson, minister of national defence; Twenty-four political staff, 
including both a director and deputy director of communications/press 
secretary and an issue manager/question period advisor and a director of 
strategic communications.  
3. Peter MacKay, minister of justice and attorney general of Canada; 21 
political staff, plus three staff in his office as lead minister for the National 
Search and Rescue Secretariat. Total of 24 political staff. 
4. Rona Ambrose, minister of health; 17 political staff, including a director of 
communications, a regional communications advisor, a special assistant 
of communications and a press secretary. Her chief of staff had been 
appointed but was not yet listed on the government directory. Total of 18 
political staff. 
5. Diane Finley, minister of public works and government services; 13 
political staff. 
6. John Baird, minister of foreign affairs; 19 exempt staff listed in the GEDS.  
7. Tony Clement, president of the Treasury Board; 17 exempt staff. 
8. Jim Flaherty, minister of finance; 21 exempt staff. 
9. Peter Van Loan, government leader in the House of Commons; 15 
exempt staff 
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10. Jason Kenney, minister of employment and social development; 24 
exempt staff 
11. Gerry Ritz, minister of agriculture and agri-food; 20 exempt staff listed in 
national headquarters of agriculture and Agri-food Canada, and two 
additional staff, including a regional communications advisor listed in the 
minister’s regional office. Total of 22 exempt staff listed. 
12. Christian Paradis, minister of international development and minister for 
La Francophonie; 16 exempt staff in the minister’s international 
development office.  
13. James Moore, minister of industry; 20 exempt staff. 
14. Denis Lebel, minister of infrastructure, communities and 
intergovernmental affairs and minister of the Economic Development 
Agency of Canada for the regions of Quebec; 24 exempt staff, including 
the usual key positions and a director of media relations and issues 
management; policy and issues management advisor; director of 
parliamentary affairs and issues management; director of strategic 
planning and stakeholder relations, and six policy advisors at various 
levels. 
15. Leona Aglukkaq, minister of the environment, minister of the Canadian 
Northern Economic Development Agency and minister for the Arctic 
Council; 18 exempt staff. 
16. Lisa Raitt, minister of transport; 27 exempt staff, including two chiefs of 
staff and a director of stakeholder relations and strategic planning.  
17. Gail Shea, minister of fisheries and oceans; 19 exempt staff. 
18. Julian Fantino, minister of veterans affairs; 10 exempt staff. 
19. Steven Blaney, minister of public safety; 16 exempt staff. 
20. Ed Fast, minister of international trade; 24 exempt staff. 
21. Joe Oliver, minister of natural resources; 10 exempt staff. 
22. Kerry-Lynne Findlay, minister of national revenue; 13 exempt staff. 
23. Shelly Glover, minister of Canadian heritage and official languages; 14 
exempt staff. 
24. Chris Alexander, minister of citizenship and immigration; 17 exempt staff. 
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25. Kellie Leitch, minister of labour and minister of status of women; 11 
exempt staff. 
26. Maxime Bernier, minister of state for small business and tourism, and 
agriculture; seven exempt Staff. 
27. Lynne Yelich*, minister of state for foreign affairs and consular; 10 exempt 
staff. This is the only ministry that fails to list either a chief of staff or a 
director of communications. The department does have a parliamentary 
affairs and issues management advisor, which also serves a 
communication function. Also, Yelich is a junior minister who is working 
as part of Foreign Affairs, which has a large political staff, including a 
chief of staff. 
28. Gary Goodyear, minister of state for the Federal Economic Development 
Agency for Southern Ontario; seven exempt staff. 
29. Rob Moore*, minister of state for the Atlantic Canada Opportunities 
Agency; No exempt staff were listed under the minister’s office. However, 
the president’s office of the ACOA lists 18 communications staff which 
included a speech co-ordinator; a manager of ministerial communications, 
and a parliamentary affairs officer. Total, at least one. 
30. John Duncan, minister of state and chief government whip; six exempt 
staff, including: lobby co-ordinator and senior lobby co-ordinator; chief of 
staff; and committees co-ordinator. 
31. Tim Uppal*, minister of state for multiculturalism; The Ministry of State for 
Multiculturalism was not listed on the GEDS as of August 24, 2013. The 
only multicultural listing was as part of citizenship and immigration. This 
could be because the directory has not yet been updated. Uppal was 
listed only as an MP, and not as a minister. Therefore, no exempt staff 
were listed.  
32. Alice Wong*, minister of state for seniors; Also not yet listed on GEDS as 
a minister as of August 24, 2013. Wong was listed as an MP but not as a 
minister. Ministry of State for seniors not found on GEDS. Therefore no 
exempt staff were listed. 
33. Bal Gosal, minister of state for sport; nine exempt staff. 
34. Kevin Sorenson, minister of state for Finance; five exempt staff. 
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35. Pierre Poilievre, minister of state for democratic reform; five exempt staff, 
including a director of communications: director of policy; director of 
parliamentary affairs and issues management and a chief of staff. [Note: 
On August 7, 2014 GEDS listed six staff for Minister Poilievre, including a 
driver and an intern.] 
36. Candice Bergen, minister of state for social development; four exempt 
staff, including: press secretary; chief of staff; director of communications 
and a driver. The Ministry of State for Social Development is listed in the 
electronic directory as part of Human Resources and Skills Development 
Canada, which has a large political staff. Total four. 
37. Greg Rickford, minister of state for science and technology, and Federal 
Economic Development Initiative for Northern Ontario; eight exempt staff. 
38. Michelle Rempel, minister of state for western economic diversification: 
seven exempt staff. 
5.8. PMO exempt staff: taking Inventory  
One method used by journalists to estimate the number of staff in various ministry 
offices, including the PMO, is to download the names of staff, and their job titles, for a 
particular political office. This is the method I have applied on a single day for four years. 
The names of all staff listed as working in the PMO were downloaded to Excel 
spreadsheets on a single day in July for 2011, 2012 and 2013 and on a single day in 
August, 2014. The result is by no means definitive or exact, but it does provide a sort of 
snapshot of the number and job descriptions of exempt staff in the PMO. The data 
collected over four years indicates an average of 101 exempt staff worked in the PMO 
between 2011 and 2014. This finding is similar to what Kozolanka (2011:114) found in 
2007, when her search of the Electronic Government Directory System showed there were 
100 exempt staff in the PMO. The number of staff my data identified by year are as follows: 
On July 14, 2011 the GEDS indicated 105 exempt staff were working in the PMO; on July 
6, 2012 the GEDS identified 105 exempt staff in the PMO; on July 17, the GEDS listed 98 
PMO exempt staff; and on August 7, 2014 the GEDS listed 97 exempt staff as working in 
the PMO. 
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It is may seem a bit of a stretch,  however, in lieu of official information on the 
subject, if you divide the annual PMO budget for each fiscal year by the number of staff 
listed in the GEDS data, you can come up with an approximate average salary for PMO 
exempt staff. According to Robson’s data, in fiscal year 2010-2011 the PMO spent $8.4 
million on salaries and contracts for about 105 staff, suggesting that the average salary 
was roughly $80,000. In fiscal year 2011-2012 the PMO budget for exempt staff was $7.2 
million, while the GEDS data indicates there were about 105 exempt staff in the PMO, 
meaning the average salary for that year was about $65,000. Again, these figures are not 
official. By contrast, the British government publishes the names and salaries of “special 
advisors” working in the office of the prime minister and for cabinet ministers. The data is 
made available online under the title “Special advisers’ transparency publications” 100 The 
data published for October 25, 2013 shows that there were 23 special advisors working in 
the office of the prime minister on that date, with the top salaries reported as GBP140,000 
(See Appendix D). Based on these figures it would seem that the British PM employees 
about 25 per cent of the staff employed by the PMO of Stephen Harper. 
No such information is available in Canada, so members of the public are reduced 
to unofficial estimates. We can therefore only estimate how many exempt staff are 
employed across government. One way to estimate is to extrapolate from Robson’s 
estimate that PMO exempt staff salaries represent about 15% of the total government 
budget for political staff, then if the PMO has a staff of about 100 political appointees, 
across government the total number employed is about 670. That number is similar to the 
number derived from my research which indicates that at least 600 exempt staff work for 
the PMO and federal cabinet ministers. That such rough measures are required – given 
that taxpayers are footing the bill for political staff – seems difficult to justify, particularly 
from a government that promised openness and accountability when first elected in 2006. 
5.9. What does the PMO staff do with taxpayer’s money? 
Kozolanka estimated that 37 of the 100 staff were working in communications. She does 
not explain the criterion for categorizing a staff member’s work as communications. I have 
relied on the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) Guidelines for Ministers’ Offices Appendix 
A: Exempt Staff Position Structure (2011) to determine that more than half of the PMO 
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exempt staff are engaged in communication-related activities. It must be noted that there 
is no specific set of guidelines for PMO staff. However, I have taken these guidelines as 
applying also to PM Harper. This seems a reasonable approach because each of the units 
in the ministers’ offices have parallel units in the PMO, and they each report to the head 
units in the PMO. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that the guidelines for duties 
performed by each unit also apply to the duties performed by exempt staff in the units of 
the same name in the PMO. The units that deal directly with communications include the 
following, according the TBS guidelines: 
 The chief of staff, whether serving in a minister’s office or the PMO, is 
responsible for “overall management… including managing the office budget and 
staff,” according to the TBS guidelines. Other duties include “developing and 
implementing strategic plans.” Because the chief of staff oversees all other units 
in a minister’s office, or in the PMO, communication is part of the mandate. 
Similarly, deputy chiefs of staff and assistants are working under the same 
mandate and are therefore also involved in communications. 
 One of the duties of the director of policy is to “liaise with key stakeholders to 
inform or consult on important policy initiatives.” That is a communications 
function and therefore policy advisors are engaged in some forms of 
communication. Based on this job description I have also included PMO planning 
and stakeholder relations staff under communications responsibilities.  
 The director of communications has extensive communications responsibilities 
which include: “strategic planning and communications advice;…leading 
comprehensive communications plans…; consult regularly with the Prime 
Minister's Office in order to better co-ordinate government-wide communications; 
oversee, and co-ordinate with the department, the development of 
communications initiatives to ensure that they are consistent with the minister's 
objectives and the government's mandate;…establishes and maintains a 
professional relationship with the media; and is the leading official spokesperson 
for the minister.” All staff in the communications unit are involved in 
communications.  
 The press secretary works under the director of communications and is 
responsible for: “providing strategic planning and communications advice…; 
 246 
managing media inquiries; [maintaining] a professional relationship with the 
media; and may be designated by the director of communications as the leading 
official spokesperson.” 
 The senior special assistant and the special assistant (communications) both 
provide “advice and support” on issues that include communications. The special 
assistant for parliamentary affairs is responsible for “briefing and preparing the 
minister for Question Period.” This involves preparing questions and answers for 
the minister (house notes), which is a communication function. I have also relied 
on media reports and interviews concerning the communications function of the 
issues management unit in the PMO. Further, the correspondence unit is 
responsible for replying to letters from members of the public that have political 
implications.  
While I make no claim that the data downloaded from GEDS is conclusive, the 
annual snapshots of personnel in the PMO do indicate some trends and characteristics of 
employment duties and patterns. It is fair to say that on average the PMO exempt staff 
runs between 85 and 95 on average, about half of whom work in units concerned with 
communicating with media and the public, including during Question Period. The 
communication duties include strategic management, strategic communication and issues 
management, which are all primarily concerned with identifying and managing political 
issues in the media. Again, perhaps one of the most salient points of this entire exercise 
is that it relied on alternative sources of information, such as the Government Electronic 
Directory Service (GEDS), rather than obtaining official numbers directly from the PMO or 
the PCO which serves as its administrative arm. It is therefore not offered as exact, but 
rather as a snapshot of exempt staff taken on a particular day or days in each of the years 
of the Harper majority government. This was necessary because the executive branch, 
and the PMO in particular, has determined that the public is not entitled to know how it 
spends tax dollars on political staff. The data downloaded from GEDS indicates the name 
of the member of staff and also their job title and the unit they work for within the PMO. 
Based on the above TBS job descriptions the following staff were involved in strategic 
political communication tasks. The tallies do not include the PM or interns who can number 
as many as 10 at any one time. The following communication units and employees were 
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found for each of the five years analysed from July 2011 to August 2015: (The tables for 
each year can be found in Appendix E). 
 July 14, 2011: 95 exempt staff, including 50 whose duties are either entirely 
concerned with communication, or it involves a significant portion of their duties, 
meaning about 52 per cent of staff were performing communications activities. 
The units included: communications (22 exempt staff); issues management (7); 
speechwriting (4); correspondence unit (6); photography (2); stakeholder 
relations (3); two members of the PM’s closest and top aides, the chief of staff 
and principle secretary; and the policy director.  
 July 6, 2012: 102 exempt staff, including 58 employed directly in communication, 
meaning about 57 per cent of total staff were engaged in managing and 
producing communication materials for media and the public. The units included: 
communication unit (23 exempt staff); correspondence unit (11); issues 
management (7); policy (1); photography (3); speechwriting (3); stakeholder 
relations (2); the principle secretary and chief of staff, both of whom oversee 
communications units. 
 July 17, 2013: 88 exempt staff, including 48 engaged in communication activities, 
meaning almost 57 per cent were employed in communication activities either 
full-time or as a significant part of their duties. The units were: communication 
including strategic communication (19); correspondence unit (7); policy (1); 
issues management (7); photography (3); speechwriting (4); planning and 
stakeholder relations (2); principle secretary (1); chief of marketing (1); PMO (2).  
 August 7, 2014: 82 exempt staff, including 43 working in communication activities 
and planning, meaning 52 per cent were involved in communication. The units 
included: communication (11); correspondence unit (7); issues management (8); 
photography (3); speechwriting (4) translation (2); stakeholder relations (3); 1 
person in PMO, and 3 in chief of staff office.  
 July 12, 2015:87 exempt staff, including at least 47 engaged in communication 
activities, meaning more than half of the PMO exempt staff were directly involved 
in communication. The number of communication staff per unit were as follows: 
communication (12 including one person in advertising); correspondence (6); 
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issues management (8); photography (3); speechwriting (4); translation (2); 
strategic communications (8); stakeholder relations (4); plus the chief of staff (1). 
Harper asked the governor general to dissolve Parliament on August 2, 2015, 
which started a 78-day election campaign leading up the federal election on October 19, 
2015. A search of the GEDS for PMO staff on August 31, 2015 found that the number of 
exempt staff employed had dropped from 87 people on July 12, 2015 to 23 people who 
were listed as working in the PMO. The GEDS showed that on August 31, 2015: 23 exempt 
staff remained in the PMO, not including Prime Minister Harper. Of the 23 remaining, 14 
staff were listed as working in various aspects of communication, which was down from 
47 communications staff on July 12, 2015. The 14 people working in communication 
included: three people in the Communication Unit, down from 12 in July; one photographer 
remained, down from three; one person remained in the strategic communication unit, 
down from eight; one person remained in the speechwriting unit, down from four; six 
people remained in the correspondence unit which remained unchanged:  and two people 
remained in issues management unit, down from eight. Other non-communication units in 
the PMO were also operating with reduced staff levels.  
Because the PMO is a secret operation, it is not possible to know exactly what 
happened to the more than two-thirds of political staff who disappeared from the GEDs in 
late August. However, one of the common factors for all political appointees in the PMO 
is that they are partisan actors loyal to the Conservative Party. It has been reported that 
many of the PMO staff took leaves to work on the Conservative election campaign. Globe 
and Mail reporter Simon Doyle reported on August 6, 2015: “About 20 staff from the prime 
minister’s office have taken leave from the government to work on the Conservative 
campaign.” Doyle noted that the list of PMO staff who moved over to work on the campaign 
included Chief of Staff Ray Novak, Harper’s closest confident and aide. Former Special 
Advisor Sean Speer, is “working on the Tory platform,” according to Doyle. He also notes 
that former PMO Policy Advisor Rachel Curran “is also working in the war room on 
scripting.” Both Speer and Curran are involved in Conservative election messaging. While 
there is nothing illegal about taking a leave to work on an election campaign, it does show 
that even a senior PMO policy advisor is a highly-partisan player. During the Duffy trial 
former Issues Management Director Nick Koolsbergen showed up to monitor the 
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testimony of former PMO colleague Chris Woodcock. Media noted that Koolsbergen was 
on leave from the PMO at the time. While it is not possible to identify all of the PMO exempt 
staff who have taken a leave to work on the election campaign, it is clear that the PMO is 
a highly political and partisan operation. It also raises questions about what duties PMO 
staff are performing if their numbers can be reduced by two-thirds when an election is 
called. Logically, it would seem that the business of running government continues despite 
the election, and yet the PMO is able to operate on less than one-third of the usual number 
of staff. It raises questions about the nature of the work assigned in the PMO, specifically 
how much of it is partisan and how much involves day-to-day or long-term governance 
issues, given that much of it can be suspended for over two months during an election. 
5.10. Exempt staff qualifications  
Under an amendment to the Lobbying Act introduced by the Conservative 
Government, political staff are prevented from working as lobbyists for five years after 
leaving government service (Canada Lobbying Act 2008).101 Former senior PMO exempt 
staff member Keith Beardsley said in an interview for this thesis on May 30, 2011 that this 
restriction has had a significant cooling effect on the calibre of people willing to accept 
appointments as political staff in the PMO and in ministers’ offices. Attracting experienced 
political staff was particularly difficult while the government was still in a minority position, 
said the former director of issues management who left the PMO in 2008. 
They [exempt staff] can't do anything that you are good at 
because it is illegal. ... Under minority government...we 
couldn't get people. So most minister’s offices right now 
have one, two and some, maybe three experienced people. 
The rest are right out of university. The biggest supplier of 
ministerial staff right now is the summer intern program. So 
you have got a whole slew of kids who have got the theory, 
but they don't have real-world experience (Rees interview 
with Beardsley May 30, 2011). 
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The youthfulness and inexperience of many PMO staff is evident even following the 
government’s achievement of majority status in May, 2011. Most of those profiled appear 
to be in their twenties and thirties, including several high-ranking staff. Their exact number 
and even their qualifications for the job, are closely guarded secrets. I had previously 
attempted to obtain information about PMO exempt staff through ATI. An ATI request (A-
2009-005511) was sent to the Privy Council Office (PCO) on January 28, 2009 and revised 
on February 11, 2009 at the PCO’s request seeking records in connection with PMO 
exempt staff resumes and details of their appointments. The request was in accordance 
with the records gathered on exempt staff in accordance with the Governor in Council 
Appointments Procedures Guide (November, 2008). Section 2.8. My request listed 92 
current and two previous PMO exempt staff. No records were provided because the PMO 
is exempt from the ATIA. 
Given the lack of official information concerning the talents, experience and 
qualifications required to work for the Harper PMO, I attempted to use less official means 
– primarily social media and news stories about exempt staff, to get a sense of what it 
takes to work for the Harper PMO. After compiling a list of PMO exempt staff listed on the 
GEDs on July 6, 2012, I attempted to collect as much information available online as 
possible for as many of the staff as possible. My primary sources were Facebook, Twitter, 
LinkedIn, the Conservative Party website and news media, especially the Hill Times which 
monitors and reports on Ottawa politics. The GEDS directory for July 6, 2012 showed on 
that date there were 105 exempt staff in the PMO, ranging from interns to the chief of staff. 
Of those, only 66 could be profiled through publically-available information. (See Appendix 
C for the information I collected on each of the exempt staff.) Although far from conclusive, 
some common characteristics and trends were indicated. Very few of the staff hold a 
degree higher than the undergraduate level. It appears that few of the staff profiled held 
graduate degrees, with only two PhD’s found among the 66 political appointees whose 
profiles were available through public sources such as LinkedIn or Facebook, or in news 
stories. Five of the political staff held law degrees, including seconded UBC law professor 
Benjamin Perrin, who held one of the two PhD’s. As noted earlier, he has since returned 
to UBC to teach. Only 15 staff could be identified as holding undergraduate degrees, 
however it is quite possible that more held degrees but simply did not declare it on social 
media profiles such as Facebook and LinkedIn, or that that their education was not noted 
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in news media stories. Of those who held degrees, many had graduated within the past 
five years. This is consistent with the frequently noted youthfulness of PMO employees. 
Among the staff employed in the PMO in July, 2012 were two who had graduated just 
months earlier, including a PMO communications assistant and a PMO junior 
correspondence writer who posted on Twitter that she was watching the Canucks on the 
side of her computer screen while writing her final university paper on comparative politics, 
adding a final tweet which read: STOP THE CLOCK! Paper done after 3. 35 unfocused 
hours. #NEWRECORD #lazycollegesenior (Twitter 6:05 P.M. April 11, 2012).  
5.11. How partisan are political staff? 
It appears the one essential credential for employment in the PMO is evidence of 
prior loyalty to the Conservative Party. This makes sense. Strategic political 
communication staff are essentially working in public relations. Like all public relations 
professionals, and unlike journalists, they owe their loyalty to their employer and no one 
else. 102 In this case their employer is the party in power, not the public who pay their 
salaries. Every staff member I was able to track, showed evidence of an affiliation with the 
Conservative Party prior to their appointment to the PMO, ranging from belonging to a 
campus Conservative club to organizing and raising funds for Conservative Party political 
campaigns. The PMs closest staff were also personally loyal to the PM. Ray Novak, who 
took over the position of chief of staff from the disgraced Nigel Wright, has known Harper 
since his early political career as leader of the Reform Party. Novak, aged 36, is a former 
student of both Harper’s former mentor, campaign manager and University of Calgary 
political science professor Tom Flanagan, and also a former student of the University of 
Calgary, where he also studied with political science professor Ian Brodie who later served 
as a chief of staff in the PMO. Novak, who has a Master’s degree in political science from 
the University of Calgary, lived above the garage at Stornoway when Harper lived there 
as leader of the Opposition.  
Also among the most loyal and powerful political staff to serve in Harper’s PMO is 
Jenni Bryne, who has twice moved between her various high-ranking positions at the PMO 
and the Conservative Party, heading up the election campaigns as director of political 
operations for the Conservatives in both the 2011 and 2015 elections. Her last posting at 
 252 
the PMO was as co-deputy chief of staff, a post she held from August, 2013 to October, 
2014 when she returned to the party as a full-time employee. She had previously held key 
job posts in the PMO, including director of issues management. Bryne, who is reported to 
be in her late 30s, most recently served as deputy chief of staff to Novak. However, as the 
Globe and Mail reported on August 27, 2013  Bryne would continue to serve as chair of 
the 2015 election campaign for the Conservative Party on a “volunteer” basis while 
working in PMO. She was always expected to return to the party to head up the 2015 
election campaign, according to the Globe and Mail.103 Her 2013 reappointments was 
interpreted by Ottawa news media at the time as an indication that the PMO would become 
even more partisan and politically-focused as it gears up for the next election campaign. 
Ms. Byrne previously served as director of issues 
management in the PMO and managed the Conservatives’ 
2011 election campaign, and is known for her partisan style 
and tight message control. She is expected to keep her 
volunteer position as the Conservative Party national 
campaign chair, according to a source – signaling campaign 
preparations will be a priority for Mr. Harper. (MacRael, 
August 27, 2013). 
According to Globe and Mail reporter Kim MacRael another Conservative Party “war room” 
veteran who is returning to the PMO is: “Alykhan Velshi, 29, a bright and fiercely partisan 
former aide to cabinet minister Jason Kenney and an experienced campaign “war room” 
staffer, takes over the job of issues management in Harper’s office…a post that oversees 
the big political picture for the government, sets a direction, and manages issues not just 
as they arise, but as they loom far out on the horizon.” What is absolutely clear is that the 
partisan nature of the PMO, already controversial, is about to become even more so.  
Following Bryne’s return to party election headquarters, Globe and Mail reporter 
Adam Radwanski wrote a lengthy profile detailing her almost two-decade long involvement 
as an organizer for the Ontario and federal Conservative parties. Bryne does not do 
interviews, so Radwanski interviewed about 30 individuals, including everyone from 
personal friends to cabinet ministers who knew her personally or had worked with her. The 
lengthy profile also reflects the level of power Bryne holds in the PMO and in the party: 
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most would only speak anonymously, which Radwanski said reflected her iron-fisted 
control on communication and also the level of power she holds both in the party and in 
the PMO with Harper’s full support. The reporter noted that even cabinet ministers fell into 
line:   
Ms. Byrne yells a lot, but that’s only a part of what makes 
her intimidating. Because she has the PM’s ear, and strong 
influence over personnel decisions, it is well known that 
getting on her bad side can be a career killer. 
Although she tends to go easier on them than she does on 
staffers and backbenchers, she has helped to create an 
atmosphere in which even relatively senior ministers appear 
terrified of venturing from their tightly scripted talking points 
(Radwanski, May 29, 2015). 
The piece presents a picture of a tough, outspoken and often intimidating 
boss who is hyper-partisan and fiercely loyal to both the party and to PM 
Harper who trusts her absolutely in return.  
However, what is perhaps even more significant than Byrne’s tough and 
partisan personality, is the fact that no matter whether she is on the PMO 
payroll or the party payroll she is always serving the Conservative Party’s 
interests in the PMO. As the Globe noted when she returned to the PMO 
in 2013, Bryne continued to work on the Conservative election campaign 
on a “voluntary” basis. Radwanski noted in his profile that Bryne 
continues to attend morning meetings in the PMO between Harper and 
his senior political staff – playing an active role in influencing discussions 
even though she is not officially working for the PMO. 
But during stints in the Prime Minister’s Office, as issues-
management director and a deputy chief of staff, she has 
helped to shape daily messaging. In recent years, even 
when working for the Conservative Party rather than the 
government, she has usually gone to the morning meeting 
between Mr. Harper and his senior staff. The PM sometimes 
turns to her for a gut check, and even when he doesn’t, she 
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often inserts herself into the debate (Radwanski, May 29, 
2015). 
Essentially, Byrne’s presence ensures that the Conservative Party always 
has a seat at the decision-making table in the Harper PMO, which 
reinforces the PM’s own partisan instincts. Whatever issue is up for 
discussion, the Conservative Party influence and interests are front and 
centre.  
5.12.   Political staff and partisan influence on government 
The partisan powers of exempt staff, particularly in the PMO, have been 
questioned by opposition parties. In 2011, then-Liberal leader Bob Rae called the PMO 
political staff “25-year-old Jihadists” who have far too much power for their age and 
experience (Payton February 24, 2011). 104 More recently, they have also come under 
criticism from former Conservative MP Brent Rathgeber, who cited exempt staff inference 
as one of the reasons why he was resigning from the party on June 6, 2013. The Alberta 
MP complained that PMO political staff, whom he described as “masters half my age [who] 
treated Members of Parliament like “trained seals” and undermined their authority as 
elected officials”, including instructing them how to vote 105(Wingrove June 6, 2013). In an 
interview with the Globe and Mail, the newly-independent MP told reporter Josh Wingrove 
he could no longer “stay on script” as written by PMO exempt staff: 
 “I don’t really fit too well in what is the PMO’s model of a 
model backbencher, and that is to read the talking points 
and stay on script,” he said, later adding that, with such 
PMO control, “MPs don’t represent constituents in Ottawa. 
They represent government to constituents.” Mr. 
Rathgeber said that is at odds with the intention of 
parliamentary tradition (Wingrove June 6, 2013). 
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5.13. Chain of command: all roads lead to the PMO 
While each ministry has its own exempt staff who report to their minister, they also 
report to, and take direction from the political staff in the PMO. This is achieved in a number 
of ways: ministerial-exempt staff answer to their chief of staff, who each in turn answer to 
their minister. Ministerial chiefs of staff also answer to the PMO chief of staff, who in turn 
answers to the prime minister, as do cabinet ministers and all other government members 
of Parliament who comprise the government caucus. Further, all ministerial directors, 
including communication, issues management, parliamentary affairs, answer not only to 
their chief of staff but also report to, and take direction from the director of the equivalent 
unit in the PMO. As a result, the PMO director of communications directs the 
communications unit in each of the ministries. Ultimately, all exempt staff report to the 
prime minister and his chief of staff. The centralized hierarchy of exempt staff is a key 
means by which the PMO maintains control of the ministers and their staff, and of all 
ministerial communication.  
Kirsten Kozolanka (2012) points out other ways in which the Conservative PMO 
has moved to gain greater control of all government communications. In addition to the 
MEP process that requires all government officials, including ministers, to seek permission 
to speak to media directly, or to make public appearances and announcements, the 
Conservatives have also has worked to limit information access for parliamentarians and 
for parliamentary committees. She cites the now infamous “two-hundred page manual for 
[Conservative] Members of Parliament on what opposition MP’s said were directions on 
how to “obstruct” and “disrupt” parliamentary committee meetings when the debate 
becomes hostile to government”(p.112). The Conservatives also refused to provide 
Parliament with reports on Afghan detainees, until they were finally ordered to do so by 
the Speaker of the House as a matter of parliamentary privilege. When the documents 
were finally delivered they were heavily redacted. Kozolanka also cities a 2008 
amendment to communication policy concerning approval of public opinion poll research 
for departments, which removed responsibility from the deputy minister – the head public 
servant in any department – and instead made approval the responsibility of the minister, 
increasing the potential for politicization of the process (p.113). Kozolanka writes that 
these various tactics amount to a concerted effort by the Harper Conservatives to control 
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the flow of all government information for its own political promotion thereby gaining a 
considerable and unfair communications advantage over other political parties in the 
process.  
In sum, the Conservative government has more invasive 
control of the Privy Council Office and the communications 
and information apparatus of the public service. It has 
reduced the role of the administrative arm of government to 
service delivery while building its own strategic 
communications apparatus, both within its own political 
office (the PMO) and in its use of the PCO as an adjunct 
office where the political marketing tools of advertising and 
public opinion research are funded and controlled. Although 
they rationalize this in the name of accountability, in so 
doing the Conservatives call into question their commitment 
to their own election platform priority of accountability and 
transparency. This also fosters the condition for an 
enhanced promotional culture within the administration arm 
of government and can be a formidable incumbency 
advantage for the government party. (Kozolanka: p.115). 
Strategic political communication tactics rely on information control (Kozolanka 2012: p. 
112) as a means to manage media and thereby manage what the public is allowed to 
know about how it is governed, or about risk information gathered by government. 
“Message control or “design (6)” includes discredited political techniques of propaganda 
and unjustifiable censorship for political purposes and advantage. It relies on politicization 
of the entire apparatus of government, and in the case of the Stephen Harper Conservative 
government, included controlling media access to government officials, including 
government scientists all of whom must seek permission to speak from ministerial and 
PMO political communications staff, and if granted permission to speak, must do so in 
accordance with tightly scripted guidelines called Message Event Proposals (MEPs) which 
were discussed in the previous chapter. Following the November 4 swearing in of the new 
Liberal government, government scientists were no longer required to request permission 
from political staff before speaking publically, including to members of news media. It is 
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not clear at the time of completing this dissertation whether the entire MEP process will 
be scrapped, or replaced. 
5.14. The traditional chain of command under attack 
Traditionally, in a Westminster parliamentary system of government the executive 
branch, comprised of the PM and cabinet ministers, communicates with the public service 
via the deputy ministers who head the public service in each ministry and department of 
government. The deputy ministers also report to the Clerk of the Privy Council, who meets 
regularly with the prime minister, usually on a daily basis to act as a liaison between the 
executive branch and the public service. Also included in the daily meeting is the PM’s 
chief of staff and other high-ranking members of the PM’s exempt staff who may also 
attend as required by the PM. Similarly, the chiefs of staff and other members of various 
ministers’ political staff also sit in on meetings with the deputy minister of their department. 
Exempt staff may also meet with the deputy minister or the PCO clerk directly without the 
presence of the minister or PM. However, the traditional protocol is that exempt staff will 
not meet with other members of the public service without permission from the Clerk or 
the appropriate deputy minister. According to a number of interviews conducted for this 
dissertation, that traditional model appears to no longer stand, often despite protests from 
the public service. Increasingly, exempt staff are going over the heads of the Clerk and 
deputy minister’s to deal directly with lower-ranking civil servants.  
5.15. New Political Governance and executive branch control 
In an article submitted to the journal Governance shortly before his death in 2011, 
public administration scholar Peter Aucoin coined the term “New Political Governance” 
(NPG) to describe the politicization of the public service by the executive branch of 
government that has accompanied the evolution of Westminster models of public service 
from Weberian public administration models of defined roles, strict and specific regulation, 
hierarchical department accountability, meritorious appointments and ministerial 
responsibility (Savoie 2013). Over the past three decades or more, beginning with British 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, the more traditional public administration model of 
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public service has fallen out of favour and in its place successive governments in Canada, 
Britain and elsewhere, have attempted to make government more efficient by modeling it 
on private business models of management and accountability. The evolution of 
governance in Canada from the public administration model to “New Public Management’ 
(NPM) and later “New Public Governance” approaches has been examined, quite 
critically, by a number of public administration and political science scholars who have 
found significant shortcomings, not the least of which is the politicization of the public 
service, which is now routinely co-opted by the executive branch to carry out partisan 
political work, particularly in the area of communications. Aucoin is brutally frank in 
describing “this politicization I call New Political Governance,” and which he believed had 
taken hold of Canada’s public service, as well as the public services in Britain and 
Australia. He describes the consequences as: “corrupt…at best…sleazy governance; at 
worst, it is a form of political corruption.” 
In contrast to legitimate democratic control of the public 
service by ministers, NPG constitutes a corrupt form of 
politicization to the extent that governments seek to use and 
misuse, even abuse, the public service in the administration 
of public resources and the conduct of public business to 
better secure their partisan advantage over their 
competitors (Campbell 2007). At best, this politicization 
constitutes sleazy governance; at worst, it is a form of 
political corruption that cannot but undermine impartiality 
and, thereby, also management performance to the extent 
that it assumes management based on nonpartisan criteria 
(Aucoin 2012: p.178). 
It is essential to understand the changing roles and mechanisms of power and influence 
inside government that have shifted Canada’s public service from a purely non-partisan 
role, albeit one that supports the party or parties elected to power however political or 
ideological they might be, to one which now is often called on to support the partisan 
political interests of the government of the day.  
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Aucoin’s stark critique builds on the work of fellow public administration and 
political studies scholars in his analysis of the impacts of imposing private business 
management models on government public service. The NPM sought to reform and 
control the public service, in part by making managers – deputy ministers, assistant 
secretaries and associate deputy ministers – more directly accountable to ministers, in the 
same way that top-level managers in private business are directly accountable to the CEO, 
In the case of government, all report to the minister or, increasingly, the prime minister. 
Aucoin explains NPM reform principles: 
Since the early 1980s, public management reform has 
occurred in all of the four Westminster jurisdictions [Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand and Britain] (Aucoin 1995). 
Management reform demanded “rolling back the state” 
(Hood 1991), reasserting political direction and control of the 
bureaucracy, and achieving greater economy and efficiency 
in the management of public resources…The focus was on 
three aspects of management:  
(1) the devolution of management authority (“to let 
managers manage”)  
(2) the separation of policy and management responsibilities 
(to better clarify and specify what ministers wanted from 
managers by way of outputs), and 
(3) the institution of measures to hold managers to account 
for performance in producing the required outputs (“to make 
managers manage”). To the degree that NPM can be said 
to be a coherent model of public administrative reform, 
these were its three major foundations: The focus was on 
improved management performance. And, not surprisingly, 
this focus remains at the forefront…Streamlining central 
management agency government-wide controls, clarifying 
the responsibilities of public service executives for 
management and related operations, and enhancing the 
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ways by which these executives are held to account are the 
principal NPM messages that have stuck (Aucoin 2012: 
180). 
The purpose was to make government more efficient and, in so doing, the hope was to 
streamline government and thereby reduce its size and cost. However, downsizing 
government has proven an elusive, if not impossible goal, with the size of the federal public 
service in Canada increasing by more than one-third between 2001 and 2011, from 
211,915 public employees to 282,955. “The bulk of the growth was in Ottawa-based units 
designed to serve the bureaucracy and accountability requirements, and to manage 
communications and media relations” (Savoie 2013: p.241). However, New Public 
Management/Governance, has succeeded in at least one of its goals – to make public 
service managers more directly accountable to the executive branch, which has also had 
the effect of increasing its political influence on the public service. In this new highly-
politicized system, the managers who are most valued by the executive branch, and 
therefore are most likely to be promoted, are those who are viewed as the most co-
operative, including from a political perspective.  
A number of political science scholars have questioned the growing influence of PMO 
political staff. University of Toronto Professor Emeritus Peter Russell questions whether 
taxpayers should be required to pay for political staff. In his 2008 book Two cheers for 
minority government, Russell wrote that he was “troubled” by both the expense of the 
political staff and by the added influence they afforded the PMO across all levels of 
government, including the offices of cabinet ministers and the public service, in the 
centralization of power in the office of the PM.  
It has long troubled me as a constitutionalist that taxpayers 
foot the bill for the salaries and expenses of a hundred or so 
people whose primary function is to serve the political 
interests of the prime minister and his party. Prime ministers 
and their political advisers will, of course, reply that what is 
good for the PM is good for the government and good for 
the country. That, indeed, is the central tenant of prime-
ministerial government. But the PMO and the centralization 
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of power in the prime minister’s office are not good for 
cabinet or for parliamentary government (Russell, 2008: 
p.104). 
In an interview in Toronto on May 24, 2011, Russell expanded on his concerns 
about both the cost and influence of PMO political staff. “Here you have a mammoth centre 
of power, whose prime purpose is political, no denying that. It is all political. And its 
taxpayers are paying for it.” He pointed out that in the American system of government, 
partisan staff are not paid from the public purse. They are paid by their own party to do 
campaign work, which Russell argues should be the case here:  “Why should it be 
supported by taxpayer’s money? In Washington they have the Committee for the Re-
election of the President. They are down the road from the White House. But it has no tax 
money.” In fairness, the Conservative Party does pay the salaries of staff working on 
election campaigns, in particular around the time of an election. However, increasingly, 
governments are in a permanent campaign mode – monitoring and persuading voters 
between elections to increase their chances of re-election. This is clearly the case in the 
Conservative government of Stephen Harper, where a number of the PMO staff have 
moved back and forth between the Conservative Party during election campaigns, and 
working for the PMO as political strategists between elections. During the 2011 interview, 
Russell challenged the right of an elected government to use public funds to fight political 
campaign, particularly given the lack of transparency and accountability concerning PMO 
staff and their duties.  
How can we ask are we getting our money’s worth? We are 
spending all this money to re-elect the Conservative 
government. How well are you doing. Where are you in the 
polls? Why should we be paying for them to achieve that 
end? Here we have a whole department of government 
which is the very opposite of a level playing field. It is a 
political machine (Russell, May 24, 2011 interview).   
In addition to the expense and lack of transparency, Russell was also concerned that there 
are no clear guidelines governing the roles, responsibilities and jurisdictional limits of 
exempt staff, who increasingly are embedded in the public service to provide political 
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advice on policies and operations, including the processing of ATI requests. The lack of 
regulation is an even greater concern given the increasing influence of PMO staff as power 
is increasingly centralized in the office of the prime minister. In addition to their work in the 
PMO, the prime minister’s political staff vet and direct the actions and decisions of political 
staff working in ministerial offices, particularly when it comes to policy and 
communications. The establishment of a sizeable and influential political staff in the PMO 
is even compromising the principle of ministerial responsibility which is fundamental to the 
Westminster parliamentary system of government, Russell wrote in his 2008 book. 
Cabinet government suffers when the influence of cabinet 
ministers is subject to direction by political staffers from the 
PMO. Cabinet ministers come from Parliament and make 
government responsible to Parliament. Unlike political 
staffers in the PMO, whose only political resource is the 
good opinion of the prime minister, cabinet ministers have 
political and governmental experience, their own 
constituencies, and political resources that are independent 
of the prime minister. Parliamentary government suffers 
when legislation and policy are part of a carefully 
orchestrated political agenda put together in the PMO and 
presented by the prime minister to the country outside of 
Parliament (Russell, 2008: p.104). 
 Russell, a highly-respected constitutional scholar, formed a non-political task force 
of scholars and political experts in 2011 to come up with a code of conduct for political 
staff based on existing models in New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The 
recommended code has not been adopted in Canada. In a follow-up email to our interview, 
Russell said improving the accountability of political staff is essential. But Canadians also 
need to be concerned about the politicization of the PMO and its reliance on advice from 
political staff, rather than on the politically-neutral expertize of the public service. 
At this stage, I think the focus should be on accountability of 
the political staff. The larger question underlying all this is 
the quiet - one might even say stealthy - way Canadian 
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government at least at the federal level has been moving 
from the traditional model of a government led by elected 
politicians supported by a politically neutral public service - 
to the US "to the victor go the spoils model" in which all of 
government at the top is political with the PM being more 
and more like the US President (of course without the 
bugaboo of Congress (Russell, June 11, 2011 email).  
5.16. Partisan interference with political neutrality of public service  
The Public Service Commission, which represents federal government public 
servants, filed a special report to Parliament in 2011 which stressed the importance of 
maintaining the principle of a merit-based, politically neutral civil service. The PSC 
reported that this relationship was being challenged by increasingly direct interaction 
between exempt political staff and public servants which blurred the lines between the 
partisan political interests of the governing party, and the non-partisan role of the public 
service. “Ministerial staff are located “in the space between politics and the public service 
and are appointed at the pleasure of ministers to provide politically partisan advice,” the 
PSC noted. Blurring the lines between the two wings of government – with partisan 
ministerial staff engaging directly with public servants – posed a “significant risk” to the 
principle and practice of political neutrality, the Commission warned Parliament:  
Some of the most significant risks to the non-partisanship of 
the public service stem from real and perceived tension 
regarding appropriate roles and responsibilities between the 
two domains. This partly reflects the fact that the traditional 
relationship between elected officials and the public service 
has been deeply changed by the emergence of influential 
ministerial staff (PSC, 2014: p.22) 
The PSC called on the government to improve training of political staff to provide them 
with a better understanding of their “roles and responsibilities” beyond that provided by 
the Privy Council Office’s Guide for Ministers manual. Just as Russell has called for clearer 
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guidelines for political staff, so too has the PSC. Specifically, the PSC called for clearer 
guidelines concerning their interactions with the public service. “Better guidance to 
ministerial staff about their interactions with the public service is also necessary and would 
encourage mutual understanding and respect between the two spheres,” The 
Commission’s report called for “Code of Conduct” guidelines similar to the codes which 
had already been adopted by the British Cabinet Office in June 2010, and by the Australian 
government executive branch in 2008. It pointed out that in the Australian code, political 
staff were prevented from dealing directly with public servants: “Australia expressly states 
that ministerial staff do not have the authority to direct public servants in their own right 
and cannot make executive decisions” (PSC 2011: 22).  
In an interview on June 2, 2011 Maria Barrados, who was then president and chair 
of the Public Service Commission of Canada (PSC), said protecting the political neutrality 
and independence of federal public servants is a key concern for the commission, which 
represents all federal public servants. (Note: Exempt staff are not members of the PSC.) 
The commission answers to Parliament, as does independent officers such as the 
Information Commissioner and the Auditor General, and not to the prime minister or other 
members of the executive branch. One of the reasons the commission was set up to 
oversee hiring and regulation of Canada’s federal bureaucracy was to end appointments 
by ministers, which threatened the political neutrality of the public service. “The idea was 
that you would have a politically neutral public service because you would control it 
through the staffing system. As time went on it became a public service based on merit 
and non-partisan with other obligations added on the non-partisan,” said Barrados, who 
served as head of the PSC for eight years before retiring in December, 2011. Originally, 
guidelines on political neutrality were so strict that public servants were not allowed to run 
for public office, but that was overturned by the Supreme Court in 1991106, said Barrados. 
However, public servants are required to step down from their jobs while running for 
federal or provincial public office. The PSC’s 2011 special report was concerned with 
politicization of the public service, including in countries such as Britain and Canada which 
share a Westminster form of government:  
There is always a tension between the non-partisanship of 
a professional public service and the need for a public 
service to respond effectively and loyally to the direction of 
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elected officials. In the Westminster tradition, we expect a 
clear demarcation between the political and public service 
spheres. However, politicization of the public service has 
become a growing phenomenon in many countries in recent 
years. As a leading international scholar in the field, Ezra 
Suleiman, describes it, bureaucracies are increasingly 
regarded as being solely the instrument of the political party 
in power and they are being transformed accordingly, 
increasingly deprived of the relative autonomy that they 
have historically enjoyed (PSC, Section 4.51). 
The report found that while promotion of public servants sympathetic to a particular party 
was one means of politicization, other factors, including increasing numbers of political 
staff or exempt staff were much more influential. Growing responsibility on the part of 
public servants to vet and manage communications with the public were also key factors 
interfering with political neutrality, according to the report. It blamed “increases in the 
number of ministerial staff and their influence on the work of the public service, the 
adoption of public management principles, the over-responsiveness of public servants to 
the priorities of the government-of-the-day and a growing role for public servants in 
tailoring and communicating public messages” (Section 4.52). Barrados said there have 
been ongoing issues with political exempt staff directing public servants to carry out tasks 
of a partisan nature, which caused tension between the two, especially if the public servant 
objected. “It wasn’t really so much the public servant deciding to do something partisan, it 
was a public servant taking direction from the minister’s office, which was partisan 
direction. Certainly in discussions I have had [with public servants] there is a real tension 
between ministerial staff and the public service,” said Barrados. She suggested that a 
partial solution might be for the executive branch to draw up a “code” for exempt staff 
which would provide clearer guidelines on appropriate interactions with the public service. 
Protecting the political neutrality of public servants is also a primary responsibility 
for the Clerk of the Privy Council and deputy ministers, said former Clerk of the Privy 
Council Mel Cappe, who served in that capacity under the Liberal government of Jean 
Chretien. The Clerk and deputy ministers should act as a bridge between the political 
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executive branch and the politically-neutral public service, Cappe said in an interview 
conducted in Toronto on May 24, 2011. “These people [the clerk and deputy 
ministers]…understand what it means to bridge between the political and non-political. 
They can stay non-political. But they understand that as senior advisors they are expected 
to be sensitive to the political,” said Cappe. The Clerk in particular meets with the PM on 
a daily basis to discuss policies and directives and also to give advice, even to argue 
another position if necessary or appropriate. Similarly, deputy ministers work closely with 
the minister and his or her political staff, although they too are only accountable to the PM, 
said Cappe. “So the role of the deputy minister and the Clerk is to make these judgements 
of what is political and what wasn’t. And to be able to play when it is appropriate and be 
the conscience of the political decision-maker. And argue the other side of everything…I 
felt it was my obligation to present the other side of every assumption or presumption,” 
said Cappe.  
However, while the Clerk and deputy ministers work closely with political actors, 
Cappe was wary of allowing political staff to approach public servants directly, although 
he acknowledged that it had become increasingly common even under the Liberal 
governments he served as clerk. Cappe said he would allow chiefs of staff – the top 
political aides in each ministry and in the PMO – to contact public servants, but only after 
seeking his permission in advance. He said it was also appropriate for political staff below 
the chief of staff level to contact public servants at the level of assistant deputy minister 
(ADM) “because an assistant deputy minister has to know how to handle an exempt staff 
person.” But Cappe was opposed to political staff contacting any public servant below that 
level, for any purpose. Nor would he happily tolerate ministers calling public servants 
directly, even if they wanted to express their displeasure. His rule for political staff and 
ministers alike was: “you are not allowed to call down into the organization.” He admits 
that the rule was often ignored and he would then call the chief of staff responsible before 
the minister to complain. “I would go back in front of the minister and tell the chief of staff, 
I don’t want your staff calling into my department. If you want something you ask the ADMs 
or me and we will get it,” he said. The whole point was to protect the political neutrality of 
the public service so that they could make decisions professionally and based on their 
expertise. He said he blamed ministers for allowing political staff to ignore jurisdictions. 
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Often it is the minister who fails to either understand or respect the need for political 
neutrality of the public service, said Cappe. 
A minister is responsible for the statements of their exempt 
staff. So if they go into a department, and the problem is, 
they don’t know the boundaries. So I can tell you about 
dozens, dozens of occasions when one of my staff would 
come to me and say ‘I have been told that the minister wants 
this. And I would say…you don’t work for them. You work 
for me. Don’t do it. That is a direct order.  
As with Barrados, Cappe was, in effect, arguing for better guidelines and greater clarity 
about what is appropriate in terms of interactions between the political wing of government 
and the public service. However, that is not the direction the federal government has taken.  
It is worth noting that the newly-elected Liberal government of Prime Minister Justin 
Trudeau issued a memorandum called Open and Accountable Government on November 
27, 2015 which appears to limit interactions between exempt staff and public servants 
involved in departmental operations. Section 11.4 contains the following instruction for 
ministers: “ministerial “political” or “exempt” staff shall provide advice that can address the 
political aspects of the Minister’s functions but do not play a role in departmental 
operations.” It is not clear at this point exactly how, if at all, this will limit the role of exempt 
staff, but it would seem to be intended to limit the role of exempt staff to political matters, 
and leave the bureaucrats to manage operations (Trudeau, November 27, 2015).  
5.17. Redefining political neutrality of the public service 
The politicization of government communication through ministerial oversight has 
had the undeniable effect of undermining all government communications, as Thomas has 
argued. Perhaps, most importantly it makes mockery of any expectation that the public 
service is politically-neutral, if by that it is understood that the public service does not do 
political work. Increasingly, bureaucrats are also responsible for helping the governing 
party manage their political image with news media. In fact, the public service’s mandate 
sets them up for political manipulation as a condition of employment. In a 2009 paper on 
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the legal and moral status of Canada’s public service, Ralph Heintzman identifies a key 
problematic concerning the public service’s vulnerability to political influence on the part 
of the party in power. The issue of political interference has surfaced as a significant 
problem in areas such as Access to Information law, where the same public officials 
charged with adjudicating the release or withholding of government records requested by 
members of the public are simultaneously charged with identifying political fallout for the 
minister whose department or actions are brought under scrutiny, or for the PMO which 
otherwise is able to control the flow of information about its government and operations.  
The problem, according to Heintzman, lies with the definition of political neutrality 
as it applies to the duties of public servants. The common-sense understanding of political 
neutrality is that an individual – in this case a public servant – will not perform duties or 
activities that are partisan in nature. We would therefore expect that public servants would 
not be called on to write media lines intended to arm their minister against politically-
harmful questioning by news media that might arise, for example, from records released 
under ATIA. That assumption would be incorrect on two fronts: first, as explained in 
Chapter 4, public servants are routinely required to produce media lines for political rather 
than institutional purposes in connection with contentious ATI requests, which they must 
also flag as politically-sensitive for members of the executive branch and their political 
staffs. So the assumption that it doesn’t happen is false, it does. However, according to 
Heintzman, it would be incorrect to interpret such a development as an indication that the 
public servants are as a result in violation of their oaths of political neutrality. The reason 
is that public servants have adopted a different definition of the terms of their political 
neutrality. Heintzman explains that public servants are neutral in the sense that they must 
switch their loyalties to the party in power when one party replaces another in government. 
So they are neutral in the sense that they are mandated to support whatever party is in 
power. Heintzman (p.3-4) 
The public service is obviously an integral part of the 
executive. It is not independent. But it is also obviously not 
part of the political executive: it is chosen differently, it has 
different functions, legal status, powers, constraints and 
values. So what is the relationship between the two, 
properly conceived?...it is very important to understand what 
 269 
a neutral public service means in these [court] decisions. It 
means a public service that is responsive to the agenda of 
the duly-elected, democratic government, and not to some 
other agenda, either another political agenda, or an agenda 
of its own (p. 3-6) 107 
This definition of political neutrality as switching loyalties to the party in power raises 
another question about whether or not public servants – if they are required to support the 
political interests of the party in power – are in fact also capable of serving the interests of 
the public, which is also their mandate. Again it comes down to a question of definitions, 
as Heintzman explains. Public servants are required to see the party in power as both a 
demonstration and manifestation of the “democratic will.” Therefore, by this definition, 
whatever serves the public’s representatives, in the form of the party granted the power to 
govern, in effect also serves the public’s interest, according to Heintzman.  
In other words, what these cases establish is not the 
independence of the public service, but its opposite, i.e. the 
public interest in having a public service responsive to 
democratic will. These cases declare that the public interest 
requires a public service that can be trusted to execute 
democratic decision-making faithfully, and not substitute for 
it some other definition of the public interest (p. 5).108 
By this definition the public service demonstrates political neutrality by switching political 
loyalties when a new party is elected to power, something akin to serial monogamy. 
Further, by this logic, despite the fact that the public service is co-opted to serve the 
political interests of the party in power, it can claim to also be serving the public’s interest 
because the party that wins the most votes in an election – whether it is a majority of voters 
or not – represents the public’s interest because its election is a demonstration of the will 
of the public.  
The fundamental flaw in this approach to governance is an underlying assumption 
that the political interests of the party in power and that of the public are one. It is clearly 
not. Governing parties often act in ways that work against the public interest, and arguably 
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seldom more so than in the use of strategic political communication practices intended to 
keep the party in power by keeping the public in the dark about the realities of governance 
and government practices. When this happens, there is little that a public servant can do. 
There is no legal institutional mechanism for a public servant to challenge the political 
communication practices of government, which as Chapter 6 shows, is entirely under the 
control of the executive branch. What it means for citizens, is that they cannot rely on 
public servants to inform them based on what is in the public’s interest, if to do so conflicts 
with supporting the political interests of the executive branch of the party in power. And 
that most certainly undermines public confidence and trust in government communication 
processes. That mistrust is legitimate, and often shared by the civil servants who are 
limited by the government of the day in terms of what public information they are allowed 
to share with the public. 
In contrast to the executive branch which is increasingly exempt from 
accountability measures such as ATIA, internal accountability measures directed at 
controlling the bureaucracy, particularly how it communicates with the public, have 
strengthened. This has happened as a direct result of the increasing powers of the 
executive branch, which have become centralized in the prime minister’s office (Savoie). 
It is important to note that the strength of internal accountability measures governing the 
actions and decisions of bureaucrats, are considered by many public administration 
scholars to be effective in the Canadian experience (Aucoin, Savoie, Franks), and some 
argue that they may even be excessive (Jarvis and Thomas 2011). But they are 
increasingly insufficient in terms of containing or controlling the risks of abuse of powers 
by elected representatives, particularly the executive. Even if the public service disagrees 
with government communication practices, it has no legal or professional right to challenge 
the executive branch, even if the communication practice or decision is damaging to the 
public’s interest. Increasingly, all government communications, including once-routine 
public service information-sharing, is controlled by political appointees working for the 
executive branches of government.  
The powers of the executive branch over bureaucratic agencies was demonstrated 
in Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s decision to end Statistics Canada’s long-form census 
questionnaire, which was regarded as an essential source of information in planning for 
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numerous government social service expenditures. Statistics Canada strongly opposed 
the change, but the only means open of demonstrating their opposition publically was for 
the president of Statistics Canada to resign in protest, which he did. 
5.18. Conclusion 
The case study of communication in Stephen Harper’s Prime Minister’s Office 
(PMO) illustrates the effect of centralization of communication under the control of a highly-
partisan PMO. As I have shown, this has resulted in an emphasis on control of authentic 
information through SPC tactics. The intent and result of this control is intended to avoid 
the risk of blame which might prove politically-damaging, and to claim credit for the 
governing party as a means to enhance political advantage. As with traditional 
propaganda methods, SPC practices such as those employed by the executive branch of 
Canada’s federal government, distort the reality of governance by seeking primarily to 
create an overly favourable public image of those who hold power. The effect is to limit 
and even prevent the public from understanding how they are governed, which 
undermines democracy. The politicization process so profoundly alters the government 
communication landscape that it requires a reconsideration of traditional understanding of 
political communication and transparency. Habermas points out that political 
communication is often construed as “a mechanism for the enhancement of co-operative 
leaning and collective problem-solving” (2006: p.414). Transparency in this context refers 
to a balanced and open flow of meaningful information about government for the public’s 
enlightenment and benefit. An example of transparent political communication in this 
context might, for example, refer to Stats Canada data or to a government department 
which voluntarily posts voluminous information about its public services and regulations 
on an Internet website. The implication is that government will act as a politically neutral 
information agent which provides extensive data and other forms of useful information for 
the public on a variety of governance programs and policies, and therefore enhances 
public knowledge about governance which enhances deliberative dialogue in the public 
sphere. There are exceptions, such as the annual reports from departments on issues 
such as budgets which do involve the risk of blame and negative public accountability. 
However, in terms of volume, the vast majority of information released by government is 
blame neutral, and may even generate credit for the government. By contrast, information 
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that involves “blame risk” could result in the responsible actors being called to negative 
account by the public, which includes news media, special interest groups and members 
of opposition parties.  
If transparency is determined and thereby controlled by the partisan players of the 
executive branch, and, or by, a politically-compromised (Aucoin, Heintzman) bureaucracy 
it is likely to avoid the risk of blame resulting from being held accountable. As has already 
been established, the executive branch has almost complete control over what 
government information will be made public in Canada. While disclosure laws such as the 
ATIA are intended, and occasionally succeed, in forcing transparency and accountability, 
political interference in the ATI process, including years-long delays in providing records, 
means that it has become an increasingly weakened tool for transparency in the Canadian 
federal government. The other avenues for uncontrolled public access to blame-risk 
information is through officers of Parliament, opposition parties, journalists or 
whistleblowers. The latter are government insiders who decide to break their oath of 
confidentiality and risk termination of employment or worse since there is no protection for 
federal public servants who break ranks and report abuses of power directly to the public. 
Their impact on transparency is therefore limited and sporadic, rather than routine and 
systematic.  
Transparency can be said to apply to information that carries no blame-risk 
potential, such as public service information and announcements that tell the public about 
a safety issue, service or entitlement. Almost all other information is controlled and 
compromised by partisan influence, whether directly through partisan political staff, or 
through politically compromised bureaucrats. That means that blame-risk information, in 
particular where the blame has political ramifications for the executive branch, largely 
remains under partisan political control and will simply not become transparent on a 
routine basis. Transparency itself is therefore controlled by partisan actors and 
compromised bureaucrats, subject only to the limited exceptions referred to above. 
Transparency applies when accountability is unlikely, or when credit (Hood) for those 
responsible is expected as a result. Transparency is resisted or denied when negative 
accountability or the risk of blame exists (Hood). Therefore, when “blame-risk” information 
is left almost entirely under the control of partisan interests and influences, as is the case 
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with “muzzled” or politically compromised public service, transparency and accountability 
are effectively delinked. Delinking the elected government from blame-risk accountability, 
and linking it instead to credit-generating information are primary tasks for partisan 
strategic political communication actors appointed by the executive branch to manage 
what the public is allowed to know about how it is represented.  
5.19. Postscript 
This case study began with the election of Stephen Harper and the Conservative 
Party on January 23, 2006 and was completed shortly before the October 19, 2015 federal 
election which saw them removed from office. It does not deal with the election, nor does 
it deal with the political communication policies and decisions of the new Liberal 
government of Justin Trudeau. However, there was an incident on election night which 
perhaps best sums up Stephen Harper’s personal approach to political communication. 
When it was clear that his party would be reduced to the status of opposition party, Harper, 
who won his own riding of Calgary Heritage, took to the podium to concede the loss of 
power. He thanked his family, his volunteers and supporters. What he did not say was that 
he had already notified the party that he would step down immediately as leader. The 
Toronto Star reported that two sources close to the former prime minister said Harper did 
not want to publically announce his resignation because he did not want “that to be the 
sound-bite that lived on in every post-election story about his legacy for years to come” 
(MacCharles & Benzie, October 20, 2015). The reporters added: “A message control freak 
in government, [Harper] moved to control how his last speech would be covered by the 
media in refusing to utter the words that he was quitting as Conservative leader.” There is 
no question that Stephen Harper is an extraordinarily secretive and controlling personality 
when it comes to political communication. However, it would be wrong to assume that he 
alone was responsible for the excesses of secrecy and message control that characterised 
his party’s time in office. Rather, the perfect storm was created when Harper’s secretive 
and controlling style of management was reinforced by the ongoing and increasing 
centralization of power in the hands of the prime minister (Savoie), and was further 
enabled by the existing culture of secrecy inside government which is the focus of the next 
chapter. 
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Sustaining Secrecy: Executive branch resistance to 
Canada’s Access to Information Act 
Note: Much of this chapter was previously published by UBC Press in 2012 as 
the lead chapter in a book titled Brokering Access: Power, Politics, and Freedom of 
Information Process in Canada. Some updates have been included in this version.109 
On June 27, 2013 Canada’s Information Commissioner Suzanne Legault took the 
unusual step of writing an opinion piece for the Toronto Star in which she called for the 
“modernization” of Canada’s Access to Information Act, which would celebrate its 30 th 
anniversary as law a few days later on July 1. As an officer of Parliament, Legault files 
both annual reports on the state of access to information (ATI) in Canada, and also special 
reports on any ATI issue she deems of sufficient significance to warrant Parliament’s 
attention. While Legault uses the official channel to make her concerns about the act 
known, her direct appeal to the public through the Toronto Star, critical rather than 
celebratory in tone on the 30th anniversary of Canada’s disclosure law, is an indication of 
the level of concern the commissioner’s office has for the effectiveness of Canada’ aging 
and diminished disclosure law. Legault cited a startling statistic about the once ground-
breaking piece of legislation which was among the first disclosure acts in the world when 
it was passed into law in 1983. 
There was a time when much of the world looked to 
Canada as a leader in access legislation. Let me share a 
sobering statistic with you. According to an international 
survey conducted by the Centre for Law and Democracy, 
we now rank 55th out of 93 nations.  
Legault pointed to the fact that the executive branch of government is no longer 
covered by ATIA – the result of court battles by the executive branch of three successive 
governments who argued that they should not face public scrutiny under the law. 
Currently, Canada’s disclosure law does not cover the House of Commons, including the 
offices of members of Parliament (MPs), the Senate, and the highest executive offices in 
the country: The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and Minister’s Offices (MO). As a result, 
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Canadian citizens are unable to use the ATIA to request records from any of those offices. 
They operate behind a wall of secrecy. Legault called on government to increase 
openness and accountability by extending the act to cover records held in the offices of 
elected representatives.   
This is in some part due to the limited coverage of the act. I 
have long advocated for the adoption of a principled 
approach to the coverage of the Access to Information Act, 
one that is steeped in openness and accountability, two 
fundamental values embedded in the act. I have also been 
and continue to be in favour of bringing all institutions 
funded by taxpayers’ dollars, in whole or in part, under the 
act. That means the House of Commons and the Senate, 
ministers and their offices, and the Prime Minister’s 
Office…If Parliament is serious about transparency and 
accountability, it must not only proactively disclose much 
more information regarding the expenses and allocations of 
parliamentarians, it must also subject itself to the Access to 
Information Act (Legault 2013, June 27). 
In an interview just over a week later on June 6, 2013 with CBC Radio’s The House, 
Legault went even further in challenging the Harper Conservative government for its 
handling of ATI over the past five years since 2006, when it was first elected to government 
in large part on a promise of greater public government accountability including a 
strengthening of the ATIA. The host of the program played a clip of Harper’s promise, as 
leader of the Opposition, to reform and strengthen ATI if his Conservative Party were to 
be elected: 
The first piece of legislation I will introduce will be the 
Federal Accountability Act. It will open the windows with 
long-overdue reforms to Access to Information laws in this 
country, said Harper. (Cited by CBC, The House: July 6, 
2013) 
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Following the clip, Legault was asked if Prime Minister Harper had kept his promise to 
strengthen ATI. She answered unequivocally: “No. The promise has not been kept.”  
However, Legault also pointed out that Prime Minister Harper and his government were 
not alone in promising to strengthen ATI while in opposition and then failing to live up to 
the promise once in office: 
It is popular for opposition parties to say they will look in to, 
but once in power it is not necessarily a piece of legislation 
that political parties want to open (Legault, July 6, 2013). 
The state of ATI in Canada is relevant to this thesis because it is, or should be, an 
important component of ensuring citizens have access to government records that 
facilitate the ability to legitimate representation through public scrutiny and accountability 
of government.  
In 2014, Supreme Court Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin gave a speech on the 
importance of openness in the justice system at the annual international Rule of Law 
conference, which was held in London. In her opening remarks, the chief justice noted the 
“open court principle is a venerable principle, deeply rooted in western consciousness,” 
citing 19th century philosopher Jeremy Bentham on the importance of transparency, which 
he describes as “publicity”: 
Where there is no publicity there is no justice. Publicity is 
the very soul of justice. It is the keenest spur to exertion 
and the surest of all guards against improbity. It keeps the 
judge himself while trying under trial (McLachlin, January 
8, 2014: p.1).110 
McLachlin noted that an “open justice” system is essential “so citizens know how justice 
is being rendered”. But it is not enough to simply know that justice is being served, how it 
is being served also matters. McLachlin’s purpose in quoting Bentham was also to point 
out that informed citizens play a crucial role in checking the powers of the court and 
ensuring that it operates according to the rule of law. “Courts must be open and reasons 
for judgment public so that the litigants, the media, legal scholars and ultimately the 
general public may follow, scrutinize and criticize what is done in the name of justice,” 
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Canada’s chief magistrate argued.(McLachlin, 2014: p.2). While McLachlin was 
specifically referring to the justice system, informed citizens serve the same corrective role 
when it comes to checking that the rule of law prevails in the country’s courts. Supreme 
Court Justice Gerald La Forest in his landmark 1997 decision concerning an ATIA court 
challenge argued that the federal disclosure law served a parallel purpose to an open 
court in terms of allowing the public to see how governance is done. La Forest ruled that 
a primary purpose of the ATIA was to inform citizens so that they may scrutinize the work 
of government and hold it to account. La Forest argued that the purpose of “access to 
information is to facilitate democracy.”  
It does so in two related ways. It helps to ensure first, that 
citizens have the right to information required to participate 
meaningfully in the democratic process, and secondly, that 
politicians remain accountable to the citizenry (Dagg vs. 
Canada: Minister of Finance, 1997). 111  
Disclosure laws, such as Canada’s ATI, allow citizens to challenge the legitimacy of 
secrecy. Disclosure laws do not trump secrecy, but they do ensure that government 
information is held in secret only if that is in accordance with the exemptions and 
exclusions prescribed by the Access law. Or at least that is how disclosure law should 
work. But that is not the case in Canada.  
In an interview for this thesis in Ottawa on May 31, 2011, Legault said that rather 
than gaining strength, Canada’s ATIA has grown less and less effective with longer delays, 
and less scope for the law – in particular following the 2011 Supreme Court decision to 
exclude the offices of members of Parliament, the Office of the Prime Minister and the 
offices of cabinet ministers from ATI – and also due to increasingly blatant political 
influence in the ATI process. Then as now, Legault did not lay the blame simply on the 
Conservative government.  
It is not just a Conservative minority government, it has gone 
steadily down year after year. That is counter-intuitive. You 
would think that an Access to Information regime, as it 
matures, would produce more disclosure. … You would 
think that, intuitively, you would find a culture would develop 
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into a more open culture. That doesn’t seem to be what is 
happening. (Legault, Interview May 31, 2011). 
As this chapter will show, the erosion of Canada’s disclosure law has been gradual but 
continuous since the act was introduced to Parliament in 1982. This chapter considers the 
history and status of government information access and control in Canada, from the 
perspective of the legitimacy of the public’s right to know how they are represented. By 
any measure, Canada’s disclosure law fails to respect, let alone facilitate, the democratic 
right to legitimate government through access to authentic and meaningful information 
about representation. The first question considered here is, why has access to government 
information become progressively more limited by successive governments over the past 
30 years.  
6.1. Resisting citizen understanding through the Access to Information 
Act in Canada 
The executive branches of every government since the ATIA was passed into law 
in 1983 have continued to resist the transparency and public accountability of government 
intended by the disclosure law. It is not enough that the executive branch operates in 
secret and outside of the ATIA. What governing parties refuse to accept, are the limits ATI 
places on government information control. Governments resist ATI because by increasing 
government transparency and limiting secrecy, it effectively limits the executive branches’ 
ability to strategically control political communication between government and the people. 
ATIA is the breach in the secrecy wall that has for more than a century protected not only 
legitimate state secrets, but has also served to protect the political interests of government 
in managing the flow of information between government and citizens. ATI poses a risk to 
the political interests of the party in power; first by limiting its control over information about 
governance, and second because requesters – particular media and members of 
opposition parties – often use ATI to target contentious records that are intended to hold 
government accountable and potentially cause political damage. It is a political risk that 
successive governments have proven unwilling to accept. ATIA challenges the normative 
Canadian governance paradigms of secrecy and information control, a limit on the powers 
of office that the executive branch continues to resist.    
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   ***** 
I want to talk today about the kind of secrecy that is 
pervasive today in many democratic societies. Let me be 
clear: this secrecy is a far cry from that pursued by the 
totalitarian states that have marred the century that is 
drawing to a close. Yet this secrecy is corrosive: it is 
antithetical to democratic values, and it undermines 
democratic processes. It is based on a mistrust between 
those governing and those governed; and at the same 
time, it exacerbates that mistrust.  
(Joseph E. Stiglitz (1999) On Liberty, the Right to Know, 
and Public Discourse: The Role of Transparency in Public 
Life, Paper presented at the Oxford Amnesty Lecture: 2) 
Canada was just the eighth country in the world to guarantee citizens the right to 
request secret government records in accordance with disclosure law when it passed the 
ATIA on Canada Day, 1983. ATIA was an important but limited victory for transparency 
and open government, with the executive branch ensuring that it would be largely exempt 
from the law’s jurisdiction and scope. The ATIA was first introduced to Parliament in 1982, 
the same year that Canada implemented a Charter of Rights and Freedoms. But ATI was 
not enshrined as a Charter right of citizens that would be forever guaranteed. Instead, and 
perhaps as a result, the law has been resisted and undermined by successive 
governments since it was introduced. Passage of the ATIA into law was delayed for a year 
until the governing Liberal Party of Pierre Elliot Trudeau secured the exclusion of Cabinet 
from ATIA jurisdiction (Section 69).   
Even this watered-down version of the law would prove a greater challenge to the 
powers of public office than successive executive branches of government were prepared 
to accept. Resistance to the ATIA has taken a number of forms: successful court 
challenges of ATI jurisdiction over records in the offices of the prime minister and cabinet 
ministers; and the introduction of supposedly temporary anti-terrorism amendments which 
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eight years later still provide ministers with the right to veto the release of records which 
otherwise qualify to be made public. In addition to limiting the scope of the law, the federal 
government has also succeeded in limiting access rights through political interference in 
the processing of ATI requests. The ongoing campaign to restore executive branch powers 
of secrecy by attacking ATI has succeeded in weakening the law, and has left Canadians 
with fewer access to information rights today than on that promising Canada Day almost 
three decades ago.  
The key question concerning the status of federal access to information rights in 
Canada is not whether the law has been weakened by the executive branch. That is a 
matter of public record. Every government since 1982 has resisted the ATIA. The question 
that is the focus of this chapter is why successive governments in Canada have worked 
to restrict the public’s right of access to government information under ATI. The answer 
lies in the threat that ATI poses to the once-unchallenged right of the executive branch to 
control the dissemination of information, and thereby to control what the public is allowed 
to know about how the powers of public office are exercised. ATIA challenges executive 
branch information control by allowing citizens to legally request otherwise secret 
government records that may result in public scrutiny and accountability, regardless of the 
political damage that might occur as a result. The only legal requirement for release of 
information is that the records requested are qualified to be made public under the ATIA. 
This does not mean that every secret record can be obtained under ATI. Far from it. 
Records related to national security or other public interests will be denied, and will remain 
secret. However, qualified records must be released upon request in accordance with the 
law, rather than in accordance with the wishes of the executive branch. That puts ATIA in 
direct conflict with the historical right of Canada’s executive branch to control government 
information.   
6.2. ATIA: a history 
Canada’s ATIA is intended to serve as a counter-balance to secrecy laws such as 
the Security of Information Act that was introduced in 1939 as a replacement for the Official 
Secrets Act. But ATIA did not end secrecy laws, and in fact protected the core principles 
of the 1939 Security Measures Act on issues of national security and international affairs 
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as exempt from the ATIA. The law did however make one profound difference to the 
powers of the executive branch by limiting its ability to apply secrecy provisions without 
challenge. Prior to ATI, the executive branch had an absolute right of government 
information control. That meant that in addition to using secrecy provisions to protect the 
public’s interest in issues such as national security, the executive branch could also use 
secrecy to censor and suppress any government information that might serve its own 
political interests. ATIA set legal limits on secrecy – too many limits in terms of making the 
executive branch exempt – but at least secrecy was determined by the law. According to 
Donald Rowat, the federal disclosure law was also intended to address growing calls from 
academics and members of the public for more “participatory democracy [which]… implies 
a better-informed public with greater access to information” (As cited by Blacked Out 
2006b: 282). Trudeau told Parliament that the law would result in “effective participation 
of citizens and organizations in the taking of public decisions” (As cited by Roberts Blacked 
Out 2006b:87). However, the Liberals insisted on adding extensive secrecy protections for 
the executive branch prior to passing the law. In his review of the legislation twenty years 
later, Information Commissioner John Reid, who was a cabinet minister in the Liberal 
government at the time the ATIA was passed by Parliament, complained that the changes 
made by the Trudeau government had in effect allowed the executive branch to continue 
to work in secret. The law does not apply to Cabinet confidences, nor would the 
Information commissioner have the right to intercede if Cabinet records were denied. 
Section 69 of the ATIA also excludes memos which “present proposals or 
recommendations...discussion papers the purpose of which is to present background 
explanations, analysis of problems or policy options... agenda or records recording 
deliberations” as well as briefings for ministers or records of “communications or 
discussions between ministers.” The only exception to this exclusion is for decisions of 
Cabinet made in public, or on decisions where at least four years have passed (Reid 2003; 
ATIA 1983).  
From the outset, Canada’s disclosure law was flawed by excessive secrecy 
protections for the executive branch. K.G. Robertson describes Canada’s ATIA as a light 
and less effective version of the American Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) introduced 
in 1966. 
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The Canadian elite did not have a uniform attitude to the 
introduction of FOI and demanded a degree of ‘protection’, 
for the process of government, hence the exclusion of 
consultative and cabinet papers, for the core political 
process. We can see that Canada has implemented a 
version of ‘freedom of information’ but by no means the full, 
radical vision, contained in ideals such as open 
government…the way in which Canada implemented the 
ideal is very much conditioned by its history and 
circumstances (Robertson 1999: p.130). 
While the government could not turn back the tide of public opinion in favour of 
greater transparency in government, the executive branches – in particular the PMO – of 
every government since 1983 has worked to strengthen the executive branch “immunity” 
(McCamus as cited by Robertson 1999: 130) from ATI. This effectively prevents public 
scrutiny of those who occupy Canada’s highest elected office. The result has been 
described by John McCamus as “the most secretive executive privilege rules to be found 
in the western world” (p. 130).  
Despite its serious limitations, ATI represented a radical departure from Canada’s 
history of official secrecy laws that had previously provided the executive branch with 
absolute control over what information would be made public, and what information would 
remain secret. ATIA offered the only challenge other than the courts to the otherwise 
absolute powers of the executive branch to determine what records remain confidential. It 
does so by forcing the release of requested information based on the law, rather than 
depending on the good will or political agenda of government officials. However, in 
practice, the law does little to break the executive branches’ right through secrecy laws to 
act as the sole arbiter in government of what information can be made public. This is all 
the more the case following a Supreme Court decision on May 13, 2011 that would finally 
declare the executive branch – PMO and Minister’s Offices – excluded from the act. The 
ruling was ten years in the making and stemmed from an opposition party researcher’s 
request under ATI to examine the daily agendas of then-Liberal Prime Minister Jean 
Chrétien. Rather than turn over the agendas, which would have shown who met with the 
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PM on a daily basis, Chrétien turned to the courts. The court battle would move through 
five levels of courts, including the Federal Court and the Federal Appeals Court, before 
finally being heard by the Supreme Court of Canada. Each level of appeal was supported 
by the prime minister of the day. Following Chrétien, who led the fight to have the executive 
branch exempted from the law, the court appeal was carried on by his successor, Liberal 
PM Paul Martin. Following his election in 2006, Conservative PM Stephen Harper also 
elected to continue the appeal. The decision was all the more cynical given that it was a 
researcher for Harper’s then-Reform Party, who had filed the original ATI request for the 
agendas while the party was in opposition. Protecting the executive branch from public 
scrutiny under ATI clearly becomes an all-party priority once in power. In what might well 
be one of its most puzzling rulings, the Supreme Court agreed with lower court rulings that 
under the language of the ATIA: “the PMO and the relevant ministerial offices are not part 
of the “government institution” for which they are responsible,” (2011 SCC 25) and were 
therefore excluded from the act. The law requires that records be in the possession of a 
government institution in order to be covered by the disclosure law. If the PMO and 
minister’s office are not government institutions, then records from those offices are not 
covered, and therefore not accessible through ATI.   
In an interview in Ottawa on June 1, 2011 former Information Commissioner John 
Reid, who initiated the court case when the request for the agendas were denied, said that 
the decision seriously weakens and undermines Canada’s federal disclosure law by 
creating a “black hole” for government information by denying access to any records held 
in minister’s office or in the PMO. 
This is a rollback. And it is a rollback that is serious 
because what it does by taking the head of an institution 
out of the loop and making it all but impossible to get into 
that office; it means that the head of the institution is 
separated from the body. It means that the act only now 
applies to the deputy minister down. So once you take the 
head out of the equation and you give the head immunity, 
in effect, you have created an enormous black hole. 
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Mr. Reid added during the interview that excluding the executive branch from ATI means 
that Canada has the dubious distinction of standing alone among nations that have passed 
disclosure laws. “We are now on our own. I think of all the regimes that exist, we are the 
only one that excludes the cabinet or senior officials,” he said. As former Liberal cabinet 
minister in the government of Pierre Elliot Trudeau, and as one of the people who helped 
draft the original Act, Reid understands the implications of allowing the executive branch 
immunity to transparency through ATI. The exclusion allows the government to control the 
flow of information out of the executive branch.  
[The exclusion allows] control over the flows of information 
within the structure, and a control of information that is 
deemed to be released out of the structure. And that 
communications control extends to minister’s speeches, 
lines, the whole thing. It is controlling communication so 
that what is deemed important [by the PMO or minister] 
only gets out. It is a communication control process. 
Controlling the information agenda was the prerogative of the executive branch prior to 
ATI, and with the help of the Supreme Court of Canada, it is once again in control of what 
it will allow the public to know about government and how it governs.  
6.3. The old order: a legacy of executive branch information control 
through secrecy 
Secrecy is an old and welcome friend of the executive branches of government in 
Britain and in Canada. Canada simply adopted and duplicated British secrecy laws during 
the late 19th Century and through most of the 20th Century. The laws strengthened 
executive branch authority and control over what information would be secret. That 
privilege has long served as a key mechanism for the centralization of power under the 
control of the prime minister and cabinet (Robertson 1982:p.51-22). The Official Secrets 
Acts in Canada and Britain were amended and strengthened by Britain several times 
between 1889 and 1920, further consolidating political control of government information 
and expertise by making the civil service answerable only to the minister; thus helping to 
establish the principle of ministerial responsibility. Canada also followed Britain’s example 
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in requiring all public servants to swear an oath of secrecy as a condition of employment 
that required that they keep all knowledge of government gained through their employment 
in confidence.  
Robertson argues that the secrecy policies were a deliberate political strategy on 
the part of the executive branch of government to limit the powers of high-profile 
bureaucrats who had begun to challenge government authority in the press (Robertson 
1982:p. 54). Once bureaucrats had been rendered silent through secrecy laws and 
confidentiality oaths, they could no longer embarrass the government by speaking out 
about policies and practices with which they disagreed. They were therefore no longer a 
political threat and instead were limited to providing expertise and advice internally. With 
the advent of official secrecy laws, the party in power had the sole authority over 
government information, and could withhold damaging information to prevent opposition 
and dissent. Government could also release information that it believed would shed a 
positive light on government and encourage positive public opinion. Robertson argues that 
secrecy allowed the party in power to use government information as a means to maintain 
political power:  
The consequence of this is that information is not simply a 
neutral commodity linked to rational decision-making, but a 
part of the political process, an element of victory and 
defeat. One would therefore expect that the greater the 
element of party government, the more secrecy one would 
find. The Official Secrets Act starts when party politics 
becomes finally dominant (Robertson 1982: p. 51-52). 
Similarly, British historian Ann Rogers (1997) also links secrecy and executive 
branch power in the British government. Revisions to the Official Secrets Act in 1911 – 
adopted in whole by the Canadian Parliament – were aimed as much at ending 
government leaks to the press as at preventing espionage. A key provision was to extend 
the leaks section to cover “recipients as well as disclosers of information, a provision that 
would directly affect the press. In a wide departure from normal legal practice, the burden 
of proof was thrown upon the individual…and the power of search was introduced” (p.23). 
The implications of this section continue to challenge freedom of the press in Canada 
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today. The consequences for Canadian journalists were evident on January 11, 2004 
when the RCMP raided the home and office of Ottawa Journal reporter Juliet O’Neill 
seeking leaked information they believed she had obtained concerning the deportation to 
Syria and subsequent torture of Canadian citizen Maher Arar. Sections of the Security of 
Information Act that sanctioned such raids were struck down by the Supreme Court of 
Ontario in October, 2006. In her ruling, Justice Lynn Ratushny found the sections infringed 
on O’Neill’s Charter Rights of “freedom of expression” and “freedom of the press.” In 
Section 188 of her October 19, 2006 judgment Ratushny wrote: 
This brings into focus the harm caused by the decision of 
the R.C.M.P. to allege criminal offences against O'Neill as 
discussed above regarding the constitutional dangers of the 
impugned sections and the abuse of process that occurred. 
That decision and course of action by the R.C.M.P. 
impinged on her right to privacy of her own person and her 
right and the right of the Ottawa Citizen Group Inc. to 
freedom of the press and operated to cause primacy to be 
accorded to the state interest in the prosecution of crimes.112 
 
Rogers argues that the 1911 revisions were intended to legalize the secrecy 
regime which had always existed on a more informal cultural basis within the British 
government – in effect to bolster the status quo elites who held power, and ensure that 
their hold on power would not be threatened by a dissenting press and public. Previously, 
a gentleman’s agreement between the upper class males who held public office was 
understood to imply that matters of governance would stay between those who governed 
and were not for public consumption. But broadening enfranchisement from those 
considered to belong to lesser classes, increasing partisanship and a growing and 
powerful professional bureaucracy threatened the self-imposed code of silence. The risk 
of public exposure for misconduct and incompetence in office grew real as opposing 
parties and ambitious bureaucrats increasingly leaked damaging information to the 
thriving press as a means to make the case against government with the public (Rogers; 
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Robertson). Near the end of the 19th century, a new secrecy law would make this practice 
a crime. 
With these new policies in place, the transition from an 
economy of secrecy based upon a shared culture and 
values to one of formal legal-rational control had begun. 
The British Citizen now lived in a state where disclosure of 
any official information without express authorization was 
an offence; where the accused was guilty until proven 
innocent; where the ‘right to know’ resided only at the 
centre of the state; and where decisions about loyalty and 
threat could be taken by the elites – this at a time when 
alternative political discourses were emerging that had as 
their objective empowerment of the demos…The effect was 
to maintain strict control of official information, to prevent its 
falling into hostile hands – hands that could belong to its 
own electorate as easily as a foreign power (Rogers 1997: 
p.23-24). 
While bureaucrats created, managed and distributed information within government, they 
did not decide what information to make public. That task was entirely the purview of the 
PM and members of cabinet, who often turned to the advice offered by the partisan political 
staff they appointed as their staff and advisors in the executive branch. Official secrecy 
laws in effect rendered the non-political public service silent outside of government, 
deliberately leaving political communication between government and its public to the 
often-partisan decisions of the executive branch (Robertson, 1982, 1999; Rogers, 1997). 
The effect of official secrecy and subsequent secrecy laws in Canada from 1890 until the 
implementation of the ATIA in 1983, was to allow the executive branch of the federal 
government to hold the exclusive and absolute authority (Martin, 2003) to determine which 
information would remain secret (Roberts, Blacked Out 2006b: p.:65).   
In his study “Cabinet Secrecy” Nicholas d’Ombrain argues that if anything, the 
introduction of ATIA tightened secrecy, in particular as it applied to what were referred to 
in the act as “Confidences of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada’ (ATIA, Section 69[1]). 
 289 
As a result, the documents excluded from ATI included: “Cabinet agendas, memoranda, 
minutes and decisions” (2004: p.343). The same exclusions were also added to the 
Canada Evidence Act, and in combination with the identically-worded section of the ATIA 
served to provide “absolute immunity for claims of cabinet secrecy made by a minister.” A 
“confidence” was “declared...to be anything that resided in particular classes of papers 
used by the cabinet in the transactions of its business – agendas, memoranda and so on”. 
The codification of specific classes of excluded information prompted routine claims of 
“privilege (now restyled by the courts as “public interest immunity”) for any paper that fell 
into one of these classes, regardless of content” (p.344). The de facto result was blanket 
secrecy for this class of documents. 
There has been no exercise of discretion: all records 
covered by the acts are routinely withheld. This does not 
mean that the privilege is being claimed inappropriately, 
still less carelessly or mendaciously. It means simply that 
the law is being applied as Parliament prescribed (p. 344). 
The old order of governing under a regime of secrecy was restored. 
6.4. A new order: transparency as a democratic right  
Sweden passed the first freedom of information law, called the Freedom of the 
Press Act, in 1766 that introduced the principle of open government called 
“offentlighetsgrundsatsen” (Banisar 2006:p.141-3). However, the law applied only to 
public-sector records and not to the political records of government. One important 
principle was that all records which are secret must be specified as so by law. This 
approach means that secrecy becomes the exception, must be justified, and that the 
records which are secret are identified as such. Harvard political philosopher Dennis 
Thompson argues that while secrecy is in some circumstances necessary, the process of 
determining secrecy must be open. “Secrecy is justifiable only if it is actually justified in a 
process that itself is not secret. First-order secrecy (in a process about or about a policy) 
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requires second-order publicity (about the decision to make the process or policy secret)” 
(Thompson 1999: p.185).  
The American Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is considered to be the first 
modern disclosure law because it covers all areas of government, unless they are 
specifically excluded for reasons such as security. The American law was introduced in 
1966 following years of pressure from journalists, primarily the Associated Press of 
Managing Editors Association, which led to the establishment of a congressional sub-
committee on government secrecy and manipulation of government information for 
propaganda purposes (Foerstel 1999: p.39). American journalists also protested obvious 
media manipulation techniques employed by the Kennedy administration in the early 
sixties, prompting a prominent New York Times columnist to complain just weeks before 
President John Kennedy’s assassination in 1963: “News management policy not only 
exists, but…has been enforced more cynically and boldly than by any previous 
Administration” (p. 19-21). Three years later the FOI law was passed. It provided both a 
mechanism of access to otherwise secret government information, but just as importantly, 
it established citizens’ access to government information as a democratic right, writes 
Alasdair Roberts in Blacked Out: 
The Freedom of Information of 1966 established a right to 
information held by government agencies, articulated a 
presumption that government documents should be 
publically accessible, and provided methods for compelling 
officials to comply with its requirements (Roberts 2006: 
p.14).  
FOIA was strengthened by several amendments during the 1970s in response to 
the loss of public trust over the unpopular war in Vietnam and President Richard Nixon’s 
resignation over Watergate. The American disclosure law was “recognized globally as 
trailblazing legislation” (Roberts, Blacked Out, 2006: p.14) which for the first time gave 
citizens a measure of control over the release of government records, and in so doing set 
a standard of open and accountable government as a hallmark of modern democracy. 
Certainly, the passing of the American FOIA put pressure on politicians in Ottawa to pass 
similar legislation, albeit reluctantly and almost two decades after the first American FOIA. 
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The 1966 American Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which remains the most influential 
model for modern disclosure acts, is grounded in the Enlightenment and American 
Revolutionary ideals of John Locke, John Adams and James Madison as they relate to 
the rights and duties of the individual as a citizen in a democratic society. Herbert 
Foerstel’s history of the American FOI movement quotes an essay written in 1765 by 
Adams in which he describes the need for “a knowledgeable citizenry as the most effective 
opposition to British rule” (Foerstel,1999: p.3). Adams’ position is consistent with the 
Enlightenment belief in empowerment through knowledge that remains a central premise 
in defending access to state information as an individual’s right. Adams wrote:  
The people have a right, an indisputable, inalienable, 
indefeasible divine right to that most dreaded and envied 
kind of knowledge, I mean of the characters and conduct of 
their rulers. The preservation of the means of knowledge 
among the lowest ranks is more important than all the 
property of all the rich men in the country” (As cited by 
Foerstel 1999: p.3 from an unsigned essay written by John 
Adam and published in the Boston Gazette). 
Of all the American influences for public disclosure, Madison may be the most 
important, and certainly most often quoted. While the right to know is not specified in the 
American constitution, the principle of the public’s right to know is implied by the First 
Amendment that he helped write.  
A popular Government, without popular information or the 
means of acquiring it is but a Prologue to a Farce or a 
Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern 
ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own 
Governors must arm themselves with the power that 
knowledge gives (Foerstel 1999: p.11). 
As cited earlier, John Dunn also sees unwarranted secrecy in government, combined with 
the manipulation and censorship of information for political purposes as a violation of the 
bargain of accountability between voters and those they elect to power as their 
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representatives (Dunn, 2005: p.185-186). An informed and empowered citizenry must sit 
at the core of a successful democracy.    
Transparency is justified in a democracy as a means for 
citizens to understand governance; first in order to assert 
their right and duty to hold those who govern to account; 
and second as a means of making government both 
answerable and responsive to citizens. 
Ann Florini links transparency and democracy because “the essence of democracy 
is informed consent, which requires that information about governmental practices and 
polices be disclosed” (2007: p.3). Based on this core premise, Florini offers a broad 
“working definition” of transparency as: “the degree to which information is available to 
outsiders that enables them to have informed voice in decisions and/or to assess the 
decisions made by insiders.” The purpose of transparency in a democracy is therefore to 
enable “citizens to gather information on the policies and behaviors of governments” in 
order that they may “hold decision makers accountable and have informed say in decisions 
(2007: 5).” Transparency by this definition implies a governmental responsibility to prov ide 
citizens with authentic information relevant to the decision-making process, and that also 
informs citizens to such a degree that they have the ability to adequately judge the risks, 
benefits and consequences involved. Only then do citizens have the ability to grant their 
“informed consent.”  
The literature on disclosure rights in a democracy invariably and inextricably links 
transparency and accountability. Christopher Hood (2010: 989) defines transparency in 
relation to accountability as it applies to governance and citizenship. He first defines 
accountability, which “broadly denotes the duty of an individual or organisation to answer 
in some way about how they have conducted their affairs. He then defines transparency 
as “the conduct of business in a fashion that makes decisions, rules and other information 
visible from outside.” Hood’s definition of transparency is similar to Florini’s. Both scholars 
also tie together the principle of transparency and the right to information that makes those 
who govern answerable to citizens. “Accountability in the sense of answerability 
necessarily implies the answerers sharing information with those to whom they are 
answerable” (Hood 2010: p.991). Hood notes that there can be accountability “of a certain 
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sort” inside government without public transparency, as is the case when civil servants 
answer to their deputy minister or to the minister responsible (Ibid). However, there can 
be no transparency as defined without accountability.   
David Heald (2006: p. 25) defines transparency in a democracy as “when the 
‘ruled’ can observe the conduct, behaviour, and/or ‘results’ of their ‘rulers.’ ” Transparency 
by this definition is central to voters’ ability to legitimate their representation in a 
democracy, by scrutinizing their actions and holding them to account. 
The rights of the ruled in relationship to their rulers figure 
prominently in democratic theory and practice, often under 
the umbrella of ‘accountability.’    
Since transparency is linked to accountability, there is a need for voters to have sufficient 
information about government to critique its policies and performance. The volume of 
information produced by a government is in no way an indication of transparency because 
it may lack authenticity, and may even be intended to mislead the public, which would be 
opaque rather than transparent. To meet its definition, government transparency must be 
both authentic enough and in sufficient supply to allow the public to understand the issue 
it is intended to address. Transparency is qualitative rather than quantitative and must be 
tied to the potential for accountability. Churning out endless copies of the PM’s video 
24/Seven in no way addresses the issue of transparency. Transparency, to be at all 
meaningful, must take on a qualitative, rather than quantitative dimension, and must be 
tied to the potential for accountability. Transparency means access to authentic 
information about government that allows informed citizens to deliberate about 
government and hold it to account as means to legitimate government.  
Hood characterizes the relationships between transparency and accountability as 
dependent on the attitudes of the government actors whom risk being held to account by 
citizens through transparency. Depending on the actor or party perspective, the 
relationship between transparency and accountability ranges from compatible and 
inseparable, to contentious and adversarial. His colourful description compares the 
relation as varying between: “Siamese twins’, not really distinguishable; as ‘matching 
parts’ that are separable but nevertheless complement one another smoothly to produce 
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good governance; and as an ‘awkward couple’, involving elements that are potentially or 
actually in tension with one another” (2010: 98). The problem, Hood explains, lies in the 
need for political parties to avoid being blamed by the public, and instead to present a 
positive image that will allow them to continue in power. The awkward-couple analogy best 
describes the relationship between transparency and accountability in the Canadian 
government experience. 
6.5. Managing the political risks of transparency: a hierarchy of 
information access and control 
The executive branch, comprised of the PM, cabinet and the president of the 
Treasury Branch Secretariat, is ultimately in control of information access and 
dissemination. The executive branch relies on the advice of its politically-appointed 
“exempt staff” who act as their advisors and who also produce and manage executive 
branch strategic political communication (SPC). As explained in Chapters 4 and 5, the 
partisan appointees are known as “exempt”” because they are not part of the public 
service, and do not belong to the Public Service Alliance of Canada that represents career 
bureaucrats. Their jobs depend on the government’s tenure in office and their interests 
are therefore tied to the interests of the party in power, even if that is in conflict with the 
public’s interest in being adequately and accurately informed. Both the professional 
mandate and personal interests of exempt staff lie in promoting the fortunes of the party 
to which they owe their personal security. Unlike career public servants, when the 
government loses power, they are out of work. But despite their uncertain tenure, as 
political advisors and managers for the government, exempt staff are among the most 
powerful agents inside government. In many cases they are assigned to monitor and direct 
the public service in order to ensure that they operate in sync with the political agendas of 
the executive branch. It is their job to promote and enforce the party line not only with the 
public, but also with the supposedly politically neutral public service. Often they do so with 
little expertise in the area in which they are assigned to provide direction. In an article 
written for the Gomery Commission titled “The Prime Minister, Ministers and their Exempt 
Staff,” Liane Benoit points to the unusual degree of power and influence granted to the 
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politically appointed executive branch staff, including the right to direct ministers and 
interfere with the work of far more experienced bureaucrats.  
Though unelected, often uneducated in the theory and 
operation of the machinery of government and regularly 
devoid of professional qualifications relevant to the 
ministries with which they are involved, these individuals, 
by virtue of their political relationship with the party in 
power and/or the minister they serve, are well placed to 
influence both the bounce and bobble of bureaucratic-
political interface and the pace and progress of public 
policy in Canada (Benoit 2006: p.1.1). 
The PM and cabinet ministers have open access to government information as 
needed in the performance of their duties – a privilege which is extended to the political 
staff to varying degrees, and entirely at the discretion of the PM or the cabinet minister to 
whom they answer. It is clear that their high-level access to information, and influence in 
the control and public dissemination of information make the exempt staff, in particular in 
the PMO and ministers’ offices, primary agents in any discussion about the public’s right 
to know. What they do with that information depends on both their mandate, and their 
perspective on whether or not transparency and accountability are a matter of public 
interest, or an issue to be managed in the best interests of the party they represent. In a 
2007 article titled, “What Happens when Transparency meets Blame-Avoidance?” Hood 
argued that while transparency and accountability may be taken by those who are outside 
of government as a “normative doctrine for the conduct of governance,” it is at odds with 
government praxis of “blame avoidance…that is often said to underlie much of political 
and institutional behaviour in practice” (p.192). Politicians in particular seek to avoid 
negative accountability, and seek instead to build credibility and support from voters by 
showcasing positive aspects of their decisions and policies. The result is a conflict of 
interests; that of the public’s interest in transparency and accountability; and of the political 
interest in avoiding blame through transparency and accountability. Blame avoidance, 
Hood argues, acts as “as driver of political and institutional behaviour” (pg. 193). He cites 
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Roberts’ studies of political interference in ATI in Canada as an example of how blame-
avoidance strategies serve to limit transparency.   
According to Alasdair Roberts (2006) …government 
responses to freedom of information laws, typically involve 
more active and defensive central management of 
information than before, to lower political risks of 
blame….the result is likely to be at least jeopardy and, in 
Roberts’ argument, perversity.  His central claim is that, 
while FOI measures are almost invariably introduced with 
the promise that they will produce a new culture of 
openness in executive government, the effect in practice 
tends to be the opposite, in the form of a climate of tighter 
central management of politically sensitive information 
(Hood: p. 193).   
In Canada, blame-avoidance strategies and information control are determined at the 
highest level of government. To illustrate this point, in the PMOs office, with the exception 
of the Clerk of Privy Council, the entire staff of the PMO are political appointees. 
6.5.1. Top tier information actors: The executive branch and its exempt 
political staff 
 As chapter 5 demonstrates, many of the executive branch’s political appointees 
are SPC experts, often referred to as spin doctors. Little is known about the individuals 
hired to work in the PMO, in large part because the PMO does not fall under ATI. Nor are 
exempt staff required to meet the transparency guidelines of civil servants, whose 
resumes, job descriptions and salaries are all a matter of public record. They operate 
behind a wall of executive branch secrecy. Although as the Duffy/Wright case 
demonstrates they are subject to rule of law and the courts can require them to testify 
about their activities, and their records can be subpoenaed as evidence. However, that is 
the result of a criminal investigation, charges and trial, and not at all as a routine manner 
to obtain authentic information. Occasionally, members of the media provide insight into 
the world of the powerful political staff who surround the PM. In February, 2011 when 
 297 
former Issues Management Director Jenni Byrne was promoted to head up the 
Conservative national election campaign, Globe and Mail political columnist Jane Taber 
(2011) wrote a profile of the top political advisor.  
She is 34 years old. Described by colleagues as 
possessing a volcanic temper with a penchant for yelling at 
cabinet ministers, staffers and senior bureaucrats alike, 
Ms. Byrne is fiercely loyal to the Prime Minister, his 
decisions and the small “c” Conservative brand… it was 
her stint at the PMO as director of issues management that 
cemented her reputation as tough but effective. The job 
involved daily damage control; she started at 6:30 a.m. 
with a conference call to ministerial staffers, gauging the 
issues, troubleshooting and helping to frame the 
government’s response. “She turned issues management 
into a tiger operation,” says a former colleague. (Taber, 
February 4, 2011) 
It is evident from Taber’s description of her authority as extending to “yelling at cabinet 
ministers” and bureaucrats that political staff such as Bryne are powerful as well as highly-
partisan actors within the executive branch. Their influence on controlling the flow of 
government information, including who will speak publically and what they will say, cannot 
be overestimated. 
6.5.2. Tier 2: public servants 
The second tier inside government is the public service, which has access to 
government information as necessary in the performance of their work. They are 
prevented by secrecy laws and by oaths of confidentiality from making government 
information public, unless they are so directed by the executive branch, or in accordance 
with ATI. The Clerk of the Privy Council Office (PCO) and the deputy ministers in each 
department are bureaucrats who serve as liaisons between the public service and the 
executive branch. While they are privy to all levels of information, they do not have the 
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right to decide what information is made public. Nor do they speak for their departments 
in public. That is the responsibility of the minister or the PM. 
6.5.3. Tier 3: Everybody else, including elected members of Parliament 
Although elected to represent constituents, MPs have no special status in terms of 
access to information. While the governing party may choose to make certain privileged 
information available to its own backbench MPs, it is entirely at the discretion of the 
executive branch. Opposition party MPs have no more information access rights in 
Canada than any other citizen and must rely on ATI to obtain records which the 
government is holding in secret. Members of Parliament have no more access rights than 
any other citizens, unless they request records as a matter of Parliamentary privilege, a 
rare move but one that has been successful recently. They do not receive copies of 
government records as a matter of course. They must request them through ATI. Records 
may be presented at any time by the government if it so chooses, and once in a while it 
does do that by allowing key individuals in opposition parties to see certain records. But 
we do not have a system like the American where certain committees have security 
clearances to see certain records as a matter of routine. MPs for any party will only see 
what the executive branch decides it wants to reveal. Therefore, even in the open forum 
of Parliament, opposition parties are far less persuasive than the governing party because 
they lack access to information, including even basic background reports used in decision-
making process. Under Canada’s Westminster model of government, opposition parties 
are denied access to expertise on issues that the public service provides exclusively to 
the governing party. The executive branch’s exclusive right to policy advice is a direct 
consequence of confidentiality oaths and official secrets laws that prevent it from making 
public, even to opposition MPs, any information that has not been authorized for release 
by the executive branch of the party in power.  
6.6. Transparency of governance as a right 
Fears about the politically-damaging potential of ATI are not without foundation. 
Disclosure laws are designed to question and challenge the political status quo by allowing 
citizens to scrutinize government and hold it to account. Justice La Forest’s judgment on 
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the purpose of ATIA as enabling public scrutiny of government was reinforced in 2006 by 
Justice John Gomery who noted the importance of disclosure law in a democracy: “An 
appropriate access to information regime is a key part of the transparency that is an 
essential element of modern democracy” (Gomery, 2006: p.136). His final report on the 
Liberal government sponsorship scandal, in which hundreds of millions of taxpayers’ 
dollars went missing, centered on improving government accountability that he defined as 
“the requirement to explain and accept responsibility for carrying out an assigned mandate 
in light of agreed upon expectation” (p. 9). Gomery recommended that the ATIA be 
significantly strengthened as a means of achieving greater accountability of government. 
His recommendations, as with all previous recommendations to strengthen ATI, were 
ignored. Meaningful transparency, it would seem, may not be in the political interest of 
governments. However, transparency of government is very much in the public’s interest, 
and, is in fact a democratic right because the public’s ability to scrutinize government and 
hold it to account is key to managing the risks of representation, as argued earlier.  
Despite government’s resistance to transparency, the public’s right to know how 
those they elect exercise power as their representatives is increasingly accepted as a 
fundamental right of citizenship in a democracy. The legal right to request and receive 
qualified government information is a manifestation of that right. Patrick Birkinshaw 
(2006a: p.48) argues that legal public access to government records is a right which is 
fundamental to all other human rights, and should be enshrined along with other human 
rights. He cites the 1946 United Nations Resolution of the General Assembly which states: 
“Freedom of Information is a fundamental human right and is the touchstone for all 
freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated”. Birkinshaw (2006) points out that 
“in Britain [as in Canada which wholly adopted the British secrecy laws] official secrecy 
was protected by draconian laws as a matter of culture.” Canada evolved as a country in 
a governance “culture of secrecy” and citizen-exclusion from government decision-
making, as opposed to the government openness and public accountability that is the 
purpose of transparency laws.  
For Birkinshaw, accountability is dependent on transparency, which relies on the 
right of the public to obtain and discuss meaningful and uncontrolled government 
information. Birkinshaw lists the public-access arguments for open government:  
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information is used in the public interest; ...information is a 
necessity for accountability – accountability is based upon 
reliable information; …reliable information is a prerequisite 
to establish effectiveness and efficiency in government; 
…information is a necessary right of citizenship; 
…information is power and its exclusive possession 
especially so; secrecy is a cloak for arbitrariness, 
inefficiency, corruption and so on; FOI reciprocates the 
trust that people place in government. (Birkinshaw 
Administrative Law Review 2006:p.183).  
Access laws assume citizenship participation in the democratic process of legitimation of 
government as a core principle. The public right to know as a political-communication right 
of citizens is intended to shift the unequal balance of power between society and the state, 
to make the state more accountable to citizens for its actions and decisions.   
6.7. Transparency versus spin 
The well-documented trend in advanced democracies is towards increased 
politicization of governance communications processes under partisan public relations 
marketing professionals who are appointed by, and work for the executive branch. This is 
certainly the case in Canada where political appointees dominate the PMO staff, primarily 
working as political advisors on various aspects of public communication and media 
relations. Political communication between the executive branch is therefore increasingly 
partisan and strategic (Morgan 1986; Franklin 1994; Rose 2000; Scammell 2000). The 
intent of politically-mediated communications is to win favourable public opinion in the 
public sphere through information selection, promotion and control. The goal is to limit 
transparency and accountability. This penchant for censorship and information control by 
executive branches of successive governing parties is enabled in Canada by the 
disproportionate strength of secrecy laws, and by the corresponding weakness of the 
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Access to Information Act. Canada’s ATIA has failed to shift the central secrecy paradigm 
of Canadian governance towards greater transparency and openness in government.  
Canada’s ATIA has from the outset excluded the executive branch from public 
scrutiny, a reality that has only been strengthened through court challenges and 
amendments over the decades since it was introduced. The ATIA is as much about the 
codification of secrecy and executive branch control of government information as it is 
about granting the public, including parliamentarians, access to government records. In 
defining what the public may know, Canada’s ATI also defines what the public may not 
know, with the scales heavily weighted in favour of the latter. Government propaganda 
and public relations campaigns do not meet the criterion for government transparency, 
that is, to meet the information needs of citizens engaged in legitimating governance 
through processes of deliberative democracy.  
Under deliberative democracy, the essence of democratic 
legitimacy should be sought ...in the ability of all individuals 
subject to a collective decision to engage in authentic 
deliberation about that decision. These individuals should 
accept the decision only if it could be justified to them in 
convincing terms (Dryzek 2000: Preface, v.). 
Equally as important as the need for meaningful and accurate information, is the 
need to recognize that the call for government transparency is never a demand for full 
disclosure of government information. There are limits on what can be made public and 
these limits are clearly defined in disclosure laws. While disclosure laws are intended to 
give citizens access to “uncontrolled information” about government (Roberts “Two 
Challenges” 2006a); records are excluded from release by law if release of the information 
would harm the public’s interest, including personal privacy rights. For example, few would 
argue that it would serve the public’s interest to release detailed floor plans for nuclear 
plants. Under disclosure laws such information remains secret because secrecy in this 
case is in the public’s interest. Every disclosure law contains extensive exemptions and 
exclusions that prevent the release of records which would harm such things as national 
security, public health and safety and even the personal right to protection of privacy. That 
said, the underlying assumption of transparency and disclosure laws is that state secrecy, 
 302 
except when it is clearly in the public interest, is bad for democracy because it impedes 
accountability, and therefore impedes the ability of voters to legitimate their 
representation.  
The public right of access is very much concerned with the role of citizenship in a 
democracy, and in particular the role played by citizens in the self-regulation process of 
democracy. The debate therefore borrows from larger debates on democratic theory, 
communication and citizenship rights, and the role of information and the public sphere 
and deliberative dialogue in a democracy, and also the relationship of media to the state 
and to the public sphere. The concept of openness in government is central to the idea of 
access to meaningful information that allows citizens to scrutinize government and hold it 
to account. 
6.8. Political interference in ATI as a means of blame avoidance  
Information control is therefore an important blame-avoidance mechanism for 
elected officials and political parties, which can be used both to contain dissent and 
distrust, and also to promote public approval and support an elected representative and 
the party in power. In a democracy all negative information about governance has at least 
the potential to pose a political risk and therefore damage the government’s public image. 
On the government side, positive information about governance in the form of “news 
releases” and political ads are churned out for media and public consumption by the 
partisan public relations professionals on staff in the PMO and by those working for cabinet 
ministers. Their mandate is to show government in a positive light in order to win public 
favour and political support, and not to provide the pubic with a balanced view of 
government. The manipulation of information for partisan purposes relies on the ability to 
control what the public knows about government. ATI challenges that control, and 
therefore poses risk to political power. One way to manage the risk is through political 
interference in the ATI process as demonstrated in an ATI request filed as part of this 
dissertation.  
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6.9. Political interference in access to information: a case study 
American duties on the export of British Columbia’s giant cedar and Douglas fir 
trees might seem like an unlikely topic for national headlines. But in the summer of 2006 
the softwood lumber dispute, as it came to be known, was big news. It was a David and 
Goliath story, with the big American lumber industry using its political muscle to have the 
Bush administration impose duties that would drive up the price of cheaper Canadian 
lumber, critically wounding the crucial lumber industry in British Columbia and Quebec in 
the process. The story also had a political dimension. The stakes for Canada’s lumber 
industry were so high, the then-recently-elected Conservatives convinced the former 
Liberal minister responsible for softwood negotiations to change parties, join the 
Conservatives and continue his work. It was the kind of story that not only drew the 
attention of the daily media, it raised behind-the-scenes questions for more in-depth 
analysis of how the Conservatives would operate under pressure. The way to get to that 
story was through the Access to Information Act (ATIA). Among the many ATI requests 
filed that summer for inside information on the Conservative handling of the softwood 
lumber dispute was my request to the Privy Council Office (PCO). The request was 
received by the PCO on July 17, 2006 (A-2006-00073/RS). I had filed it to the PCO rather 
than the PMO because the executive branch of government in Canada is exempt from 
disclosure law and operates in complete secrecy. The PCO is as close as anyone using 
ATI can get to open the door on PMO policies and decisions. The high-profile, high-stakes 
softwood lumber dispute seemed to provide an opportunity to examine the influence of 
PMO partisan communication practices on public policy, albeit at a distance through the 
PCO. My request was simple: “I am seeking copies of all PMO/PCO Communication 
records concerning the softwood lumber agreement.” The records were requested from 
the time the Conservatives won office on January 20, 2006 until the request was received 
on July 17. It would take 44 months for my request to be completed, and then only partially. 
Records were finally mailed to me on March 22, 2010, just under four years after I filed my 
request.  
The story on softwood lumber had long grown cold and was no longer news. But 
the records were still of interest. The length of the delay suggested that political 
interference in ATI was as alive in the Conservative PMO as it had been under the previous 
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Liberal governments (Rees 2003). A follow-up request for a log of activities on the file, 
known as ATIPFlow, would confirm suspicions. The ATIPFlow received in June, 2010 (ATI 
request PCO A-2010-00020 / PF) showed clear evidence of inappropriate political 
interference in the ATI process by the PMO. The final step before mailing the records to 
me was to transmit them to William Stairs, then senior advisor to the prime minister. Stairs 
and other political staff have no legitimate role to play in the processing and handling of 
the ATI requests. Yet my file was delayed in his office for a week, from March 9 until March 
16, 2010, before it was returned for release by the ATI official handling the file in the PCO. 
It was a clear case of political interference. 
The ATIPFlow log of the activities over the 44 months also showed the political 
interference was ongoing, beginning on the day it was received. The log shows that it was 
immediately flagged as a “Red File,” a code word used to alert strategic political 
communications in government that an ATI request is of interest to them and should be 
monitored throughout the processing of the requested records. The Red Files system was 
part of a government-wide ATI alert system for executive branch communications now 
referred to as the ‘Amberlight’ system (Rees, 2003), which was exposed as a result of 
research I conducted for the Toronto Star’s one-year Atkinson Fellowship in Public Policy 
Journalism. Under the PMO/PCO Red Files system, the softwood lumber request was 
bounced back and forth between ATI officials, whose job it is to handle ATI requests in 
accordance with the law, and PMO communication staff whose only interest in the file is 
political.   
The requested records were reaching final approval stage when on April 9, 2009 
the file was reassigned to a different ATI officer in the PCO, according to the log. Within 
days, the new ATI officer rewrote the wording of the request, and narrowed the scope of 
records requested. There was no consultation and no permission obtained to rewrite the 
request. Now instead of requesting “all PMO/PCO communication records” as I had 
intended, the request targeted only “records involving the exchange of communications 
on softwood lumber policy between policy makers and political communications officials.” 
That change led to the removal of 438 pages from the file – reducing the number of records 
slated for release from 654 pages to 126 pages. The radically-reduced package was 
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processed by ATI but was not yet ready for release. First, it would have to meet the 
approval of the political staff in the PMO.  
On April 28, 2009 the file was transmitted to top-ranking PMO political staffer Jenni 
Byrne, then a top strategic political communication advisor to Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper. Nobody in government was a more partisan actor than Byrne. And it was her job 
to review my request before it could be released. Byrne reviewed the file over a five-day 
period before shipping it back to ATI on February 4, 2009. No explanation was entered in 
the ATIPFlow log. The next step after the files were finally released to me in March, 2010, 
was to file a complaint with the Office of the Commissioner, both concerning the redacted 
pages and also concerning the political interference which had caused the distinctly 
unreasonable delay. It would take almost three years, until March 26, 2013 for the PCO 
to release an additional 35 pages in response to the Commissioner’s investigation of the 
complaint – meaning that it had taken just four months shy of seven years to process the 
request. Clearly any disclosure system that takes almost seven years to respond to a 
request for records – even if that is not the norm – is virtually useless as a means for 
citizens to access government records. By that point the records are all but meaningless, 
other than to demonstrate that the system is badly in need of a substantial overhaul. 
The softwood lumber example is far from an anomaly, in fact, political interference 
in ATI is systemic and government-wide. At the time of our interview in May, 2011, Legault 
had just finished investigating blatant interference in an ATI request by political staffer 
Sebastien Togneri, Director of Parliamentary Affairs to Christian Paradis, then minister of 
Public Works. As his LinkedIn profile shows, it was Togneri’s job to brief “the Prime 
Minister’s Office and the Minister daily on Issues Management” (Sebastien Togneri, 
LinkedIn, October 2, 2015). One of Togneri’s duties was to track “sensitive” – the code 
word used to designate media and other requests that might prove to be of political 
concern to the government – ATI requests for the Public Works ministry, and as it would 
turn out, to direct ATI staff, who are public servants, in the handling of those requests. In 
July, 2010 Togneri learned that Public Works ATI staff had processed and released a 
request from Canadian Press Jim Bronskill, one of the most active and experienced media 
users of ATI in Canada. The request had been sent to the mailroom, waiting to be sent 
back to Bronskill. Bronskill would later track the handling of his request with a follow-up 
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request. He received a copy of an email from Togneri, to the ATI officials handling the 
request demanding that they go to the mailroom and retrieve the request which he had 
asked be cut further – severed - prior to release. Political staff are not entitled to determine 
what should and should not be released under ATI. That responsibility is supposed to rest 
with the trained and politically-neutral ATI public servants. In an email dated July 27, 2009, 
Togneri responded to news from the ATI office that the requested records had been 
released. Togneri replied: “Well unreleased it.” He added: “What’s the point of asking for 
my opinion if you’re just going to release it!” (Ditchburn, October 4, 2010). His LinkedIn 
profile shows that as of October 2, 2015 he was employed as the executive assistant to 
B.C.’s minister of energy and mines. 
Information Commissioner Legault filed a special report to Parliament on March 
22, 2011 condemning the action by Togneri, who was subsequently dismissed. In her 
opening message to Parliament, the Commissioner refers to the significance of ATI as a 
mechanism for accountability of government. She then laid out the circumstances that led 
to the political interference, and called for changes to the ATIA to prevent such interference 
from continuing. 
Access to information is fundamental to democracy, as a 
way for citizens to keep their governments accountable. 
Political interference with the access process, which was 
set up in the Access to Information Act, to operate without 
bias or partisanship, undermines this accountability. 
Legault addressed the seriousness of political staff interfering with ATI and also admitted 
that she had little power as Information Commissioner to prevent this from happening in 
the future:  
The results of the investigation highlight a significant 
limitation in the Act. The law was drafted such that it is very 
difficult for the Information Commissioner to ensure that 
political staff members are held accountable for 
interference with the Act. In particular, the confidentiality 
provisions of the Act make it impossible for the 
Commissioner to directly refer matters of interference 
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involving political staff members to law enforcement 
agencies for investigation and possible criminal 
prosecution. 
In her special report, Legault also raised concern about the ATI public servants who went 
along with orders from Togneri by pulling back the released request, in violation of the 
ATIA. The records released after an 82-day delay, were reduced from the 137 pages 
initially identified as qualified for release under the Act to 30 pages, following Togneri’s 
review. Legault questioned why ATI public servants would go along with such a decision: 
The investigation that is the subject of this special report 
centres on an incident of interference with an access 
request by a political staff member in a Minister’s office. 
The case also puts into sharp focus the consequences of 
public officials not exercising their duty to say “no” to 
inappropriate requests from those who have no authority to 
make them (Legault, Special Report, March 2011). 
Legault recommended to Parliament that “relevant sections” of the ATIA be strengthened 
to provide her office with the powers necessary to “respond fully and appropriately to all 
instances of interference (Legault March, 2011). More than four years later no such 
reforms have been implemented. 
When I interviewed Legault two months later in May, 2011, she reiterated her 
concerns about the effect political interference by political staff was having on the work of 
ATI public servants. She said that the public servants, only one of whom had refused to 
follow Togneri’s orders, had a legal obligation to stand up to political staff and refuse to 
follow instructions which violated the Act:  
I would say the other really disquieting thing about this 
investigation is that the bureaucrats actually followed up on 
these instructions by the political staffer. Of all the ones 
that we interviewed, and I would have to see the report to 
see how many there were, but of all of those who were 
interviewed, there was only one person in the bureaucracy 
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that did not follow these instructions. Everybody else did, 
up to quite senor levels within that organization. Which 
means that there was no check and balance any more in 
this institution. I think is very important is that bureaucrats 
have a duty to say no…I think they have a legal duty to say 
no because the political staffer clearly had no delegation of 
authority under the legislation to do as he did. 
During our interview Legault also noted that a government tracking system for 
politically-sensitive ATI requests, which I first identified in 2003 as operating throughout 
government departments (Rees, “Amberlighting” Atkinson Fellowship, 2002-2003) were 
still in operation in 2009. Public Works used an ATI request surveillance system they called 
“purple files” which served as a code to notify political staff that the department had 
received a request that might prove politically-sensitive. Once identified as a “purple file”, 
or in the case of the PCO a “red file” or in many other departments as an “Amberlight” file, 
the request would be monitored by SPC communications staff and other political advisors 
who have no legitimate role to play in the ATI process. Legault noted that almost ten years 
later, political surveillance of ATI requests was still routine, at least at Public Works. (Other 
ATI requests showed it was also in operation under a variety of different code names in 
other departments at the same time.) Legault said she was hopeful the purple file 
surveillance system would end, given that she had officially registered her concerns: 
The other disquieting thing, I find, in the result of this 
investigation was the Purple File process that was ongoing 
at Public Works. They have undertaken to change that 
completely, as a result of this investigation (Legault 
Interview, May 31, 2011) 
No review or reform of ATI has resulted from Legault’s special report. However, the report 
remains significant because it was the first time any information commissioner had 
officially acknowledged systemic political interference in the ATI system at the direction of 
political communication staff. The report identified the “Purple Files” system at PWGS, 
which was the department’s specific designation for its “Amberlighting” process which had 
been public knowledge since the publication of my reports for the Toronto Star in 2003. 
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During our interview, Legault described the political interference process at PWGS as 
“disquieting.”  
What we uncovered in that is there had indeed been 
political interference by the political staffer of the then 
Minister of Public Works. And it is very clear. .And in this 
instance, which is documented and is based on evidence, 
actual interference in the ATI process. (Rees, May 31, 
2011) 
The ATIA does not recognize political interests as a legitimate reason to delay the release 
of requested records. According to the ATIA, political interests are irrelevant, and are 
therefore an inappropriate criterion for determining what the public should be allowed to 
know about government. In fact, political interference in the public’s right to know how they 
are represented is anti-democratic because it interferes with the public’s ability to 
legitimate government and thereby manage representation. The seriousness of this 
interference is evident both in the Commissioner’s findings at PWGS and in the case study 
presented. But there is currently no sign that the system of political interference is about 
to change. None of the Commissioner’s recommendations have been implemented. And 
political interference appears to be so deeply entrenched that it is unlikely to change soon 
and perhaps not even as a result of a change in government. 
6.10. A legacy of political interference in ATI 
Political interference in ATI was not invented by the Conservative government. 
Over ten years in office ending in 2003, the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien 
established a government-wide system of surveillance of so-called “sensitive” ATI 
requests that were monitored and reviewed by political communications staff reporting to 
the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). All requests from media, members of opposition parties 
and other contentious requesters were flagged by strategic political communications 
advisors, using secretive internal communications branch codes such “amber light” and 
“Red Files” (Rees 2003). In addition to tracking and reviewing the requests, the requested 
records were not released to the requester until copies of the records had been sent to 
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the government’s spin doctors. The PCO and the PMO communication departments 
played a key role in overseeing the political surveillance process. All ministries and 
departments of government reported to executive branch communications when they 
received a contentious request (Rees 2003). The requests were logged and monitored by 
political appointees working in the strategic communications offices of the executive 
branch.   
Roberts was interviewed in 2003 about the practice for the Toronto Star series on 
ATIA (Rees 2003). He pointed out that singling out certain types of requesters such as 
journalists for different and delayed processing of requests was the equivalent of unequal 
treatment under the law. His own research showed that requests from journalists and other 
contentious requesters such as opposition MPs were subject to longer processing delays 
than other types of requests. “Everyone is entitled to equal protection and treatment under 
the law,” Roberts said when I interviewed him for my Toronto Star series on Access to 
Information in Canada. “There is no provision in the law that says that journalists and 
politicians get second-class treatment,” said Roberts. In a 2005 Public Administration 
article, Roberts warned that the “lessons from Canada are sobering.” Roberts pointed to 
damaging political interference in ATI by the executive branch in ATI through the amber 
light and Red Files monitoring systems:  
The promise of increased openness has been undercut by 
the development of administrative routines designed to 
centralize control and minimize the disruptive potential of 
the FOI law. Special procedures for handling politically 
sensitive requests are commonplace in major departments. 
Information technology has been adapted to ensure that 
ministers and central agencies are informed about difficult 
requests within days of their arrival. Communications 
officers can be closely involved in the processing of these 
requests, developing ‘media lines’ and other 
‘communications products’ to minimize the political fallout 
of disclosure. These practices are largely hidden from 
public view. Nevertheless, they play an important role in 
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shaping the substance of the right to information (Roberts, 
2005). 
Systematic political interference under the amber light process was condemned as 
“wrong” in 2003 by Stephen Harper, who was then leader of the opposition Conservative 
Alliance Party. When I interviewed then-opposition leader Stephen Harper for the Toronto 
Star in 2003 for comment Amberlighting, he said such practices violated the spirit of the 
ATIA (Rees).  
 My understanding, and the public’s understanding, is that 
this is not how it is supposed to work…This entire super-
process ... blurs the line between the statutory public 
service functions of the civil service, and political reporting. 
That to me is really wrong in principle and there is no doubt 
that this is not in the spirit of the act (Rees, November 1, 
2003).  
However, as the Togneri affair, and other requests such as the softwood lumber request 
cited earlier confirm, following his election to power as prime minister, Harper changed his 
view. As government, his party has implemented an even more comprehensive 
communication surveillance process for ATI requests, in particular for requests made to 
the Privy Council Office. The practice of political interference in ATI requests appears to 
have become even more sweeping and laborious than under the Liberals. For example, 
under the Liberals only politically-sensitive requests for information were designated as 
Red Files for communications branch clearance. Recent research shows that under the 
Conservatives, every ATI request received by the PCO is referred to the PMO for political 
oversight prior to release (Rees, 2010). The change may have been in reaction to 
criticisms about the Amberlight process singling out certain requesters, in particular the 
media and members of opposition parties, for different and therefore unequal treatment 
under the law. However, the result is hardly an improvement as contentious request are 
still submitted to PMO/PCO for political communication reviews and the result is a dramatic 
increase in delays that means it may take years to receive information requested from the 
PCO. Similar PCO delays are routine and are cited as a “Key Performance Related 
Challenge” in a 2009 report by the former Information Commissioner Robert Marleau titled 
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“A Dire Diagnosis for Access to Information in Canada” (Marleau 2009). While resistance 
to ATI is partisan and political, it is not a single party issue. Every executive branch since 
the law was passed has taken steps to limit its potential to negatively-impact their tenure 
in office. 
6.11. Information Commissioners: transparency watchdogs 
The most consistent and effective critics of the limits of the ATIA have been the 
information commissioners, who serve as ombudsmen for ATI and are required to report 
to Parliament annually on the state of access in Canada. Information Commissioner John 
Grace was highly critical of what he termed “the culture of secrecy” (Grace, 1996) in 
government during the 1990s. Chiefly, Grace was concerned with the unwillingness of the 
bureaucracy to embrace the idea of public access to government records that had 
previously been entirely under their control, and that of the executive branch. In particular, 
Grace pointed to what he termed “a traditional culture within ND/CF [the Department of 
National Defence and Canadian Forces] of secrecy and suspicion of those seeking 
information.” (p.18) Prior to ATI, civil servants were part of an inside elite whom, unlike the 
public, were trusted because of their professionalism and expertize to handle sensitive 
government information. These same bureaucrats were being asked to hand over 
information for which previously they had been trusted and required to keep in confidence, 
in effect to protect the information from the public. British social historian David Vincent 
provides some valuable insight into public servants’ perceptions of confidentiality as an 
indication of trust and therefore as an honour. 
The honour of the civil service was seen as both the means 
and the end of the maintenance of secrecy…’official 
confidence’ had a double charge. It referred at once to the 
confidentiality of the information, and to the faith the public 
vested in the discretion of officials (Vincent 1998:85). 
Allowing the public access to the type of information that had once been trusted only to 
bureaucrats was, in some eyes, a show of disrespect for the professionalism of the civil 
service, and therefore was resented. However, the more fundamental problem was that 
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the executive branch, including the PMO, offices of cabinet ministers and the TBS, which 
oversees administration of ATIA, failed to set an example and tone which made it clear to 
the bureaucrats processing the requests that this was a priority. From the outset, 
commissioners have complained about inadequate funding and staffing levels. The 
resources to do the job in a timely manner have never been provided. The message the 
underfunding sent to the public service was that ATIA was not a government priority. 
Grace noted this failure. He reported that bureaucrats responsible for processing the 
requests were not encouraged to consider ATI as “a core function, and may thus be given 
a low priority” (Grace, 1996: p.18).  
Commissioner John Reid, who succeeded Grace, has been the harshest critic of 
the secrecy provisions of the ATIA. The act contains 13 exemptions, which prevent the 
release of any records related to national security, policing or other issues the release of 
which might harm public health and safety. It also prevents the release of information 
concerning advice to cabinet, as well as all cabinet records (ATIA, 1983). In 2000, the 
federal government commissioned a task force comprised almost entirely of federal 
bureaucrats to review the ATIA and make recommendations for amendments. The task 
force received submissions from most of the major stakeholders, and several scholars in 
the area of public administration. The majority of submissions recommended that many of 
the mandatory exceptions either be dropped entirely, or be made discretionary, meaning 
that in some cases the government could choose to release the information. Several 
submissions and a special report on the task force tabled by Reid (2002) called for an 
amendment of the ATIA which would include a “public interest override,” similar to clauses 
already included in several of the provincial freedom of information laws, including B.C.’s 
FOI Act. The override would state that the public interest is paramount and acts as an 
override on all other sections of the Act. Reid explained the need for the override as 
follows: 
The absence in the federal Act of a general public interest 
override is a serious omission which should be corrected. 
Again, with the exception of the personal privacy 
exemption, the Act should require government to disclose, 
with or without a request, any information in which the 
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public interest in disclosure outweighs any of the interests 
protected by the exemptions (Reid, 2002). 
The decision, according to several submissions and a subsequent report by Reid, would 
be based on whether or not the release of the information was in the public interest, and 
whether or not the release of the information would result in harm, which was contrary to 
the public interest. This is an important and reasonable test, which would determine that 
secrecy is justified only if it served the public’s interests. Records could therefore be 
denied only on the grounds that release of records would harm the public interest. Secrecy 
essentially would be decided on the basis of a public harms test – if it was harmful to the 
public interest to release, then it would remain secret. However, despite the 
recommendations, the task force recommended that the number of exceptions be almost 
doubled – from 13 exceptions to 25, with eight of the new exemptions to be mandatory. 
The recommendations were roundly dismissed by scholars, stakeholders, and the 
commissioner as an attempt by the bureaucracy at retrenching secrecy practices within 
government. Commissioner Reid produced a special report for Parliament, which took the 
government to task for attempting to shift the already uneven balance of disclosure and 
secrecy. The bureaucratic task force failed to recommend a public-interest override, but it 
was a moot point. The terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2002 would result in an increase in 
secrecy and deliver a severe blow to public access to information rights in Canada.  
6.12. Securing secrecy: anti-terrorism law trumps access to information  
While an increased level of concern is clearly justified after 9/11, security has also 
been appropriated by the government as a means to challenge disclosure laws and 
expand the scope of secrecy laws. The balance dramatically tipped in favour of secrecy 
and executive-branch control of information, as part of Canada’s Anti-terrorism Act that 
was rushed through Parliament on Oct. 15, 2001, just over a month after the Sept. 11 
attacks on New York and Washington. The most important amendment, in terms of limiting 
public access rights, allowed a minister to issue a certificate – allowing the minister to veto 
the release of a record, which would otherwise qualify for release under the ATIA. The 
ministerial override could not be challenged by the information commissioner, whose role 
as ombudsman was to mediate and rule on disagreements between government and the 
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requester. Nor was there any avenue for appeal to the courts. While it was deemed 
essential at the time, in the eight years since the Anti-Terrorism Act passed, not one 
certificate has been issued. Nonetheless, the power of cabinet to overrule the act and the 
commissioner remains law. 
Another significant aspect of the Bill-36 Section 13 amendment of the ATIA 
provides a mandatory refusal to release information involving other governments, both 
domestic and foreign. The ATIA already contained a discretionary provision – meaning 
that it was up to the bureaucrats to decide – concerning the release or refusal of 
information that involved other governments. Other governments would be consulted as 
part of the discretionary process, and in practice at least, any objections that they raised 
would usually be grounds for refusal. However, it was still occasionally possible to get 
information from the federal government that also involved another government. Following 
the intergovernmental restrictions on accessing records, this potential no longer exists. 
The government argued that the Anti-Terrorism Bill amendments were necessary 
in a post-9-11 world. The justification was that the terrorist attacks were the impetus for 
the restrictions on public access. However, that does not appear to be the case. Roberts 
used ATI to obtain a confidential Privy Council memo written months prior to 9/11 which 
called for the amendments on inter-governmental records which were passed as part of 
the Anti-Terrorism amendment package. In an Oct. 8, 2002 article in the Winnipeg Free 
Press, Roberts writes: The memo “written in May 2001 suggested that the access law 
created a growing problem for security and intelligence officials. The end of the Cold War 
had led to ‘the development of more bilateral intelligence relationships’ and ‘a more 
complex set of sensitivities regarding protection of information provided in 
confidence’”(A3). Eight years later, the restrictions on the public right of access, introduced 
as temporary emergency measures under Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill, still stands as law.  
 Sidney Shapiro and Rena Steinzor (2006: 99) point to the increase in government 
secrecy since 9/11 as challenging and undermining the “checks and balances” system of 
accountability in the American constitution. “When secrecy becomes pervasive, it 
becomes difficult, even impossible for Congress and the public to determine what is going 
on in the executive branch. Government failures are hidden and the public interest suffers.” 
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Transparency therefore plays an important role in the “constitutional system of checks and 
balances, not least because it is the condition precedent for a free press.” They point to 
the risk of “information asymmetries” in which “the agent [in this case the executive branch] 
is often in control of the information the principle [individuals who comprise the voting 
public] needs to judge that person’s performance.” (Shapiro and Steinzor 2006: 110). Not 
only does it make it more difficult to monitor the agent’s performance, it also opens the 
door to the potential for propaganda methods – the promotion of false information or half-
truths and withholding of negative information – to mislead the public into supporting the 
party in power. It is therefore essential to define transparency as access to meaningful 
information, which allows citizens to accurately scrutinize and assess government’s 
actions and decisions in order to hold it to account.  
Security increasingly takes precedence over freedom of information, and as a 
result secrecy remains the dominant and normative governance paradigm. There was a 
stage in the late 1990s when it appeared that there was a global momentum for the public 
right of access. Since 1966, more than 60 countries have implemented FOI legislation, 
admittedly with varying degrees of effectiveness. But in countries such as Canada and the 
U.S., once leaders in the FOI movement, the public right of access has been diminished 
in the response to September 11 2001. 
6.13. Conclusion 
Disclosure law is essential as a check and balance to ensure government 
transparency and accountability. Accountability is a difficult issue for a democratically-
elected government to argue against, and none do. Accountability is an issue that has 
wide public support and it is also the basis of the legitimation process which allows citizens 
to understand the risks posed by government actions and decisions, and to manage them 
accordingly as a result. There is widespread agreement that government lacks sufficient 
accountability in Canada. This was pointed out by Justice John Gomery, who held the 
PMO directly responsible in his report on how weak accountability resulted in the 
disastrously secretive Liberal sponsorship program.   
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A general lack of transparency about government 
spending, and a reluctance by the public service to call 
attention to irregularities because of the increased 
concentration of political power in the PMO, are the 
weaknesses in the present-day system of Canadian 
government (Gomery 2006: Vol. 1: p.  8). 
The lack of meaningful uncontrolled information about governance is as apparent in 
Canada as are the consequences for its democratic system. The PMO has become a 
partisan PR operation more inclined towards managing the message as a means to 
promote its own political interests, than in providing meaningful information that promotes 
the public’s interests in scrutinizing government and holding it to account. Excessive 
secrecy allows the executive branch to manage, limit and control both Parliament and the 
public’s right to know, which as a result, ceases to be a right. Fundamental to any shift 
from the current secrecy and information-control paradigm to one of openness and 
accountability is the need to set a test or parameters for information access. It is true that 
governance requires a considerable degree of secrecy in areas such as national security, 
criminal investigations and even in the protection of personal privacy. But what is 
becoming increasingly clear is that secrecy, if unchecked, can threaten the very basis of 
democracy by diminishing or even extinguishing the public’s ability to scrutinize those who 
they elect to power as their representatives. Democracy therefore requires both a 
significant degree of secrecy and of transparency. The balance must be determined in, 
and by the public’s interest. If it is in the public’s interest for certain records to be held in 
secrecy, then secrecy is justified. If, however, it is in the public’s interest for information to 
be made public – for example in cases of risks to public health or safety – then secrecy is 
not justified. Even when secrecy can be justified, the processes of secrecy need to be 
transparent. Citizens have a right to know what sort of information is being withheld and 
why (Thompson, 1999). 
While some information will always be restricted to those who hold government 
office, a better-informed Parliament would no doubt elevate the level of debate, and might 
even lead to a less adversarial discussion between informed participants, all of whom are 
stakeholders in the public’s interests. The deliberate poverty of information for opposition 
 318 
parties is also a loss for the public. The open forum of Parliament is an important 
opportunity to inform the public from both the government perspective and from that of the 
opposition parties. While essential elements of secrecy laws must always apply, were MPs 
to be granted access to such things as background reports – compiled by politically-neutral 
bureaucratic experts to inform the executive branch in their decision-making process – the 
public would subsequently also gain access to meaningful information about governance 
practices and policies. It is evident that the historical governance paradigm of secrecy is 
still the normative mode of operation for the executive branch of Canada’s federal 
government. Once in office governments have worked to manage the risks to political 
power that the release of negative information poses to their tenure. The PMO has 
consistently resisted the ATI as an infringement on the executive branches’ traditional right 
to decide what the public is allowed to know about how it is represented in government. 
Canada’s PMO is a closed-shop, staffed primarily by spin doctors and political strategists 
hired specifically to take advantage of the cloak of secrecy to control and manipulate the 
public’s perspective of what happens in that secret world. There must be a re-evaluation 
of the current practice of blanket secrecy for Canada’s highest office and elected officials. 
What is clear is that secrecy for political purposes alone has no place in the democratic 
process of government, and in fact is anti-democratic when it fails to serve the public’s 
interest, especially if it undermines, if not entirely prevents, the public’s ability to 
understand and manage how it is governed. Limiting secrecy to when it is in the public’s 
interest to withhold government information, would be one way to approach the re-
evaluation process. But before that can happened, what is required is a paradigm shift 
from an historical sense of an executive entitlement to control information through secrecy; 
to an understanding and acceptance that the price of the right to represent is public 
accountability, which enables checks and balances on elected government.  
  The central premise must be that if it is in the public’s interest to release 
information, then it should be available to the public. Further, it is always in the public’s 
interest to understand how it is governed. Only when it is against the public interest to 
release information is secrecy justified, and even then the public has a right to understand, 
at least in a general sense, what sort of information is being withheld. Secrecy for purposes 
of political risk management is never acceptable, because it undermines the public’s right 
to manage the risks of representation and is therefore anti-democratic. This paradigm shift 
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would both allow and encourage the public service to be more proactive in providing the 
public with information that it is in their interest to know. Knowing, or understanding the 
risks of representation, requires extensive access to authentic, meaningful and 
uncontrolled information about government. Whether that information should be released 
or held in secret should be determined by whether it is in the public’s interest to release or 
censor the information. Disclosure laws such as ATIA are essential to ensuring that the 
public can legally challenge government decisions concerning secrecy, in particular when 
it is exercised for political advantage rather than in accordance with the law and the 
public’s interest. In fact, political interference in the public’s right to know how they are 
represented is anti-democratic because it interferes with the public’s ability to legitimate 
government and thereby manage the risks of representation. 
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Transparency and Trust:  Complementary or 
Contradictory? 
7.1. Transparency versus trust 
If we accept the public’s right to know how it is governed, then the right to greater 
transparency of government is also a given. Transparency of government records that are 
qualified for public release, meaning that the transparency is in the public’s interest, 
operationalizes the right to know by providing access to authentic information about 
governance required to fuel the legitimation processes through informed public 
deliberation. However, transparency does not necessarily result in greater public trust, and 
in fact may have the opposite effect when it reveals abuse or misuse of power and 
dominance. The paradox of transparency, especially for those who are in government, is 
that, while it strengthens democracy, it is not synonymous with, and may even be the 
antithesis of, strengthening government. In fact, as Christopher Hood has pointed out, the 
term “transparency and openness” itself has many historical and evolving definitions and 
interpretations as it pertains to government, and “seems to be more like an idea that has 
been reinvented after having been left aside.” (2006: p.19). The definition applied here as 
a guide to expectations of openness and its fraternal twin transparency (Heald: p.26) in 
national, provincial and municipal governments is the definition provided by British Lord 
Nolan in 1995 in The First Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, which 
states as follows: 
Holders of public office should be as open as possible about 
all decisions and actions that they take. They should give 
reasons for their decisions and restrict information only 
when the wider public interest clearly demands” (as cited by 
Heald 2006: p.19). 
While public expectations of openness and transparency have grown over the past half 
century, governments have learned not to expect to earn greater public support should 
they choose to comply with public demands for increased transparency, whether through 
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the introduction of disclosure laws or by more open procedures and access to information. 
In fact, greater transparency and access to knowledge about government and governance 
processes have arguably contributed to a decrease in public trust of government. Trust is 
lost rather than gained first because, as Alasdair Roberts has noted, transparency allows 
greater accountability – much of it generated by news media in the form of negative news 
coverage. And further because governing parties, which fully understand the negative 
consequences for power of unwanted accountability, often attempt to limit or interfere with 
the transparency process, including the Access to Information in Canada as is 
demonstrated in the previous chapter. Publication and public awareness of government 
reluctance to be open and transparent further erodes public trust. So transparency from a 
political perspective, at least, is a lose-lose situation for government parties. They lose 
public trust if transparency results in negative stories and public perceptions of their 
conduct and policies, and they lose public trust if they are seen to avoid or interfere with 
those same processes of openness and transparency which the public increasingly 
expects. Roberts explains this effect as it applies to Freedom of Information laws: 
There is good reason to think that FoI will cause suspicion 
of government to worsen. One obvious reason is the steady 
supply of news stories about mismanagement or abuse that 
will be produced by FoI. 
There is a second reason why FoI may aggravate distrust. 
The law creates a process that guarantees ongoing, high-
profile conflict over access to government documents. Every 
year there will be thousands of instances in which 
government officials deny access to information, and 
hundreds of cases in which the information commissioner is 
asked to rule on those denials. The entire process will work 
to reinforce the perception of secretiveness—even if more 
information is, in fact, released. (Roberts 2005b: p.107)113 
Roberts’ predictions have proved accurate in the British experience with FOI, and reflects 
a similar loss of public trust in other countries such as Canada with FOI laws that expand 
government transparency (Worthy 2010: p. 575).114 
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There is little question that transparency processes, including FOI and ATI, which 
lead to authentic understanding on the part of electors may serve to highlight abuses, 
inefficiencies and misuses of power that indicate representative risks. Therefore, 
government transparency which leads to authentic public understanding of risk may well 
serve to undermine public trust in government and its institutions. This question of 
diminishing public trust and the implications for democracy is therefore one which must be 
considered in any evaluation of the value and consequences of greater transparency, 
according to Worthy.  
The debate around FOI and trust is important because 
conventional political discourse holds that trust in 
government has been declining across Western Europe and 
other advanced democracies since the late1960s and early 
1970s with various events or societal shifts attributed as 
causal (see Dalton 2005; Hetherington 2005; Levi and 
Stoker 2000; Nye, Zelikow, and King 1997). [As cited by 
Worthy 2010: p.575]. 
Stephan Grimmelikhuijsen also considered the false but “common assumption that 
government transparency is the answer to declining levels of trust in government” (p.231). 
His 2011 Post-Doctoral Thesis titled Transparency and Trust, found the opposite 
correlation: “Transparency has a limited and mostly negative effect on trust” (212). 
Grimmelikhuijsen divides the transparency and trust literature into three camps: 
“transparency optimists,” transparency pessimists” and those who dismiss the importance 
of transparency on either public trust or government, “Optimists argue that “lifting the veil 
of secrecy will be beneficial to all of us (Davis, 1998) since transparency can do no harm 
if you have nothing to hide,” writes Grimmelikhuijsen. They believe “government will 
perform better” and as a result, public trust in government will build (p. 231). In the optimist 
camp Grimmelikhuijsen includes Joseph Nye Jnr. (1997) and other proponents of 
disclosure laws such as Hood and Heald (2006). Transparency pessimists, according to 
Grimmelikhuijsen, “argue that there is a “dark side of transparency” which will lead to 
“misinformation, worse decision-making, politics of scandal and distrust.” In this pessimists 
camp he includes scholars such as Onora O’Neill (2002). In a BBC lecture O’Neill argued 
“transparency can encourage people to be less honest, so increasing deception and 
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reducing reasons for trust: those who know everything they say or write is to be made 
public may massage the truth. Public reports may underplay sensitive 
information…evasive and uninformative reports may substitute for truth-telling.” She is not 
alone in her concern that people will “self-censor” out of fear that their remarks might be 
made public. Other scholars such as Donald Savoie have expressed concern that ATI 
would serve to quash frank discussion among public servants inside government. He cites 
anecdotal evidence that public servants are now much more careful about producing a 
record of their conversations (1999: p. 290). What that suggests is that public servants are 
still managing to convey their opinions, just not in writing where possible. Some actions 
and decisions require documentation and that will continue. But this objection ignores the 
fundamental argument that the public has a right to know how it is governed and is entitled 
to qualified records – those that meet the requirement for public release as determined by 
disclosure laws such as ATI. It may make some public servants more guarded, and 
certainly makes elected officials uncomfortable, but that does not negate the public’s right 
to review qualified records. 
In a later article called “Ethics for Communication?” (2009) O’Neill objects to 
transparency provided through Freedom of Information requests for another reason 
altogether:  it is essentially not worth the trouble because the information released may 
not be heard or read by the public; 
It is all too common for material that is publicly disclosed or 
disseminated, thereby achieving transparency, not to be 
read, heard or seen by any or many audiences; even where 
it is read, heard or seen, it may not to be grasped or 
understood by those audiences. Transparency counters 
secrecy, but it does not ensure communication (cf. Heald 
and Hood 2006). Sometimes it is even used to maintain 
secrecy: one effective way to ensure that information is not 
communicated is not to keep it secret, but to ‘release’ it with 
no fanfare (O’Neill, 2009: p. 170).  
O’Neill’s point is that transparency may not lead to communication or deliberation 
among members of the public because they may not realize what has been made available 
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to them. However, if this is a legitimate concern, then at worst the transparency that 
disclosure laws allows is no worse than secrecy which makes certain that the public will 
not know or communicate about the information held by government. There is also ample 
evidence that significant information will become public knowledge, especially if opposition 
parties or news media have access to the information. The argument also seems to 
suggest that every piece of government information made available, either voluntarily or 
through FOI or ATI is of such significant consequence to the public that they must discuss 
and deliberate its merits, or lack thereof. As with all communication, much of what is said, 
released, broadcast or read is of limited interest or of interest to a limited audience. If we 
impose a popularity test as a measure on what government information should or should 
not be made public – based on how many people talk about it or know about it – then very 
little information should or would be made available. It is a false standard for testing the 
value of transparency. For example, it may be of considerable interest to me to know about 
soil contamination in my new neighbourhood. It would help me assess personal risks. But 
it may be of no broader interest because it does not generally affect anyone outside of the 
neighbourhood. None the less, such information is of value, if only to a handful of people.  
O’Neill is also concerned with how transparency negatively affects trust. Her 2002 
BBC lecture is primarily concerned with the untrustworthiness of news media. However, 
she also argues that: “If we want to increase trust we need to avoid deception rather than 
secrecy.” She admits that in some cases transparency “may indirectly reduce deception” 
but only where there has been “prior deception…and even if there has been deception, 
openness is not a sure-fire remedy.” (2002: 72). It is quite frankly not a logical or well-
reasoned argument, and the conclusions O’Neill draws appear to be based in her own 
suspicion and mistrust of unethical news media, and fears concerning the nefarious uses 
it might find for information obtained through greater transparency. She does not address 
the public’s right to transparency other than to dismiss transparency as unlikely to have 
any significant impact on deliberations in the public sphere.  
The final camp described by Grimmelikhuijsen is comprised of scholars “who take 
a neutral stance…trust is not or only marginally determined by transparency but by other, 
external, factors, such as economic tide.” (p.231). He places Alasdair Roberts in this camp, 
although that is not an entirely accurate description. As has already been shown, Roberts, 
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along with Worthy are actually in a fourth camp, not described by Grimmelikhuijsen, which 
is comprised of scholars who admit that transparency often does result in diminished trust, 
but argue that as a positive for democracy rather than a negative. Earned distrust is not 
only deserved, it is an essential component of the democratic process of legitimation, or 
delegitimation of governance. Transparency allows the public to know about corruption, 
abuse and incompetence and therefore become less trustful of government. Risks are 
revealed through transparency and access to authentic information. Grimmelikhuijsen’s 
own findings most closely match the neutral camp, although he did find transparency was 
more likely to have a negative effect on trust, than a positive one. This leads 
Grimmelikhuijsen to an interesting question of particular salience for this thesis. He asks: 
“should we care about negative effects” on trust? (p. 240). 
If we accept the public’s right to know the risks of representation through 
transparency of government, the answer must be no, it does not matter. Trust gained 
through deception is a greater evil than mistrust earned through understanding, whatever 
the consequences for the affected political individual or organization. Mistrust that results 
from public understanding as a result of access to authentic information is the basis of 
legitimation, which has the potential for either positive, or negative outcomes. If we take 
the level of trust in government as an indicator of the health of a democracy, or conversely 
the lack thereof, then it begs the question of whether transparency is of benefit. However, 
while trust makes governance less complex from the point of view of the governors, public 
trust is not the only, or even best measure of the strength of democracy. Loss of trust, 
especially when based on evidence of breaches of trust, may serve as a check on abuse 
of the powers of elected office, and may lead to more critical and active citizenship. I am 
therefore proposing that the framework for discussion of transparency in governance is 
expanded beyond the negative impacts on public trust and political fortunes, to one which 
balances those consequences against mitigating the risk which citizens undertake when 
they delegate the powers of public office to representatives who form government. This 
framework changes the analysis of trust evaluation in a democracy. 
 
 326 
7.2. To trust or not to trust: Is that really the question? 
Thomas concludes his paper Trust, leadership and accountability in Canada’s 
public sector, with the observation: “Trust matters. It can be violated or exploited, but it 
has much to recommend it” (2011: 32). It is an important point. But what is trust? And what 
role does trust play in a modern and evolving democracy society such as Canada? This 
chapter considers a number of differing definitions and concepts of trust as they apply to 
the political sphere. Despite the differences, including whether trust is built through a 
personal relationship between two or more people; or between the voters and those they 
elect to power, the cornerstone of a trust relationship is: "the belief that 
somebody/something is good, sincere, honest, etc. and will not try to harm or deceive 
you." 115 While dishonest politicians and examples of violation of public trust abound in 
democratic governments worldwide, it is seldom, if ever achieved with the public’s blessing 
or prior agreement. No politician would run for office by pledging to violate the public’s 
trust once in office. Public trust is therefore a fundamental component of democracy.  
As Thomas’s survey of interdisciplinary differences in the definitions and 
interpretations of trust illustrates, there are what he describes as “a glut of definitions of 
trust” (p.15) which vary across disciplinary fields of study in accordance with the contexts 
in which the definition of trust applies. Psychologists focus on interpersonal trust which 
involves direct relationships between individuals and is based on knowledge and 
experience of one another. Thomas cites Kieron O’Hara’s (2004) contrast between 
interpersonal trust or “local trust” with “global trust (also called institutional trust)” that 
“requires people to trust beyond their own personal sphere, not just in people they know, 
but also in organizations, institutions and overall systems, such as government and its 
various components.” (Thomas 2011: p.7). Since it is rarely possible for citizens to know 
their representatives personally, global trust is the trust context of interest for political 
communication studies. Rather than basing trust on personal knowledge of the individual 
or institution, global trust is based on “generalized expectations,” according to Thomas. 
Global trust produces generalized expectations of 
behaviour and allows for inference about motives, intentions 
and competence. Such generalized trust enables us to 
simplify a complex world and to reduce uncertainty. In fact 
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this concept of global trust provides much of the basis for 
the way that individuals, groups and organizations interact 
in modern society. (2011: p.7). 
Clearly there is a difference between local trust between two individuals who know one 
another, and the generalized trust in a relative stranger seeking public office. In the case 
of personal trust, our experience with another person may lead to a strong expectation, or 
a belief, that they will neither harm nor deceive us. That expectation, although it must exist 
for there to be any level of trust, is significantly diminished in the case of global or 
generalized trust, often to the point where we are aware that there is a risk of harm or 
deceit.  
Most scholars distinguish between local and global trust, and may even deny a 
direct link between the two trust concepts. Thomas cites Russell Hardin’s 2006 book Trust 
in rejecting the use of trust, which he describes as limited to personal relationships 
because it relies on personal knowledge of one another, and therefore should not be used 
to describe political relationships between citizens and government. Thomas quotes 
Hardin’s conclusion: “we should generally speak not of trust in government but only of 
confidence in it” (Hardin, 2006: p.29, as cited by Thomas, 2011: 8). Thomas concedes that 
trust and confidence “could operate separately. For example, citizens could “trust’ the 
motives of public sector leaders, but not have “confidence’ in their capacities” to achieve 
those same goals (pg. 8). However, Thomas also notes that most citizens view trust and 
confidence as interchangeable concepts (p.8). 
Citizens are not alone in using trust and confidence as interchangeable concepts. 
Some political studies scholars also see the concepts as parallel, if not co-dependent. 
Joseph Nye Jr. (1997:1-18) is one example. Nye also interchanges trust with “public 
support” (1997: p.2) suggesting a direct link between what people believe about a 
government’s motives – basically that they trust its intentions are good and that it will 
therefore “not try to harm or deceive you” – and the public’s willingness to support the 
government. But local or global trust is seldom, if ever, blind. A more measured definition 
than one based on “belief” is needed, one that admits to a potential for harm and 
deception, however unexpected. In 1998, Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt and Camerer (1998) 
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examined the literature on trust across several disciplines and found that all definitions of 
trust contained two consistent elements: “confident expectations” and a “willingness to be 
vulnerable.”  
Regardless of the underlying discipline of the authors — 
from psychology/micro-organizational behaviour (e.g., 
Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies; Mishra & Spreitzer) to 
strategy/economics (e.g., Bhattacharya, Devinney, & 
Pillutla) confident expectations and a willingness to be 
vulnerable are critical components of all definitions of trust 
reflected in the articles. The most frequently cited definition 
in this special issue is "willingness to be vulnerable," 
proposed by Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995).” 116 
While the subject might be willing to trust someone based on “confident expectations,” 
awareness of “vulnerability” also means that at the same time they are aware of the 
potential for harm. 
Awareness of vulnerability is similar to Leiss’ definition of risk as the chance of 
serious harm (2001:3). The potential for harm exists in a democracy because 
representative government sets up relationships of power where elite are dominant and 
hold authority over the majority of citizens, who elect them, and in so doing agree to be 
subject to their authority. This awareness of vulnerability or more accurately an awareness 
of risk is central to the bargain of modern democracy, where citizens rightfully claim the 
right to legitimate government by scrutinizing its actions and decisions and holding it to 
account. Trust is therefore not simply a matter of the public handing over the reins of power 
and believing first, that no harm can result, and second that they have no way of monitoring 
or mitigating the risk of harm should it arise during a term of office. The modern bargain of 
democracy is instead built on a trust built on “confident expectations” that those who are 
delegated power will exercise their powers in accordance with mutually-agreed and 
accepted social and ethical standards, including the rule of law. However, there is also an 
awareness of the risks that representatives, or entire governments may fail to live up to 
those expectations, whether through accident, circumstances beyond their control, 
incompetence or corruption and abuse of power. The reasons are largely irrelevant as it 
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is the public alone which has a right to decide through their votes whether or not to 
continue to delegate authority to those who hold power, or to remove them from power. 
The bargain of democracy struck between voters and those they elect as their 
representatives is that once in power, the elected officials will first respect the public’s 
expectation that they will do no harm, and will also not resort to deception to hide risks. 
However, the risk of representatives breaking that bargain is both known and anticipated 
in the democratic system. This is evident in rules and guidelines built into the democratic 
process to reduce the risks of harm and deception. These safety measures both define 
the legal and constitutional limits of power and set consequences for those who violate 
agreed expectations, including criminal actions and penalties, and removal from power 
through elections. These limits on the exercise of power help comprise and legitimize 
citizens’ “confident expectations” (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, Camerer 1998: 394) in 
representation, meaning that while their vote is a show of trust in the particular individual 
or party they endorse, it is also a vote of confidence in the constitutional and institutional 
restraints on the powers that elected office provides. 
7.3. Transparency and trust: conflicting or complementary 
paradigms? 
The right to legitimate representation through qualified transparency of 
government in a democracy means the public has the right to be sceptical about 
representation; to question their representatives; and to achieve this, they also need to be 
informed about government actions and decisions. Further, citizens have a right to 
deliberate openly and freely about governance, and to consider the consequences of 
governance decisions and policies for their own lives, for the lives of fellow citizens, for 
their community, province and nation. However, these rights are meaningless unless 
citizens are provided with adequate and authentic information on which to deliberate. They 
therefore have a right, this paper argues, to receive meaningful and comprehensive 
information about government as a means to scrutinize government and hold it to account. 
According to Anthony Giddens (1994: 186) understanding representation and any risks it 
may pose, gives meaning to the idea of trust because rather than blind acquiescence or 
unsubstantiated “belief”, trust is instead grounded in choice. The choice involves an 
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evaluation of risk to determine whether or not trust is warranted, a choice that we make 
both in our personal and global relationships. Giddens’s trust is “active” rather than 
passive, transforming from a mechanism of obedience, to one which relies on knowledge 
of the risks to test its own validity through discourse and the exchange of information. 
Active trust is trust that has to be energetically treated and 
sustained (186)...In the profound transformations 
happening now in personal life, active trust is necessarily 
geared to the integrity of the other. Such integrity cannot be 
taken for granted on the basis of a person’s incumbency of 
a particular social position. Trust has to be won and actively 
sustained; and this now ordinarily presumes a process of 
mutual narrative and emotional disclosure (Giddens: p. 
189). 117  
7.4. Loss of trust constitute as a “crisis for democracy?”   
There is no question that there is growing mistrust of government on the part of 
citizens. Loss of public trust has been cited by many political pundits and scholars as an 
indicator of what has been described by Nye and others as a “crisis of democracy.” 
Numerous polls have separately documented what has been described as a decline in 
trust or “confidence” by citizens in their political representatives. In the introduction to Why 
People Don’t Trust Government Joseph Nye Jr. writes: 
Confidence in government has declined. In 1964, three 
quarters of the American public said that they trusted the 
federal government to do the right thing most of the time. 
Today only a quarter of Americans admit to such trust (Nye, 
Zelikow and King, 1997: p.1). 
Richard Neustadt (1997: p.180) also points to a measurable decline in Americans’ level of 
trust in government and politics in general. “Since the mid-1960s, trust in American 
institutions, and in government more than most, has declined precipitously and 
continuously as measured by opinion polls” (1997: p.180).  
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Thomas notes a similar trend in Canada, which also faces a loss of public trust in 
government, whether the measure is public opinion polls, voter turn-out or from decreasing 
public participation in the democratic process. 
Like citizens in many other established democracies, 
Canadians have become steadily more critical over the past 
four decades of their political leaders, their government 
institutions and even their system of democracy. We know 
this mainly from public opinion surveys of various kinds, but 
declining turnouts in elections and reduced participation in 
other activities such as membership in political parties, are 
also taken as indicators of disillusionment with politics and 
government. Canadians regularly tell pollsters that they 
have less trust in their politicians, identify less with political 
parties, have less confidence in the main institutions of 
government and express less satisfaction with how 
democracy operates in this country, believing that 
government is run for the benefit of a few big 
interests”(Thomas 2011: p.14-15).  
 However, Thomas points out that in Canada at least, this loss of trust in the actors and 
institutions of government does not appear to have undermined citizens’ faith in 
democracy itself. “National pride and support for the principles of Canadian democracy 
remain high, with two thirds of citizens usually saying that Canada has the best democracy 
in the world (Nevitte, 1996 and Nevitte 2004, as cited by Thomas 2011: p.15). Thomas 
says while there may be what he describes as a “trust deficit” between citizens and 
government (Thomas, 2007)118 he calls it an “exaggeration” to say that “Canada’s public 
service is facing a crisis of trust” (Thomas: 32). What concerns Thomas and other political 
studies scholars is the possibility that “weak trust” or growing mistrust of politics and 
politicians “leads to declining political engagement by citizens,” although Thomas also 
warns that “the studies are inconclusive on this point.” (Thomas: p.32).  
Nye and Neustadt raise similar concerns. Applying the trust “crisis” label more 
broadly to citizen’s attitudes towards government, would seem to result, or at least gain 
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potency, from the increasing use of “public trust” as a central measure for determining the 
strength or weakness of democracy. Political pundits, academics, pollsters and politicians 
alike frequently point to a “crisis of democracy” resulting from growing public mistrust of 
politicians and government.119 This often-cited decline of trust in government (Orren, 1997)  
120 is held in contrast to an ill-defined golden era of high public trust, reportedly occurring 
in the United States and other developed democratic countries between the end of the 
Second World War and the 1960s, with the exception of the United States which, 
according to Neustadt, the 1980s administration of Ronald Reagan when public trust was 
higher than previously, or subsequently (1997: p.180). It should be noted that measuring 
levels of trust is an inexact science and can be flawed depending on a number of variables, 
including how the questions are asked; the meaning of trust for the individual questioned, 
which given that scholars can’t even agree on a definition is most certainly broad and 
varied in the public realm; and whether or not the responses are considered, or merely an 
expression of popular and generalized cynicism about government (Nye 1997: 5). Worthy 
questions whether the so-called Golden Age of great public trust is reality or wishful 
thinking: 
The view that there existed a “Golden Age” in which 
government was trusted by large parts of the populace has 
been challenged, not least because the data are sparse and 
inconclusive (see Van De Walle, Van Roosbroek, and 
Bouckaert 2008; and Worthy 2010: p.575) 
What is clear, and worrying, is that the percentage of people who vote in elections has 
declined in the United States and Canada over the second half of the 20th century and 
into the 21st century (Nye, Zelikow, Orren, 1997). Since declining confidence and 
decreasing voter turnouts both follow downward trends, falling public trust is often cited as 
both causal, and as therefore having negative consequences for democracy.  
Nye and Zelikow argue that declining public trust has at least two negative 
consequences for democracy; first because it breeds a cynical disengagement from the 
political process by citizens and second because widespread mistrust of government 
makes it more difficult to govern (1997: p.277). As trust erodes, voters become more 
cynical about the political process and disengage, leaving fewer and fewer voters to 
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determine the outcome of elections – resulting in what Nye and Zelikow (1997: p.277) 
describe as a “thin democracy”.121  Secondly, decreasing public trust makes it more 
difficult, and therefore less efficient to govern.  
…too much trust may be a bad thing for our liberties…too 
little may mean a government incapable of performing well 
the tasks that most people want government to do (Nye and 
Zelikow, 1997: p. 227). 122  
Innumerable opinion surveys have determined a declining sense of trust in leadership over 
at least the past four decades across most Western democracies. This well-established 
pattern of declining public trust is often interpreted as an impediment to effective 
democratic governance. Neustadt argues that governance is more difficult if those who 
hold public office are faced with constant public scepticism, scrutiny and criticism. 
Declining public trust for politicians and government has "truly and continuously 
damaging" consequences for democracy, he argues (Neustadt 997:p.180). Nye and 
Zelikow (1997) similarly argue that while "too much trust may be a bad thing for our 
liberties...too little may mean a government incapable of performing the tasks that most 
people want the government to do" (1997: p.276). Loss of trust or active mistrust of a 
government, its actions and decisions, certainly can make governing more difficult for 
those who hold power. 
One example of how seriously loss of trust in government can impact the 
functioning of government itself was the 2011 American government deadlock over the 
passing of a bill to allow the country to pay its debtors. The deadlock was drawn along 
party lines and over an anti-government political ideology of the extreme right which 
mistrusts all government as a matter of principle. The influential right-wing anti-
government faction of the Republican Party, called the Tea Party, pressured the 
Republican majority in Congress to vote against Democrat President Barack Obama’s 
proposal to equally cut services and raise taxes in order to cut $4 trillion from the country’s 
debt burden over the next decade. The Tea Party is founded on an ideology of anti-trust 
in modern government, and argues for a return to what its proponents believe are 
fundamental principles of the American constitution, which they believe have been 
subverted by existing and established political parties, including moderate Republicans, 
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and in particular Democrats. American law professor Jared Goldstein says the Tea Party 
movement takes as its inspiration two books written in the 1980s by W.Cleon Skousen, 
that Goldstein describes as “products of the paranoid edges of the radical right wing of the 
Cold War” (2010). They believe with what amounts to religious fervour, that government 
has lost its way and cannot be trusted:  
Like religious fundamentalist movements, the Tea Party 
movement arises in opposition to modern developments 
that supporters believe conflict with foundational principles. 
Like fundamentalist movements, the Tea Party movement 
reaches back to a mythic past, the foundation of the nation, 
to identify the fundamental principles they espouse, 
principles that believers perceive to be under attack - belief 
in God, individualism, limited government, the free market, 
and the sanctity of private property. To Tea Party 
supporters, adherence to the fundamental principles they 
project onto the Constitution serves to divide true believers 
in the constitutional faith from “anti-Americans” who would 
compromise or subvert the nation’s fundamental principles 
(Goldstein, 2010). 123   
Failure to pass the debt bill would have meant that the U.S. government would run out of 
funds by the beginning of August, and for the first time in its history the U.S. would be 
unable to meet its financial obligations, including repaying its loans. Failure to reach 
agreement could prove “catastrophic” for the U.S. economy, warned Treasury Board 
Secretary Timothy Geithner on the CBS program “Face the Nation:”124 But the profound 
lack of trust in government proved more compelling than the potential for financial 
catastrophe.  
In the end it came down to a last-minute compromise which removed the proposal 
for raising taxes and seriously reduced the amount of the deficit to be cut. In the meantime, 
the political battle over a fundamental issue of repaying national debt shook international 
and financial institutional confidence in the ability of the United States to function. The 
country’s financial rating was downgraded by Standard and Poor’s from triple A, a rating 
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which allows a country to borrow at the lowest interest rates, to double A plus. As a 
consequence, stock markets around the world fell, raising questions about whether the 
U.S. and other countries would suffer a financial relapse into the recession of 2008 and 
2009. This same exercise would be repeated again in the final days of 2012, when the 
country would face what became known as a “fiscal cliff.” Again the situation was only 
partially resolved – once again ignoring the growing debt faced by the U.S. (Steinhauer, 
January 1, 2013)125 
It would seem that mistrust of government, particularly on the part of the influential 
Tea Party faction of the Republican Party, trumps even pending predictions of doom. This 
extreme case more than bears out concerns expressed by Nye and Neustadt about failing 
trust making governing more difficult. In this case, it seemed that it was in the public’s 
interest to pass the bill, and in fact opposition seemed to be confined to a minority. Their 
opposition and loss of trust in opposition Democrats, and the President in particular, does 
make it difficult for “performing the tasks that most people want the government to do,” as 
Nye and Zelikow warned. 
7.5. Loss of trust can serve democracy 
However, while an irrational loss of trust based on ideological polarization might 
constitute a “crisis of democracy,” loss of trust based on an assessment of genuine risk 
may result in an affirmation of the democratic process. Citizens who have an authentic 
understanding of governance, rather than a fear based on propaganda and 
misunderstanding, may exercise their right to dissent, and to hold government to account 
and for the public to influence government policy and legislation. Many scholars, including 
Nye see loss of trust, or mistrust, as essential to American democracy. 
One possibility is that the current symptoms [of mistrust] are 
a sign of health. The United States was founded with a 
mistrust of government. The American Constitution was 
deliberately set up in such a way that a King George could 
never rule over us again. And some might add, “nor anybody 
else.” ...A long Jeffersonian tradition says we should not 
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worry too much about the level of confidence in government. 
If the polls reflect wariness rather than cynicism, the result 
may be healthy (Nye: p.2-1)126. 
In Nye’s view, provided that the mistrust is based on a genuine or active opposition to 
government’s actions – as opposed to an unthinking cynicism about government generally 
– then mistrust of government serves a role.  
Even if it is less efficient and more difficult to inform and convince the public, that 
does not mean that democracy is weakened by the process, quite the contrary. 
Democratic governance is not merely about efficiency, and it is certainly not a process that 
requires the electorate to simply go along without questioning the decisions of their 
representatives. It is possible that a dictatorship or tyrant may, at least for a time, run a 
more efficient government, given that it will run without messy interference from the 
outsiders who comprise the public. But there are no scholars who would argue for the 
benefits of tyranny or dictatorship over democracy as a preferred form of governance. 
Democracy is messy: the public will matters, and must be considered. People are elected 
as representatives rather than rulers. Democracy is at its core about the rule of law, and 
about the ability of citizens to legitimate representation through risk assessment, 
management and control.  
7.6. Active trust: critical citizens consider the risks 
Pippa Norris (1999) argues that a more cynical approach by citizens does not 
necessarily equate with “disengagement.” Mistrust may, in fact, have the effect of 
engaging citizens. It may signal a positive trend towards “critical citizens” who question 
and call into account authority and established institutions, and may thereby serve to 
strengthen democracy.  
Criticism does not necessarily imply disengagement. It can 
mean the reverse…It is too easy to link trends like the 
decline of trust in America with the fall in turnout, without 
seeing whether these phenomena are actually causally 
connected. …dissatisfaction with the performance of 
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regimes characterized by widespread corruption, abuse of 
power and intolerance of dissent, can be regarded as a 
healthy reaction. Too much blind trust by citizens and 
misplaced confidence in leaders, for good or ill, can be as 
problematic for democracy as too little. The consequences 
of declining support for government institutions therefore 
remain open to debate (Norris, 1999: p.27).127 
Most citizen-organized political activities are arguably the result of a breakdown of trust, 
resulting in a need to take actions that inform, focus and redirect those who govern. 
Petitions, protests, and presentations to government are all evidence of public mistrust, in 
that sense. They are a demand by citizens who have at the very least set aside, or openly 
rejected the idea that they should merely leave it to government to decide what is best – 
trust – and instead lobby for or demand a change in the government’s course of action, or 
that it take action on a particular issue when it fails to do so of its own volition.  
This alternative interpretation essentially calls into question the idea that public 
trust, or the lack of trust, is an important or even relevant indicator of the strength or health 
of a particular democracy. Not voting may be intended as a show of protest, for example. 
It may not show a lack of interest in the political process, but rather a rejection of traditional 
avenues of influencing those in power. As the environmental movement has shown, it is 
possible for citizens who see themselves as standing outside of the normative political 
process to nonetheless influence that same political process. Direct actions, protests and 
other mediatized environmental campaigns influence political discourse in the public 
sphere, and thereby shape and influence the environmental policies of mainstream 
political parties, all of which systematically and, where resources allow, obsessively and 
even excessively monitor and measure the public’s pulse on issues (CP, December 13, 
2007). 128 
7.7. Nobody trusts a liar 
The public’s right to know and to understand how they are governed is necessary 
not only to legitimate government, but also to mitigate the risk of harm that may result from 
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a government that misleads and therefore derails the legitimation process – in particular 
if it does so through deliberate deception. The risk of harm is greatest when individuals 
are deliberately deceived, or subjected to lies, defined by Sissela Bok as “any intentionally 
deceptive message which is stated (1999:13).” The purpose of lying is to gain advantage 
or to avoid disadvantage for the liar. Lying unfairly tips the balance of power in favour of 
the liar, and against those who are deceived. Bok argues lying makes the deceived less 
capable of accurately evaluating the potential outcomes and consequences: 
To the extent that knowledge gives power, to that extent do 
lies affect the distribution of power; they add to that of the 
liar, and diminish that of the deceived, altering his choices 
at different levels...the estimates of costs and benefits of any 
action can be endlessly varied through successful deception 
(Bok, 1999:p.19).129 
Lying is a dangerous game both for those who are deceived and for the liar, who always 
risks discovery. As with personal relationships, lies once detected or even suspected serve 
to undermine trust, and perhaps even undermine the stability of society itself. When lying 
becomes the norm, the consequences for society itself can be broad and dire, warns Bok: 
Imagine a society no matter how ideal in other respects, 
where word and gesture could never be counted upon. 
Questions asked, answers given, information exchanged – 
all would be worthless. Were all statements randomly 
truthful or deceptive, action and choice would be 
undermined from the outset. There must be a minimal 
degree of trust in communication for language and action to 
be more than stabs in the dark. This is why some level of 
truthfulness has always been seen as essential to human 
society, no matter how deficient the observance of other 
moral principles....A society, then, whose members were 
unable to distinguish truthful messages from deceptive 
ones, would collapse. But even before such a general 
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collapse, individual choice and survival would be imperilled 
(Bok: p.18-19).130 
The ultimate example of leaders as liars is in North Korea, which is a dysfunctional state 
held together by terror and coercion. Even if citizens object, they have no choice and no 
ability to change leadership. However, in a democracy when citizens discover they have 
elected liars, then they lose trust in government and can remove it from power by voting 
against it. It is also evident that whenever we grant power to others, including our elected 
representatives, we risk the potential for harm resulting from abuse of those powers. Trust 
is therefore an inadequate method – if it is a method at all – for democratic legitimation of 
governance. In place of mere trust, the public has a right to know how those they elect, 
and those who hold public offices exercise their powers. Only through understanding and 
knowledge acquired through access to meaningful and authentic government information 
can we assess the risks of harm, and mitigate the risk. 
7.8. The right to know through access to authentic information   
The right for citizens to receive government information concerning potential harm 
already exists as legislation under Freedom of Information laws in at least two Canadian 
provinces: Alberta and British Columbia. The FOI legislation in both provinces – Alberta’s 
FOI law is largely a copy of B.C.’s FOI legislation – states as follows under Section 25: 
Information must be disclosed if in the public interest 
25  (1) Whether or not a request for access is made, the 
head of a public body must, without delay, disclose to the 
public, to an affected group of people or to an applicant, 
information 
(a) about a risk of significant harm to the environment or to 
the health or safety of the public or a group of people, or 
(b) the disclosure of which is, for any other reason, clearly 
in the public interest.131 
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Several elements of this section are relevant to implementing the public’s right to know 
how it is governed. First, Section 25 (1) begins by noting that where there is evidence of 
risk, or it is in the public’s interest (1 –b) information should be made public, even if there 
has been no formal request under the act to do so. This puts the onus on government to 
proactively release information about risk, and or, that is in the public’s interest. The 
section is also an override on all other provincial legislation, meaning that if information 
held by any department of government poses a risk to the public it must be made public. 
It therefore has broad scope and jurisdiction. While risk and harm are traditionally 
interpreted as physical risks of harm, there is no reason why the definition of risk could not 
be expanded to include representational risk, or risks posed by government actions, 
decisions or policies. Finally, the section acknowledges that information should be made 
public if it is “clearly in the public interest.” Therefore even when there is no evident risk, 
information should be made public if it is in the public interest to do so. I am pointing to 
this section of the act to show that it would not take a great leap in terms of adding 
mandatory proactive release of information when it is in the public interest to existing 
disclosure legislation. .  
7.9. Conclusion: transparency and the right to know  
Democracy at its most basic level requires that citizens delegate power to a chosen 
group of representatives who become the dominant authority, and to whose authority all 
citizens are subordinate, at least within the strict parameters of the rule of law and 
accepted codes of behaviour. This bargain of democracy is struck between citizens and 
their representatives on the legal and moral understanding that the public’s trust will not 
be betrayed by those who hold power. Therefore, while public trust is essential to 
democracy, it is granted by voters conditionally, based on a mutually-agreed expectation 
– in part codified in law, but primarily grounded in shared but unwritten moral codes and 
social standards of behaviour – that those who gain and hold power will use that power in 
a trustworthy manner. Failure to do so in effect breaks that bargain and can therefore 
legitimately – both on legal and moral grounds – result in a revocation of power. 
Authentic information that allows citizens to understand the business and 
consequences of government in a democracy is a right. Only through understanding can 
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citizens legitimate government by assessing its actions and decisions. Legitimacy relies 
on several factors which have been well-canvassed by political theorists, including the 
need for checks and balances in the system of government. Public scrutiny of government 
and public accountability are established mechanisms for the strengthening and protection 
of democracy, and will be considered in the conclusion. Information about representational 
risk may be uncovered by actors such as news media and opposition members of 
Parliament; accidently-discovered; leaked by whistleblowers; or made public through 
citizen-generated Access to Information requests. However, none of the current 
government information avenues fully satisfy the public right of access to information. 
Rather, as a right, public access to information requires qualified and systematic 
government transparency mechanisms which must involve the routine release of 
authentic, meaningful and qualified information about governance practices and 
consequences, and about the actions and decisions of those who exercise the powers of 
representation.  
In a democratic system of government that relies on the support of the majority of 
voters to obtain political power, there can be little question that it is more difficult to govern 
a sceptical public than a trusting public. Certainly, democratic governments expend 
enormous time, energy and expense to convince electors that their decisions are 
legitimate and deserving of ongoing support. Strategic political communication for the 
purpose of maintaining voter support, often through deceptive persuasion practices, has 
become a central function of the executive branch of the Canadian federal government, 
and of elected parties and leaders in virtually all advanced democracies, as is 
demonstrated throughout this dissertation.   
Representation always poses the risk of abuse by those who are so empowered 
by voting citizens. What is at risk is nothing less than the safety, security, freedoms and 
rights of each citizen, and the welfare of the society that elected individuals are both 
empowered and mandated to represent. Unlike the traditional and passive governance 
paradigm of public trust, mistrust which results from active scrutiny of government by 
citizens is the basis of the legitimation process which relies on open and shared 
expressions of discontent and dissatisfaction in everyday conversations and through 
discourse in the public sphere, including media; dissent and legal protest; and ultimately 
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withdrawing the right to represent by withdrawing electoral support at an election.  Each 
of these democratic assessment and control mechanisms relies on access to authentic 
government information. Citizens are then enabled to decide by means of public 
discourse, through the right to vote; to dissent, and any other legal means, whether to 
reject or support particular representation. Transparency of information about governance, 
and the public accountability it enables are central and essential to democracy. In an age 
where strategic political communication is the norm for government focused primarily on 
its own political advantage, and in particular the executive branch of government, it has 
never been more important that citizens have the means to authentic information that 
allows understanding of representation and governance. 
 343 
  
Protecting the public’s right to know through access 
to authentic information 
 
...the democratic process requires the ready availability of 
true and complete information. In this way people can 
objectively evaluate the government’s policies. To act 
otherwise is to give way to despotic secrecy.  
Pierre Elliot Trudeau (As cited by Supreme 
Court Chief Justice Beverley McLauchlin, 
2009) 132 
8.1. Strengthening the public’s right to know 
This dissertation is concerned with the public’s right to qualified, authentic 
information that allows citizens to understand how they are represented and governed. 
Previous chapters considered why this is a right in a democracy, including the right to 
understand the risks of representation. This dissertation has also considered the 
democratic values of authentic political communication between government and citizens 
in terms of facilitating communicative action through understanding. This is posed in 
contrast to the implications for democratic deliberation of strategic political communication 
tactics intended as a means of public persuasion rather than citizen understanding. The 
underlying argument is not only that the public has a right to know, but that what they know 
depends on understanding governance and representation through access to authentic 
information. If we accept this argument, then the question is how do we reform existing 
legislation and practices to facilitate this right?  
My interest throughout was to establish as a right the ability of the public to obtain 
authentic information that allows understanding of governance. There is no question, as 
numerous examples illustrate, that allowing the executive branch of government to control 
and determine public information has decreased access to authentic information. The 
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entire Duffy cover-up can be boiled down to the PMO’s determination to prevent the public 
from discovering PM Harper had appointed a senator who had filed highly questionable 
expenses – some of which were accrued working as a fundraiser for the Conservative 
Party. While impossible to quantify, decreasing access to authentic government 
information is also evident in the Conservatives muzzling of public scientists and what 
amounts to censorship of their expertise which must be filtered by partisan communication 
actors before it is released to the public. Any argument for increased access to authentic 
information must therefore consider the detrimental effect of allowing partisan players to 
act as censors and referees on public knowledge and understanding of governance. 
Perhaps it is time to think about government communication along the lines of the 
separation of church and state, where politically-neutral players bound by the legal limits 
of legislation such as the Access to Information Act decide what information should be 
released in the public’s interest. This would allow for much of the information now exempt 
from release to remain secret. However, it might help to take political advantage or 
disadvantage off the table as a legitimate criteria for censorship or secrecy of information. 
Much government information about public services and other non-political information is 
currently made available in a routine manner, and without political interference. Public 
health officials still issue public health warnings, environmental agencies issue warnings 
about pollution and Elections Canada provides the public with information on voting. Public 
Service information is still issued on a daily basis, and usually without ever coming to the 
attention of the PMO or other partisan players. Government is simply too big for everything 
to go through the executive branch. That said, the executive branch has a legitimate role 
to play in protecting national security and other sensitive issues. However, it is clear that 
the executive branch increasingly seeks to manage information that might pose political 
risks, such as science on climate change due to carbon reduction or an increase in the 
use of Alberta’s oil sands. For this reason, partisan consequences of communication need 
to be ruled as legitimate reasons to prevent public access. In fact, the bargain of 
democracy is exactly the opposite: In exchange for power, the governing party agrees to 
being held accountable for its actions and decisions. Information control for political 
advantage essentially breaks that bargain and needs to be reformed.  
I am arguing that any reform of government communication laws, guidelines and 
practices should start from the premise that the public has a right to authentic information 
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that allows understanding. In Canada, the starting point for communication reform is 
reform of ATIA. My approach in making the following recommendations, most of which 
originate with actors who are far more informed in their fields than am I, is from the position 
of “practical philosophy”  which Tully argues aims to: 
Characterise the conditions of possibility of the problematic 
form of governance in a redescription…that transforms the 
self-understanding of those subject to and struggling within 
it, enabling them to see its contingent conditions and the 
possibilities of governing themselves differently. Hence, it 
is not only an interpretive political philosophy, but also a 
specific genre of critique or critical attitude towards ways of 
being governed in the present – an attitude of testing and 
possible transformation (Tully, 2008: 16).  
The recommendations are grounded in the thesis of this dissertation which is that the 
public has a right to know how it is governed, provided that it is in the public’s interest that 
they know. And that it is only possible for the public to know if it has the ability to access 
authentic information that allows understanding of governance. The important caveat in 
making recommendations based on historical theory and contemporary praxis is 
necessarily that these are not intended as the definitive answers or solutions to questions 
of communication rights and practices.  
8.2. Working towards transparency of government in the public’s interest 
One of the first necessary reforms would be a re-evaluation of how elected 
representatives are informed, or as in the case now for opposition MPs, are excluded from 
any meaningful opportunity to be briefed about government policies and decisions. 
Currently, opposition MPs, who are elected with the same duty to represent their 
constituents as government MPs, have no more right to access unpublished government 
records than do the members of the public. This leads to an impoverishment of debate in 
the House of Commons where the government holds all the information cards. Not even 
the most basic background reports produced by bureaucrats specifically for the 
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government – including for bureaucrats and for the executive branch – can be released to 
MPs without the permission of the executive branch. The expertise of Canada’s massive 
federal bureaucracy is currently restricted to advising the executive branch alone, 
including unelected political advisors who have far greater access to secret information 
than elected MPs.  
The Conservative Party recognized this deficit while serving in opposition prior to 
their first election as government in 2006. The newly-elected government created the 
position of Parliamentary Budgets Officer under its Federal Accountability Act as part of it 
election promise to increase government accountability. However, from the outset the 
budget officer would lack the independence of other parliamentary officer such as the 
auditor general and information commissioners who report only to Parliament and act 
independently of other government institutions and agencies, the budgets officer is under 
the control of the Library of Parliament and therefore is not an independent office. 
However, it does have a broad mandate to inform parliamentarians about projected costs 
for government programs and policies. The mandate posted on budget officer’s website 
reads as follows: 
The mandate of the Parliamentary Budget Office is to 
provide independent analysis to Parliament on the state of 
the nation's finances, the government's estimates and 
trends in the Canadian economy; and upon request from a 
committee or parliamentarian, to estimate the financial cost 
of any proposal for matters over which Parliament has 
jurisdiction.  
Senior federal public servant Kevin Page was appointed as Canada’s first 
Parliamentary Budge Officer on March 25, 2008, almost two years after the legislation to 
set up the office was introduced. Page would spend six years in the position, much of it at 
loggerheads with the government over reports which often challenged its strategic political 
communication on large-scale budgetary commitments such as fighter planes and the cost 
of Canada’s commitments in the Afghanistan war. I interviewed Page on May 30, 2011 at 
his Ottawa office and he acknowledged the resistance to transparency his office had faced 
to that point. He blamed both the executive branch and the public service’s lack of 
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transparency in failing to inform parliamentarians about the policies and decisions on 
which they were asked to vote. His office was hoping to make more information available, 
and acknowledged that it had not been an easy task: 
I think there is a recognition that Parliament is pretty closed. 
It is closed to Canadians. It is closed even within the 
executive side. So that cabinet ministers don’t know what 
goes into the budget and are not briefed. …In our office we 
kind of took this on and we have had a bumpy ride. The first 
year and a half was not fun (Rees interview with Kevin Page, 
May 30, 2011)  
Before his appointment, Page had worked as a financial analyst for the finance 
department, the PCO and for the Treasury Branch Secretariat, and had more than 30 
years as a government insider. During that time he had witnessed a decline in 
transparency throughout government.  
It is kind of a cultural issue now. I think it was a culture that 
we have taken to extremes, in terms of transparency. I think 
the trajectory is very negative. It is not flat. It is actually 
declining. I had my first public service job in 1981, worked in 
Finance and the Privy Council Office and Treasury 
Board…Even in the budget context I think the trajectory is 
going down. It’s been down even within the executive. So 
how we brief to the government has been getting smaller 
and smaller. And that has kind of transferred itself to 
Parliament and to Canadians.   
However, he said transparency had taken an even greater hit under the Conservatives 
than with previous governments. He blamed executive branch message control and 
political interference with the work of public servants on a scale not seen previously:  
I think under this government you could probably make the 
case that communications is done differently from previous 
governments. The whole control of message, the 
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centralization of control of message, there is a premium on 
that. More than others who were less centralized.  
Page said the public service, in particular the deputy ministers who head 
each department, also had to share some of the blame for failing to defend 
its own mandate of political neutrality.  
But I would not let the public service off the hook in terms of 
financial analysis and how these documents are written 
because at the end of the day there are like 460,000 of us 
[public servants]…These deputy ministers of these big 
central agencies, they are supposed to be non-partisan 
accountability officers… I think the trajectory towards less 
transparency predates this government. I am not blaming 
this government. And again, the public service and the 
political side are equal partners in this. 
Page continued to battle for information throughout his highly-contentious six-year 
term in office. In a recent interview on CBC radio’s The Current he told host Anna Maria 
Tremonti, that often his office had to go outside of the federal government to get 
information on huge budget items such as the cost of the proposed purchase of F-35 
fighter jets and the Afghan war, working with Americans in projecting costs because no 
information could be obtained from the executive branch or public servants in Canada. He 
has recently written and published a book on his experience as Budget Officer titled: Truth, 
Lies and Numbers on Parliament Hill (2015). During the radio interview he renewed his 
call for greater transparency of government in the interest of informing discussion in 
parliament and among members of the public. 
The state of our institutions, the ability of the legislature to 
hold the executive to account is very important. I think it is 
valuable for Canadians to have access to the work people 
like me do, public servants. We could hopefully help explain 
how we look at costs when we send people to war and what 
are the policy debates that flow from that…Once you put out 
those numbers you would hope that you stimulate a political 
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debate, like what are the other options…But if you shut 
down debate because you don’t provide any information, I 
think there is a cost to parliament (Page interview on The 
Current, September 29, 2015).  
What is evident from people like Page, and  the work of Canadian political studies scholars 
and from the journalists who cover politics in Ottawa is that the federal system of 
government is facing a transparency crisis which is worsened by power relations in which 
the prime minister and his political staff hold  too many of the cards. What is perhaps less 
evident is just how significant control of communication has been in allowing the PM and 
his political staff to control government. As this dissertation has attempted to show, the 
centralization of power in the hands of the PM described first and most determinedly by 
Donald Savoie is in large part due to the first minister’s ability to control the flow of 
information in government. That control includes denying even Parliament the right to 
know how the PM and his party governs. MPs, ministers and bureaucrats alike are 
muzzled and are allowed to speak only in the scripted and strategically-political language 
provided by PMO communications staff. The public are thus denied authentic information 
as a means to avoid the risk of blame, and fed in its place a steady diet of partisan credit-
seeking “messaging” that serves the messenger’s ends, but seldom the receiver’s ability 
to understand how it is governed.  
Ultimately, inside government it is the PM who decides what the Canadian public 
will know, and what will remain secret. As a result, Canada is teetering dangerously close 
to the system of “despotic secrecy” which Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau warned 
against in the mid-seventies. Ironically, it was executive branch communication policies 
and practices which Trudeau and his Liberal government put in place which helped to lead 
the way. In fairness, Trudeau and the Liberals also introduced the Access to Information 
Act, which opened the secret filing draws of government to the public on the basis of law, 
rather than at the pleasure of the government. However, by the time ATIA was enacted a 
year later in 1983 by the newly elected government of Brian Mulroney, the Liberals and 
Conservative executive branches had already taken steps to limit its ability to peer into 
anything that might provide insight into its own inner workings. Cabinet secrecy would 
remain secure despite the ATIA. But executive branch resistance to ATI did not end there 
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and over the next three decades successive executive branches would seek, and 
eventually succeed in making the executive branch of government totally exempt from the 
federal disclosure law – rendering Canada’s ATIA one of the weakest disclosure laws 
enacted in any democratic country in which freedom of information is regarded as a 
legitimate right. So not only does the executive branch have the legal right to control all 
communication within government, it has closed the one communication avenue that 
previously existed, limited as it was, for the public to obtain information about the executive 
branch. Leading right-to-information (RTI) scholar Alasdair Roberts makes an important 
point about how excluding one branch of government from disclosure law, skews access 
across government as controversial decision-making moves to the closed information 
venue: 
If certain parts of government are known as enclaves that 
are outside the law, there is a strong temptation to shift 
activity to those enclaves. This undermines decision-making 
processes and respect for the law within and outside 
government (Roberts, 2012: pp. 6). 133  
This may explain, at least in part, why the ATIA exempt PMO has become communication 
central. Roberts argues that ATIA must be reformed to bring all departments, agencies 
and institutions of government, including the executive branch, under the law.  
Supreme Court Justice McLachlin also called for reforms of ATIA in a speech 
delivered in 2009 on the importance of ATIA and privacy legislation. The chief justice 
began by reminding her audience of the fundamentals of parliamentary democracy:   
The legislative branch is the foundational element of 
democracy. It is built on the premise that power flows from 
the people to their elected representatives who are 
empowered to make the laws that govern the people. The 
legislative branch represents the will of the people. It derives 
its power from the people, via the ballot box. 134 
Access to information which informs public debate facilitates that 
fundamental power relationship in a democracy, McLaughlin argued. The 
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ability of the public to obtain authentic information about government is 
central to an effective democracy, not only because it allows citizens to 
make informed choices as voters, but also because it allows citizens to act 
to check and control the use and abuse of power by those they elect.  
In sum, in any system, democracy included, the apparatus 
of the stare must be controlled. Without controls, the natural 
tendency to increase power will not be restrained. And 
without information, the necessary controls, whether at the 
ballot box or through judicial challenge, are absent. 
Constraining the “apparatus of the state”, to borrow 
Mallory’s term, depends on the people being informed about 
what government is doing.  
Canada’s ATIA is one step – at the moment faltering – towards ensuring the 
public’s ability to obtain authentic information. As McLaughlin also points out, the parallel 
Privacy Act and many provisions in the ATIA protect individual privacy, and in the case of 
ATIA, also allows for secrecy where prescribed by the law, which with some necessary 
reform is as it should be in the best interests of the public. However, despite the 
introduction of ATIA, Canada has a long way to go before it breaks free of the system of 
government communication described by Professor Donald C. Rowat, whom McLaughlin 
also quoted, in his 1978 argument for the introduction of disclosure law in Canada. His 
warning was valid then, and valid now: 
The most advanced democracies have been gradually 
coming to realize that they have inherited from earlier times 
a tradition of governmental secrecy which is incompatible 
with the people’s right to know how they are being governed. 
The principle embodied in this tradition is that all 
administrative information is to remain secret except that 
which the government decides to release. 
In fact, control of information flow has never been tighter than it is today in the executive 
branch, and particularly the PMO. The difference from 1978 to today is ATIA, which is the 
only breach in the wall of PMO information control, and since it does not apply to the 
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executive branch, what happens behind its own inner circle remains secret. But the way 
forward towards democratizing information flow is also suggested by Rowat, as 
McLaughlin pointed out by quoting him in her London lecture on the rule of law:  
By now, several democratic countries have reached the 
conclusion that this principle is wrong and ought to be stated 
the other way around: all administrative information is to be 
open to the public except that which needs to be kept secret 
as defined by law (January 8, 2014).   
Rowat is arguing for a paradigm shift from the long-standing concept that 
government owns government information, to one that accepts that government 
information belongs to the public unless it is in the public’s interest to remain secret. It is 
not a new idea, but it will no doubt meet with resistance both inside government at the 
level of both the executive branch and the bureaucracy, and no doubt even with scholars 
who are concerned that public servants in particular already face extensive scrutiny inside 
government through internal audits and various other oversight. But the right to know is 
foundational to democracy and takes primacy over the comfort level of bureaucrats and 
elected representatives alike. The measure is, or should be, what best serves the public’s 
interest, rather than institutional or political interests.  
If power relationships inside government are to be rebalanced, it must include a 
rebalance of information control both inside government and between government and the 
public. This is already in place in the U.S. where on his first day in office on January 21, 
2009 President Barack Obama issued a memorandum which set out new transparency 
guidelines called the Open Government Directive to heads of all government departments. 
In part the memorandum reads as follows: 
Government should be transparent. Transparency 
promotes accountability and provides information for 
citizens about what their Government is doing. Information 
maintained by the Federal Government is a national asset. 
My Administration will take appropriate action, consistent 
with law and policy, to disclose information rapidly in forms 
that the public can readily find and use. Executive 
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departments and agencies should harness new 
technologies to put information about their operations and 
decisions online and readily available to the public. 
Executive departments and agencies should also solicit 
public feedback to identify information of greatest use to the 
public (Obama, January 21, 2009)135. 
This was a hopeful gesture which has not borne full fruit, far from it. As the Edward 
Snowden case amply proves, much of what government agencies do in the United States 
would remain secret were it up to the Obama administration. Therefore, while it would be 
beyond naïve to argue that the U.S. is a perfectly transparent state, it is without question 
far more open to public access and scrutiny than is the case in Canada. It is also clear 
that any hope for greater transparency and access to authentic information about 
government needs to begin at the top with the executive branch committing to the principle 
first, and then directing the public service to work towards that end.  
8.3. Transparency versus information control 
It is beyond the scope of this project to provide detailed recommendations on how 
to proceed. Rather, my purpose has been to argue that democracy is at its core a 
communications exercise which depends on citizens’ ability to obtain authentic information 
about government and the representatives they elect in order to legitimate and control that 
government. It is therefore evident that if democracy is to be reformed in ways that make 
terms such as transparency, accountability and legitimacy of government meaningful, a 
key place to start is by reforming and improving public access to information about 
government. Fortunately, a model for moving towards a democracy in which authentic 
information is available already exists. Disclosure laws such as Access to Information and 
Freedom of information, while desperately in need of reform, lay the groundwork for 
determining what government information is in the public’s interest to make public, and 
what information should remain secret in the public’s best interest. A sensible starting point 
might therefore be to reform ATIA to ensure that it serves the public’s best interests, rather 
than protecting the political or institutional interests of either politicians or bureaucrats. 
There are guidelines from which to proceed. Information Commissioners from John Grace 
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to the current commissioner have called for specific reforms which would expand the 
scope and effectiveness of ATIA in Canada.  
8.4. Proactive disclosure: make information available online without the 
need to file a request 
Reform of the government information regime needs to extend beyond the right of 
individuals to use disclosure laws such as ATIA to request qualified information about 
government. In fact, qualified information relevant to decisions and the consequences of 
those decisions should be made available online on a routine basis so that anyone who 
wishes to understand a policy, decision or action of consequence to their lives or the lives 
of other citizens has the ability to simply look it up. No formal request. No fees and no 
delays. Current Information Commissioner Suzanne Legault has argued for improved 
proactive disclosure since her appointment in 2010. She presented a paper arguing for 
increased proactive disclosure of government information to the Standing Committee on 
Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics on April 29, 2010 as an essential element of 
open government. She began by defining proactive disclosure as “an environment where 
information is routinely disseminated electronically, with the exception of that which 
government must protect because it poses a risk to a public or private interest.” 
Technological advancement has made it realistic for governments to publish records by 
posting them to websites and other electronic information portals at minimal cost. The 
result is easy access for members of the public. Legault stressed the need for government 
to act quickly, in part due to increasing delays in the processing of ATIA requests, but also 
because ATIA is limited in its reach and effectiveness because it “is reactive in the sense 
that access is granted only after someone asks for it.” Legault notes that it is “urgent that 
government make a commitment to greater disclosure of its public information and 
imperative that it develop a comprehensive open government strategy to support it.” She 
explained: 
Proactive disclosure is an essential component of the 
broader concept of open government. Open government is 
predicated on a system in which government records are 
available to citizens in open standard formats that permit 
unlimited use and re-use of the information. This facilitates 
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public engagement and participation which, in turn, 
promotes greater transparency, accountability and trust in 
government. (Legault, 2012). 
While there is a question as to whether greater access equals greater public trust, it is 
clear that proactive disclosure is an important component in making government 
accountable. Nor does this mean an abandonment of the ATIA, as the disclosure law 
would continue to serve as a guide to determining which records are qualified for 
disclosure, and which records should remain secret or private. FOI and ATI requests could 
also still be filed by individuals who wish to obtain qualified information that is not routinely 
available. But for the most part, disclosure requests should be seen as last-resort 
methods, rather than the first step in understanding governance. That is why it is essential 
that the ATIA is reformed and expanded in its scope.  
8.5. Reforming ATIA  
There is no question that Canada’s ATIA is in desperate need of reform and that 
many blueprints for reform already exist, thanks largely to the commitment of the 
information commissioners whom for the past two decades have tabled their concerns and 
recommendations for change in reports to Parliament. There have been too many specific 
recommendations to list here. However, the reports provide an excellent starting point for 
any government that is serious about rehabilitating ATIA in Canada.136 Any government 
which was determined to reinstate a functioning ATIA would start by consulting those 
recommendations, and by bringing in former and current commissioners to work alongside 
disclosure scholars and ATI bureaucrats in updating the act. That said, there are a few 
key recommendations that would have a profound effect on the effectiveness of the Act: 
 One immediate reform would be to ensure that the executive branch is 
brought back under the umbrella of ATIA. This in itself would go a long 
way to making the act effective, and also in checking the powers of the 
executive branch. As the Duffy case makes clear, much can be learned 
about how a government conducts its business by reviewing the records 
concerning its handling of particular events and issues.  
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 Several commissioners have recommended a public interest clause 
similar to the sections that exist in the B.C. and Alberta FOI legislation be 
added to the ATIA. The establishment of the public interest as paramount 
in ATIA and as an override on all other acts, would set the public interest 
as a test for determining which records should be made public or held in 
secret.  
 Give the Information commissioners order powers, meaning that their 
orders must be acted upon. Several provincial FOI commissioners 
already have order powers.  
Finally, there is the issue of protecting ATIA officials from political interference, which has 
been addressed as a concern in two reports by current Information Commissioner 
Suzanne Legault (2011 and 2014). It is clear that it is necessary to consider ways and 
means of protecting the political neutrality of bureaucrats, and in particular ATIA officials 
who have been targeted for routine political interference in their duties. Perhaps limiting 
or outlawing contact between political staff and ATIA officials would prove effective. 
Certainly, political staff should not be allowed to instruct ATIA officials or otherwise 
interfere with their work, including requiring them to write media lines and other political 
communication products concerning the requested records. Firewalls between ATIA 
officials charged with processing requests and political staff should be considered, with 
communication between political staff and ATIA public servants handled at senior levels, 
with ATIA co-ordinators communicating with deputy ministers, who then communicate with 
political staff. Even then, it should not involve any discussion of political consequences 
arising from releasing requested records which might in some way prejudice the ATIA 
process. Consideration might even be given to setting up an ATIA agency which operates 
under its own deputy minister and separate from any particular department of government. 
These recommendations are by no means comprehensive, but they would provide an 
important starting point in any conversation concerned with reforming ATIA to reflect and 
protect the public’s interest in obtaining authentic information about government. 
 357 
8.6. ATIA as the cornerstone for public access to authentic information  
As already mentioned, one of the reasons why it is essential to reform ATIA is that 
it could serve as the cornerstone for broader access to authentic records. While the 
disclosure law does open an avenue for challenging what  Pierre Trudeau described as 
“despotic secrecy,” it should not be the first means of doing so. Rather, ATIA is in effect 
the codification of access and secrecy law, which were it based on determining the public 
interest in either outcome, could provide a guide for greater proactive release of authentic 
information. Some proactive release of information already exists. The Treasury Branch 
provides the expense claims of executive branch staff, for example. Anyone who wants to 
know about their expenses can simply look up their claims. The recommendation here is 
for a greatly expanded proactive release program which would see key records posted 
online so that any interested individual could simply look them up, rather than filing a 
request. Exactly which records might be included will have to be determined by 
independent parties who might consider such factors as which records are requested most 
commonly under ATIA, but also which records are first qualified for release, and which are 
essential to enable the public’s understanding of governance. If the purpose of ATIA is 
greater transparency of government, then it must have a proactive component which 
would result in the routine and systematic posting of significant government records 
without the need for a particular request. A revamped ATIA could serve as more than a 
passive mechanism activated only when an individual files a request for specific 
information. ATIA could serve as a guide for proactive – voluntary – release of government 
information. It would help bureaucrats to determine which information is qualified for 
immediate posting to online websites as a matter of course. Issues like privacy and 
national security would continue to be protected, along with a myriad of other exemptions 
included in the ATIA, provided that the exemptions served the public interest. The 
argument presented here is for an expansion of the role and purpose of ATIA to one which 
enables government departments and agencies to proactively and routinely make public, 
without the need for a specific request, significant and qualified government records that 
would contribute to the public discourse by increasing citizens’ understanding of how they 
are governed; the consequences of governance decisions; and the rationale for those 
decisions. As with the courts, there are limits to openness, including privacy rights and the 
need to protect national security.  
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8.7. The need for secrecy 
The argument is for making qualified authentic information about government 
available on a systematic and routine basis when it serves the public’s interests to do so. 
Secrecy, when it serves the public’s interests or protects the privacy of individuals, also 
has an important place in the political communication practices of a democracy. 
Governments can justify the use of secrecy provided that it serves the publics’ interests, 
and that the public is provided first with a notification of what sort of records are being 
withheld, and second, a general explanation of why this is necessary (Thompson, 1999). 
In Democratic Secrecy, Thompson acknowledges that secrecy, although sometimes 
essential to any government, poses a dilemma for democracy: 
The conflict involves his basic dilemma of accountability: 
democracy requires publicity, but some democratic policies 
require secrecy. The first horn is familiar enough; the 
policies and processes of government must be public in 
order to secure the consent of the governed. At a minimum, 
democracy requires that citizens be able to hold officials 
accountable, and to do that citizens must know what officials 
are doing, and why. But the second horn points to the fact 
that some policies and processes, if they were made public, 
could not be carried out as effectively or at all. These 
policies and processes may well be ones to which citizens 
would consent if they had the opportunity. The most familiar 
examples are in foreign policy and law enforcement 
(Thompson, 1999: p.183).  
Thompson argues that it would be detrimental to ignore the importance of secrecy, but 
argues that the issues of publicity and accountability cannot be simply ignored. He 
therefore offers a compromise solution, which should be considered further in any 
reassessment of transparency. Thompson proposes a “lifting of the veil of secrecy just 
enough to allow for some degree of accountability” (p. 185). The first step, where it is 
feasible, would be to “make secrecy temporary” thus allowing “citizens to judge the policy 
or process.” If that is not possible, then government should practise what Thompson 
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describes as “second order publicity” (p. 185) which would reveal to the public that a 
process or policy has happened in secret, while not giving away any details of the policy 
or process that should remain secret in the best interests of the public (p. 185). Another 
means of democratizing the secrecy process would be to include elected representatives 
who have been sworn to secrecy in the process, at least to the extent of notifying them of 
the secret actions or decisions. This is routine practise in the American government where 
all–party committees oversee sensitive files such national security. The overall argument 
I am making is for more systematic and less partisan methods and guidelines for 
determining whether secrecy or access is the appropriate designation as determined by 
what best serves the publics’ interest.  
8.8. Determining whether information is authentic or politically strategic  
Freedom of speech is among the most important rights in a democracy. It is 
therefore not acceptable to deny a political party the right to advertise its own merits. 
Political parties and politicians should be able to advertise their merits as much as they 
wish and can afford to fund from their own revenues. However, there is no legitimate 
reason why taxpayers should pay for that advertising, nor is it acceptable for a government 
to serve up propaganda and advertising in place of authentic information. Democracy 
requires an informed electorate that has sufficient grasp and understanding of government 
and its decisions to weigh the consequences and call it to account for its actions and 
decisions. Here too there are models for how to begin the process of reform. In the spring 
of 2015, Ontario’s Auditor General Bonnie Lysyk, went public with her concerns about the 
Liberal government’s proposed changes to the Government Advertising Act. Lysyk was 
concerned that the government of Premier Kathleen Wynn planned to “gut” restrictions on 
government advertising which distinguished between advertising as a public service and 
advertising which was credit-seeking for the government. (Ferguson, Toronto Star, May 
12, 2015). Ontario’s Advertising Act listed examples of the types of advertising issues that 
qualified for public funding: 
(2) Examples of reasons for which a government office may 
choose to communicate to the public in a manner described 
in subsection (1) include, 
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(a) informing the public about existing, new or proposed 
government programs, plans, services or policies, including 
fiscal policies such as policies respecting pensions or taxes; 
(b) informing the public about changes or proposed changes 
to existing government programs, plans, services or 
policies; 
(c) informing the public about the goals, objectives, 
expected outcomes, or results of, or rationale for, a matter 
referred to in clause (a) or (b); 
(d) informing the public of their rights and responsibilities 
under the law; 
(e) encouraging or discouraging specific social behaviour, in 
the public interest; 
(f) promoting Ontario or any part of Ontario as a good place 
to live, work, invest, study or visit; 
(g) promoting any economic activity or sector of Ontario’s 
economy or the government’s plans to support that 
economic activity or sector; and 
(h) informing the public about Ontario’s relationships with 
other Canadian governments, including promoting Ontario’s 
interests in relation to those governments. 2015, c. 20, 
Sched. 14, s. 2. 137 
In essence, in order to qualify for public funding, advertising had to inform the public about 
a public service or health issue or some other matter that served the public interest. 
Perhaps more importantly, the Act specified that “partisan” information did not qualify for 
public funding. It defined “partisan advertising” as follows: 
(2) An item is partisan if, 
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(a) it includes the name, voice or image of a member of the 
Executive Council or of a member of the Assembly, unless 
the item’s primary target audience is located outside of 
Ontario; 
(b) it includes the name or logo of a recognized party, within 
the meaning of subsection 62 (5) of the Legislative 
Assembly Act;  
(c) it directly identifies and criticizes a recognized party or a 
member of the Assembly; or 
(d) it includes, to a significant degree, a colour associated 
with the governing party, subject to subsection (4). 2015, c. 
20, Sched. 14, s. 8.138 
It was the jurisdiction of the auditor general to determine whether or not a proposed 
advertising campaign fit either category. Interestingly, only one percent of ads were 
rejected for funding on the basis that they were partisan – suggesting that government 
was self-regulating its own advertising plans based on the distinction. The government 
proposed a much more limited definition of “partisan advertising” which would only 
eliminate ads which used the party name and other credit-seeking factors such as party 
logos “to a significant degree”. Lysyk complained that the change would mean: “I would 
no longer be able to consider factors such as political context, the use of self -
congratulatory messages, factual accuracy or an advertisement’s criticisms of other 
political parties in my review.”139 She asked that her office therefore be relieved of the 
responsibility of reviewing government ads. What is significant for this dissertation, is not 
so much the political battle, but rather the example of an act which seeks to define the 
difference between advertising which is essentially strategic political communication for 
partisan purposes, and public service advertising which presents the public with authentic 
information that serves the public’s interest. Such legislation at the federal level would 
prove useful for weeding out expensive partisan advertising, and also for establishing, 
even indirectly, standards for authentic political communication.  
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8.9. Depoliticization of communication: Limiting the partisan influence of 
the PMO 
This is not a political science dissertation, and I will therefore not make suggestions 
on the restructuring of institutions of government. However, what is clear from the case 
study of the PMO is how central control of information equates to control of government 
as a whole. Protecting political neutrality of government communication would be one step 
towards decreasing executive branch control of government. As with ATIA, a first step 
would be to decouple the bureaucracy and political staff, including ending practices such 
as Message Event Proposals which require PMO political staff’s permission for 
bureaucrats to speak to news media, or even to discuss their work with professional 
colleagues, as is the case with government scientists. Ministerial responsibility should also 
mean that the minister is responsible for determining if and when she will communicate 
with the public, and what she will say when she does. These changes would no doubt 
prove controversial and may even be too extreme to implement. However, it is important 
that any reforms of government be directed at reducing the centralization of power in the 
hands of the PM. 
8.10. Conclusion 
The purpose of this conclusion has been to suggest ways in which political communication 
rights might be strengthened in the Canadian context, and to provide suggestions that are 
useful in a global context. If anything about democracy is apparent, it is that it is always a 
work in progress, and not always on a positive trajectory, as the history of Canada’s ATIA 
makes clear. The possibility for positive change always exists, and in particular when the 
public determines that the time for change is now. There is an ongoing need for critical 
analysis and constant adjustment to the changing state of political communication and 
dialogue between citizens and their representatives in government. Central and essential 
to this critical analysis is what Tully terms as “questions of freedom.”  
The questions of politics are approached as questions of 
freedom. What are the specific practices of governance in 
which problems arise and the practices of freedom by 
which they are raised? And what are the possible practices 
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of freedom in which free and equal subjects could speak 
and exchange reasons more freely over how to criticise, 
negotiate and modify their always imperfect practices? 
This is a permanent task of making sure that the 
multiplicity of practices of governance in which we act 
together do not become closed structures of domination 
under settled forms of justice but are always open to 
practices of freedom by which those subject to them have 
a say over and an hand in them (Tully, 2008: 38). 
This conclusion argues for a consideration of the role political communication plays in 
facilitating mechanisms of democracy such as public scrutiny of government, 
accountability, authentic deliberation and legitimation of government. These mechanisms 
all rely on the public’s ability to obtain authentic government information that allows 
understanding of government and representation. By contrast, these fundamental 
operations and mechanisms of the democratic process are undermined, and even denied 
when political communication with the public is managed and controlled for the strategic 
interests of institutions of government, or the political interests of the party in power. 
Facilitating democracy therefore requires a reassessment of political communication 
between government and the public it is elected to represent and serve. In order to realize 
the public’s right to know how it is governed, it must have access to authentic information 
that allows understanding. Partisan credit-seeking and blame avoidance has no legitimate 
role to play inside government, and should no longer be funded by taxpayers. Rather it 
should be made clear that strategic political communication is a partisan communication 
product and as such, paid for by the parties who sponsor and promote its intended 
message. SPC should never be substituted for the authentic information to which the 
public is entitled. This dissertation therefore argues for the right of citizens to greater 
access to “authentic” or “undistorted communication” (Dakroury 2009: p.126) between 
government and citizens, and equally to be protected from attempts to disguise SPC 
information by identifying it as official government information paid for by taxpayers. This 
would mean a radical departure from the current reality of a political communication 
landscape, including outright propaganda, controlled by government and largely focused 
on the production of politically-strategic information that promotes the partisan interests of 
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government. It calls for greater transparency of government in the form of systematic and 
routine public access to authentic government information that is qualified for release 
because it is in the public’s interest to do so. This is also an argument for an expansion of 
transparency of government information that takes as its guiding principle a consideration 
of the public’s interest in knowing. I am recommending a reinterpretation of information 
laws, including access and secrecy that takes as its central principle that government 
information belongs to citizens and should be available to citizens as long as it is in their 
interests that it be released. My intention is to help promote an informed and critical 
approach to information rights that adopts what Tully describes as an “attitude of testing 
and possible transformation” (p.16). My hope is to be part of a critical public conversation 
about how to proceed in that direction.    
8.11. Postscript: New government, new communication perspective? 
In March, 2015 Liberal leader Justin Trudeau introduced private members’ Bill C-
613, which he described as the Transparency Act, in which he called for a number of 
significant amendments to Canada’s Access to Information Act. Although the act was 
defeated on April 1, 2015, which is coincidentally also April Fools’ Day, the amendments 
it proposed if passed, would have resulted in a fundamental shift towards greater 
openness and transparency for Canada’s federal government. Speaking in favour of the 
bill on March 31, 2015, Trudeau said that his Transparency Bill would result in a 
fundamental shift in how government records and data were viewed, moving from a regime 
which favoured secrecy over access to one that “would make all government information 
and data open by default and easily accessible.” The purpose for this radical shift was 
to strengthen Canadian democracy, Trudeau told the House of Commons. 
I believe more openness and transparency, along with strengthened 
information laws, will lend more accountability to this place. It is important to 
Canadians and to the continued health of our democracy. 
Although the bill was defeated, Trudeau promised that if elected his government would 
introduce measures to make government more open and accountable. He listed the 
democratic reform changes his party proposed, including: “ending the practice of 
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appointments of candidates by party leaders and, instead, holding open nominations; 
loosening the grip of the Prime Minister's Office on Parliament; working with all parties to 
consider electoral reform; banning partisan government advertising; and embracing 
evidence-based scrutiny.” The Liberals’ “open parliament” plan demonstrated “a 
willingness to raise the bar on openness and transparency,” said Trudeau (March 21, 
2015).  
At the time of writing in February, 2016, the Liberal government led by Prime 
Minister Trudeau has been in power for about three months, a very short period of time in 
which to implement policies. It is therefore difficult to predict whether the reforms the party 
promised while in opposition will be borne out as legislation. However, there are some 
reasons for optimism concerning increased openness in government at this early juncture. 
One of the first acts of the new government was to make public the “Ministerial Mandate 
Letters” which are given to each new minister outlining the government’s expectations for 
the minister and his or her department. While issuing mandate letters is a long-standing 
tradition, never before have they been made public. The letters to the ministers explain 
that the prime minister expects “Canadians to hold us accountable for delivering these 
commitments.” The mandate letter for each of the Liberal ministers are posted on the 
prime minister’s website. A number of ministers have been charged with duties that would 
increase the availability of authentic information for parliamentarians, government 
committees and for the public in general. Among the most significant mandates is a review 
of the Access to Information Act, which is noted in three separate departments: the 
Ministry for Democratic Institutions, the Justice Ministry, and Treasury Board. This is 
extremely encouraging, if not conclusive evidence that significant reform and greater 
transparency in government is in the works. The following mandates would all contribute 
to a more open and transparent government, and if implemented would improve the 
public’s ability to obtain authentic information that would allow greater understanding of 
government. Several key sections are quoted from the mandate letter for the department 
identified: 
 Mandate letter for the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons:  
Strengthen Parliamentary committees so that they can 
better scrutinize legislation. This includes:  ensuring that 
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Parliamentary committees are properly resourced to bring in 
expert witnesses and are sufficiently staffed to continue to 
provide reliable, non-partisan research.  
 Mandate letter for the Minister of Democratic Institutions: 
Work with the President of the Treasury Board and the Minister of 
Justice to enhance the openness of government, including supporting 
a review of the Access to Information Act  
 Mandate letter for the Minister or Justice and Attorney General of Canada 
Engage all parties in the House of Commons to ensure that the 
process of appointing Supreme Court Justices is transparent, inclusive 
and accountable to Canadians. Consultations should be undertaken 
with all relevant stakeholders.  
 Mandate letter for the President of the Treasury Board Secretariat 
Strengthen oversight on government advertising and modernize the 
Communications Policy of the Government of Canada to reflect the 
modern digital environment.  
Take a leadership role to review policies to improve the use of 
evidence and data in program innovation and evaluation, more open 
data. 
Strengthen the oversight of taxpayer dollars and the clarity and 
consistency of financial reporting. 
Work with the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons to 
improve reporting to Parliament. 
Work with the Minister of Justice to enhance the openness of 
government, including leading a review of the Access to Information 
Act to ensure that Canadians have easier access to their own personal 
information, that the Information Commissioner is empowered to order 
government information to be released and that the Act applies 
appropriately to the Prime Minister’s and Ministers’ Offices, as well as 
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administrative institutions that support Parliament and the courts.140 
These are ambitious and important starting points for the reform of public access to 
authentic political communication in Canada. Time will tell how it plays out. 
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